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Abstract 
 
Why be moral? One possible, and compelling answer is that to act morally is in an 
agent’s self-interest. Such an answer can be either elevationist (broadly speaking 
the Aristotelian/Platonic approach) where self-interest is elevated to coincide with 
living the good life, or reductionist where morality is defined as acting in an 
agent’s self-interest. 
 
Elevationist moral theories appear flawed. If you are in possession of information 
that, if divulged, will bring about the deaths of others then it may be virtuous to 
stay silent. However, if staying silent results in you being slowly tortured to death 
in an effort to extract the information then it seems bizarre to suggest that in doing 
so you are flourishing, happy, or acting out of self-interest. 
 
Reductionist moral theories, acting for the ‘good of self’ rather than the ‘good of 
others’, are widely considered to be the antithesis of morality. Moral philosophers 
tend to attack such positions claiming that the doctrine of egoism is unworkable. It 
is commonly claimed that any theory which recommends ‘an agent do x if x is in 
the agent’s best interest’ is inconsistent, incoherent, or contradictory and fails to 
meet the basic requirements of a moral theory (notably the requirement of 
universalisability). 
 
I begin this thesis with an examination of ethical egoism in its most widely known 
consequentialist form; i.e. an agent ought to act so as to bring about the best 
consequences for that agent. I examine the major criticisms of this theory and 
demonstrate that the axioms of egoism can be developed so as to overcome these 
criticisms. I argue that consequentialist based ethical egoism is coherent, 
consistent and noncontradictory. However, I go on to argue that while egoism can 
be formulated in a manner that overcomes all the aforementioned analytic 
criticisms it is a flawed moral theory in that within certain contexts the action 
deemed morally correct by egoism is, as a matter of fact, morally pernicious. That 
a theory contains a flaw is not reason enough to discard the entire theory and I go 
on to contend that the problem with egoism is the consequentialist approach, not 
the fact that it is based on self-interest. 
 iii
In Part 2 of the thesis I abandon the consequentialist approach and examine the 
possibility of a flourishing-based form of ethical egoism. I further develop the 
axioms of egoism established in Part 1 through an examination of the concept of 
flourishing (as commonly associated with virtue ethics). Ultimately I tread a path 
between the consequentialist and elevationist positions. While I do not elevate 
self-interest to acting virtuously I do contend that an egoist must adopt certain 
virtues if that egoist is to have the best possibility to flourish. However, I further 
contend that an egoist ought to act so as to promote that which the egoist values 
and that this agent-relative hierarchy of values, which necessarily contains certain 
virtues, determines the manner in which an egoist ought to act. 
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Abstract 
 
Why be moral? One possible, and compelling answer is that to act morally is in an 
agent’s self-interest. Such an answer can be either elevationist (broadly speaking 
the Aristotelian/Platonic approach) where self-interest is elevated to coincide with 
living the good life, or reductionist where morality is defined as acting in an 
agent’s self-interest. 
 
Elevationist moral theories appear flawed. If you are in possession of information 
that, if divulged, will bring about the deaths of others then it may be virtuous to 
stay silent. However, if staying silent results in you being slowly tortured to death 
in an effort to extract the information then it seems bizarre to suggest that in doing 
so you are flourishing, happy, or acting out of self-interest. 
 
Reductionist moral theories, acting for the ‘good of self’ rather than the ‘good of 
others’, are widely considered to be the antithesis of morality. Moral philosophers 
tend to attack such positions claiming that the doctrine of egoism is unworkable. It 
is commonly claimed that any theory which recommends ‘an agent do x if x is in 
the agent’s best interest’ is inconsistent, incoherent, or contradictory and fails to 
meet the basic requirements of a moral theory (notably the requirement of 
universalisability). 
 
I begin this thesis with an examination of ethical egoism in its most widely known 
consequentialist form; i.e. an agent ought to act so as to bring about the best 
consequences for that agent. I examine the major criticisms of this theory and 
demonstrate that the axioms of egoism can be developed so as to overcome these 
criticisms. I argue that consequentialist based ethical egoism is coherent, 
consistent and noncontradictory. However, I go on to argue that while egoism can 
be formulated in a manner that overcomes all the aforementioned analytic 
criticisms it is a flawed moral theory in that within certain contexts the action 
deemed morally correct by egoism is, as a matter of fact, morally pernicious. That 
a theory contains a flaw is not reason enough to discard the entire theory and I go 
on to contend that the problem with egoism is the consequentialist approach, not 
the fact that it is based on self-interest. 
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In Part 2 of the thesis I abandon the consequentialist approach and examine the 
possibility of a flourishing-based form of ethical egoism. I further develop the 
axioms of egoism established in Part 1 through an examination of the concept of 
flourishing (as commonly associated with virtue ethics). Ultimately I tread a path 
between the consequentialist and elevationist positions. While I do not elevate 
self-interest to acting virtuously I do contend that an egoist must adopt certain 
virtues if that egoist is to have the best possibility to flourish. However, I further 
contend that an egoist ought to act so as to promote that which the egoist values 
and that this agent-relative hierarchy of values, which necessarily contains certain 
virtues, determines the manner in which an egoist ought to act. 
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Consequentialist Egoism 
 
 2 
Chapter 1 
Egoism 
 
§1.0 Introduction 
Egoism can be divided into two general types of theories: psychological egoism 
and ethical (or rational) egoism. Psychological egoism is a descriptive theory 
claiming that we always, as a matter of fact, act in the manner we believe will 
further our own self-interest. Any act that appears altruistic in nature can always 
be explained as having been motivated by the agent’s self-interest. A 
psychological egoist may claim that performing act ‘X’ made the agent happier 
and that the agent’s real motivation for ‘X’, which on the surface seems to be 
altruistic considerations, was the agent’s own happiness and not the good of 
another. The example of Abraham Lincoln and the drowning pigs demonstrates 
such a position;  
Mr. Lincoln once remarked to a fellow passenger on an old-time mud 
coach that all men were prompted by selfishness in doing good. His fellow 
passenger was antagonizing this position when they were passing over a 
corduroy bridge that spanned a slough. As they crossed this bridge they 
espied an old razor-backed sow on the bank making a terrible noise 
because her pigs had got into the slough and were in danger of drowning. 
As the old coach began to climb the hill, Mr. Lincoln called out, "Driver, 
can’t you stop a moment?" Then Mr. Lincoln jumped out, ran back and 
lifted the little pigs out of the mud and water and placed them on the bank. 
When he returned, his companion remarked, "Now Abe, where does 
selfishness come in on this little episode?" "Why bless your soul, Ed, that 
was the very essence of selfishness. I should have had no peace of mind all 
day had I gone and left that suffering old sow worrying over those pigs. I 
did it to get peace of mind, don’t you see?" (Quoted in J. Feinberg, 
"Reason and Responsibility")  
Lincoln claims he was acting to promote his own happiness by the removal of a 
situation that caused him stress. An apparently altruistic act of kindness is 
therefore claimed to have been motivated by selfishness. However, in many cases 
psychological egoism – i.e. the claim that all human actions are motivated by 
selfish desires - is implausible.  Shaver (2002) tells the story of a soldier who 
throws himself on a grenade to prevent others in his platoon being killed; it seems 
absurd to suggest that such an act could be described as motivated by the soldier’s 
self-interest. The psychological egoist might offer one of two possible 
explanations for the soldier’s actions. Firstly, it might be claimed the soldier’s 
 3 
action was from self-interest in that the soldier could not have lived with himself 
had he acted otherwise. What I presume is meant by ‘not being able to live with 
himself’ is that the soldier would feel guilt and remorse at not having acted to 
save the lives of the others. As Shaver (2002, para. 7) notes, “guilt may 
presuppose that the soldier had a non-self-regarding desire for doing what he takes 
to be right”. The soldier’s guilt avoidance appears not to be out of purely selfish 
motives but from a feeling of not living up to his obligations to others. Perhaps a 
similar criticism might be laid against Lincoln’s analysis of why he was motivated 
to act.   
 
Secondly, the psychological egoist might claim that given that the soldier did 
jump on the grenade this action must have been motivated by what the soldier 
believed was in his best interest. If this is what is meant by psychological egoism 
then the position is unfalsifiable, for it is simply the claim that: 
 
1. Any and every action we take is chosen by us 
2. therefore in acting as we chose we must have been doing what we 
believed was in our self-interest 
3. therefore we acted from our own self-interest.  
 
 
“[P]sychological egoism turns out to be trivially true” if, by definition, any and all 
“intentional action is self-interested” (Shaver, 2002). Psychological egoism offers 
a reductionist account of self-interest; self-interest is simply “whatever one is 
finally, all things considered, motivated to do” (Baier, 1991, p. 201). According to 
psychological egoism the question, ‘What ought I do in this context?’ is 
meaningless (logically, it can have no objectively correct answer). Any conclusion 
the agent reaches in answering this question, where the answer is denoted by the 
behavior of the agent, is necessarily ‘what the agent believed it was in the agent’s 
self-interest to do’. Whatever action the agent undertakes (assuming the agent was 
free to choose) will, as a matter of fact, be what the agent believed was in the 
agent’s best interest. Yet, agents do ponder this very question for it appears, 
intuitively, to be very meaningful indeed. Given that moral agents do seek 
answers to this question it seems reasonable to search for better ways of 
answering it. Saying ‘A did X therefore X was, as a matter of fact, what A 
 4 
believed was in A’s best interest’ is irrelevant to how we choose, and sometimes 
agonise over, our actions.  
 
Ethical (or rational) egoism is a theory of how we ought to act, as opposed to how 
we do act, and refers to any normative theory that:  
 
(i) Tells us that we ought to act, or that we have sufficient reason to 
act, in a certain manner, and  
(ii) Preferences the self, self-interest, self-happiness or self-value over 
others or other concerns, in determining how we ought to act.  
 
Ethical egoism, free from the rigours of philosophical analysis, seems an entirely 
plausible theory1. Doing something because it is in our best interests to do so 
appears intuitively right whereas an altruistic action, especially when doing so 
goes against self-interest, calls for justification. Butler (1726, Sermon II, Para. 20) 
noted that “when we sit down in a cool hour, we can neither justify to ourselves 
this or any other pursuit till we are convinced that it will be for our happiness, or 
at least not contrary to it”. 
 
However, that a theory appeals to a layperson is far from sufficient grounds for 
members of the philosophical community to adopt it. Most contemporary moral 
philosophers view the egoist standpoint as reprehensible and the antithesis of 
morality, an antithesis that must be defeated if moral theory is to make any 
progress2. Given this general presupposition that egoism is false, those criticizing 
the theory tend to spend very little time developing its premises. The result is that 
a theory of selfishness that few (if anyone) would actually subscribe to is shown 
to be false. For example, according to Rachels (1974, p. 297) “[by] ethical 
egoism, each of us should take the attitude that other people simply don’t matter, 
except insofar as they are useful to us” and, “the right thing to do, on any 
occasion, is whatever would best promote [the egoist’s] best interests” (Rachels, 
1978, p. 426). Dismissing such a theory shows only that selfishness, using others 
solely as a means to our own ends, and self-interest with total disregard for others, 
                                                
1
 I will draw no distinction between ethical and rational egoism at this early stage. 
2
 In as much as, if the question ‘Why be moral?’ can’t be answered there seems little point in 
working out the intricacies of how to be moral. 
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is flawed as the basis of a moral theory. However, it is far from clear that this is 
what is entailed by an ethical egoist standpoint.  
 
In determining exactly what is entailed by ethical egoism I will briefly digress and 
consider just how an egoist might act when facing a moral dilemma. My reason 
for doing so is to show that while the egoist acts from self-interested motivation it 
does not necessarily follow that the egoist’s actions will be totally selfish in nature 
or that the actions will be far different from those recommended by other moral 
theories3. Following the case study I will introduce the central criticisms of 
egoism and in discussing these criticisms will determine what the axioms of a 
valid, noncontradictory, and consistent theory of ethical egoism might be. 
 
§1.1 Egoism – A Case Study 
Twenty passengers are out on a pleasure cruise when the boat runs into 
serious trouble and starts to sink. Unfortunately, one of the two lifeboats is 
in disrepair and unusable. One female passenger (the egoist) manages to 
successfully launch the usable lifeboat and discovers that all of the other 
passengers have jumped overboard and are now swimming around calling 
out to her for help. The cruise is not expected to return for 72 hours and so 
the passengers of the boat will not be missed for three days and none of 
the 19 passengers, now in the water, will be able to survive this period 
unless taken aboard the lifeboat. The lifeboat is well equipped and has 
provisions that will guarantee the safety of five passengers until help 
arrives. Every passenger above the five (the absolute safety margin) who 
are taken on board reduces the overall chance of survival by 10%; i.e. 
eight passengers in the lifeboat will have a 70% chance of surviving until 
rescued, 12 passengers will have a 30% chance and, if 15 or more 
passengers are taken aboard then it is certain that all will perish. 
 
Now, assuming she has the means to stop others boarding the lifeboat 
without her permission, how many others (if any) ought the egoist to allow 
on board? 
 
   
Critics of egoism often assume that if the egoist is looking out for her own best 
interests then she will want to do the utmost to protect her own life. The egoist 
would simply sail off into the sunset leaving 19 passengers to die or, at best, 
might rescue four other like-minded souls if they were needed to help man the 
                                                
3
 To be selfish is to act for personal gain; to act out of self-interest may require the foregoing of 
personal gain. I will examine the distinction between acting from selfishness and acting out of self-
interest in section 2.  
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boat. (They would need to be like-minded otherwise it might prove very difficult 
to convince the other four that they should put themselves at no risk and rescue no 
others – she may very quickly find that she has lost control of the situation, no 
longer commands the life raft, and is unable to effectively act to maximise her 
interests.) 
 
However, the egoist’s decision is not so simple; she will also want to ensure that 
upon rescue she is not held criminally responsible for allowing nineteen to die - a 
result that is likely to be highly detrimental to her interests and will result in harsh 
repercussions. (In order to avoid making the calculations unnecessarily complex I 
will assume that the repercussions are ‘harsh’ to the extent that they are equal in 
value to ‘loss of life’). Therefore, she should certainly rescue at least four others, 
as this entails no risk to herself. However, even assuming the difficult task of 
surveying the nineteen for four like-minded persons could be accomplished, it is 
still probable that she would be judged as acting wrongly and punished harshly 
upon rescue.  
 
It might be suggested at this point that if egoism is correct then the laws (upon 
which the harsh punishments are based) require that an agent acts immorally (i.e. 
against the agent’s self-interest). Such an assumption is somewhat premature; 
until the axioms of ethical egoism have been fully expounded it cannot be pre-
determined that laws based on egoistic principles would be so different from laws 
based on other principles.  
 
Returning to the question of who the egoist ought to rescue I suggest that, for the 
egoist, the answer lies in balancing probabilities. That is, balancing the probable 
outcome of specific actions and calculating the degree to which they are beneficial 
or detrimental to the egoist. On the one hand we have the probability of the 
egoist’s survival; on the other the probability of the egoist facing repercussions 
upon rescue (and the probability that those taken on board rebel against the 
egoist’s decision). It is difficult to assign probability values; however, I have 
made the following assumptions: 
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1. The totally selfish action (the egoist ensuring she has a 100% chance 
of survival) is 100% certain to result in severe repercussions. 
2. Maximum risk (rescuing 14) ensures no repercussions. 
3. The median lies around the 50% mark and few would judge someone 
harshly who accepted a 50/50 chance of survival. 
 
It is of course likely that the degree of repercussion would also vary and that in 
some cases repercussions would be acceptable to the egoist given that it is better 
to be alive, even if suffering hardship, than it is to be dead4. However, accounting 
for this would add an extra degree of complexity to the calculations. Further, the 
extra consideration is unnecessary for examining the point at hand. So I will add 
the premise: 
4. The repercussions, at all levels, are severe to the point that the egoist 
will want to do her utmost to avoid them. That is, the repercussions are 
equal in value to loss of life. 
 
Using these variables the egoist’s decision can be reached mathematically; 
 
S% - ( S% . R%) 
 
S% is the probability of survival and R% is the probability of repercussion. 
 
This formula calculates the probability of survival (S%) less (S% times R%), the 
chance of survival, multiplied by the probability of repercussions. Repercussions 
are multiplied by survival probability for the simple reason that if the egoist does 
not survive then the egoist faces no probability of repercussions (assuming that 
repercussions against the dead, or the estate of the dead, are not of any interest to 
the egoist)5.  
 
Calculating the probability that the egoist will face repercussions is extremely 
difficult and any claims that the ‘actual probabilities are X%’ will be arbitrary. 
However, as in any consequentialist theory, if a calculation is to be made then 
values must be assigned. Therefore, I have selected three mathematical methods 
of distribution, which I believe would be generally accepted, to apportion the 
                                                
4
 This point is somewhat controversial as some may claim that death is better than a life of extreme 
suffering. However, it might be countered that a life that has even the smallest possibility of value 
outranks death and the certainty of no value.  All I wish to claim here is that given everyday 
circumstances life is preferable to death even if that life involves a degree of suffering.  
5
 I have taken a fairly general game theory approach to the calculations, according to which the 
value to an agent is the chance of something good (survival) less the chance of something bad 
(repercussions). The same results are obtained by the more traditional mathematical approach of 
multiplying positive probabilities, i.e. the chance of survival multiplied by the chance of avoiding 
repercussions. S% . (1-R%) 
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probability of repercussions between 0% (for taking maximal risk) and 100% (for 
taking no risk).  
 
Fig 1.1: Acting so as to ensure a chance of survival (S%)  
determines the probabilities of repercussion (R%) 
 
Saved Chances of survival Probability of repercussions (R%)6 
  Curve           Reduced C        Incremental 
1-5 100% 100%                100%               100% 
6 90% 65%                   71%                 80% 
7 80% 36%                   45%                 60% 
8 70% 16%                   23%                 40% 
9 60% 4%                     6%                   20% 
10 50% No Repercussions 
11 40% No Repercussions 
12 30% No Repercussions 
13 20% No Repercussions 
14 10% No Repercussions 
15 0%      (Death) No Repercussions 
 
I have assumed in the above figures that no repercussions occur when a 50% risk 
is accepted. However, setting a 0% probability of ‘no repercussions’ only when 
the maximum risk (save 14 passengers at a risk of 90%) is accepted results in 
only minor differences to the final result. The Curve method of distribution 
assumes that the chance of repercussion drops quickly as risk is accepted. 
Incremental assumes the probability of repercussion is directly proportional to 
the degree of risk taken and the reduced curve (Reduced C) lies between the two.  
 
If these values are correct then the result of the equation [S% - (S% . R%)] will be 
that if the egoist rescues seven passengers (including herself), thus reducing her 
chance of survival to 80%, she accepts a 36% to 60% probability of repercussions 
and the value of her action will be between 0.512 [80% - (80% . 36%)] and 0.32 
[80% - (80% . 60%)].  
 
 
 
 
                                                
6
 The three methods of assigning value to repercussions are Curve (even ratio squared), Reduced 
Curve (non-even ratio squared), and Incremental (Values are staggered at an even ratio between 
0% and 100%). 
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Assessing how many people the sole passenger of the lifeboat ought to save is 
now simply a matter of performing this calculation ten times. Saving one to five 
passengers at no risk produces the same result and there is no point doing the 
calculation for 15 or more passengers as this results in certain death for all.  
 
Fig 1.2: The value to the egoist of saving n passengers. 
 
 The Value  of the action:  
Egoist saves 
n passengers 
Curve Reduced C Incremental 
One-five 0 0 0 
Six 0.324 0.26 0.18 
Seven 0.512 0.44 0.32 
Eight 0.588 * 0.54 0.42 
Nine 0.576 0.56 * 0.48 
Ten 0.5 0.5 0.5 * 
Eleven 0.384 0.36 0.4 
Twelve 0.252 0.14 0.3 
Thirteen 0.128 Negative 0.2 
Fourteen 0.036 Negative 0.1 
Fifteen All Die All Die All Die 
 
* Indicates the optimal value under each system of calculation. 
 
 
The egoist then ought to save between eight and ten passengers and it maximises 
her self-interest to subject herself to a risk of between 30% and 50%. It may be 
insisted that the only way the egoist can be certain of avoiding repercussions is to 
rescue 14 passengers. However, this makes very little difference to the final result 
as is demonstrated in the following tables.  
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Fig 1.3: Acting so as to ensure a chance of survival (S%)  
determines the probabilities of repercussion (R%) 
(Fig 1.1 revised) 
 
Saved Chances of survival Probability of repercussions (R%) 
  Curve        Incremental 
1-5 100% 100%             100% 
6 90% 79%                89% 
7 80% 60%                 78% 
8 70% 44%                67% 
9 60% 31%                 55% 
10 50% 20%                 44% 
11 40% 11%                 33% 
12 30% 5%                  22% 
13 20% 1%                   11% 
14 10% No Repercussions 
15 All Die No Repercussions 
 
 
Fig 1.4: The value to the egoist of saving n passengers. (Revised) 
 
 The Value  Of the action 
Saves Curve Incremental 
One-five 0.000 0.00 
Eight 0.388 0.233 
Nine 0.415 0.266 
Ten 0.401 0.278 
Eleven 0.355 0.266 
Fourteen 0.100 0.10 
 
 
Revising the figures (to allow for the possibility of repercussion if any fewer than 
the maximum number possible are rescued) means that under the curve-method of 
distribution the egoist is obligated to save nine (rather than eight) passengers and 
under the incremental method of assigning probabilities the egoist is obligated to 
save ten passengers (as per the previous calculation). 
 
Some may object to the means by which the egoist has reached this decision, and I 
do not intend to debate that particular issue at this time. My objective was simply 
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to show that the egoist’s decision differs from what many assume it will be 
(selfish, 100% self preservation) and that the action promoted by the egoist’s 
doctrine, divorced from the reasons for the action, may not differ all that much 
from the correct action as determined by other moral theories and appears 
intuitively to be a morally reasonable course of action.  
 
I am not claiming there are no differences between the moral theories. While, 
according to egoism, selfishly saving only oneself is not the correct act (i.e. it is 
not the act that maximises the agent’s self-interest), it does hold the view that 
there is no moral difference between (a) saving only herself and (b) saving four 
others in so far as the acts are assigned the same utility. Such a position conflicts 
with what I would assume normal moral intuition to be; namely, saving more is 
better than saving fewer. However, it remains to be seen whether it matters that 
egoism draws no distinction in the degree of wrongness of the two acts, given that 
the act of saving only herself and the act of saving four others are equally judged 
as wrong7. For now I will turn my attention to considering what action might be 
recommended by alternative moral theories.  
 
The agent subscribing to virtue theory ought to find some mean between acting 
cowardly (saving few if any passengers) and acting with foolhardiness8. The 
ideally virtuous person would attempt to find a mean between these extremities 
and act courageously. It is difficult to determine exactly what the courageous act 
would be, however if the courageous action is the mean between cowardliness and 
rashness we can make a rough calculation. If we assume the cowardly act to be 
saving five or fewer and the foolhardy act to be an attempt to save anything above 
14 passengers then we can assume the mean (and the courageous act) to be 
attempting to save ten passengers9. The virtuous agent would probably also act to 
reduce the suffering of those left behind but then so might the egoist, albeit for 
very different reasons. 
 
                                                
7
 From this point on the term ‘egoism’ refers to ethical egoism. 
8
 A foolhardy act would be attempting to save all of the passengers such that the outcome is one of 
complete catastrophe. 
9
 Coward (5) + Foolhardy (15) divided by 2. 
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The utilitarian has as difficult a calculation as the egoist - how many to attempt to 
save in an effort to maximise interests. Maximising overall utility requires 
maximising positive utility (the probability of survival of those taken into the 
lifeboat) and minimising negative utility (the number of unfortunates left behind 
and denied the possibility of survival). This can be calculated by:  
Utility = S%n – (S%xdx)  
Where S%n represents n persons aboard the lifeboat with S% possibility of 
survival and (S%xdx) represents the negative utility incurred from each passenger 
(dx), left to perish and denied S%x probability of survival. The life raft can support 
a maximum of 14 passengers therefore the maximum value of dx is 1310.  
 
This builds risk aversion into the utilitarian calculation, in so far as the utility 
value of attempting to rescue n passengers is reduced according to the probability 
of success. To save four passengers (five including the utilitarian) with a 100% 
chance of survival produces a positive utility of 5.0, however the next person who 
could have been saved but was left to perish produces a negative utility of 0.9, the 
next 0.8, 0.7, 0.6 etc. This results in a total negative utility of 4.5. Thus the total 
utility value of saving five of the twenty passengers is 0.5 (5.0 positive utility less 
4.5 negative utility). 
 
Saving a total of nine passengers and leaving 11 to die (the six the life boat cannot 
support plus the five who could have been rescued) means that those on board the 
lifeboat have a 60% probability of survival. The utility of this act can be 
calculated by (5.4) – (0.5+0.4+0.3+0.2+0.1), The 60% chance the nine have of 
survival gives a positive utility of 5.4, the five who could have been saved but 
were not produces a negative utility of 1.5, and the overall utility value of saving 
nine passengers is 3.9.  As we did with the egoist we can now calculate the value 
for all of the possible outcomes:   
 
 
 
 
                                                
10
 The 20 passengers of the cruise, less the six that cannot be saved, less the person already 
occupying the lifeboat.  
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                  Fig 1.5 Utilitarian value of saving n passengers 
 
Passengers Saved Utilitarian Value 
5 0.5 
6 1.8 
7 2.8 
8 3.5 
9 3.9 
10 4.0 
11 3.8 
12 3.3 
13 2.5 
14 1.4 
15 0.0 
 
 
The result of such an equation obligates the utilitarian to an action similar to the 
one reached by the egoist (save nine or ten) and the same as the virtuous person 
(save ten). According to the utilitarian one ought to save ten passengers and 
accept odds of survival of 50%. In this scenario, maximising self-interest and 
maximising the interests of the majority result in very similar actions. Without 
substantial additional assumptions about how conflicting rights are to be assessed 
there is no equivalent calculation that can be made for a rights based approach.   
 
Somewhat surprisingly, it seems that if we consider who the egoist and utilitarian 
would save we find that the egoist’s, rather than the utilitarian’s, action matches 
more closely with what intuitively seems to be the correct thing to do. Most 
people may find the utilitarian’s motives, in working for the majority, intuitively 
more plausible. However, our egoist would be likely to rescue some women and 
children (assuming some were onboard) and while her reasons for doing so might 
draw scorn, (that rescuing those most vulnerable is likely to further reduce the 
chance of repercussions), the act itself, rescuing women and children first, fits 
more closely with commonly held beliefs about the right thing to do. On the other 
hand, while acting so as to give the greatest number the chance of survival, the 
utilitarian ought to select those more able to staff the lifeboat - the fitter and 
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stronger. Small children, and many women, are unlikely to qualify; in fact the 
utilitarian may well find herself in a position where she is compelled to throw 
herself overboard to maximise chances of survival for the group. 
 
My purpose in discussing this case study is to show, in the first place, that an 
egoist theory may, at least in some contexts, promote actions that would gain wide 
approval (and it must be emphasised I am referring only to the act itself not the 
motivation for the act). Further, egoism may promote actions that are very similar 
to, if not the same, as those actions promoted by the major ethical theories. 
Secondly, egoism is not as clearly counterintuitive (in terms of the acts the theory 
promotes) as is often supposed and at times may more closely fit with our 
intuitions about correct action than do the actions promoted by more generally 
accepted moral theories; Saving the women and children first intuitively appears 
to be the correct act, yet this is the act promoted by the egoist’s doctrine (from 
self-interest) as opposed to the utilitarian whose doctrine advises sacrificing the 
women and children in favour of the more able-bodied (in order to maximise 
survival chances).  
 
At this point, I will make it clear that I am not claiming that egoism always 
promotes acts that match our moral intuitions or that are compatible with, or 
intuitively superior to acts promoted by other moral theories. I am only showing 
that ethical egoism is worthy of consideration as a moral theory and ought not be 
discarded out of hand. 
 
It might be countered that my case is quite artificial and has been carefully 
sculpted so as to present a desired result. This is true to a degree just as it is true of 
all philosophical thought experiments. However, the case presented is not 
unusually bizarre and is certainly possible in the real word. That aside, it is worth 
discussing one direct objection before moving on, namely that if it were not for 
the likelihood of repercussions in the lifeboat case, the egoist would appear to lack 
any compelling motivation to rescue any of the other passengers, unless it 
somehow added to her own chance of survival. Sailing off alone and leaving 19 
people to die is intuitively immoral and counter to the advice of all other-
regarding moral theories. Thus it might be claimed that, in so far as repercussions 
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reflect common beliefs about the right thing to do, it is no great surprise that this 
makes itself felt (in conjunction with survival) in the egoist’s actions.  
A case study could be created where as a matter of fiat the egoist will face no 
repercussions and in such a world the egoist would save at most four others. Such 
a world would be a strange place indeed and if we lived in such a world our 
notions of morality would likely be very different indeed, certainly such a world 
would not be based on egoist principles11. In this world, however, there is no way 
the egoist can possibly know there is no possibility of repercussions and the act 
must be based on the probable outcome of the choices made. It is of course a 
different question as to whether an egoist looking back on the decisions would 
judge them right or wrong (armed with the knowledge of success/failure and 
what, if any, repercussions eventuated).  
 
While, at least, it ought to be true that laws and repercussions reflect our beliefs 
about right and wrong it is far from clear that these laws/repercussions would be 
so different in a society that conformed to egoist principles. For example, the 
egoist might reason as follows: I want laws in place that allow the greatest 
probability that my interests will be maximised. In a lifeboat type scenario, given 
the probability that any given individual is more likely to be in the water than in 
the lifeboat, any rational individual would want laws that maximised the 
probability of that individual’s survival. Before an emergency presents itself, an 
egoist would therefore reason that self-interest lies in having a specific set of laws 
(acknowledging the small possibility that such laws could go against the egoist’s 
self-interest) that favour those in unfortunate predicaments. The egoist’s self-
interest during such an emergency is determined, to a degree, by the existence of 
those laws developed before an emergency. 
 
It might be countered that such a claim is inconsistent or circular and attempts to 
hide the fact that egoism is a morally pernicious doctrine. I will try to defend 
egoism against these and other major criticisms and in doing so will aim to 
uncover the necessary axioms of a valid form of ethical egoism. 
 
                                                
11
 If all were egoists then those ashore (who had people they valued on the boat) would be likely to 
take action. 
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§1.2 Egoism – Criticisms 
As mentioned, egoism is most often viewed as the antithesis of morality and an 
antithesis that must be defeated. It therefore comes as no surprise that a vast 
number of objections have been formulated over the years. It would be quite 
beyond the scope of this project to survey all of the individual objections; 
however, they can be categorised into several distinct types of objection. Over the 
next few chapters I will examine in depth the individual criticisms that I consider 
to be the strongest representatives for each type of objection and in doing so will 
begin the development of an egoist axiom that does not fall foul of these 
objections.   
 
The types of objection I will consider are: 
 
1. Egoism is self-defeating: This objection accepts egoism as a theory of 
action but claims it fails to meet its own goal of attaining the best results 
for the egoist.  
2. Definitional: This objection accepts that egoism is a theory but denies that 
it meets the requirements of a moral theory. 
3. Contradictions: This type of objection makes the claim that egoism results 
in an internal or external contradiction. 
4. Inconsistency/Incoherence: These objections claim that egoism places 
inconsistent requirements on action or that, in effect, it promotes no action. 
5. Pernicious Doctrine: This objection makes the claim that egoism promotes 
acts that are intuitively recognisable as evil. 
6. Theories of the self: This type of objection makes the claim that references 
to self-interest as made by egoism are flawed given that the notion of a self 
is problematic.  
 
Finally, I will consider pseudo-defences. By this I mean arguments purported to 
be defences of egoism but which are formulated in such a manner that the theory 
they are supposedly defending is rendered impotent. I will briefly introduce each 
of these objections in the following sections. 
 
§1.2.1 Criticism that Egoism is Self-Defeating 
The method used by the egoist to solve the ‘Drowning Passengers’ dilemma was a 
simplified probability calculation (a type of game theory analysis). This might be 
thought unusual given that game theory is most often used as a tool in analysing 
dilemmas to the effect that egoism is shown to be self-defeating. My reason for 
doing this was that game theory most often presents moral dilemmas as finite non-
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zero games12. In Chapter 5 I will argue that moral dilemmas cannot be treated in 
this way and the conclusions drawn with regard to egoism are demonstrably 
incorrect. 
 
Game theory is utilised to demonstrate that egoism is self-defeating when faced 
with a prisoners’ dilemma. A prisoners’ dilemma type situation arises when the 
best option for one player (or moral agent) is dependent on what another player 
(another moral agent) does, and the first player cannot know how the other will 
play13. A simple version of the prisoners’ dilemma can be formulated as: 
 
You and a fellow convict have been arrested on suspicion of committing a 
crime. The evidence against both of you is quite weak and unless the 
guards can elicit a confession you will both receive only relatively small 
jail sentences. The guards approach each of you separately and offer the 
following deal. 
 
If you confess and the other prisoner does not you will be set free and the 
other will face eight years in jail. 
 
If neither of you confess the evidence is sufficient that you will both face 
two years in jail.   
 
If you both confess then you will both be jailed for five years. 
 
It is usually assumed that an egoist, to maximise self-interest, must confess. The 
criticism against egoism is that if everyone acts according to egoism then 
whenever a dilemma (of the prisoners’ dilemma type) is faced everyone will 
confess resulting in everyone being worse off. In the example above the prisoners, 
purportedly acting as egoists, both end up serving five years in jail. If neither had 
confessed they would have each served only two years. The conclusion is that 
according to egoism the agents would have been better off not acting as egoists. A 
non-self-interested co-operative theory (under game theory analysis) results in 
greater utility for the players than does a self-interested one. However, as will be 
discussed in Chapter 5, moral dilemmas cannot be accurately assessed by games 
                                                
12
 I analysed the drowning passengers’ dilemma as a finite non-zero game.  I did so to avoid 
introducing unnecessary complications at this early stage and to show that even assuming game 
theory can be legitimately applied to finite non-zero games the outcome is not always as initially 
expected. 
13
 The prisoners’ dilemma was first published by Albert Tucker in the early 1950’s. 
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theory if they are treated as ordinary non-zero games; moral dilemmas cannot be 
expressed as single events.  
 
When assessing a prisoners’ dilemma, if the set of iterations are considered, as I 
will argue they must be, it is highly improbable that confession is the action 
promoted by self-interest. Further, as Mosely (2001, par. 4) notes, “the nature of 
the game pre-empts other possibilities. The sentences are fixed, the choices are 
fixed; whilst this applies to the two prisoners, it is not obvious that every-day life 
generates such limited and limiting choices.” Forcing a prisoners’ dilemma into 
the mould of a single non-zero event creates a hypothetical scenario that is too 
distant from reality to demonstrate anything of practical value. In conclusion I 
will show that, once it is accepted that ethical dilemmas do not fit the non-zero 
game mould, egoism is not self-defeating. 
 
§1.2.2 Criticisms – Definitional 
Definitional criticisms do not object that egoism is a self-defeating, incoherent or 
inconsistent theory. Instead they reject the claim that ethical egoism is a moral 
theory, for it is often assumed that an essential quality of morality is its other-
regardingness. For example, Nagel (1986, p. 197) writes “[M]oral requirements 
have their source in the claims of other persons” and similar sentiments can be 
found expressed in the writing of most contemporary moral philosophers. 
 
Egoism is often question-beggingly placed outside the moral arena; morality is 
defined as or presumed to be other-regarding and then egoism is dismissed as 
nonmoral on the grounds that it is not other-regarding. This occurs to the extent 
that the question ‘why should I be moral?’ is often conflated with ‘why should I 
not be an egoist?’ As Lemos (1971, p. 381) notes, the terms ‘moral’ and ‘ethical’ 
are frequently, and without argument, used to denote other-regarding actions. 
Circularity aside, assuming morality can somehow be defined in terms of others 
we are left in something of a quandary – there seems to be no overriding answer 
to the question ‘why act from other-regarding (so called moral) rather than self-
interested reasons?’ As I will argue in Chapter 2, there can logically be no 
objective answer to this question. Further, I will argue that attempting to define 
morality as essentially other-regarding leads to inconsistencies and contradictions 
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that can only be overcome by including self-regard within the definition of 
morality. This being the case, egoism can be examined not as an antithesis to 
morality but as a competing moral theory14.  
 
Even allowing that a theory of self-interest could be moral in nature, egoism still 
faces the further challenge that it fails to meet even the minimal requirement to 
gain membership in this definitional category. Amongst these are the 
requirements that, in order to be considered a moral theory, it must meet certain 
conditions of adequacy. Three such conditions are that a moral theory must be 
public, universal and, perhaps most importantly, that an agent must be motivated 
for the right type of reasons if it is to be claimed that the agent acted morally. 
Gottlieb (1996, p. 3) presents a criticism that falls within the definitional category 
claiming that “the motive of ethical egoism is the wrong sort of motive for a 
moral individual to have, and undermines any other morally good motives which 
such a person might have”. Gottlieb’s argument, like all other definitional 
criticisms, begs the question. Motives are assumed to be moral when the good of 
others provides the motivation and nonmoral when the motivation comes from 
self-interest.  
 
Another method of classifying objects (broadly a definitional criterion) is by 
reference to their functions and so I think it is appropriate to consider it here15. 
The question ‘how ought I act?’ often arises through conflicts of interest and it is 
commonly accepted that one of the primary purposes of morality is conflict 
resolution. This leads to the criticism that egoism is not a moral theory because it 
is unable to perform the function of interpersonal conflict resolution. Such 
criticisms are usually formulated around scenarios involving the distribution of 
scarce resources.  
 
Assume  is a scarce resource and Agent1 and Agent2 (both egoists) will 
have their interests met only by obtaining .  
                                                
14
 It is competing in the sense that moral theories define right action, and the reason for acting, 
differently. It may turn out on an applied level, as moral theories become more sophisticated, that 
there is little difference in the actions they recommend.  
15
 For example, common dictionary definitions of ‘clock’ include reference to the functional 
criterion, namely that a clock is a time keeping apparatus. Likewise we can limit the scope of what 
is and is not a moral theory by inclusion of functional criteria. 
 20 
 
Therefore the action promoted by egoist theory to each agent is that they 
obtain  for themselves, with the result that conflict ensues.  
 
It would seem that egoism offers no means of resolving a scarce resource 
dilemma and the egoists are reduced to a battle of strength; in such a context, 
might determines right. While this criticism may well hold true where scarcity is 
extreme it is insufficient grounds to dismiss egoism. In Chapter 2 I will argue that 
if the criticism relies on extreme scarcity then the criticism is too strong, in so far 
as in defeating egoism other-regarding moral theories are equally defeated. 
However, where the scarcity is less than absolute “ethical egoism does not have to 
logically result in a Darwinian struggle between the strong and the weak” 
(Moseley, 2001). Ultimately such attacks against egoism are little more than 
strawman arguments. 
 
§1.2.3.1 Criticisms – Logical (internal) Contradictions 
G.E. Moore believed he had fully discredited egoism and claimed in Principia 
Ethica that a “[n]o more complete and thorough refutation of any theory could be 
desired.” (1962, p. 99). Moore’s refutation is formulated around the nature of ‘the 
Good’ itself and concludes that the egoist doctrine results in an absolute 
contradiction. According to Moore egoism results in the position that two things 
(both X and ~X) are each the sole good, which is an absolute contradiction and 
the fundamental flaw in egoism. It cannot be the case that “an immense number of 
different things are, each of them, the sole good.” (Moore, 1962, p. 101). In short, 
Moore’s criticism involves the determination of what is a good. An egoist agent1 
claims that agent1’s self-interest is, by egoism, the sole good. However, another 
egoist agent2 makes exactly the same claim; agent2’s self-interest is, by egoism, 
the sole good. Given that in many cases agent1’s and agent2’s good will be 
mutually exclusive we are left with the contradiction: 
Agent1’s good is the sole good, and 
Agent2’s good is the sole good, and 
Agent1’s good and agent2’s good are mutually exclusive. 
 
In Chapter 3 I will consider two responses to Moore’s criticism. Firstly, I will 
briefly consider whether showing a theory to be contradictory by way of formal 
logic necessarily shows that theory to be flawed, given that logic itself faces 
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numerous objections. Secondly, I will consider Moore’s claim that ‘the Good’ 
must be nonrelational and agent neutral. Smith (2003) and Rasmussen (1999) are 
amongst those who have presented persuasive arguments showing that ‘the Good’ 
can be agent relative. If ‘the Good’ can be legitimately defined by reference to an 
agent then Moore’s contradiction is dissolved. An “immense number of different 
things” are goods but each of them is only a sole good relative to a specific agent.  
 
§1.2.3.2 Criticisms – Logical (external) Contradictions 
Moore’s criticism was that egoism contained an internal contradiction, effectively 
rendering the theory itself contradictory. However, a successful defence of egoism 
from the charge of internal contradiction does not save egoism from the criticism 
that, when applied to a particular case, it renders contradictory or inconsistent 
results. 
 
If we assume that ‘the Good’ can be defined relative to a specific agent, recognise 
that good is still a Good-in-itself and, and follow Moore in thinking that 
recognition of a Good-in-itself obligates an agent to act, then there can be no ad 
hoc restrictions on which Good-in-itself obligates action. Thus, where Goods-in-
themselves come into conflict, a contradiction still arises and the egoist is placed 
in a position whereby an obligation to both X and to ~X exists. 
 
Smith (2003) attempts to defend egoism from this criticism by appealing to the 
psychological states of the agent, and I will argue that this defence fails on several 
counts. Instead, drawing on Rasmussen’s (1999) account of flourishing (a version 
of ‘the Good’) from a specific standpoint I will argue that ‘the Good’ relative to 
some other agent does not obligate action for the reason that ‘the Good’ can only 
be recognised from within a specific worldview and we have no direct access to 
others’ worldviews.   
 
§1.2.4 Criticisms – Inconsistency / Incoherence  
The criticism that egoism is inconsistent is similar in form to the criticism from 
contradiction but differs in one vital aspect. Whereas arguments from 
contradiction claim that the egoist is obligated to perform two (or more) mutually 
exclusive acts, arguments from inconsistency claim only that the egoist desires 
 22 
that mutually exclusive acts occur. Arguments from incoherence usually follow 
from arguments from inconsistency. Whereas arguments from inconsistency 
attempt to show that the egoist desires inconsistent states of affairs to come about, 
arguments from incoherence attempt to show either that:  
 
(i) given that egoism advises inconsistent actions it in fact advises no 
discernable action, or  
(ii) it is not possible to act as egoism advises. 
 
In presenting an argument similar in structure to Moore, Medlin (1957) claims 
that egoism results in an inescapable inconsistency in so far as any agent 
subscribing to egoism will find themselves in a position where they will want both 
A and ~A to occur and while such a position is not contradictory it is clearly 
inconsistent. To be inconsistent is to desire to have your cake and to desire to have 
eaten it, that is, it is inconsistent but logically possible to hold both desires 
simultaneously. If an agent equally wants A and wants ~A to occur, and wanting 
A and wanting ~A is a result of applying the egoist doctrine, then egoism has 
offered inconsistent advice on how to act, and has in effect offered no advice and 
is incoherent as a moral theory of actions.  
 
Egoism is also criticised for being inconsistent in that it may recommend actions 
that prevent the egoist from following the egoist doctrine. Examples of this 
criticism are usually formulated by way of thought experiments but examples can 
also be found in ordinary life. In order to protect his own interests (especially in 
times of war) an egoist may find that it is in his best interests to join the army. In 
the army (in order to best protect his own life) the egoist will need to learn to 
work in a team and develop an attitude of following commanding officers’ orders. 
However, in many cases following such orders (which will be for the good of the 
unit/mission) will be other than the actions promoted by egoism. It would seem 
that in such cases egoism advises that in order to promote self-interest the egoist 
ought not to be an egoist. The arguments from inconsistency and incoherence will 
be discussed in Chapter 4. 
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§1.2.5 Criticisms – The Parity of Moral Theories and the Nature of the Self 
When discussing egoist doctrines, it is generally assumed that it makes sense to 
talk of the rational long-term interests of an agent. However, in doing so the egoist 
leaves himself open to the criticism that the theory subscribed to is a hybrid16 and 
that hybrid theories are (a) inconsistent and (b) inferior to pure moral theories17.  
 
Moral theories can be either agent neutral or agent relative but not both, 
temporally neutral or temporally relative but again not both. A moral theory is 
temporally neutral if it includes the claim that Good is morally important and 
obligates (or gives good reason for) action, regardless of when it occurs. 
Conversely, a temporally relative moral theory claims that Good is relative to 
some specific point in time and only obligates (or gives good reason for) action at 
that point in time; the egoist adopts a temporally neutral position. A moral theory 
is agent neutral if it includes the claim that the Good is morally important and 
obligates (or gives good reason for) action for any agent, whereas an agent 
relative moral theory claims that good is relative to an agent and only obligates (or 
gives good reason for) that agent to act. The egoist adopts an agent relative 
position, in part to overcome the criticism that egoism is contradictory.  
 
The criticism against egoism is that moral theories must have parity, they must 
either be completely neutral or completely relative. There can be no possible 
justification for the arbitrary selection of relativity (in the case of agents) and 
neutrality (in the case of temporal concerns) within a single moral theory. As 
Nagel (1970) notes, if the egoist’s future self provides reasons to act (temporal 
neutrality), then others also provide reasons to act (agent neutrality). Likewise, 
Parfit (1984) assumes parity is required and claims that if the egoist has no 
obligation to others then future interests cannot override present interests.   
 
Even assuming it can be shown that parity is not required by a moral theory and 
that we have good reason for treating agent and temporal concerns differently - 
and Sidgwick (1913) and Brink (1992) present convincing arguments to this effect 
                                                
16
 A hybrid theory is one that mixes aspects of two or more theories, for example, being absolutist 
in one aspect and relativistic in another.  
17
 I have included the criticism that hybrid theories are inferior to pure moral theories under 
criticisms relating to the self because it introduces the concept of presentism and temporal slices 
which are central to the criticisms regarding the nature of the self.  
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- the egoist still faces a challenge from presentism (an agent and temporally 
relative theory). The presentist claims that an agent ought to act so as promote the 
agent’s immediate self-interest. 
 
The challenge to the egoist is as follows: If the utilitarian (or any agent and 
temporally neutral theory of rational benevolence) must answer the egoist’s 
question ‘Why should I sacrifice my good for the good of another?’ (a question to 
which it is assumed the utilitarian cannot present a convincing answer) then the 
egoist is logically compelled to answer the same question from the presentist, 
‘Why should I sacrifice an interest now for one in the future?’ While presentism 
(in this pure form) is a highly implausible moral theory the challenge to those who 
subscribe to egoism is logically equivalent to the one presented by the egoist to 
those who subscribe to agent neutral theories, and it represents a challenge that 
must be overcome. 
 
Assuming the presentist challenge can be overcome this is still insufficient, for a 
temporally neutral version of egoism faces further problems with regard to the 
self. As Gough (1998) points out, the egoist acting now does so to benefit not 
himself but some future self; the beneficiary of the act is some distant self who 
may have a completely different set of interests. The egoist cannot claim to be 
acting for the benefit of himself when he will not be that same self at the point 
where benefits are accrued. In effect, in acting for the benefit of some future self, 
the egoist is acting in an altruistic manner. Zemach (1978) argues a similar point 
by claiming that egoism is based on a ‘howler’ and that egoism is either irrational 
or meaningless. Zemach claims that the notion of a ‘self’ is confused, a matter of 
convention rather than fact, and consists of a series of overlapping temporal slices 
(depending on the criteria used) which bear only degrees of similarity to each 
other. The self (agent and beneficiary) to which the egoist refers cannot be clearly 
identified, and if the self cannot be clearly identified across time then the egoist 
cannot act for his long term best interests. 
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§1.2.6 Criticisms – Defending Egoism 
Surprisingly, even those who defend egoism are far from content when they judge 
their defense to have been successful. After finding no arguments that 
successfully show egoism to be either inconsistent or incoherent, Lemos (1971, p. 
392), confesses that he wished the opposite were true: 
 
I therefore wish that there were some way to show, to the satisfaction of 
everyone, that egoism is incoherent or inconsistent. But I must confess that 
if there is I do not know what it is. I therefore hope that someone can point 
the way out, for I, at least, cannot remain content with the position of this 
paper, nor do I see how anyone who accepts non-egoism can be content 
with it. But then perhaps I am hoping for the impossible. And if the 
argument of this paper is sound that is precisely what I am hoping for. 
 
Perhaps such sentiment is the result of the presupposition that egoism must be 
flawed and necessarily promotes immoral actions. Perhaps it results from the fact 
that most of those who take up the task of defending egoism find the theory 
distasteful and thus devote little space to developing its axioms. However, the 
result of this method is that a theory is defended that few if any would actually 
subscribe to.18 
  
Even Kalin (1995) who presents perhaps the most widely known defense of 
egoism devotes little of his article to developing the theory. The result is that 
while Kalin (1995, p. 89) claims that it “makes sense to speak of egoism as a 
morality” given that it provides an answer to the question ‘What ought I do?’ and 
any theory that provides a “coherent answer to it thereby deserves to be regarded 
as a moral theory”, the egoism he defends ends up sounding far from attractive. 
Kalin’s egoism is a private morality that cannot be promulgated and lacks most of 
the features associated with moral theories. The egoist cannot enter into moral 
debate, cannot receive moral advice, cannot give moral advice, cannot establish 
institutions of reward and punishment, cannot teach his children morality and 
cannot justify his behaviour to others. As such, Kalin’s defence of egoism comes 
across more as a criticism and we are left wondering of what use, if any, such a 
private morality would be (if indeed, given Wittgenstein’s critique of private 
language, a private morality is even logically possible). 
                                                
18
 I am not sure that the existence of a theory that is valid but which no one would subscribe to 
presents anything more than a trivial theoretical problem. 
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Therefore, Kalin’s defence will be treated for the most part as a criticism and it 
will be shown that a developed egoism need not be a private morality and an 
egoist can give and take moral advice, and join in moral discourse. 
 
§1.2.7 Criticisms – Egoism is a Pernicious Doctrine  
The final criticism of egoism is often considered the weakest from an analytical 
perspective. This opinion, however, is based on a less than complete 
understanding of the criticism. If egoism falters it is because it is unable to 
counter the challenge that it promotes acts clearly recognisable as morally wrong. 
 
In the final chapters of Part 1 I will examine Rachels’ (1974) claim that egoism is 
a pernicious doctrine. This claim is usually dismissed for the simple reason that it 
relies on a circular argument; Act Y is clearly recognisable as morally pernicious, 
Egoism promotes Act Y, therefore egoism is pernicious. Given that egoism is a 
moral theory that determines right acts it cannot be the case that it is wrong 
because it promotes an act that is judged as morally pernicious according to some 
other moral standpoint. However, such counters mistake the strength of Rachels’ 
argument which is based on the claim that some acts are objectively recognisable 
as morally wrong with far more certainty than we can ever be sure about the 
correctness of any moral theory. In effect, Rachels is making a claim about moral 
facts that, if true, would clearly demonstrate that egoism is flawed. In examining 
Rachels’ theory it will be necessary to consider the nature of moral facts. In doing 
so I will examine Harman’s (1977) argument and in countering this position show 
that moral facts do indeed exist, albeit in a limited sense. This makes Rachels’ 
criticism of egoism far more difficult to overcome.  
 
But before such criticisms can be considered it is necessary to determine whether 
morality is necessarily or by definition other-regarding and, assuming the answer 
is no, whether egoism can meet the minimal conditions of adequacy and be 
defined as a moral theory.  
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Chapter 2 
Definitional Issues 
 
§2.0 Introduction 
It is commonplace within discussions of the nature of morality to classify self-
regarding actions as outside the concept of morality. Gert (2002) denies that 
morality governs self-regarding behaviour (ch. 2, para. 18). Gert is not alone in 
such views; according to Rogers (1977) most contemporary philosophers would 
insist that morality is essentially other-regarding. Generally, philosophers who 
adhere to this opinion subscribe to what is referred to as the self-other model; the 
view that “an action has no moral worth unless it benefits others – and not even 
then, unless it is motivated by altruism rather than selfishness” (Rogers, 1977, p. 
1). The very first objection to egoism is not that egoism is a flawed moral theory 
but that it is not even a moral theory. 
 
As Rogers (1977, p. 2) notes, it is not so much that theories of self-interest 
(notably egoism) are “demonstratably false … but rather that [egoism] contradicts 
one of our most deeply held dogmas about morality”, that the very concept of 
morality involves the promotion of, or regard for, the good of others. If such a 
concept is accepted as part of the definition of morality then egoism, or indeed 
any theory which evaluates right action in terms of maximisation of self-interest, 
is predefined as something other than a moral theory19. As Hart (1978, pp. 3-6) 
notes about the concept of punishment, to apply a definitional stop and claim that 
egoism is not a moral theory simply because it falls outside of some commonly 
accepted definition is the wrong type of answer and unlikely to convince an 
advocate of egoism that they are not following a moral doctrine. The very 
investigation at hand is whether egoism is a moral doctrine and this question 
cannot be answered by reference to a definition alone. 
 
Rogers goes on to cite several contemporary authors from across the field of 
ethics who explicitly accept the self-other model and build the concept of other-
regardingness into the definition of morality. I will begin this chapter by briefly 
examining the positions extolled by three ethical theorists each of whom, 
                                                
19
 As is indicated it is not denied that egoism provides prudential reasons for action only that these 
reasons are not moral reasons. 
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according to Rogers, embraces the self-other model. I will then consider what 
justification and reasoning might warrant the exclusion of self-regarding interests 
from the moral domain. 
 
§2.1 Peter Singer’s Utilitarianism 
According to Singer, “[t]he ethical life is the most fundamental alternative to the 
conventional pursuit of self-interest” (Singer, 1997, p. vii). It should be made 
clear that Singer (1997, p. 23-24) is not claiming that self-interest and morality are 
logically exclusive, but rather (1977, p. 4-9) that the gratification of immediate 
self-interest, for the most part greed and selfishness, is the antithesis of morality. 
Singer allows that an alternative enlightened form of self-interest where the 
‘ethically reflective life is also the good life for the person leading it’ may provide 
a solution to the self-other conflict. Even so, the reason for acting is still the good 
of others, and the ‘good life (for me)’ is defined in terms of living an ‘(other-
regarding) good life’. 
 
Further, utilitarianism itself is not entirely other-regarding. The (self-interested) 
preferences of an agent are given equal weight with the like interests of every 
other person affected by a moral decision. Self-preferences are reduced to one 
amongst the many rather than being totally excluded, as stated by Mill (1963, p. 
218) “each to count for one [including the self] and none to count for more than 
one”. Assuming the possibility of a moral decision where no other person is 
affected by the agent’s decision (and for Singer this means no other sentient 
creature), then right action (maximization of interests) and self-interest will 
necessarily coincide. However, even in this rare case, the reason for acting is not 
out of my own self-interest but to maximise interests, giving equal weight to all 
equal interests of all those affected by the decision, which in this case just 
happens to be limited to me alone. 
 
 In the majority of moral cases many others will be involved and my own self-
interest, while given equal weighting, plays only a very small part. In any moral 
decision, where numerous people have an interest in the outcome, the act 
promoted by utilitarianism (that is the act that maximises interests) is likely to be 
the same regardless of whether or not my specific self-interests are counted. While 
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utilitarianism does make a small place for self-interest it denies it any primacy. 
The reason for acting is the maximization of, primarily, others’ interests even 
when this may mean sacrificing self-interest. 
  
§2.2 Rights and Virtues 
The extent to which other-regardingness has primacy within virtue and 
deontological theories is even more pronounced. Aristotle allowed for the 
inclusion of self-regarding virtues, such as moderation, within his moral theory. 
However, Thomas Nagel, a Neo-Kantian, denies Aristotle’s position that “The 
moral life is defined in terms of the good life” (1986, p. 195), which might include 
self-regarding virtues, and instead claims that “moral requirements have their 
source in claims of other persons” (1986, p. 197). According to Nagel if an action 
is not for the good of another it is not a moral requirement. Likewise, Lawrence 
Blum, a virtue theorist, argues that for a trait to have any moral value it must be 
directed toward the good of another: 
 
Basically what makes the altruistic emotion morally good is that its object 
is the weal of another person. Why it is of moral value to have sympathy, 
compassion, or concern for someone is that one is thereby concerned for 
the good – the weal and woe – of another person (Blum, 1966, p. 163). 
 
Some virtue theorists admit that virtue ethics is at least formally egoistic and that 
developing the virtues is of benefit to the possessor - not that possessing the 
virtues guarantees flourishing but that it is the best bet for having a flourishing life 
(Hursthouse, 1999, p. 173). However, the virtuous person is expected to promote 
flourishing and to act in accordance with the virtues even where to do so is quite 
clearly detrimental to the agent’s own flourishing. While the ultimate reason for 
possessing the virtues may be some form of enlightened self-interest the reason 
for acting virtuously in some specific context is the good of others.  
 
§2.3 Appeals to the Best Explanation  
If we resolve to define morality as essentially other-regarding or necessarily 
requiring other-regarding sacrifices then we are presented with something of a 
quandary; namely ‘why be moral?’. If morality means, by definition, ‘acting for 
the good of others’ then why should I preference reasons for acting so as to 
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benefit others (i.e. moral reasons) over reasons for acting to benefit the self (i.e. 
prudential reasons)?  
 
As I see it, there are only two methods by which to argue for the truth of the 
proposition that reasons from an other-regarding standpoint offer superior 
justification for acting than do reasons from self-interest, religious conviction, 
financial obligation or aesthetic notion.20 Firstly, it might be argued that self-
regarding reasons are fundamentally flawed as reasons for acting. Prudential 
reasons for actions are, in effect, only pseudo-reasons because they fail to meet 
the minimal requirements of being valid, noncontradictory, and consistent.21 As 
long as we accept that valid reasons must meet minimum criteria of adequacy 
(whatever those criteria might be) and that reasons from self-interest fail to meet 
these criteria then, by default, other-regarding reasons (so long as they meet the 
criteria of adequacy) are superior. Egoistic reasoning is criticised on the grounds 
that such reasons fail to meet one, or more, of the basic criteria of adequacy. I will 
briefly examine these criticisms later in this chapter, and will argue that they are 
not successful in showing that other-regarding reasons are superior by default. 
 
Secondly, it might be argued that, while self-interest does provide reasons to act, 
other-regarding reasons provide superior and overriding reasons for action. 
However, such arguments are conceptually confused. For any given proposition 
there will be numerous competing hypotheses H1, H2, H3, that equally explain the 
proposition and all meet the minimum requirements of adequacy. For example, 
given that we want to explain the existence of the universe we could invoke a 
scientific hypothesis (H1) or a religious, creationist explanation (H2)22. How then 
are we supposed to choose between H1 and H2 and label one of the two hypotheses 
superior? If we are to avoid circularity then we cannot choose between the two 
hypotheses by reference to either of the existing hypotheses. While it is 
necessarily true that, according to scientific criteria for a best explanation, H1 (the 
                                                
20
 For the sake of simplicity I will limit the discussion to consideration of other-regarding reasons 
and self-regarding reasons for action. 
21
 This is in no way meant to be a list of the minimum requirements of a good reason. The criteria 
given are merely being used to indicate the type of attack that might be used to discredit prudential 
reasoning. 
22
 I am oversimplifying in assuming only single scientific and religious explanations exist. 
However, this has no impact on the arguments that follow.  
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scientific explanation) is the better explanation it is equally true that, according to 
the religious criteria for a best explanation, H2 (the religious explanation) is 
superior23. It would seem that any noncircular selection of Hx as the best or, at 
least, most probable explanation requires an independent criterion by which to 
rank the competing hypotheses. Without such a criterion, as Sayre-McCord (1988, 
p. 278) notes, we will then not be saying that one explanation really is better than 
another, only that we have societal or personal preferences regarding 
explanations. Those inclined toward scientific beliefs will preference scientific 
explanation; those inclined towards religious beliefs will preference religion. 
Likewise, without some form of overriding and independent criterion, labelling 
other-regarding theories of action as superior to self-regarding reasons for action 
is nothing more than societal or personal preference and holds no compelling 
force. 
 
The alternative to dismissing the claim that some valid explanation is superior to 
another valid explanation is to hold to the proposition that there is an overriding 
criterion (with the property of being superior) by which the best explanation can 
be determined. This might be accomplished if we could locate some 
unchallengeable criterion to apply but if no such criterion exists, as seems likely 
to be the case given that such criteria are constructs, then any claim that X 
represents the criteria of a best explanation is logically incoherent. 
 
Let E1 be any set of criteria by which to determine a best explanation. 
 
Let E2 be any second set of (different) criteria by which to determine a 
best explanation. 
 
Sets E1 and E2 are mutually exclusive. 
 
Just as it is invalid to select H1 or H2 as a superior explanation by reference to H1 
or H2 it is equally invalid, for the same reasons, to select E1 or E2 as a superior set 
of criteria by reference to either of the existing criteria (E1 or E2). Such an answer 
would be circular and show only that the set of evaluative criteria Ex was 
                                                
23
 Scientists often make the claim that scientific explanation is superior because it meets the 
scientific community criteria of being testable by experiment and able to produce predictions about 
the world. The religious community claims the religious explanation is superior because it explains 
supernatural phenomena (that by its very nature is not testable by experiment.)  
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preferable because it met the criteria of Ex. The selective criteria are then only 
preferred, not superior. The only way to demonstrate that E1 or E2 is a superior set 
of evaluative criteria is by reference to a third (and ultimately superior) set of 
evaluative criteria.  
 
Let F1 be a higher level set of evaluative criteria that has the property of 
being superior. 
 
If F1 provides the means to judge between the superiority of not only E1 and E2, 
but also between H1 and H2 then E1 and E2 are rendered obsolete. If we have an 
ultimate form of explanatory criterion then we have no need to appeal to E1 or E2. 
However, the claim that F1 is superior to E1 and E2 is itself in need of justification 
and any attempt at explanation leads to a reductio ad Absurdum. 
 
1. Showing F1 to be a superior set of criteria cannot be accomplished by 
reference to F1 as such an explanation would be circular.   
 
2. F1 cannot be shown as superior by reference to E1 or E2. These are 
already statements of preferable selective criteria that differ from F1. 
Reference to E1/E2 would necessarily result in E1/E2 being selected as the 
preferable set of explanatory criteria. 
 
I am not dismissing the importance of explanatory criteria (and I shall return to a 
discussion of explanations in Chapters 5 and 6). My claim is only that given two 
opposing explanations (science versus religion, or self-regarding versus other-
regarding reasons for action) it is logically impossible to show that one of the 
explanations is superior to the other where both offer valid explanations from 
within their paradigmatic standpoints. Those who hold tightly to the religious 
criteria will never be convinced by scientific explanation where the explanation 
differs from their own, and vice versa. 
 
It might be claimed that there is some significant difference between the type of 
explanations required for things in the world (and the conflict between the various 
available explanations) and the type of explanation required for theories of how 
we ought to act. This, however, does not appear to be the case. The conflict 
between self and other-regarding acts is demonstrated in the Ring of Gyges: 
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Gyges, a shepherd, discovers a ring that has the power to make him 
invisible. Gyges travels to the capital, seduces the queen, and with the 
power to move undetected conspires with the queen against her husband, 
slays the king and takes control of the city (Lydia). (Plato, Republic, 359d-
360b) 
 
Glaucon claims that whoever possessed such a ring, and had the ability to move 
undetected and with no possibility of retribution, would soon submit to self-
interest and hedonistic impulses.24 The dilemma faced by Gyges is ‘why, free 
from any possibility of retribution, ought we act from other-regarding motivations 
rather than self-interest?’ The basic conflict between other-regarding reasons to 
act and self-interested reasons to act can be phrased, for any individual act: 
 
(i) An agent has reason to act for the good of others. Gyges could have 
acted, and had reason to act, in an other-regarding manner.  
 
(ii) An agent has reason to act for the agent’s own good and, in doing so, 
acts other than for the good of others. Gyges had reason to act as he did, 
out of self-interest. 
 
Rationale can be provided for both types of reasons and, as has been claimed, 
where the reasons are mutually exclusive there can be no logically compelling 
reason as to why preference should be given to other-regarding reasons over self-
interested reasons. It is, however, often claimed that reasons from an other-
regarding standpoint are normatively more important than reasons of any other 
form. Copp (1997) presents the following to show the inherent flaw in claiming 
that other-regarding reasons are overriding: 
 
1. If the claim that ‘S’ (other-regarding morality) is normatively the most 
important standpoint then it must be judged from an authoritative 
normative standpoint ‘R’ that yields the verdict that ‘S’ is normatively the 
most important standpoint. 
 
2. If ‘R’ is to be authorative then either ‘R’ is of equal importance or is 
normatively more important than ‘S’. 
 
3. ‘R’ cannot be of equal importance to ‘S’, (as was discussed earlier in this 
section) for no set of criteria or theory can be judged supreme from within 
                                                
24
 Such dilemmas have been examined through the mediums of stories and films, for instance; 
H.G.Wells’ Invisible Man, Rubin/Ramis’s Groundhog Day, and Tolkien’s Lord of The Rings in 
which Gandalf (among others) turns down the One Ring of Power recognising that although he 
would attempt to use it to do great good he would through it, out of his own self-interest, do great 
evil. (Through Gandalf’s statement Tolkien, like the philosophers discussed earlier in the chapter, 
implies that the nature of morality is other-regarding). 
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its own standpoint. ‘S’ will always be supreme when judged from within 
‘S’ just as ‘I’ (reasons from self-interest) will always be supreme when 
judged from ‘I’. 
 
4. Therefore (by 2 & 3) ‘R’ must be normatively more important than ‘S’. 
 
5. Therefore (by 1 & 4) ‘S’ cannot be normatively the most important 
standpoint. 
 
Copp (1997 p. 103) sums up the argument: “The incoherence can be displayed in 
two sentences: The claim that a standard ‘S’ had the property of supremacy is the 
claim that it is normatively the most important standard as assessed in terms of 
some other standard ‘R’ which is normatively the most important standard. But 
only one standard could be normatively the most important”.  
 
Why be moral (act for other-regarding reasons), rather than act out of self-
interest? There can be no objective answer to this question. At best it might be 
answered that there is a societal preference for acting from other-regarding 
reasons, whereas the question, “why act from self- rather than other-regarding 
reasons”, has a compelling, if circular, answer; because it is in my interest to do 
so. If it cannot be shown that other-regarding reasons are normatively superior to 
reasons from self-interest then dismissing theories of action based on self-interest 
requires demonstrating that such theories are in some way flawed. Whether this is 
possible will be considered throughout Part 1 of this thesis. 
 
§2.4 Defining Morality; Self versus Other  
Assuming that reasons of self-interest are valid and given that there is no 
overriding reason to act from other-regarding rather than self-regarding reasons I 
am interested in whether it makes any sense to limit the definition of morality to 
essentially other-regarding action. Defining theories of self-interest as outside 
morality, and thus viewing reasons based on those theories as nonmoral results in 
many seemingly moral questions having no moral solution; ‘How ought I to act in 
this context given that no one else is affected?’ is not a moral question on this 
view despite an intuitive feeling to the contrary.  
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§2.4.1 The Lack of Self-Guidance 
If moral theory offers no guidance where others are not involved then absurd 
consequences follow, consequences that despite intuitions to the contrary we are 
unable to label as immoral. Consider the following scenario;  
 
On a spaceflight you are knocked off course and crash land on a planet 
uninhabited by any form of sentient life. Further, given the remote part of 
the galaxy this planet is located in it will never be of any use to any other 
civilisation. The planet has an abundance of vegetation and could support 
you indefinitely. However, you see no purpose in living a solitary lifestyle 
but are not the type of person to simply and quickly end your own life. 
Instead, you decide to destroy every living thing on the planet (and you 
have in your spaceship the destructive capacity to allow you to complete 
this task). Just before commencing this rampage of destruction you are 
stuck by the thought ‘is it morally permissible for me to follow this course 
of action?’   
 
This seems like a moral question yet, according to Gert’s and many others’ (other-
regarding) definition of morality there is nothing morally wrong with this course 
of action. The act of destroying all life on the planet is of no moral significance 
for the simple reason it will affect no others25. 
 
Rogers (1997, p. 2) considers a similar Crusoe example. A person is shipwrecked 
on a small island with the means to survive, but alone and with no hope of rescue. 
Rogers questions whether we really want to say there is no moral difference 
between (a) the strandee who strives to improve their life, despite the difficult 
circumstances; building shelter, using sustainable food sources, cultivating where 
possible, and spending their time as constructively as circumstances will allow, 
(b) the strandee (such as in my example) who wages a private and destructive war 
against the environment or, (c) the strandee who is lazy and simply gathers food 
when necessary and does the bare minimum required to survive.  
 
It would appear that the strandee who strives towards self-improvement and an 
improvement in living conditions is exhibiting virtue yet, as Rogers (1997, p. 3) 
points out, on the self-other model such “virtue has no specifically moral merit”. 
                                                
25
 I am assuming ‘others’ is limited to, at the most, sentient beings. However, it may be that our 
obligations do not just concern other agents, but include other living things too (and perhaps even 
all other things). The issue is not just about the extent of the moral community in the sense of a 
community of agents.  Even so, the example does show that there are moral issues that aren’t 
other-regarding in the ordinary sense. 
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If morality is defined in terms of other-regardingness then, where no others are 
involved, we must deny any moral distinction between someone who acts to better 
themselves and someone who is self-destructive. It is not that the self-destructive 
person acts immorally on this view; I am not defining morality as altruistic and 
then claiming that any act which is not other-regarding is immoral. The claim is 
simply that if morality is defined as essentially other-regarding then the self-
destructive acts in the example have no moral status whatsoever; all of the acts 
(a,b,c) have no moral significance.   
 
While nothing discussed in this section shows any logical problem in defining 
morality as other-regarding we can question whether a morality that fails to 
answer the apparent moral question ‘how ought I to act? (in a context where no 
others are involved)’ is really the best definition available.  
 
The need for self-guidance and reasoned answers to how I ought to act when 
others are not affected by my actions provides strong argument for the inclusion 
of acts from self-interest within the definition of morality. If there is good reason 
to exclude self-interest from the definition of morality then there must be some 
substantial difference between other- and self-regarding reasons. It is to those 
differences that I will now turn my attention.   
 
§2.4.2 A Question of (Moral) Effort 
It is sometimes argued that the difference between other-regarding and self-
regarding actions is that other-regarding actions require special effort, (sometimes 
question-beggingly referred to as moral effort) whereas it is considered easy to act 
out of self-interest. Such claims are demonstrably false. Rogers (1997, p. 3) notes 
“parents seem inclined to put their children’s good before their own” and there are 
innumerable examples of parents putting their lives at risk to enter hazardous 
environments to rescue trapped children. As Singer (1997, p. 107) notes “the 
readiness of parents to put the interests of their children ahead of their own 
interests is a striking counter-example” to the claim that self-interest is always the 
easiest option. In general everyday circumstances, and not just in cases of 
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emergency, it seems unlikely that most parents would find it easy to act out of 
self-interest and spend money on holidays at the expense of their children26. 
  
Unless ‘self’ is somehow expanded to encompass all those that are close to us 
then, in some limited contexts (perhaps only those involving their offspring, or the 
larger group an agent values), the inclination and therefore the easier choice seems 
towards other-regarding and away from self-regarding actions. In many cases it 
requires far greater effort to act from self-interest. For example, parents are 
naturally inclined to care for others, their own offspring, despite any risks to 
themselves. Parents acting for the sake of their children, at the expense of self-
interest, casts doubt on the claim that sacrificing self-interest requires special 
effort. Acting out of self-interest is not, by default, the easy option.  
 
Further, unless self-regarding actions are defined in terms of simple, in the 
moment, hedonistic pleasures then people often have great difficulty acting out of 
rational self-interest. It is far easier to give in to a craving (for example smoking) 
than to recognise a self-interest (long term health), and resist. If other-regarding 
actions hold some special status it is not because they, as a rule, require a greater 
effort on the part of an agent. Perhaps then it is not so much that the motivation 
for other-regarding actions is necessarily harder but that it differs in kind from 
self-interested motivation. 
 
That an ethical theory defines right by a set of criteria does not necessarily imply 
that we will be motivated by those criteria. However, it does appear that, if an 
agent is searching for an answer to the question ‘how ought I act?’, the answer to 
that question will provide some form of motivation.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
26
 I am not claiming that parents always put their children’s interests first. Instead, my point is that 
generally children are fed (more than the absolute minimum), clothed (again more than the 
minimum), provided with school materials etc when parents could have acted otherwise.  
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§2.4.3 The Myth of Pure Motivation 
If we allow, in principle, that both self- and other-regarding interests could 
provide moral motivation, then the following objection may be raised: 
(i) Motivation toward self- and other-regarding actions may lead to an 
agent being motivated to act in mutually exclusive ways. 
 
(ii) Other-regarding motivations will be impure. That is, they will be 
tainted by self-interested motivations. 
 
The first of these objections is not really related to the inclusion or exclusion of 
self-interest from morality. If there are situations in which self and other-
regarding interests will motivate the agent in mutually exclusive ways then 
potentially we do have a problem. However, this in itself does not give reasons for 
excluding self-interest from the definition of morality. The problem could just as 
easily be overcome by the exclusion of other-regarding interests. This could even 
be considered a preferable answer to the criticism given that other-regarding 
concern for two or more agents might similarly have a mutually exclusive nature. 
Whether there is a deeper problem involving contradiction and inconsistency will 
be discussed in Chapters three and four. 
 
The second objection is simply that moral motivation requires purity; there cannot 
be multiple motivations. If self and other-regarding motivations are both moral 
motivations then it may turn out that agents have ‘one thought too many’. The 
purity of motivation, for the good of others, is tainted when the agent further 
considers whether the act is in the agent’s self-interest. The notion of enlightened 
self-interest often surfaces at this point, namely acting in an other-regarding 
manner will ultimately be in the agent’s self-interest. As Rogers notes, 
“Philosophers who stress motivational purity sometimes observe that when we 
deal justly and benevolently with others, we tend to do best by ourselves” (1997, 
p. 12). The point is that an agent’s enlightened self-interest is furthered by not 
directly considering that self-interest (that is, by not allowing that self-interest to 
be a motivational factor). If we act generously and honestly toward others, 
motivated by a desire for their good, then it is probable we will be well accepted 
in the community and be able to form meaningful relationships. Ultimately this 
will probably be in our own self-interest in as much as the benevolent course of 
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action, all things considered and in most contexts, is likely to have the greatest 
chance of producing consequences that are in the agent’s enlightened self-interest.  
 
But how is this supposed to work? Presumably, if an agent follows the virtuous 
life he does so with the knowledge that it is the best way to act and the way most 
likely to result in a good life for the agent. However, purity of motivation requires 
that the agent be in no way motivated by that knowledge. The motivation must be 
solely for the good of others. This recommendation, somewhat bizarrely, tells us 
“that morality will further our interest, but in order to act for our interest, we 
cannot act for our interest” (Rogers, 1997, p. 12). I doubt that pure motivation is 
even logically possible. As Rogers remarks, “Requiring unself-interested concern 
for other people borders on the oxymoronic: It tells one to act toward them in a 
concerned – i.e., interested – way, but not to be motivated by that concern, i.e. 
interest” (1997, p. 13). It seems absurd that all thoughts that a specific action is 
ultimately in my own self-interest must be struck from my mind else the exact 
same action loses all of its moral force.  
  
§2.4.4 Inconsistencies in Defining Morality as Essentially Other-Regarding. 
Defining morality as other-regarding leads to numerous inescapable 
inconsistencies. The three inconsistencies that I will examine are the Darwinian 
double standard, logical inconsistency and, discrimination against the self.   
 
The Darwinian double standard occurs when claims are made that we have an 
inclination towards other-regarding morality and at the same time denying any 
worth to inclinations from self-interest because we are inclined toward them. 
Singer (1997, p. 124) concludes his chapter on selfishness with the claim: 
 
Human beings often are selfish, but our biology does not force us to be so. 
It leads us, on the contrary, to care for our offspring, our wider kin, and, in 
certain circumstances, for larger groups too. 
 
Are the other-focused actions described by Singer to be classified as moral acts? 
They meet the criteria of moral acts in that the acts are other-regarding and they 
also meet other criteria commonly associated with definitions of morality. For 
example, they are likely to reduce harm or promote flourishing, and could easily 
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be part of a public system. If Singer is correct and our biological makeup leads us 
to care for others then it seems that we can extract the implicit generalisation: 
 
(i) Others form a moral end, and 
(ii) We (the self) are inclined toward this end. 
 
Yet the self-other model embraces the inconsistency that: 
 
(i) The self cannot form a moral end, and  
(ii) We (the self) are inclined toward this end. 
 
According to Rogers this inconsistency involves the claim that, (a) as society 
evolves virtue will win out and we will be inclined toward morality, and (b) 
denying that self-interest has any moral worth because we are inclined toward it. 
 
Secondly, there is a logical inconsistency in the self-other model. Dewey (1908, p. 
364) points out that consistency requires that the self either is or is not a moral 
end. However, the self-other model leads to a contradiction where the exact same 
act that results in the exact same moral end has a different moral status dependent 
solely on the agent carrying out the act. 
 
Consider the following scenario: 
 
I (Agentme) through no fault of my own have insufficient food.  
 
Presumably the act (X) of providing me (Agentme) with food, where the act 
does not impinge on any other agent, is a good one. Indeed where some 
agent (Agentother) carries out act (X) to benefit Agentme the act is defined 
by most philosophers as a moral one.  
 
Yet, when the agent and beneficiary are the same (that is where Agentme 
acts to provide Agentme with food) the act (X) is denied any moral status.  
 
Assuming no other conflicting moral obligations; if providing food for those in 
need is good then providing food for the hungry (whoever the hungry might be) is 
a good act and whoever provides the food acts rightly. If the beneficiary and the 
provider happen to coincide then an act of self-interest must have moral standing. 
Adherence to the self-other model leads to an inconsistency. Removing this 
inconsistency requires, according to Rogers (1997, p. 4), either: 
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(i) Reconceiving our own self-interest in a manner that does not question-
beggingly build immoralism right in, or 
 
(ii) Banishing all self-interest from the moral domain, others included. 
 
The final inconsistency I will look at, that of banishing self-interest from the 
domain of moral theory, can be explicated by the statement ‘What’s so different 
about me?’. One of the criticisms often leveled against egoism is that it fails to 
show that the self is different in any morally relevant way, such that a line of 
demarcation can be drawn between the self and others in assessing the legitimate 
beneficiaries of moral actions. It is commonly accepted that to exclude any group 
from the moral community, unless they can be shown to differ in a morally 
significant manner, is inconsistent.  
 
There are factual (sexual) differences between men and women, and factual 
(racial) differences between Europeans and Africans. However, if these groups are 
to be treated differently then it needs to be shown how these factual differences 
make a moral difference – and it seems that no such moral difference exists. As 
Singer (1976, p. 150) points out “from the mere fact that a person is black, or a 
woman, we cannot infer anything else about that person”. Thus egoism is charged 
with being flawed as it cannot show any moral difference between the self and 
others and thus has no reason to privilege the self over others. Yet, those who 
promote the other-regarding model of morality are guilty of this exact form of 
discrimination; they privilege others over the self. 
 
§2.4.5 Admiration of Self-interest 
I think enough has been said to cast considerable doubt on the practicality of 
defining morality as other-regarding (or for excluding theories of self-interest); it 
is question-begging, logically flawed and inconsistent.  Further, it seems there are 
cases where we intuitively believe that actions that do not affect others have moral 
implications (such as the Crusoe example §2.4.1). Rogers likewise argues that we 
do intuitively assign moral worth to actions taken out of self-interest and presents 
the following example: 
 
Consider the case of a certain Vietnam veteran whose contact with a 
grenade during the war has left him permanently confined to a wheelchair. 
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Upon returning to the U.S., he decides to enrol in architectural school to 
pursue a lifelong ambition.  Each school day for four years he wheels 
himself out to the bus stop at 7 a.m., takes an hour long bus ride and then 
wheels himself, rain or shine, around a large, hilly campus going from 
classes to labs to the library. At 7 p.m. he reboards the bus, goes home, 
fixes himself dinner, studies as long as he can, and goes to sleep. He 
eventually graduates top of his class and becomes a highly successful 
architect. (1997, p. 6) 
 
Rogers claims that the veteran in the story would be widely praised, due to his 
moral virtue, despite the fact that his actions were out of self-interest. While I 
generally agree with the point made, Rogers doesn’t spend much time examining 
the case and perhaps reaches her claims a little prematurely. Would we admire the 
same veteran, completing the same course in the same manner (and presumably 
showing an equal amount of courage, determination and integrity) but who was a 
thoroughly unlikeable, cynical and sarcastic person? Perhaps one of the reasons 
we would admire the veteran is because, in acting as he does and in the way he 
does, the veteran provides a role model. If we admire the veteran because he acts 
as a good role model then the moral attributes we are admiring take on an ‘other-
focused’ aspect; we admire the veteran because he provides a role model for 
others. However, perhaps one of the reasons we admire the veteran is because he 
acts for himself without impacting on our own self-interest. The veteran’s bravery 
and courage benefit himself and he is a good role model for others because he 
demonstrates how to act out of self-interest, that is how to be a good egoist. Why 
the veteran might be admired is open to debate. However, I agree with Rogers that 
cases such as this demonstrate that “to assume in advance, that a person’s efforts 
at self-realization, or flourishing, must be at variance with morality, is manifestly 
false (Rogers, 1997, p. 6).   
 
Rogers offers a second example that focuses on our intuition that certain acts have 
moral implications, and more clearly demonstrates that at times we do want to 
include actions directed toward the self within the context of morality – namely 
when we consider those acts to have moral implications. 
 
A student cheats on a final exam. The exam grades are not scaled and so 
the student’s results can have no effect on others in the class. The exam 
plays no part in the career the student will eventually follow and the 
student does not cheat on any exams where the knowledge is vital to his 
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chosen career. The student’s lecturer is aware of his cheating but is 
unconcerned.  
 
Further none of the other students know of the cheating, nor will the 
student’s act become known to anyone other than the lecturer, so the 
cheating student will not become an anti-role model. (1997, p. 6) 
 
Retaining the definition of morality as other-regarding results in being unable to 
say that the student’s action had any moral implication; the student’s actions did 
not affect any one else27. Claiming that the student’s action had moral 
implications results in being unable to exclude self-interest from moral 
consideration. The principle involved in the ‘cheating’ scenario is that honesty is 
sacrificed. To be dishonest is to distort the truth, and to misrepresent facts. The 
important point is that the facts are distorted, not to whom they are distorted28. As 
Rogers correctly notes (1997, p. 8) “The question of the beneficiary of one’s 
virtue is a separate matter from whether one has and exercises that virtue”. It may 
be countered that deception of another is a greater wrong and does a greater harm 
than self-deception. This may be the case but I am not concerned here with the 
degree of harm. All things considered, killing is morally worse than stealing but 
they are both moral concerns. Likewise, all things considered, harming others may 
be worse than harming the self but this is not a valid reason for excluding the self 
from moral consideration.  
 
It may well be that other supposed virtues, for example generosity, are best 
explained by reference to others. I have so far limited my discussion only to 
honesty, as honesty is necessary for the formulation of best explanations. 
However, even if it could be shown that some specific virtue is solely other-
regarding this would be insufficient for barring the self from the definition of 
morality as a whole. 
 
So far my claim is that, although others may provide reasons to act, the self may 
equally provide reasons to act, and while the good of others may provide us with 
                                                
27
 I am assuming the students are not ranked, or that the ranking is of no relevance.  It would be a 
different story if by cheating a student gained a higher ranking that somehow adversely affected 
another student. 
28
 A discussion of honesty and its importance in formulating best explanation will be discussed in 
the concluding sections of  Chapter 5 along with why (in most cases) honesty is in an agent’s self-
interest. 
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moral motivation, consistency requires accepting the claim that our own good 
equally provides moral motivation. As has been shown, separating the self and 
others within the domain of morality leads to logical inconsistencies. However, 
while self-interest in itself cannot legitimately be excluded from the definition of 
morality there may be good reason for excluding theories of self-interest from the 
set of moral theories; namely that theories of self-interest defeat the function of 
morality. If the function of any item Y is that it performs the function X then, in 
most cases, something that cannot perform the function X is not a Y29. If it can be 
shown that an essential function of morality is X then any theory Y that is 
incapable of performing that function is clearly not a moral theory. 
 
§2.5 Conflict Resolution 
It is generally accepted, that “[t]he function of morality or ethics is to rationally 
adjudicate disputes so that societal relationships can endure” Duska (1999, p. 27). 
Theories of self-interest are criticised on the grounds that they offer no system for 
the resolution of conflict, and since they fail to perform this essential function of 
morality are not moral theories. Working on the reasonable assumption that those 
evoking a moral code are looking for ways to solve moral dilemmas (and that 
such dilemmas often involve conflicts of interest) then the criticism that theories 
of self-interest fail in this regard (if the criticism is valid) would appear to be good 
grounds for excluding theories of self-interest from the class of moral theories.  
 
The argument for the exclusion of theories of self-interest might be formulated as 
follows: 
P1) Conflict resolution is an essential function of morality. 
P2) Theories of self-interest are unable to resolve conflicts of interest. 
C) Theories of self-interest are not moral theories. 
 
P2 appears to be the weakest premise for clearly it is not the case that egoism is 
unable to solve any conflicts of interest. For example, if some resource (R) exists 
and both Agent1 and Agent2 have an interest in R then while a conflict of interest 
appears to be present it is not the case that a Darwinian struggle will necessarily 
                                                
29
 I say ‘in most cases’ because a broken Y is still a Y (of some sort). Accepting that the function 
of a clock is to keep time does not mean that a broken clock is suddenly rendered a non-clock. 
However, we can say that something that was never designed to, and never has the ability to, keep 
time is not a clock. 
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follow. For either agent to monopolise R is not in that agent’s best interest given 
that both agents also have an interest in avoiding unnecessary conflict. In such 
cases co-operation, not conflict is promoted by egoism. Every member of any 
society has an interest in gaining the necessities for survival30. However, rational 
self-interest lies in gaining a share of that resource, not in monopolizing the entire 
resource, for to do otherwise would be to unnecessarily create enemies, which can 
hardly be considered in an agent’s best interest.  P2 is clearly false if it means 
egoism is unable to resolve any conflicts of interest, given that the egoist has an 
interest in avoiding conflicts. 
 
Furthermore, there doesn’t appear to be a problem where there is a shortage of 
resources such that it is not possible for everyone to gain a sufficient share. It is in 
each agent’s interest to ensure they have as good as possible a chance of receiving 
their share of an insufficient resource, and they ought to co-operate with others in 
any scheme that ensures they are not discriminated against in the division of 
resources. The egoist also has an interest in ensuring that when they become 
available any resources the egoist gains are not at risk from those who miss out. It 
is therefore in each individual agent’s interest to ensure there are procedures in 
place to make sure that those who miss out are controlled. Although the agent is 
fully aware that they could be the one who misses out, and acknowledges that if 
this occurs then all interest in having such controlling procedures in place will 
vanish, at the point prior to distribution of resources the egoist’s interest lies in 
ensuring such procedures are established31. 
 
 Where there does appear to be a problem is in the case of extreme scarcity. 
Where R is a scarce resource such that only Agent1 or Agent2 (but not both) may 
acquire R and both Agent1 and Agent2 have a rational interest in acquiring R, 
egoism advises both Agent1 and Agent2 that they ought to obtain R, and conflict 
ensues. Consider the following case:  
 
                                                
30
 No doubt most have an interest in gaining more than the minimum. However, to ensure the 
minimum for survival is still a primary self-interest.  
31
 While it is possible to create scenarios where an individual need not co-operate (for whatever 
reason) I am interested, at this point, only in the average agent and demonstrating that, in most 
cases, theories of self-interest can resolve conflicts of interest. 
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An accident occurs in an experimental laboratory and four technicians are 
infected with a deadly virus. The four technicians are isolated before the 
virus can spread. The good news is that there is an antidote to the virus; 
the bad news is that only a single dose is available (and it will not be 
possible to obtain additional antidotes prior to the virus killing the infected 
technicians). The lab doctors are unable to decide who to vaccinate and so 
they place the antidote in the isolation room and suggest the technicians 
decide among themselves who gets the cure. 
 
The antidote is an extremely scarce resource (R) and all of the technicians 
(Agent1-4) have a rational interest in obtaining the antidote32. It would seem that 
the recommendation of egoism is that each agent ought to obtain the antidote for 
themselves as sharing is not an option. The result is a conflict between the agents, 
and the outcome probably determined by the survival of the fittest.  
 
However, unless some guarantee of success exists, the egoist will not want to 
enter into a fight that may result not just in death (as they fail to obtain the 
antidote) but in spending their last few hours of life in a great deal of pain. Thus, 
it might be countered that the best interest of the egoist does not lie in getting the 
antidote, but in ensuring they have the best possible chance of obtaining the 
antidote.  For example, the egoist could agree to a decision being reached through 
the drawing of straws. However, while it might well be in the egoist’s interest to 
participate in playing the game, as soon as the game is over the best interest of the 
losers remain in getting the antidote and they (the majority) have no interest in 
honoring the outcome of the game. Peace only lasts while the game is in progress, 
and then conflict returns. 
 
Egoism seems to run into a serious problem when attempting to resolve conflicts 
that arise from extreme scarcity, and are such that the majority will miss out. The 
initial argument, reformulated in terms of conflicts of interest regarding extreme 
scarcity, is as follows: 
P1) Resolution of conflicts of interest (in cases of extreme scarcity) is an 
essential function of morality. 
P2) Egoism is unable to resolve conflicts of interest in cases of extreme 
scarcity. 
C) Egoism is not a moral theory. 
 
                                                
32
 There may be some debate around the nature of rational self-interest.  However, if anything is an 
example of rational self-interest it would seem that an individual agent’s survival would fit the bill. 
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However, in this formulation the requirement of P1 is too demanding. For while 
moral theories in general do not promote conflict, neither do they offer a solution 
to conflicts involving extreme scarcity. It is perhaps even a strength of egoism that 
it recognises some conflicts as irresolvable for to deny this would present an 
overly simple view of moral life. 
 
Reconsider the infected technician’s case from a utilitarian perspective. 
Unsurprisingly, that one survives and three die (a utility of -2) is better than if four 
die (a utility of -4) and so, by utilitarianism it is better if someone gets the 
antidote. Yet, unless utilitarianism offers some method of determining who gets 
the antidote then no practical solution has been offered. An appeal might be made 
to ‘who offers the most to society’ but there is unlikely to be much difference 
between four technicians working similar jobs; one might have a large family, one 
might do a lot of charity work, one might be working on some major project that 
will benefit…, it seems an impossible task to objectively rank such values and 
each individual is likely to think their effort ought to be ranked as more beneficial. 
Assuming there are no willing martyrs amongst the group, all utilitarianism offers 
is what everyone (including the egoist) is already aware of; (i) It is better if 
someone lives than if everyone dies, and (ii) It would be best to avoid conflict if 
possible (conflict maximises neither the individual nor the majority interest).  The 
utilitarian, like the egoist, might agree to a drawing of straws. However, once the 
game is over it is difficult to see how honoring the result maximises interests 
(given that the majority, in honoring the agreement, are going to die). If the 
question ‘what ought we do now?’ is asked (after the game of chance is 
completed) then maximised interest lies in the game being re-played. The three 
losers want a rematch and only the winner wants things to remain as they are. 
There is no escape from this repetition as following the completion of every game 
interests will be maximised (three losers versus the lone winner) by replaying the 
game of chance. 
 
Virtue theorists would seem no better placed. Given that there is no way to 
resolve the dilemma (within virtue theory itself) the technicians, as virtue 
theorists, might turn to drawing straws as in the previous examples. The 
difference with virtue theory is that it seems the losers ought to honor the result of 
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the game and let the winner of the lottery use the antidote, while the losers wait to 
die. I am somewhat dubious of a moral theory that both recommends and justifies 
the agent dying, although others seem to accept that morality may call upon the 
agent to embrace serious self-sacrifice. For example, Hursthouse claims, “here is 
an occasion where, say, if I speak out as I should, I am going to be shut in an 
asylum and subjected to enforced drugging”33 (1999, p. 171). Rights theory fares 
much the same as virtue theory and offers no actual solution, only 
recommendations that the agent ought to accept the outcome, once a decision has 
been made. Each of the four agents has a right to life, but this in no way helps 
determine who gets the antidote. Rights-based theorists might also agree to the 
drawing of straws and might even agree that the winner had the right to the 
antidote but again it seems somewhat absurd to say that after the competition the 
losers should simply wait to die. Regardless of whether moral theory requires of 
an agent to lay down their life, my point is that none of the theories offer a 
solution to the actual dilemma. Whichever theory they subscribe to the agents 
might agree to a game of chance to decide who gets the antidote. However, there 
is no moral compulsion toward such an action and even should the agent agree to 
that game of chance it is the lottery and not the moral theory that determines the 
correct action. Further, upon completion of a game of chance, if the agents are 
consequentialists the losers will find themselves under no obligation to accept the 
result. For both egoists and utilitarians if the losers ask the question ‘what ought I 
do now?’  the original dilemma is recreated. Virtue and rights based theories, 
while offering no solution to the original dilemma, avoid the return to a state of 
conflict by advocating the honoring of the result in that the losing agents are 
morally required to die.  
      
I contend that it is not a problem that egoism actively promotes conflict in the 
context of extreme scarcity (where the absence of conflict simply means accepting 
death) just as in certain contexts some moral theorists make room for the concept 
of a ‘just war’ (and in doing so implicitly accept that morality cannot always solve 
conflicts of interest). Egoism correctly determines that if life is our ultimate value 
                                                
33
 My italics. 
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then in situations of extreme scarcity the resolution of the moral dilemma 
necessarily involves conflict.  
 
The rules of Jus ad Bellum outline the generally accepted conditions of a just war. 
I would argue that, while individuals rather than states are involved, similar 
conditions occur where extreme scarcity is involved. The five conditions of Jus ad 
Bellum include that there be just cause for the conflict, that those involved have 
the right intentions, that there is a public declaration of the intent for conflict, that 
the conflict is a last resort and that there is reasonable probability of a successful 
outcome from the conflict. Through applying these rules to the technicians’ 
scenario it can be clearly demonstrated that the conflict promoted by egoism 
meets the requirements of Jus ad Bellum. Firstly, each of the technicians has just 
cause given that the action is promoted by a well-developed theory of action and 
that the conflict is initiated only to protect an agent’s life (where no alternative 
exists).  Secondly, the technicians act for the right intentions given that the 
motivation to act is to protect the agent’s own life. Thirdly, while it is unlikely the 
technicians would make a formal declaration to commence conflict, such a public 
declaration of intent is implicitly made. While individuals differ from states, and 
formal declarations of conflict are absent, given that all the involved agents 
recognise that a conflict of some form is inevitable then the declaration for the 
necessity of conflict is implicitly public34. Fourthly, the conflict is undertaken 
only as a last resort. While the technicians ought to wait, hoping perhaps that 
further antidotes might eventuate, ultimately the only solution to the dilemma will 
be a conflict over the antidote, the only other alternative being death. In such 
cases it would seem that survival of the fittest is both necessary and preferable as 
the strongest is likely to have a greater chance of making a full recovery. The 
conflict will have a reasonable probability of success as, short of all the 
technicians being so incapacitated that no-one obtains the antidote, the probability 
is that the strongest will survive. Further, casualties from the conflict are limited 
to those that would likely die anyway.  
 
                                                
34
 That is a rational agent will realise that the dilemma has no solution unless three of the agents 
are prepared to accept the outcome of some game of chance. The recognition that diplomacy will 
not lead to a solution (and that action must be taken) is also the recognition that conflict is 
inevitable. 
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In most cases egoism can resolve conflicts of interest and in the majority of cases 
it will promote co-operation as being in an agent’s own interest. Failing to resolve 
conflict in cases of extreme scarcity is not a problem for egoism for the very 
reason that in these cases conflict is the solution to the problem. Unlike other 
theories, egoism is very clear about when conflict is justified: in times of extreme 
scarcity, where co-operation is not an option and where the agent’s life is at risk 
through inaction. 
 
§2.6 Conclusion 
The position of this chapter so far has been mostly negative. I have been critical of 
the notion that egoism is not a moral theory on the grounds that morality is by 
definition other-regarding. In contexts where only the individual is affected, 
questions over how he/she ought to act, seem intuitively to be moral questions. To 
rule out egoism by definition alone accomplishes little and the question ‘is egoism 
a moral theory?’ simply slides to ‘if egoism isn’t a moral theory then why be 
moral?’. Further, I argued that egoism could not be excluded on the grounds that it 
fails to meet the basic function of conflict resolution. As demonstrated, in most 
cases egoism does offer conflict resolution and when it does not it seems that (i) 
other theories are equally unable to solve the conflict, and (ii) the conflict is 
justified under the conditions of Jus ad Bellum. 
 
What then do I consider to be the definition of a moral theory? As a background 
against which egoism can be judged, in the chapters that follow I will adopt a 
minimalist and functional definition of morality; that function simply being action 
guidance. Like Kalin (1995) I accept that ‘What ought I do…?’ is a moral 
question and that any theory that offers a “coherent answer to it deserves to be 
regarded as a moral theory” (Kalin, 1995, 89). It follows that egoism is quite 
clearly a moral theory provided that it is coherent. I take a coherent theory to be 
one that fulfils the conditions of adequacy, that is, (at the very least) the theory is 
noncontradictory, consistent, and universal. Even these minimal requirements are 
open to challenge, but some bedrock must be accepted if any progress is to be 
made35.  
                                                
35
 I do not however dismiss the challenges to these criteria out of hand and where required 
discussion of the adequacy of these criteria will occur. 
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I will now turn my attention to whether egoism is a coherent theory beginning 
with an examination of Moore’s (1962) proof that egoism is internally 
contradictory and thus not a coherent moral theory. 
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Chapter 3 
Egoism is Contradictory 
 
“[n]o more complete and thorough refutation of any theory could be desired.”  
(Moore, 1962, 99). 
 
§3.0 Ultimate Rational Ends and the Universal Good  
In Principia Ethica, Moore formulated an argument that he believed was a 
complete refutation of ethical egoism. Moore attempts to prove that the theory of 
ethical egoism is self-contradictory and can therefore be dismissed not just as a 
valid moral theory but as a valid theory of any form36. I will begin this chapter 
with an examination of Moore’s criticism, which is specifically aimed at 
Sidgwick’s (1913, §1) claim that ‘Egoism is a rational (moral) doctrine’. I will 
then examine some of the responses to Moore’s argument, most notably those 
raised by Broad and Smith, before developing a position based on Rasmussen that 
is not susceptible to Moore’s criticism. In doing so I will begin to build the 
axioms that according to ethical egoism denote right action. 
 
Moore (1962, 99) paraphrases Sidgwick as claiming that “the Egoist may avoid 
the proof of utilitarianism by declining to affirm, either implicitly or explicitly, 
that his own greatest happiness is not merely the ultimate rational end for himself, 
but a part of Universal Good.” The proof of utilitarianism, according to Sidgwick 
(1013, Preface to sixth edition), is that from a non-interested (i.e. a God’s eye) 
perspective it is “reasonable to prefer the greater good [the good of the majority] 
to a lesser good [the good of the individual]”. However, the egoist can deny that 
his individual happiness, his good, is just a part of universal happiness and further 
claim that “It cannot be proved that the difference between his own happiness 
[and everyone’s happiness] is not for him all important.”  (Sidgwick, ch. IV, §1). 
According to Sidgwick, given that relative to the specific agent there is an 
important difference between his happiness and a general maximisation of 
happiness then it is both reasonable and rational for the individual to give 
preference to his own good. 
 
 
                                                
36
 However, as I will note in §3.1, the assumption that self-contradiction is sufficient to dismiss a 
theory is not accepted without exception.  
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Sidgwick’s claims can be summarised as: 
1. The egoist can claim the egoist’s ultimate rational end is ‘Good’.  
 
2. The egoist can deny that ‘my ultimate rational end’ is ‘an ultimate 
rational end in itself’ and therefore claim it is not good-in-itself.  
 
3. In short, the egoist claims ‘my ultimate rational end’ is ‘a good’ not 
‘good in itself’. 
 
The egoist can claim that ‘my happiness is my ultimate rational end and that the 
ultimate rational end is a good’ without being committed to claiming that 
happiness is the objective ultimate rational end and therefore that happiness is a 
good in itself wherever it occurs.  
 
 4. The above concepts of good are part of the rational moral doctrine of 
egoism.  
 
In brief, Sidgwick is outlining a position whereby an ultimate rational end is 
relative to an agent and, given that an agent’s ultimate rational end is an agent’s 
good, that good is relative to an agent. Further, Sidgwick is claiming it is rational 
for an individual to preference his/her own good over a (utilitarian) maximised 
good. Moore (1962, p.99) attacks both Sidgwick’s claims regarding good and his 
conclusion (that egoism is a rational doctrine) as “absurd”. According to Moore, 
Sidgwick’s thesis is flawed in that it is never clearly defined what is meant by an 
“ultimate rational end” and  it is “the use of such undefined phrases which causes 
absurdities to be committed in philosophy”. Moore attempts to refute Sidgwick’s 
claims via an analysis of the phrase ‘ultimate rational end’ in order to show that 
egoism - the view that we each ought to maximise our own good - is self-
contradictory.  
 
Moore claims that if ‘X’ is my ultimate rational end then it must: 
 
1. Be rationally recognisable, by me, as ‘truly good’, and 
2. In being an ultimate rational end it must be ‘truly good in itself’.  
 
That is, an agent’s ultimate rational end must be rationally recognisable by the 
agent as good in itself. Given that Moore claims that ‘the good’ is simple, 
universal, and indefinable, if the agent recognises an ultimate rational end as good 
in itself then it must also be conceded that the agent’s ultimate rational end (a 
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good in itself) is part of the universal Good (Moore, 1962, p.100). From this 
Moore derives the premise: 
 
 P1) If X is an agent’s ultimate rational end then X is Good in itself. 
 
Moore does not apply these exacting philosophical standards to his own thesis and 
defines Sidgwick’s undefined phrase by reference to what is, according to Moore, 
an indefinable concept (‘good’). While claiming that Sidgwick’s absurd 
conclusions are the result of undefined phrases (insisting that ‘ultimate rational 
end’ is definable) Moore claims that good, as he is using it, is indefinable. 
However, it is unnecessary to enter into an argument as to what is and what is not 
philosophically definable as it is not essential to accept Moore’s claim that Good 
is a simple and indefinable concept. All that needs to be accepted is Moore’s 
claim that an ‘egoist’s ultimate rational end’ is a ‘good in itself’, whatever ‘good’ 
happens to be. If Moore is correct then this analysis already leads to serious 
problems for Sidgwick’s egoism; It seems that by egoism the only good is the one 
the agent determines and that each agent determines what that good is. Thus, “an 
immense number of different things are, each of them, the sole good.” (Moore, 
1962, p.101). 
 
Moore then turns his attention to the qualifying phrase ‘for himself’ and denies 
that this qualification can have any meaning. All Sidgwick’s ‘for himself’ does is 
to introduce a dilemma, “the egoist’s happiness must either be good in itself, and 
so part of Universal Good, or else it cannot be good in itself at all” (Moore, 1962, 
p. 100). Moore’s claim can be broken down as follows: the clause ‘for himself’ 
implies ‘not for others’ or, at the very least, ‘not necessarily for others’. However, 
if ‘X’ is my ultimate rational end then ‘X’ (by premise 1) is good in itself and 
therefore equally good for others. If ‘X’ is not a good in itself then it cannot be an 
‘ultimate rational end’ for me or anyone and the egoist has no ultimate rational 
reason to pursue ‘X’. If ‘X’ is a good in itself then everyone has a rational reason 
to, and for Moore ought to, pursue ‘X’.  The egoist ought to promote ‘X’ for 
himself and everyone else ought to promote ‘X’ for the egoist, just as the egoist 
ought to promote ‘X’ for all others. 
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The following appear to be Moore’s primary principles: 
 
 P1) If X is an agent’s ultimate rational end then X is good in itself. 
 
P2) If X is good in itself then everyone has reason to promote X for 
themselves and everyone else. 
 
Assuming that ‘X’ equates to the agent’s greatest happiness, Moore (1962, p.101) 
claims that no possible analysis of the egoist’s claim that “his own greatest 
happiness is the ultimate rational end for himself can escape the implication that 
his own happiness is absolutely good; and by saying that it is the ultimate rational 
end, he must mean that it is the only good thing – the whole of the Universal 
Good”, which leads to the formal contradiction of egoism. 
 
(by egoism) Each agent ought to pursue their own ultimate rational end 
exclusively. 
 
(by Moore’s  principles P1  and P2) Everyone has reason to promote the 
egoist’s ultimate rational end and the egoist has reason to promote the 
same ultimate rational end for others. 
 
Therefore egoism results in a contradiction in that the theory requires that an 
egoist pursue mutually exclusive goals. Egoism requires the pursuing of only the 
agent’s ultimate rational end and the pursuing of the ultimate rational ends of 
others. Building on Moore’s argument we can determine that an egoist (Agent1) is 
committed to: 
 
1. Agent1 regards Agent1’s happiness as Agent1’s ultimate rational end. 
2. If ‘Agent1’s happiness’ is Agent1’s ultimate rational end then ‘Agent1’s 
happiness’ is the ultimate rational end (good in itself). 
3. Agent1 ought to pursue Agent1’s ultimate rational end (Agent1’s 
happiness) exclusively. 
 
Furthermore, that some other egoist (Agent2)  is equally committed to:  
 
1. Agent2 regards Agent2’s happiness as Agent2’s ultimate rational end. 
2. If ‘Agent2’s happiness’ is Agent2’s ultimate rational end then ‘Agent2’s 
happiness’ is the ultimate rational end (good in itself). 
3. Agent2 ought to pursue Agent2’s ultimate rational end (Agent2’s 
happiness) exclusively.  
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If the ultimate rational end is ‘universal good in itself’ and therefore refers to the 
exact same thing in both cases, as Moore claims it must if it is the ultimate 
rational end, then under Moore’s analysis of obligation (namely that good in itself 
implies an equal obligation wherever it occurs and that we cannot make ad hoc 
restrictions of when the good obligates action) both agents have reason to act to 
promote the happiness of the other in direct contradiction with the principle of 
egoism.  
 
If Agent1 tries to deny this, claiming that only Agent1’s own happiness is the 
ultimate rational end, then it follows that Agent2 (another egoist) can make the 
exact same claim; only Agent2’s personal happiness is the ultimate rational end. 
However, this leads us to the position: 
1. For Agent1 only Agent1’s happiness (X) is the ultimate rational end.  
2. For Agent2 only Agent2’s happiness (Y) is the ultimate rational end. 
 
From points 1 and 2 Moore would infer: 
 
3. X is the ultimate rational end. 
4. Y is the ultimate rational end. 
5. X  Y  (Agent1’s and Agent2’s happiness are not the same)  
6. If X then ~Y  (If X is the (and therefore only) ultimate rational end and  
X  Y then it follows Y is not the ultimate rational end).  
7. ~Y is the ultimate rational end.  
 
Ethical egoism leads to the logical contradiction Y is the ultimate rational end and 
not Y is the ultimate rational end. Therefore, by the principle of explosion (i.e., 
anything can be proved if the starting premise is a contradiction) if egoism is true 
then anything and everything is true. 
  
If these arguments are sound and logical contradictions are necessarily false, then 
Sidgwick is mistaken, egoism is self-contradictory and not a rational doctrine. If 
ethical egoism is to meet even the minimal requirements of a moral theory then it 
must be shown where the presented arguments have gone amiss. 
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§3.1 Denying the importance of Logical Contradiction 
To hold that a proposition is both true and a contradiction presents a major 
problem for classical logic; anything and everything can be derived (logically 
proven) if the initial premise is a contradiction.  
1. X • ~X 
2. X   Simplification of 1 
3. X v (Anything) Addition 
4. ~X  Simplification of 1 
5. (Anything) Disjunctive Syllogism  3,4 
 
Given the implications of accepting a contradiction as true it is usually assumed 
that showing a theory to be logically self-contradictory is a fatal criticism and 
sufficient reason to dismiss the theory as false. However, this is not necessarily 
the case and one valid response to the criticism that egoism is self-contradictory is 
simply to deny that the criticism of self-contradiction holds any compelling force. 
As Hindman (1997, para. 14) notes, for feminists “the charge ‘self-contradictory’ 
no longer necessarily disables another’s argument”.  If classical logic is flawed 
then claims based on the logic are also flawed.  While the criticism that a theory is 
contradictory may not be enough, in itself, to dismiss a theory it still seems far too 
important a consideration to overlook. At the very least, while resorting to the 
type of hierarchies abhorred by those who dismiss logical contradiction, it appears 
to be that a theory that isn’t contradictory is preferable to one that is.  With this in 
mind I will move on to other methods of showing Moore’s criticism to be flawed 
that do not rely on the difficult task of tearing down classical logic.  
 
§3.2 Broad’s response to Moore 
Broad’s defence of Egoism against Moore is to attack the claim that X being 
Good in itself gives each of us reason to promote that good wherever it might 
appear.  Broad (1952, 45) claims that if an agent is an ethical egoist then “he will 
assert that it is not his duty to produce good experiences and dispositions as such, 
without regard to the question of who will have them”.  According to Broad, the 
egoist can deny Moore’s premise that ‘the good’ provides reason to act wherever 
it occurs. The egoist need not accept that even a ‘precisely similar good’ in others 
provides reason to act. According to Broad the egoist’s reasons to act are relative 
to who will benefit - and are compelling only when it is the egoist who will gain 
that benefit. 
 58 
Moore’s premise 2: 
P2) If X is good in itself then everyone has reason to promote X  for Y, 
themselves and everyone else. 
 
According to Broad this ought to be formulated as: 
P2) If X is good in itself and Y is an egoist then Y has reason to promote 
X only if Y will benefit from X 
 
Broad’s claim highlights a weakness in Moore’s initial argument. The egoist need 
not accept that even a ‘precisely similar good’ for others (and it is not made clear 
exactly how Broad’s ‘precisely similar good’ differs from Moore’s ‘good in 
itself’37) provides reason to act and the egoist can not be accused of being 
contradictory in pursuing only his own good even if that good is precisely similar 
to the good of others.  
 
Broad is successful in showing that egoism is not self-contradictory but I agree 
with Smith (2003, p. 582) that Broad is mistaken if he thinks this has “saved it 
simpliciter”. If we allow Moore’s first premise, and Broad has given us no reason 
to dismiss this, then an agent’s ultimate rational end is good in itself. If something 
is good in itself and good in some way leads to obligations then “there can be no 
ad hoc restrictions on which of the things that are good create obligations” (Smith, 
2003, p. 582). Given that the egoist need not accept that good in itself provides 
reason to act wherever it occurs, Moore’s argument does not show egoism to be 
self-contradictory. However, while the contradiction has been removed the ad 
hocery remains. As Smith (2003, p.582) points out, if we allow Moore’s first 
premise to stand unchallenged the egoist’s ultimate rational end is a good in itself 
and if the egoist’s ‘ultimate rational end’ is a good in itself then Broad’s 
structuring of the egoist doctrine relies on an ad hoc condition for deciding when 
precisely similar goods obligate action38. If  Agent1’s and Agent2’s good is 
precisely similar and therefore, as Moore argues, equally obligatory then the 
egoist’s claim that good (when I benefit) obligates action but a precisely similar 
good (when you benefit) doesn’t, is ad hoc. 
                                                
37
 Moore would likely argue that the reason why act ‘A’ and act ‘B’ appear to be precisely similar 
goods is simply that they are both parts of Good in itself. It is not that giving food to some starving 
person X and giving food to some starving person Y are cases of precisely similar goods but that 
giving food to the starving is Good in itself. 
38
  Due to the ‘good’ in ‘good in itself’ being precisely similar wherever it occurs. 
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§3.3 Smith’s Response to Moore 
 
Smith correctly points out that Moore’s argument is not just a dismissal of ethical 
egoism. Moore’s argument can be generalised and in its generalised form it is 
dismissive of all ethical theories that hold that good is in some way relative.  
 
When I talk of a thing as ‘my own good’ all that I can mean is that 
something which will be exclusively mine, as my own pleasure is mine … 
is also good absolutely; or rather that my possession of it is good 
absolutely. The good of it can in no possible sense be ‘private’ or belong 
to me; anymore than a thing can exist privately or for one person only 
(Moore, 1962, p. 99). 
 
Moore’s absolutist (agent-neutral) position on good means that commonsense 
morality, such as the position that I have a special ethical obligation to my family 
(relative altruism) is, like egoism, judged to be ‘absurd’. We are equally obligated 
to act both for the good of those close to us and for total strangers, as we are 
equally obligated to act for the good of others and ourselves. “To the extent that 
we find this conclusion [that our obligation to promote the Good of family and 
strangers is equal] difficult to believe, the question we must ask ourselves is 
where [Moore’s] argument goes wrong.” (Smith, 2003, p.583). 
 
In understanding where Moore’s argument is flawed it is necessary to determine 
exactly what is entailed by the first premise and, more specifically, what Moore 
means by good. For Moore good in itself is simple, that is to say it is not a 
complex concept and cannot be defined by reference to its parts. Further, good in 
itself is non-natural; a simple property that is not identical with any natural 
property. For example, good cannot be defined as happiness. To do so is to 
commit the naturalistic fallacy. That is, it is not obviously apparent that the 
question ‘is happiness in itself always good?’ is simply a tautology (is happiness 
in itself always happiness?). Rather it would seem that the question is significant 
and that the answer is far from obviously yes.  
 
Further, according to Moore, good in itself is an objective (non-relational) simple 
non-natural property. If X’s ultimate rational end is good it is because the ultimate 
rational end itself has the property of goodness, it is not reliant on any relationship 
between the agent (X) and the ultimate rational end. However, the egoist need not 
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accept that good must be non-relational and can instead posit that the egoist’s 
ultimate rational end is best defined in terms of Goodx; that is, good is relative to a 
specific agent X.  From this we can determine that an egoist holds all of the 
following: 
 Agent1’s ultimate rational end is GoodAgent1 
 Agent2’s ultimate rational end is GoodAgent2 
Agent2’s ultimate rational end is not GoodAgent1 
Agent1’s ultimate rational end is not GoodAgent2 
 
This allows Smith to challenge Moore’s first premise (if X is agent Y’s ultimate 
rational end then X is good in itself), and deny that something being an agent’s 
ultimate rational end leads to the conclusion that it must be good in itself. “In 
other words, what would follow from the fact that being F is good for A is not, as 
Moore would have it, that A’s possession of the property of being F is good in an 
unqualified sense but, rather, that A’s possession of the property of being F is 
GoodA” (Smith, 2003, p. 584). 
 
Thus, retaining Broad’s premise 2, only actions that affect an agent making the 
decisions obligate that agent to act, and modifying Moore’s first premise to 
incorporate good as a relational concept, the egoist position becomes the 
noncontradictory position that:  
P1) If X is an agent Y’s ultimate rational end then X is Goody  
P2) If X is Goody and Y is an ethical egoist then Y has reason to X  
 
But, this is still insufficient either as a final defence of egoism or to entirely defeat 
the spirit of Moore’s argument that the recognition of good, wherever it occurs, 
obligates action. Smith recognises that his defence is open to challenge and 
considers several counters to his arguments, then (routinely) rejects them all. 
While Smith solidly defends his thesis from most of the considered attacks, his 
rejection of the strongest counter-argument, that “the posited connection between 
goodness and obligation is ad hoc” (Smith, 2003, 594-598), is insufficient39. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
39
 I will not outline each of the individual counter-arguments here and will instead  focus only on 
the strongest of the counter-arguments. 
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Working with Moore’s concept of a simple, indefinable Good the 
goodness/obligation counterargument is formulated as follows:  
Let us accept the assumption that good is (while simple and indefinable), 
as a matter of fact, relative to an agent.  
 
Let us further assume that the act φ will bring about Goodme, while a 
precisely similar act ψ will bring about Goodyou.40  
 
The egoist claims that I am obligated (or have good reason) to φ but I am under no 
obligation (or have no good reason) to ψ, but this is just an ad hoc condition on 
which goods obligate us to action. Good may be determined relative to an agent 
but once that good is determined, if that good is from a precisely similar act, then 
that good is in itself qualitatively equal. That is, the ‘good’ in the Goodme and the 
‘good’ in the Goodyou are equally good even if the determination of X being good 
is relative to an agent. Smith’s Goodn shows only that the identification of good is 
relative to an agent, not that it differs in kind. If Moore is correct about the nature 
of obligations, then Goodme and Goodyou once recognised, confer an equal 
obligation and to deny this is to place an ad hoc restriction on which goods 
obligate action.   
 
Smith presents a defence to this criticism based on a psychological account of the 
desires of an agent. The rejection of this counterargument relies on the claims 
that: 
1) Agent1 believes φ is GoodAgent1 (good for Agent1) because Agent1 
believes Agent1 would desire φ in a given situation if Agent1 “had a 
maximally informed and coherent and unified desire set” (Smith, 2003, p. 
597). 
 
Thus, by universalisation:  
 
2) Agent1 also believes φ is GoodAgent2 in a similar situation because 
Agent1 believes Agent2 would desire φ in a given situation if Agent2 “had a 
maximally informed and coherent and unified desire set”. 
 
Smith argues that the most coherent pair of psychological states for Agent1, with 
regard to position 1, is that Agent1 both believes that in a certain situation Agent1 
would desire φ and actually desires φ. However, with regard to position 2, the 
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 Here I mean something like my obtaining food when I am starving versus you obtaining food 
when you are starving. 
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claim that ‘Agent1 both believes that in a certain situation Agent2 would desire φ 
and that Agent1 actually desires Agent2 φ’ is no more coherent than ‘Agent1 both 
believes that in a certain situation Agent2 would desire φ and that Agent1 is 
indifferent (or averse) to Agent2  φing’. 
 
Smith’s (2003, p. 597) defence is based on the claim that there is plainly 
“incoherence involved in my having beliefs about things that are Goodsme and yet 
having no desire that those Goodsme obtain” and no such “incoherence at all 
involved in my having beliefs about things that are Goodsother people, and yet having 
no desire at all that those Goodsother people obtain”. 
 
This defence fails for several reasons. Firstly, unless some notion of second order 
desires are built into the equation we can quite clearly have beliefs about Goodsme 
yet not desire Goodsme. For example, someone may believe that they ought not 
smoke yet desire to smoke. This can be overcome by talk of second order desires; 
my having beliefs about things that are Goodsme and yet having no (second order) 
desire that those Goodsme obtain, even though I may have (addictive/weakness of 
will) desires to the contrary, is incoherent. However, there is no incoherence in 
holding the belief that I ought to give up X, and desiring to be in the position 
where I had given up X, but at this present point in time desiring X and the short 
term effects (pleasures) that come from X.  
 
Secondly, if it is the case that any beliefs about Goodsme necessarily lead to a 
desire that Goodsme obtain then Smith must also hold that it is coherent to hold 
inconsistent desires and to embrace contradictory goals. It is possible that I hold 
the following beliefs about Goodsme, (i) that it would be Goodme if I gave up 
smoking (because I believe that smoking will cause health problems) and, (ii) that 
it would be Goodme to smoke (as I enjoy the pleasure of smoking). According to 
Smith if I believe i and ii represent Goodsme then I desire that both i and ii obtain. 
While it is logically possible, if inconsistent, to hold both of these desires it results 
in a contradiction to hold the desire that both i and ii obtain (that is, while I can 
hold inconsistent desires a contradiction occurs in desiring to bring about a state 
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of affairs that satisfies both desires). It cannot be the case that I necessarily desire 
that all beliefs I have about Goodsme come about.  
 
Finally, it is unclear, even if it can be established that I must desire that those 
Goodsme obtain, how my possibly lacking a desire that a recognised Goodother people 
obtain for those other people frees me from an obligation to promote those 
Goodsother people. If the good involved is qualitatively equal, and it is the good that 
obligates my action, not my desires, then it makes no actual difference whether or 
not I desire that Goodsother people obtain. My desire to A and lack of desire to B may 
well explain why I act in manner A rather than B but it does not remove my equal 
obligation toward both A and B. If an egoist is not obligated to act in manner B it 
must be because the egoist does not recognise that B is necessarily a Goodother 
people, not that the egoist recognises but does not desire that Goodother people comes 
about. The reference to desires is an unsustainable ad hoc condition with regard to 
when Good obligates action. 
 
§3.4 Rasmussen and Relative Values 
Rasmussen (1999) considers a similar line of argument to Smith and while not 
posed as a refutation of Moore, and phrased in terms of human flourishing rather 
than the good, provides a distinction that allows us to draw the conclusion that in 
most cases the egoist cannot be obligated to act for the Goodsother-people for the 
simple reason that, in most cases, the egoist can never know what those Goodsother-
people are. 
 
Rasmussen denies that speaking of human flourishing as the ultimate rational end 
of human conduct commits us to agent-neutrality.  According to Rasmussen (1999 
p. 22) it is possible for an agent’s flourishing to be both agent relative (GoodX) 
and universalisable (GoodX-in-itself). Rasmussen (1999, p.4) explicates the claim 
that human flourishing is agent relative as follows: 
 
Human flourishing, G, for a person, P, is agent-relative if and only if its 
distinctive presence in world W1 is a basis for P ranking W1 over W2, even 
though G may not be the basis for any other person’s ranking W1 over W2. 
There is no human flourishing period, human flourishing is always and 
necessarily the good for some person or other. 
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Human flourishing is not an objective concept; what it is for a specific person to 
flourish is relative to a specific agent and, even more so, relative to that agent’s 
worldview. Rasmussen (1999, p. 6) is claiming that no two specific cases of 
human flourishing can be the same, nor are they interchangeable. What constitutes 
a particular agent’s flourishing is dependent on what it is for that agent to flourish 
given that agent’s worldview. 
 
Within Agent1’s rational worldview (W1), Agent1’s flourishing (F1) 
(whatever that might consist of) gives Agent1 reason to act.  
  
Within Agent2’s rational worldview (W2), Agent2’s flourishing (F2) gives 
Agent2 reason to act.  
 
and by universalisation: 
 
Within any Agentn’s rational worldview (Wn), Agentn’s flourishing (Fn) 
gives a person (Agentn) reason to act, and determines ‘good’ (where 
flourishing is an Agent’s good) relative to the Agentn 
 
If attainment of human flourishing (whatever that might consist of) gives ‘reason 
to act’, then Agent1 and Agent2 must acknowledge the other’s legitimate reason to 
act. However, F2 does not obligate Agent1 to act, nor does F1 obligate Agent2, for 
the simple reason that Agent1 does not have direct access to W2  (Agent2’s 
worldview) and so cannot objectively determine what would constitute flourishing 
relative to Agent2. My flourishing is my ultimate rational end and therefore, 
according to Moore, good in itself. However, it is only recognisable as good in 
itself within a specific worldview and that is both relative and unique to an agent. 
Thus good in itself is actually GoodW(x) in itself, that is, Good in itself relative to 
an agent (X) and that agent’s worldview (W).  
 
Ramussen’s notion of a worldview bears some resemblance to the Instrumental 
Theory of Rationality. According to Instrumental Theory reasons are inherently 
relative to some presupposed framework and while an agent can, and indeed must, 
reason within a framework agents cannot reason between these frameworks41. As 
Shaver (2002) notes all moral theories can be labelled instrumental, and therefore, 
in a trivial sense, all moral theories can be viewed as frameworks. ‘The Good’ or 
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 As Foot (1997, p.315) notes these reasons can be moral, immoral or non-moral. 
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‘Flourishing’, however those concepts might be defined, are the goals of a moral 
agent and moral rules are simply instrumental in attaining that end. On a more 
serious level frameworks are not independent of a worldview and it is not possible 
for an agent to have a framework or theory unless they already hold to some 
worldview. Given that what leads to an agent’s flourishing is relative to a 
worldview, not to some framework that may be layered atop that worldview, if 
ethical egoism is an instrumentalist theory it is so only in the trivial sense that a 
utilitarian giving to charity, as that maximises general happiness, is 
instrumentalist (Shaver 2002). An egoist may adopt several frameworks and 
reason within those frameworks, for example an egoist may adopt the framework 
of etiquette while at a dinner party and reason within this framework but what it is 
for the egoist to flourish is relative to the egoist’s worldview not the temporarily 
adopted framework (even if the reason for temporarily adopting such a framework 
is the agent’s flourishing).  
 
Adding Rasmussen’s concept that an agent’s ultimate rational end (Moore’s good 
in itself) is relative not just to an agent but within an agent’s worldview we can 
reformulate the egoist doctrine as: 
 
P1) If X is an agent Y’s ultimate rational end then X is GoodW(y) in itself.  
P2) If X is GoodW(y) in itself and Y is an ethical egoist then Y has reason to X.  
 
That is, X is good in itself relative to agent Y and within Y’s specific worldview. 
This position overcomes the goodness/obligation counter-argument to which 
Smith’s position is vulnerable. While the act φ will bring about GoodsW(me) and 
the act ψ will bring about GoodsW(you) the good in each case, once determined, is 
qualitatively equal. It is not ad hoc to add that you are only obligated to act for the 
good only when that good is recognisable as such by you. 
 
3.5 Moral Relativism 
Harman (1983) considers flourishing as a basis for ethics but is critical of the 
merits of such an approach on the grounds that it leads to moral relativism. His 
criticism, while not a direct criticism of the position I have laid out so far, is 
important in that it may appear that defining obligation in terms of GoodW(y) must 
result in some form of moral relativism. 
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Harman (1983, 312-313) argues that flourishing “seems inevitably relative to one 
or another set of values. People with different values have different conceptions of 
‘flourishing’, of the ‘good life’”. Further, “it is difficult to see how one rather than 
another conception of flourishing is to be validated simply in ‘the nature of 
things’ or in the ‘nature’ of persons - except in the sense in which different sets of 
values yield different conceptions of nature or of the nature of a person!”. Harman 
(1983, 320) goes on to claim that under such a form of moral relativism “there are 
no basic demands everyone has sufficient reason to accept as providing reason for 
action”. 
 
At face value Harman appears to have made a valid criticism. Under the egoistic 
theory outlined Agent1 may find the eating of other sentient creatures intolerable 
and detrimental to any form of flourishing while Agent2 considers that fine meats 
are an essential part of the good life. However, if Harman believes that the 
essence of a good moral theory is its ability to provide an objective answer to such 
questions as the acceptability of eating meat then he sets a standard that is near 
impossible. Rather, I contend that the essence of a good moral theory is that it 
explains the nature of these differences, helps us to understand the implications of 
these differences and provides an objective answer as to how I ought to act (given 
my worldview) - not what is the objectively correct way to act. While this is a 
form of relativism, in as much as how I ought to act is determined by, and relative 
to, my worldview, it is a limited form of relativism. An agent cannot formulate 
whichever worldview the agent wishes and the boundaries which limit 
worldviews also limit what constitutes flourishing within those worldviews. If by 
relativism all that is meant is a theory that holds variable X is relative to some 
other variable then I have no quarrel with this label being applied here. However, 
as Machan (1985, 388) notes, “Harman’s talk about the alleged relativism of any 
flourishing ethics really amounts not to relativism but to contextualism.” It is not 
relativism (as the term is commonly used) to note that what constitutes flourishing 
depends on the context, the rational worldview that a specific agent holds, 
anymore than it is “relativism in medicine to recognise that general principles of 
human health apply differently to different people” (Machan, 1985, p.389). 
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Consider the following cases: 
 
Within Agent1’s worldview animals are, as sentient creatures, members of 
the moral community and to eat a fellow member of the moral community 
is, to Agent1, a horrendous thought. Needless to say, committing 
horrendous acts is detrimental to Agent1’s flourishing and therefore Agent1 
will claim such acts are wrong - although they are actually wrong in 
themselves only with reference to Agent1 and Agent1’s worldview.  
 
For Agent2 animals are a living resource and while Agent2 may believe 
animals ought to be treated humanely (for anthropocentric reasons) 
considers there is nothing wrong with raising them for food. The 
enjoyment Agent2 gets from eating meat enhances Agent2’s life and leads 
to Agent2’s flourishing and is judged by Agent2 to be good - however, it is 
only actually good relative to Agent2  and Agent2’s worldview.  
 
The moral judgments themselves are incommensurable without an understanding 
of the worldviews the judgements are relative to and while we cannot have direct 
access to the worldviews of either Agent1 or Agent2 what we do know is that what 
constitutes flourishing for Agent1 and Agent2 is dependent upon those 
worldviews. Once it is recognised that the source of the differing moral 
conclusions is due to differences in the agents’ worldviews (with regard to the 
moral status of animals) it may be possible to objectively discuss why these 
conclusions were reached.  
 
In ruling out all forms of relativism Harman sets the moral bar too high. It also 
seems that his critique contains several misunderstandings. Firstly, in claiming 
that flourishing is relative “to one or another set of values” Harman appears 
mistaken. Flourishing is not relative to some selected set of values, rather it is 
objectively determined within an agent’s worldview42. The theories Harman is 
objecting to use flourishing as ‘the standard’, as ‘the value’ for making moral 
judgements, and this being the case, as Machan (1985, 388) notes,  “[f]lourishing, 
then, cannot be relative to one or another set of values since there are no values 
apart from flourishing, not at least in the morally relevant sense”. 
 
Secondly, it seems unlikely that Harman is correct in saying that a position (which 
incorporates a limited relativism) leads to there being ‘no basic demands everyone 
has sufficient reason to accept as providing reason for action’. Given the 
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 Exactly how flourishing is determined relative to a worldview will be discussed in Part 2. In 
brief the worldview we hold determines what it is to flourish in the world. 
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constraints on the worldview we can rationally construct there may well be areas 
of overlap and, even given that what constitutes flourishing for each individual 
agent is determined from within that agent’s worldview, it is possible (and I will 
suggest probable) that individual agents will find they have sufficient reason to 
(and are perhaps obligated to) carry out actions that are, in application, precisely 
similar.  Further, as human knowledge advances the constraints on worldviews 
that can be rationally constructed will likely become ever tighter. As this happens 
the overlap between worldviews, and the moral obligations that arise from those 
worldviews, will become ever more similar.43 
 
Even where worldviews lead to incommensurable moral conclusions, such as 
Agent1 determining it is immoral to eat meat and Agent2 determining the same act 
is morally acceptable, an understanding of the differing conclusions can be 
reached by an examination of the worldviews on which they are based. If either 
agent can be shown that their worldview is flawed, or that a competing worldview 
is superior, then what constitutes flourishing for that agent may well change and 
with it what constitutes correct action. For example, when worldviews contained 
the assumption that Africans were less than human it was a simple matter to 
formulate the moral conclusion that using them as slaves was morally acceptable. 
As science progressed, and human knowledge increased, it became ever harder to 
rationally hold on to such a view, and as that worldview became far harder to 
justify so did the notion that slavery was morally acceptable.  
 
3.6 Moorean Challenges and Naturalistic Fallacies. 
Returning to Moore, I will consider one final point before dismissing the criticism 
that egoism is internally contradictory. It might be argued that I have moved, 
somewhat loosely, between talk of ‘the good’ and ‘flourishing’ throughout this 
chapter and in doing so have conflated the two and committed the naturalistic 
fallacy. Firstly, I do not believe this to be the case. In defending egoism against 
charges of contradiction I have been developing a standard for value judgements 
and in this respect the substitution of ‘flourishing’ for ‘the good’ was well 
motivated and necessary. Secondly, I do not believe that Moore’s open question 
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 The defence against Harman’s criticism outlined in this section has been very brief. The reason 
for keeping it brief is that the defence depends upon a deeper analysis of worldviews; I will 
undertake such an analysis in Chapter 6 when considering another of Harman’s criticisms. 
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‘Is flourishing itself Good?’ or ‘Ought we flourish, rather than do something 
else?’ makes any sense. In postulating flourishing as a standard by which right 
action can be judged, to ask if this standard is itself good is “presumptuous since it 
treats the question at hand as if it already had a good solution.” (Machan, 1985, 
p.389) ‘Is flourishing itself good?’ can only be answered if some independent 
standard for good already exists. While the question appears at face value to be 
important it either: 
(i) Reduces to a tautology; ‘Is flourishing flourishing?’  
 
If flourishing is the standard for good then it makes no sense whatsoever 
to ask if it is good. If, as will be argued throughout this thesis, flourishing 
is the standard by which good is to be measured then to ask ‘is flourishing 
good’ is simply not to ask a question. All an inquirer asks in questioning if 
flourishing is good is ‘if good is good’ and that is not a question. 
or,  
 
(ii) Requires a reference to some independent pre-existing standard of the good. 
 
That is, if we cannot use flourishing as our standard for good then the 
question cannot be answered unless we have some other standard 
reference for good. However, according to Moore’s naturalistic fallacy we 
can have no such standard.  
In this case the question ‘is flourishing good?’ is really ‘is flourishing 
good by reference to some indefinable concept?’ a question that is 
unanswerable and therefore meaningless. 
 
Moore’s question, as phrased, is either meaningless or unanswerable.  To make 
use of an analogy, the following question might be posed, ‘Is X really light?’ That 
is, “when a theory is advanced as to what light is, people can ask ‘but is that really 
light?’ as if they already know what light is.” (Machan, 1985, p.389). To ask if X 
is really Y (where X is an explanation of Y) is meaningless in that the question is 
unanswerable except by reference to X or to some other theory; a theory that 
would then itself face the exact same question.  
 
We should not ask if X is really Y but rather: Is X the best theoretical explanation 
of Y that is available to us? Similarly, the real question is not: ‘Is flourishing 
really good?’, but ‘Is flourishing the best explanation of good?’, i.e., ‘is 
flourishing the best candidate for serving as the standard for value judgements?’ – 
At this point the answer to the latter question appears to be yes. 
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3.7 Conclusion. 
The purpose of defending egoism from the criticisms in this section has been 
twofold. Firstly, if egoism was to fall to these criticisms there would be no point 
continuing with this line of investigation and thus a response to the criticisms is 
essential. In this respect I believe I have successfully shown that egoism, correctly 
formulated, involves no logical contradiction with regard the egoist’s concept of 
‘the Good’. 
 
The second purpose, as intimated above, was to determine how to best formulate 
the theory of egoism. In avoiding the criticism of contradiction it has been 
determined that the egoist must hold to a version of the good that is relative to a 
specific agent’s worldview.    
 
To briefly recap, in Chapter 2 I argued that egoism provided an answer to the 
question “what ought I to do?” and that any theory that provided an answer to this 
moral question qualified as a moral theory. In this chapter I have argued that 
egoism is not contradictory and made a first attempt at developing the initial 
premise of egoism.  
If  is Goodw(y) and Y is an egoist then Y has reason to bring about ’.  
 
If an agent recognises some ‘state of affairs’ as good, where good is relative to an 
agent’s worldview, then that agent (as an egoist) has strong moral reason to act in 
a manner that will bring about that ‘state of affairs’. I have not claimed that ethical 
egoism provides overriding reasons to act; but have instead argued that the very 
concept of overriding reasons for action is logically incoherent. An egoist can, and 
should, accept that there can be other reasons to act. In deciding how to act a 
process based on legal, financial, aesthetic, or religious theory could be applied 
and reasons for acting in a specific manner determined. An egoist must also 
accept that there are other moral theories and application of any of these theories 
will also provide a reasoned answer to the question how should I act.44 In 
becoming an ethical egoist what an agent does is not to deny that these other 
reasons for action exist but to give preference to self-interested reasons for action, 
claiming to be morally justified in doing so. Consider the task of buying a new 
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 I am assuming that all these theories meet the minimum requirement of adequacy. 
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fridge. An agent may simply apply financial reasoning; purchasing the fridge that 
best meets the agent’s budgetary restrictions. Likewise, the agent may apply only 
aesthetic reasons throwing financial concerns to the wind and purchasing the 
fridge that most matches the agent’s aesthetic sensibilities. However, if the agent 
asks ‘which fridge ought I buy?’ then the agent will turn to moral theory and the 
moral implications of such a purchase. Which moral theory an agent will turn to 
depends on which theory the agent believes offers the best explanation, or theory, 
of how an agent ought to act.45  
 
To allow that an agent has ‘strong reason to bring about ’ rather than ‘an agent is 
obligated to bring about ’ enables us to avoid falling into logical paradoxes, 
without rendering ethical statements meaningless. If, when faced with a tragic 
dilemma such that an agent has equal prima facie duties to act in mutually 
exclusive ways then a strong sense of ‘ought’ can result in logical contradictions. 
To say that ‘an agent is obligated to bring about , that is that an agent must act to 
bring about , but that the agent is not going to act is such a manner’ lacks sense. 
As Cordner (2001, p. 542) notes, if an agent claims ‘I have to do X but I’m not 
going to do X’ then at the point the agent commits to ‘I’m not going to do X’ the 
agent has already dismissed both the force of the obligation and the belief that the 
agent has to do X. However, if the moral ‘ought to’ means only that an agent has 
‘strong reason to’ then this sort of contradiction is overcome.  
 
The egoist doctrine that ‘an agent (Y) on recognition of some Goodw(y) ought to 
act so as to bring about that good ()’ means only that the agent (Y) has ‘strong 
(moral) but non-obligatory reason to act so as to bring about that good’. An agent 
can believe that ‘I ought to act to bring about ’ and continue to claim ‘yes, I 
ought to act to bring about ’ even as the agent commits to acting in some other 
manner. ‘Yes, I have strong reason to act to bring about  but (for some other 
reason) I am not going to’ expresses that an agent understands the reasons for 
acting to bring about  but on this occasion is determined to act otherwise, that is 
the agent has decided to give preference to some other reason for acting.  
However, while such a position avoids contradiction it may lead to inconsistencies 
or incoherence. I will now my attention to such criticisms. 
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 The position I am developing is subjective in the limited sense that, as I will go on to argue, it is 
logically impossible to claim one coherent moral theory is superior to another.  
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Chapter 4 
Inconsistency & Incoherence 
 
§4.0 Introduction 
Ethical egoism provides an agent with strong reason to carry out an action rather 
than an obligation to act. However, if an agent (y) recognises that  is Goodw(y) 
and therefore has strong reasons for acting so as to bring  about, then it is also 
reasonable to assume that the agent desires that  come about.  
 
Accepting that tragic dilemmas exist, situations will arise where an agent would 
desire (if it were possible) to take mutually exclusive actions. This being the case 
it seems likely that all moral theories will, on occasion, lead to inconsistent 
desires. However, it may simply be that ‘given the way the world is’, tragic 
dilemmas are unavoidable and the fact that moral theories may, on occasion, 
result in an agent formulating inconsistent ideas does not, in itself, present a major 
problem. Perhaps we need simply accept that situations arise for which no perfect 
solution exists.  
 
However, the question ‘what ought I do?’ does not surface only when an agent is 
left facing a tragic dilemma. If the consequence of attempting to answer this 
question by evoking a specific moral theory is that on each and every occasion the 
agent formulates inconsistent desires then it is unlikely any maximally informed 
agent would give preference to this kind of theory. It is the claim that egoism is 
such a theory that underlies Medlin’s (1957) criticism. Medlin argues that 
attempting to universalise egoism leads to a general inconsistency to the point 
where the theory becomes incoherent and offers no moral guidance. If this 
criticism is successful then egoism is not a moral theory (and perhaps not a valid 
theory at all) in that it fails to meet even the minimalist definition that a moral 
theory provides an answer to the question “what ought I to do?” 
 
§4.1 Ultimate Principles and Ethical Egoism 
Medlin claims that ultimate ethical principles are necessarily boldly asserted and 
are not the result of philosophical arguments. “To arrive at a conclusion in ethics 
one must have at least one ethical premiss. This premiss, if it be in turn a 
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conclusion, must be the conclusion of an argument containing at least one ethical 
premise. And so we can go back indefinitely but not for ever.” (Medlin, 1957, p. 
111). Medlin’s claim is that at some point all philosophical arguments either: 
 
(i) become circular and rely on the conclusion of some later argument as 
an essential premise.  
(ii) assert some naturalist claim and attempt to derive an ‘ought’ from an 
‘is’, or 
(iii) rely on the claim that bedrock has been reached and assert a value 
premise as being foundational.  
 
Arguments that rely on (i) or (ii) are usually dismissed on the grounds that (i) 
circular argument are fallacious46, and (ii) the claim that it is not possible to derive 
a value (how we ought to act) from a fact (how the world is)47. This leaves only 
(iii) arguments that make a claim that some principle is bedrock and must be 
accepted, without argument, if any progress is to be made.  In the case of moral 
theory this bedrock usually takes the form of an ultimate ethical principle. If this 
indeed is the case, then as Medlin notes, this principle ought to be closely 
scrutinised for “there is no room for reason even to go wrong”.  (1957, p.111) Any 
principle that is to stand, or be preferenced, as an ultimate principle of moral value 
must undergo the most rigorous examination. Medlin undertakes such an 
examination of the ultimate principle of egoism and claims that if egoism is a 
description of how we ought to act then its principle, which is nothing more than 
an “expression of incompatible desires” (Medlin, 1957, p.118) is unsuitable as a 
candidate for an ultimate moral principle. Further, if the ultimate principle on 
which egoism is based is dismissed then the theory itself must also be dismissed.  
 
Medlin begins by setting up the basic criteria for something to be classified as a 
moral theory. Firstly, Medlin (1957, pp. 112-123) claims that ethical egoism, if it 
is a moral theory, must be universal48. If an agent subscribes to a doctrine that 
cannot be promulgated, a doctrine that must be held in secret, then according to 
Medlin that agent holds no moral doctrine at all. Medlin implicitly accepts the 
claim that moral theory must be public and that a theory, held in secret, thus 
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 Although some trivial circularity may be deemed acceptable. 
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 I will not engage with this claim here. 
48
 For Medlin being universal appears to necessitate being public. 
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rendering an agent unable to enter moral debate or to give moral advice is 
something other than a moral theory. Medlin gives no argument as to why a moral 
theory must be universal or why it must be public49. However, given that this very 
discussion is about how agents ought to act I will accept that the discussion is, and 
indeed must be, about a public moral theory. It has not been determined that 
‘being universal’ is part of the minimum requirement of adequacy. However, for 
the sake of argument I will  accept Medlin’s stipulation that a theory must be 
universal, at least to the extent that any agent in the same circumstances facing the 
same moral choice ought, in applying a specific theory, reach the same moral 
conclusion. 
 
Secondly, Medlin (1957, p. 113-114) claims that egoism must be formulated as a 
categorical theory, that is, it must be consistent with the claim that the egoist 
doctrine incorporates an ultimate moral principle and that we ought to act in 
accordance with that principle “because that is what we ought to do”. If the egoist 
tries to avoid this formulation and instead claims that ‘an agent ought to act in 
accordance with the principles of egoism because…’ then the egoist is not an 
egoist. The ultimate principle subscribed to is whatever follows the ‘because’, and 
given the denial of the categorical formulation the principle must be something 
other than egoist in nature. 
 
To summarise, Medlin claims that: 
(i) A moral theory must be public and universal. 
(ii) A moral theory must be categorical not hypothetical. 
 
 
§4.1.1 Medlin’s attack on Ethical Egoism 
Medlin (1957, p.114) briefly attacks egoism on the grounds that, since it cannot be 
promulgated, egoism fails to meet the basic requirements of a moral theory, 
namely that such theories must be public. If an agent is an egoist and the primary 
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 Medlin (1957, p.114) does note that an agent could hold to a form of private egoism and while 
Medlin claims such a doctrine, if it is a doctrine at all, is not an ethical one he admits that an 
individual egoist may quarrel with this. Medlin offers only the following  reply to someone who 
holds such a position “Let him call himself what he will, it makes no difference. I’m a philosopher, 
not a rat catcher, and I don’t see it as my job to dig vermin out of such burrows as individual 
egoism”. I contend that individual egoism is not as impregnable as Medlin fears but will delay 
discussing the concept of a private morality until §4.2 and §4.2.1 
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concern of an egoist is to further the egoist’s own interests then, according to 
Medlin, in many cases to promulgate the egoist doctrine and to recommend that 
others give primacy to their own interests would be to frustrate the egoist’s own 
interests and hence to act contrary to the principles of egoism.  
 
With reference to the infected scientists scenario (§2.5), if one of the scientists 
was an egoist and the remainder subscribed to virtue theory then it would be 
contrary to the egoist’s doctrine to promulgate the doctrine and in doing so risk 
persuading the others that egoism is a preferable ethical theory. Further, if after 
the drawing of straws the egoist is fortunate enough to be the winner then the 
egoist is better off applauding the others’ virtue (as they wait to die), keeping his 
beliefs about how they ought to act to himself. I have already claimed that the 
infection case is a special one and bereft of easy moral answers. However, 
Medlin’s claim is far more general, namely that in ordinary everyday cases it will 
be contrary to the interests of the egoist to promulgate his doctrine. In promoting 
their own interests, others will invariably have an impact on the egoist’s interests 
and thus it is contrary to the egoist’s interests to convince others to adopt this 
doctrine.  
 
Medlin considers two responses the egoist may raise. Firstly, the egoist might 
claim that the doctrine can be promulgated as long as it is fully understood what it 
is to be in an ‘agent’s ultimate interest’. I have already advanced this line of 
argument in attempting to show that the egoist doctrine tends to promote co-
operation and that the egoist has a self- interest in avoiding conflict (§2.5). Medlin 
thinks it will always be possible to force this type of defense into hypothetical 
egoism and ultimately show that some general principle other than egoism is 
being defended50. Secondly, the egoist may claim that the doctrine may be 
promulgated as long as the agent promulgating the doctrine takes pleasure from 
doing so (that is, it is in that agent’s self-interest to promulgate the doctrine). 
However, Medlin concludes, rightly I think, that this second defense is just a 
disguised form of individual egoism in which, just as a matter of chance, the 
egoist takes enjoyment from promulgating the doctrine.  
                                                
50
 Claims such as we will all be better off if we act out of self-interest showing the assumed egoist 
to be a confused utilitarian. 
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The criticism that egoism cannot be promulgated is serious and I will return to this 
claim in later sections. However, I will set it aside for the moment, just as Medlin 
does (believing it unnecessary to develop this line of attack), in order to move on 
to a criticism that Medlin claims is “both fatal and irrefutable”. 
 
§4.1.2 Ethical Egoism: Inconsistency and Incoherence 
Medlin (1957, p. 166) claims that the egoist’s belief that ‘I should act for my self-
interest’ can be equated with ‘I want to be happy’ and ‘I ought to do whatever 
makes me happy’. Further, Medlin insists that this also involves the attitude ‘I 
want myself not to care about others’. However, while it may be that the egoist 
has no primary reason to act for the happiness of others (unless doing so promotes 
the egoist’s own happiness) this does not mean that the egoist must refrain from 
doing so, nor does it entail that the egoist does not care about others. Nothing in 
the egoist doctrine suggests that he ought not, or does not, care about others only 
that the preferred reasons for action involve primarily self-interest. Perhaps 
Medlin means that the egoist does not care about others as an end in itself. Even 
so, the claim seems insufficient to support Medlin’s view. 
 
The egoist doctrine developed so far  (§3.7) consists of the conjunct: 
I (Agent1) in recognising  as GoodW(Agent1) (that is,  is good in itself 
relative to Agent1’s worldview) have good reason to bring  about.  
and 
I (Agent1) in acknowledging that  is GoodW(Agent n) (that is,  is good for 
some other agent ‘n’ relative to that agent’s worldview) do not have good 
reason to bring  about. 
 
Inserting Medlin’s emotivist view (with regard to moral language) the claims that 
 is good relative to my worldview, is in my self-interest, and that I have good 
reason to  equates to me wanting and desiring . Accepting that I do desire that 
 comes about the conjunct can be reformulated as: 
I (Agent1) in recognising  as GoodW(Agent1) (that is,  is good in itself 
relative to Agent1’s worldview) desire that  comes about. 
and 
I (Agent1) in acknowledging that  is GoodW(Agent n) (that is,  is good for 
some other agent ‘n’ relative to that agent’s worldview) do not desire that 
 comes about. 
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Medlin, applying the principle of universalisability, claims that the principle 
applied to Agent1 must equally be applied to Tom (Agent2), Dick (Agent3), and 
Harry (Agent4) and that this “can be expressed by an infinite number of avowals” 
(Medlin 1957, p. 115). 
I (Agent1) in recognising GoodW(Agent1) want (desire) GoodW(Agent1) to come 
about.  
and 
I (Agent1) in recognising GoodW(Agent2) want (desire) GoodW(Agent2) to come 
about.  
and 
I (Agent1) in recognising GoodW(Agent3) want (desire) GoodW(Agent3) to come 
about.  
and 
I (Agent1) in recognising GoodW(Agent4) want (desire) GoodW(Agent4) to come 
about.  
 
and with reference to the second clause of Medlin’s conjunct and in 
accordance with egoism. 
 
I (Agent1) in recognising GoodW(Agentn) have no desire that GoodW(Agentn) 
comes about. 
  
I have already argued that an agent is not obligated to act for another’s good 
because good is relative to an agent’s worldview and in most cases Agent1 will 
not have access to Agent2’s worldview and thus no knowledge of Agent2’s good. 
However, although an agent, in most cases, cannot know the specifics of another’s 
good the agent does know that there is something that represents good, albeit 
relative to that agent’s worldview. Further, Agent1 must accept that the good of 
others (GoodW(Agentn)) may be identical to Agent1’s own good (GoodW(Agent1)) or, 
that some other agent
 
in pursuing what that agent recognises as good 
(GoodW(Agentn)) may act in a manner that is detrimental to Agent1’s good.51 
Consider some scenario where the good of several agents requires the mutually 
exclusive acts (such as the laboratory/antidote scenario in §2.5 where the good of 
one agent, i.e. getting the antidote, excludes others from attaining their good). 
According to Medlin: 
                                                
51
 Medlin (1957, p.117) does consider the counter-arguments that (given the world was different 
than it is) everyone could obtain whatever was good relative to that agent. However, as Medlin 
goes on to note, this is simply not the case in this world and everyday examples of conflict are 
commonplace. Further, it is pointless for the egoist to claim ‘if the world were different….’ as to 
do so would be to slip into hypothetical egoism and ultimately to argue as a utilitarian; if the world 
was such that acting as an egoist maximised happiness (utilitarian ultimate principle) then we 
ought to act as egoists. 
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By universalising egoism: I desire that I get the antidote and, I desire that 
Agent1 gets the antidote and, I desire that Agent2 gets the antidote and, I 
desire that Agent3 gets the antidote and, I desire that Agent4 gets the 
antidote. 
 
By egoism itself:  I desire that I get the antidote and therefore also desire 
that others (Agents2-4) do not get the antidote. 
 
Clearly such desires are inconsistent and incompatible. Further, if these desires 
are equal in strength (and according to the principle of universability they must be 
equal) then the egoist theory provides no action guidance. Faced with equal, 
mutually exclusive, and competing desires, no answer to the question ‘what ought 
I to do?’ has been provided. This leads Medlin to conclude that egoism is not only 
inconsistent but also incoherent. In Medlin’s view egoism, taken at face value, 
only appears to be a theory of how to act; once egoism is universalised it provides 
no such direction. Rather, an agent is presented with an infinite number of 
conjuncts that each provide equally compelling force toward incompatible ends. If 
a theory of action fails to give any action guidance, or presents guidance that 
cannot be followed, then nothing has been said. Medlin concludes that 
universalised egoism fails to provide action guidance, is therefore incoherent and 
in failing to answer the question “what ought I to do?’ is not even a moral theory. 
 
§4.2 Kalin: In Defence of Egoism 
Kalin (1995, p. 83) attacks the underlying logic of Medlin’s argument and claims 
an error has been made in universalising the egoist principle. Moving from the 
egoist principle that ‘I ought to (or have strong reason to)….’ to ‘others ought to 
(or have strong reason to)….’ does not result in the type of conjunct that Medlin 
envisages.  An agent who subscribes to egoism is someone who desires to follow, 
or give preference to, the dictates of egoist doctrine: 
(a) I (Agent1) desire to act in accordance with the dictates of egoism. 
 
Universalising this principle means that the egoist (Agent1) believes others 
(Agentn) ought to act in accordance with the dictates of egoism and, according to 
Medlin, wants others to act in accordance with egoism. The correct conjunct to (a) 
is: 
(b)  I (Agent1) desire that others (Agentn) act in accordance with the 
dictates of egoism. 
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If the clause ‘dictates of egoism’ is fully expanded in terms of the egoist ultimate 
principle (as developed so far), universalising egoism results in the following 
conjunct: 
I (Agent1) in recognising  as GoodW(Agent1) (that is,  is good in itself 
relative to Agent1’s worldview) have good reason to bring  about.  
In Medlin’s terms, Agent1 wants, and desires that  come about. 
 And 
I (Agent1) want others (Agentn) in recognising  as GoodW(Agentn) to 
acknowledge they have good reason to bring  about. 
In Medlin’s terms, Agent1 desires that Agentn desires  comes about. 
 
Agent1 does not want GoodW(Agent n) to come about. Agent1 wants Agentn to want 
GoodW(Agent n) to come about.  
 
Kalin demonstrates the principle by analogy to sports and games. In any sports 
match a team does not want the opposition to win. Rather, the team wants the 
opposition to want to win (in order that good competition follows). But, at the 
same time as a team wants the opposition to want to win, they also want the actual 
result to be that the opposition loses.   
 
The infinite conjunction of avowals52 that the egoist holds is: 
I (Agent1) in recognising GoodW(Agent1) want (desire) GoodW(Agent1) to come 
about.  
and 
I (Agent1) in recognising GoodW(Agentn) want (desire) Agentn  to want 
Goodw(Agentn) to come about.  
and 
I (Agent1) do not want (desire) GoodW(Agentn)  to come about unless 
GoodW(Agentn)  is beneficial (GoodW(Agent1)) to Agent1. 
 
Kalin claims that such a universalised position is both consistent and coherent 
and, as Sidgwick notes, even though from the point of view of the universe, it may 
be preferable to act for a greater good than a lesser good it is “also undeniably 
reasonable for the individual to prefer his own” (Sidgwick, 1913, Preface to Sixth 
Edition, p. xviii). 
                                                
52
 Medlin declares the conjunct to be ‘infinite’.  The conjunct refers to the conjunction of the 
desires of all humans (and possibly all future generations) even so the conjunction is really only 
very large not infinite. 
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Surprisingly, given that he is writing in defence of egoism, Kalin (1995, p. 86) 
agrees with Medlin that the egoist cannot promulgate the doctrine. Further, given 
that the doctrine cannot be promulgated, Kalin (1995, p. 86) claims the egoist is 
also prevented from joining moral discussion, giving or receiving moral advice, 
establishing laws based on egoism, teaching morality to others, or justifying 
actions to others. Kalin claims that the egoist’s inability to promulgate the 
doctrine poses no significant problem for egoism because there is no reason why 
an egoist must promulgate the doctrine. According to Kalin (1995, p. 89) egoism 
is essentially a private morality.  
 
§4.2.1 Kalin, Wittgenstein, and Private Morality 
Assuming that the logic of Kalin’s defence is sound, like Hauptli (2002) I am left 
wondering what exactly the purpose of a private morality is. Early in his thesis 
Kalin (1995, p. 83) claims that the egoist is not affirming a moral doctrine simply 
so he can get his goodies out of life (no moral theory being necessary for such a 
course of action). However, it appears that the only function performed by Kalin’s 
version of egoism is the self-justification for an agent ‘getting his goodies out of 
life’. Given that Kalin’s egoist must hold his doctrine in secret and apply the 
theory without recourse to any external criterion it would appear that there is no 
way for an agent to distinguish between acting out of self-interest and acting out 
of desire that is perceived (by the agent) as self-interest. 
 
I will argue that a strong parallel exists between attempting to hold a private 
theory and attempting to employ a private language and that Kalin’s private 
morality is subject to Wittgenstein’s criticism of private language.   
 
Let us imagine the following case. I want to keep a diary about the 
recurrence of a certain sensation. To this end I associate it with the sign 
"S" and write this sign in a calendar for every day on which I have the 
sensation. - I will remark first of all that a definition of the sign cannot be 
formulated. - but still I give myself a kind of ostensive definition. How? 
Can I point to the sensation? Not in the ordinary sense. But I speak, or 
write the sign down, and at the same time I concentrate my attention on 
the sensation. But what is this ceremony for? for that is all it seems to be. 
A definition surely serves to establish the meaning of a sign. - Well that is 
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done precisely by the concentration of my attention; for in this way I 
impress upon myself the connection between the sign and the sensation. 
But "I impress it on myself" can only mean: this process brings it about 
that I remember the connection right in the future. But in the present case I 
have no criterion of correctness. One would like to say: Whatever is going 
to seem right to me is right, and that only means that here we can’t talk 
about ‘right’. (Wittgenstein, 2001, Part 1, §258) 
 
What I take Wittgenstein to mean is that, given I have a private mental state to 
which I refer by a specific sign  ‘S’, there is no criterion of correctness by which I 
can test if the sign ‘S’ is rightly applied to some later mental state. There is no 
possible test to confirm either that I am using ‘S’ correctly or whether the 
experienced mental state is similar, in all relevant respects, to the earlier one. Talk 
of my private mental state now being the same type of mental state ‘S’ is 
meaningless.  The most that can be claimed is that the private mental state I am 
experiencing now seems like the same type of mental state I previously referred to 
as ‘S’. 
 
I suggest something similar happens when Kalin’s egoist attempts to apply his 
private morality. The egoist, facing a moral choice, internally questions ‘What 
ought I do now?’ and claims I ought to act to bring about  because  is in my 
best interest. However, given that the reasons the egoist believes ‘’ to be in his 
best interest are private (and according to Kalin cannot be shared or discussed 
without violating the egoist principle) then there is no way of determining the 
truth of the claim that  is actually in the agent’s best interest. Given the 
compelling force of human ‘wants’ and ‘desires’ it is easy to imagine that an 
agent could mislabel a ‘want’, rather than a ‘best interest’, as .  An agent wants 
to bring about  because that agent believes  to be in his best interests. 
However, the only test as to  actually being in the agent’s best interest is 
internal, so there is no testable difference between what seems to be in the agent’s 
best interest and what actually is in the agent’s best interest.   
 
I am not claiming that the argument against private morality is the same as the 
private language argument or that the argument can be directly carried across. 
However, the structure of the two arguments does suggest an interesting parallel. 
Further, if we adopt Kripke’s (1982, pp. 109-110) view that the private language 
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argument is an example of the impossibility of following a private rule then the 
argument against private morality is another, strikingly similar, example. Kripke 
goes on to claim, the conclusion to the private language argument can be found 
prior to its specific formulation; “Hence it is not possible to obey a rule 
‘privately’: otherwise thinking one was obeying a rule would be the same thing as 
obeying it.”  (Wittgenstein, 2001, Part 1, §258) For Kalin’s private egoist there is 
no difference between following the dictates of egoism, and acting out of self-
interest, and acting in a manner believed to be the dictates of egoism, but 
potentially nothing more than fulfilling some desire. It may well turn out that the 
egoist is acting out of self-interest, but without some means of verification, a 
verification that must be external to the agent, the claim that a moral doctrine is 
being adhered to must be abandoned. A minimum requirement of adequacy 
appears to be that for a theory to be applied that theory must be public. 
 
§4.2.2 Kalin, Carlson, and What the Egoist Wants 
Even assuming Kalin’s thesis can be reformulated to overcome the outlined 
problem in holding a private morality the thesis is still open to a second form of 
attack, namely that Kalin hasn’t actually universalised egoism but rather presented 
some type of sophisticated individual egoism.  
 
Carlson (1973, p. 28) attacks Kalin’s notion of (weak) universalizability and 
argues that it is not a case of universalizability at all. Carlson does so by 
examining the sports analogy, given that Kalin’s defense of egoism “depends for 
its plausibility on the analogy with the competitive game situation” (Carlson, 
1973, p. 27). In highlighting a flaw in the sports model, Carlson exposes a similar 
weakness in Kalin’s claim that ethical egoism can be consistently universalised. 
Carlson focuses his attention on the following passage from Kalin: 
But does believing that A ought to Y commit one to wanting A to do Y? 
Surely not. This is made clear by the analogy with competitive games. 
Team A has no difficulty in believing that team B ought to make or try to 
make a field goal while not wanting team B to succeed, while hoping that 
team B fails, and, indeed, while trying to prevent team B’s success. Or 
consider this example: I may see how my chess opponent can put my king 
in check. That is how he ought to move. But believing that he ought to 
move his bishop does not commit me to wanting him to do that, nor to 
persuading him to do so. What I ought to do is sit there quietly, hoping he 
does not move as he ought (Kalin, 1995, p. 82-83). 
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According to Carlson (1973, p. 27), Kalin conflates the hypothetical ‘(I believe) A 
ought to Y if A wants to succeed’ with the categorical ‘(I believe) A ought to try 
to succeed’.  In the football example the fundamental belief, derived from 
universalising egoism, is not that A believes that B ought to try to make a field 
goal. Rather, what A believes is that  B ought to try to win the game. In saying 
that ‘team A’ believes ‘team B’ ought to kick the field goal Kalin suppresses the 
antecedent; what team A believes is that team B ought to make or try to make a 
field goal if team B wants to win the game.  
 
However, given that team A does not want team B to actually win the game (and 
winning the game involves successfully scoring field goals), team A “does not 
believe that team B ought to make a field goal” (Carlson, 1973, p. 27). Likewise 
in the chess game, it is not the case that (I believe) my opposition ought to put my 
king into check but that I don’t want him to; rather (I believe) my opposition 
ought to put my king into check if my opposition wants to win the game. I do not 
want my opposition to ‘succeed’ in winning the game and therefore I do not 
believe my opposition ought to succeed at putting my king into check.  
 
Kalin makes a two-part claim (i) I believe A ought to Y, and (ii) I don’t want A to 
Y. However, once the hypothetical is exposed (ii) is rendered obsolete. Similarly, 
in the chess game, that I don’t want my opposition to put my king into check is 
made redundant when the hypothetical ‘A ought to put me in check if A wants to 
win’ is exposed. While it is true that I don’t want my opposition to put my king 
into check it is also true that I do not believe my opposition ought to succeed in 
putting my king into check given that I don’t believe the opposition ought to win 
the game. The crux of Carlson’s criticism is that Kalin has conflated (i) what ‘(I 
believe) others ought to try to do, but that I don’t want them to do’ with (ii) what 
‘(I believe) others ought to do (i.e. to succeed at doing), but that I don’t want them 
to do’. According to Carlson an egoist could hold (i) which equates to, others 
ought to attempt to be egoists but I want them to fail, but cannot hold (ii) others 
ought to be successful egoists. If (ii) cannot be held then universalisation (in 
Kalin’s weak sense) has failed.  
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Presumably the reason I (Agent1) act in accordance with the dictates of egoism is 
that I believe that the right thing to do is to make every attempt to maximise my 
interests. Therefore an egoist can be referred to as having successfully achieved 
the goals of egoism if at the end of the day the egoist’s interests have, as a matter 
of fact, been maximised. As the egoist cannot believe an opposition ‘ought to 
move so as to win the game if the egoist’s interests are maximised by winning’, 
likewise an egoist (Agent1) cannot believe that ‘others ought to successfully act in 
accordance with the dictates of egoism if in doing so the actions of others will 
prevent, or negatively impact upon, Agent1’s interests. 
 
If an agent holds: 
 (i) I (Agent1) ought to be successful in following the dictates of egoism 
 
then the correctly universalised form of (i) is: 
(ii) I (Agent1) want (desire) others (Agentn) to successfully act in   
      accordance with the dictates of egoism 
 
and, if others acting as egoists will be detrimental to Agent1’s self-interests, then 
Agent1 also holds: 
(iii) I (Agent1) want (desire) “the circumscription of the range and             
      multiplicity of [my] own satisfactions” (Carlson, 1973, p.28). 
 
Such wants are clearly inconsistent and, ultimately, incoherent. The egoist wants 
both to succeed in maximising interests and, in wanting others to be successful, to 
fail at maximising those interests. As Carlson (1973, p. 29) notes, the only way 
Kalin can avoid this inconsistency is if he holds the position that an egoist 
believes others ought only to attempt to be egoists and that the egoist wants them 
to fail in this attempt. That is, to avoid inconsistency, Kalin’s egoist must hold: 
 
(i) the egoist (Agent1) ought to successfully maximise self-interest  
(ii) others (Agentn) ought to attempt but fail at maximising interests.  
 
However, the expense of retreating to such a position is the giving up of universal 
egoism in favour of individual egoism; (ii) is not a universalised form of (i).  
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§4.2.3 Private Universal Egoism  
At this point it would appear Kalin’s private universal ethical egoism is in serious 
trouble. Firstly, according to Carlson the attempt to universalise egoism has failed. 
Kalin conflates the distinction between attempting to act as an egoist and 
successfully acting as an egoist, and his universal egoism is really just an 
elaborate formulation of individual egoism. Secondly, even if Carlson’s criticism 
could be overcome, I am extremely doubtful that a private morality is possible.  
 
However, I will argue that Kalin’s attempt to universalise egoism can be 
successfully developed and that the egoism that follows from such a development 
is both consistent and public – an agent can promulgate egoism, in most cases, 
without acting in a manner that is detrimental to the agent’s self-interest. To do so 
it will be necessary to develop a two-factor account of egoism, one that separates 
reasons for action and motivation to act. 
 
§4.3 Re-Universalising Ethical Egoism 
The ultimate principle the egoist believes, is that if  is good in itself relative to 
the egoist’s worldview then  provides the egoist with strong moral reason to act. 
However, that an agent who subscribes to egoism has moral reason to act for that 
agent’s own self-interest does not lead to the conclusion that an agent who 
subscribes to egoism has an overriding reason to act in order to bring  about on 
each and every occasion; as discussed in §2.3, the egoist may have numerous 
reasons to act otherwise. In applying the principles of egoism in a specific 
scenario, the egoist will be advised to act in a specific manner, however the egoist 
may act nonmorally and instead apply some other theory of action guidance53, a 
theory that may advise the agent to act in some other manner. If n valid theories of 
action exist and no specific theory can be shown to be objectively superior then 
the answer to the question which course of action will I take in this situation is 
multiply realisable. If egoist theory is applied then acting so as to bring  about is 
determined as the correct moral act. However, the egoist need not consider every 
decision he makes as a moral one and may apply a nonmoral theory in 
                                                
53While consistency requires that the agent ascribes to a single moral theory the egoist may also 
ascribe to other decision making theories (such as financial) that are more applicable within certain 
contexts. 
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determining how to act in a specific scenario.54 It is only when the egoist 
considers the scenario has moral implications and asks ‘how ought I to act?’, that 
acting in a manner determined by a nonmoral theory and contrary to that advised 
by egoism is determined as less than ideal. An egoist does not claim that certain 
types of reason are objectively superior. However, if the egoist determines this to 
be a moral scenario, such that the question ‘how ought I to act’ is relevant, then in 
doing so the egoist is giving preference to reason for acting based on the egoist 
axioms of self-interest.  
 
Universalising this principle does not require incorporating the claim that egoism 
is overridingly superior to other theories and therefore universalising egoism does 
not determine how an agent who subscribes to egoism must act  (as Medlin, Kalin, 
and Carlson seem to accept) but rather provides moral reasons for acting as well 
as the moral justification for those actions. 
 
If  is recognised as good in itself relative to Agentn’s worldview then  
provides Agentn with strong moral reason to, and justification for acting to 
bring  about. 
 
This first factor principle provides an egoist with moral reason to act but does not 
in itself completely motivate the egoist to act, as competing reasons may motivate 
the egoist to act otherwise. In making such a claim I am accepting that reasons are 
causes of actions in something akin to Davidson’s position: 
R is a primary reason why an agent performed the action A, under 
description d, only if R consists of a pro-attitude of the agent towards 
actions with a certain property, and a belief of the agent that A, under the 
description d, has that property. (1963, p. 687) 
 
 
An egoist has a pro-attitude towards self-interest and will find reason for acting 
where the agent believes that a certain action will hold that property. However, an 
agent may hold several such pro-attitudes that may provide the agent with 
competing reasons to act in different manners. That said, the egoist places strong 
                                                
54
 As indeed we often do. We do not, as a rule, morally question how we ought to act with regard 
to day to day routine. How much will I spend on groceries is usually the result of financial 
decision making rather than based on moral concerns. 
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import on the moral doctrine of egoism and the pro-attitude toward self-interest is 
likely, all things considered, to provide the egoist with primary reason for acting. 
 
I began this chapter assuming that if an egoist (Agent1) recognised  as 
Goodw(Agent1) then Agent1 had strong reason for bringing  about and that it was 
also reasonable to assume that Agent1 desired  came about. As has already been 
noted the egoist may have other reasons to act, reasons that are the result of 
applying nonmoral theories of action and that may prescribe a different course of 
action. Further, given the complexity of human life it is likely that several 
outcomes may also be recognised as Goodw(Agent1) and that both  and  may be 
Goodw(Agent1) and provide Agent1 with strong mutually exclusive reasons to act. 
These problems can be overcome, to some degree, by adding the clause ‘and 
would maximise an agent’s interests’ to the egoist principle:  
If  is recognised as good in itself relative to Agentn’s worldview and 
acting to bring  about would maximise Agentn’s interests then  
provides Agentn with strong moral reason to, and justification for acting. 
 
This overcomes the problem of competing goods. However, that an agent has 
strong moral reasons to bring  about does not necessarily lead to an agent 
wanting or being motivated to bring  about as, on a specific occasion, an agent 
may be motivated to act from reasons that arise through the application of 
nonmoral theories. There is nothing irrational in claiming that ‘egoism is the 
preferable moral theory but on this specific occasion I am going to preference 
nonmoral reasons for action’, for example an agent may simply act on a whim. 
 
The egoist’s ultimate moral principle is that maximised self-interest provides an 
agent with reasons for acting. This principle can be universalised without 
contradiction or inconsistency and simply points to the uncontroversial concept 
that all agents have self-interested reasons for acting55. It is a completely different 
matter whether an agent will, or should, act because of those reasons. 
 
 
 
                                                
55
 It is of course controversial that these are moral reasons.  But this is secondary to the point I am 
currently making. 
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§4.4 Ethical Egoism and Moral Motivation 
As I argued in Chapter 2 it is unlikely moral reasons have overriding status, 
therefore the degree of motivation an agent will have to act morally depends on 
the degree of conviction an agent has that reasons derived from the application of 
a moral theory are preferable to reasons derived from a nonmoral theory or 
principle. I contend that an ethical egoist is someone who: 
(i) believes that in most cases moral theories provide reasons for action 
that are preferable to nonmoral ones. 
and 
(ii) believes that moral reasons derived from self-interest are preferable to 
those derived from other-regarding reasons for action. 
 
I have already argued that so long as a theory meets some minimum requirements 
(consistency, coherence, possibly noncontradiction) then it is not logically 
possible to claim that any specific theory that meets these minimum requirements 
is superior to any other theory that also meets these minimum requirements 
(§2.3)56. Ultimately the method of moral reasoning that an agent subscribes to is 
entirely individual and a matter of personal preference (assuming, as I have 
claimed, that more than one method of moral reasoning meets these 
requirements). That an agent believes a theory X, given that X is a coherent 
consistent theory, offers the best explanation for Y is, in itself, suitable 
justification for an agent subscribing to X. To convince someone that they are 
mistaken in this approach requires either convincing them that another theory is 
preferable (for whatever reason) or demonstrating that the currently preferred 
theory fails to meet the minimum requirements for being considered a theory of 
any kind. 
 
For an agent to claim that a theory, in this case egoism, is preferable (in that it 
provides better reasons for action than do other theories) is also to accept that, in 
most cases, those reasons provide the agent with the motivation to act in the way 
that the theory ascribes. In short, if A believes X is the preferable theory of action 
guidance and X recommends acting to bring  about then A is likely to be 
motivated to act so as to bring  about. 
                                                
56
 An extra criterion is necessary if we are to separate moral theory from theories in general. That a 
theory is coherent etc is insufficient for claiming it provides a relevant solution to a moral 
question. I will examine this final criterion in the final chapters of part one. 
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§4.4.1 Internal and External Reasons 
The position I am outlining has some similarity with Bernard Williams’ (1981) 
thesis that “we cannot have genuine reasons to act that have no connection 
whatever with anything that we care about” (Chappell, 2006). However, I am not 
claiming that external reasons for action (reasons not personally connected to an 
agent’s wants and desires) can always be reduced to some kind of internal desire 
satisfaction, except perhaps on some purely formal level.  At a very basic level it 
appears to be part of the human condition to try to make sense of the world and 
thus, at a primary level all reasoning is fueled by an internal desire for 
explanation.  
 
However, making sense of the world requires not only explaining events in the 
natural world but also explaining why humans act as they do. In this respect when 
we question why X did Y we are asking for greater explanation than just X had an 
internal desire to Y and doing Y satisfied that desire. What we are often asking is, 
what reasons provided the dominant motivation for X doing Y?  
 
Every agent, prior to acting, may face a multitude of competing reasons. When 
contemplating ‘What ought I to do?’ an agent finds external reasons of the form: 
Financially I ought to…, legally I ought to…, for other-regarding reasons I ought 
to…, for self-interested reasons I ought to…57, all of these reasons, in as much as 
they are the result of consistent and coherent theories of action, equally present 
the agent with reasons to act. However, and in this I agree with Williams (1981, 
p.111), none of these reasons in themselves motivates the agent to act. While 
initially it is an agent’s desire that motivates an agent’s rational deliberation over 
‘how the agent ought to act’ (without a desire for answers the deliberation process 
would not even commence), it is from that point a continual synthesis of internal 
and external reasons that lead to, and provide, an agent’s desires and motivation 
for action. 
 
Human desire for answers leads to the deliberation over external reasons for 
action. Deliberation over external reasons for action leads to an agent formulating 
                                                
57
 Ethical self-interested reasons for action are external and the result of rational considerations 
whereas physiological egoism would represent internal reason for action. 
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a belief that X is a better type of reason for action58.  A belief that X is a better 
type of reason provides internal reason (and motivation) for acting upon some 
specific external reason. Beliefs about the best type of reason lead to deliberation 
over, and preferencing of, certain types of external reasons for action in specific 
contexts. Such a process is not static; in deliberating over external reasons in 
specific contexts and debating these reasons, agents may, over time, come to 
modify their beliefs and preferences over what represents the best type of reason 
(or, if a type of reasoning can be shown to be unsound, to dismiss that type of 
reasoning altogether).  
 
To recapitulate, in attempting to answer the question ‘how ought I to act?’ an 
agent may formulate the belief that actions that accord with reasons of the type 
provided by the egoist doctrine are preferable. Motivated by the belief that egoist 
reasons are the preferable type of reason, an agent who faces a specific moral 
dilemma is likely to be motivated to act in accordance with the egoist doctrine. 
However, if the act promoted by the egoist doctrine conflicts with the agent’s 
other beliefs (other reasons for acting or, perhaps, intuitions) the agent may find it 
necessary to re-examine the initially accepted theory. If that agent then finds it 
necessary to modify or replace the previously accepted theory then a new belief 
about the preferable type of reason for action will be formulated and along with it 
the motivation to act in such a manner.  
 
Reasons for acting are, and must be, universalisable. However, that a reason to act 
provides an agent with the motivation to act on those reasons depends upon the 
agent giving preference to those reasons over competing reasons that might also 
motivate action. The ultimate principle of egoism provides reason for acting and 
is universalisable. Accepting the dictates of egoism as providing reasons to act is a 
matter of assigning individual preference to those reasons. 
(i) (Universal principle of ethical egoism) If  is recognised as good 
in itself relative to Agentn’s worldview and acting to bring about  
is the act that would maximise Agentn’s interests then  provides 
Agentn with strong moral reason to, and justification for acting. 
 
                                                
58
 It might also lead to the agent adopting some nihilistic position that no reasons are preferable. 
However, I take the very fact a nihilistic position frustrates the initial desire for answers to be one 
of the reasons the position is avoided. 
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(ii) (Individual motivation for acting) If Agentn believes that ethical 
egoism provides preferable reasons for acting then Agentn will, in 
most cases, be motivated to act in accordance with (i). 
 
 
The egoist principle (i) is universal in that every agent is provided with self-
interested reasons to act. However, the motivation for acting (ii) is individual as 
the belief and acceptance of a specific theory as preferable is relative to the 
individual agent. Egoism might appear paradoxical if it is seen as dictating how an 
agent must act. But this is not actually the case for once it is accepted that egoism 
is simply a theory that provides reasons for acting it can be seen that although an 
agent believes that X is the preferable theory this does not equate to X being the 
preferable theory, nor that all agents ought to act in accordance with X. 
 
To recapitulate, I am examining the claim that egoism is a coherent, consistent 
and non-contradictory theory of action. I am not claiming it is the theory of action 
or that it is inherently superior to other theories of action. As I have previously 
argued it is logically impossible to label one of competing coherent theories as 
superior except from within the viewpoint of that theory.  
 
§4.5 Ethical Egoism and the Sports Model 
Kalin’s defence of egoism (§4.2) relies on an analogy with a sports model, a 
model with which I am uneasy. It simply does not seem to represent a good 
analogy given that games, in general, are built on a model of conflict whereas 
morality is supposedly concerned with conflict avoidance and resolution. A good 
competition is one where the state of conflict is present and promoted throughout 
the duration of the game. Morality (generally) is designed to resolve conflict and 
in terms of morality the sooner the conflict is resolved the better. It would appear 
that applying moral theory to a game scenario would effectively be to defeat the 
purpose of the game. Consider the bizarre results of applying utilitarian logic to 
the sports model. Should I kick a field goal? Well, if my team are the unsupported 
underdogs and more people would gain satisfaction from the favourites winning 
then No! I ought to refrain from kicking, or purposely miss the field goal.   
 
However, for consistency with the previous sections I will retain the model and 
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while I am doubtful of the analogy it does at least do enough to demonstrate that 
egoism can be universalised without any of the inconsistency that Carlson 
envisages. Consider the final moves in a game of chess.59 I have just made a bad 
move such that if my opposition (Deb) notices my error she will be able to 
capitalise on the mistake, move her rook, place me in checkmate, and win the 
game. However, if Deb overlooks my mistake it is I who will be able to capitalise 
on the position and win the game. If the egoist principle is applied to this case it 
would seem that: 
(i) Upon noticing my error, and assuming Deb wants to win the game, 
Deb  has strong reason to move the rook and win the game. 
(ii) I, in wanting to win the game, have strong reason for wanting Deb 
not to move the rook. 
(iii) I, in wanting to win the game, have strong reason for not drawing 
Deb’s attention to the game-winning move. 
 
There is nothing inconsistent in my accepting that Deb has good reason to place 
me in check (universalised ultimate principle of egoism) and my also not wanting 
Deb to place me in check (I lack motivation toward this end), hoping that either 
(a) Deb doesn’t realise such an act is an option, or, (b) is motivated to act from 
some other reason. Universalising reason for action does not lead to wanting those 
actions to come about or to wanting others to want those actions to come about. 
Neither am I prevented from promulgating the egoistic principle and discussing 
reasons for action; Deb would undoubtedly be completely unsurprised, after 
asking what she ought to do, by my stating the somewhat obvious claim that she 
has good reason to make whichever move is most likely to promote her winning 
the game. In terms of motivation to act, (in so much as I am an egoist) I am 
motivated by my belief that egoism provides a better type of reason to accept (ii) 
and (iii) as preferable reasons in this scenario and I am motivated (iii) not to draw 
Deb’s attention to the rook move.  
 
However, a problem arises if Deb asks ‘Should I move the rook?’60 How, as an 
egoist, am I supposed to answer this question? I would be answering truthfully if I 
replied ‘No, although you have good reason to move the rook, in that it would 
                                                
59
 I selected the chess game analogy as this simplifies the event to competition between two agents 
rather than two teams. 
60
 A possible but unlikely state of affairs in that if Deb wants to win, and recognises the rook 
move, then this in itself ought to motivate Deb to move the rook. 
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further your self-interest in enabling you to win the game, I don’t want you to be 
motivated to act for this reason as it would result in the thwarting of my self-
interest’. However, in giving such an answer I would expose my vulnerable 
position and, in all likelihood, give the game away contrary to the dictates of 
egoism.  
 
I will shortly return to how I think the egoist ought to analyse such a scenario. 
Firstly, I want to consider the type of answer Carlson would likely contend the 
egoist ought to give. Carlson would envisage a problem for the egoist in 
answering Deb’s question. The egoist, in holding the belief that the egoist 
principle provides the preferable means by which to answer questions regarding 
how an agent ought to act, should also hold the “disposition to induce in others 
attitudes consistent with what one believes” (Carlson, 1973, p. 29). If Carlson’s 
claim is correct then it seems the egoist answer to Deb’s question ought to be  
‘Yes, you have good reasons to move the rook and the reasons for doing so are 
preferable to any reason you might have for acting otherwise’, but to give such an 
answer is to act contrary to  the  egoist’s best interests. It seems that the two-factor 
version of egoism has simply pushed the inconsistency problem back a step. The 
egoist can both universalise the egoist principle (reasons for action) and 
promulgate this principle (each agent has egoist reasons for action). However, the 
egoist cannot promulgate that egoism is the preferable reason for action without 
being inconsistent and acting in a manner detrimental to the egoist’s interests.  
 
Carlson (1973, p. 29) does not assume that an egoist must act so as to induce 
consistent attitudes in others on every occasion but “only when the appropriate 
circumstances obtain”. Sports and games, which are built on models of conflict, 
are simply not one of those occasions. The egoist can promulgate the egoist 
principle on most occasions given that most are well aware that self-interested 
reasons for action exist. However, the interesting question is whether ‘appropriate 
circumstances’ exist such that, in those circumstances, an egoist ought to act so as 
to induce a similar attitude in others and where, in doing so, the egoist would be 
acting in a manner detrimental to the egoist’s interests. 
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In most everyday settings I can see no reason why an egoist must attempt to 
convince others that the egoist’s preferenced theory is generally preferable except, 
possibly, in circumstances where the egoist is required to justify an action taken. 
One scenario where an egoist would be required to promulgate and expound upon 
the preference toward egoism would be in serious philosophical moral debate. 
However, in this context there appears to be no reason why the egoist cannot 
promulgate (i) the universal principle of egoism and, (ii) the reasons why self-
interest is a preferable principle upon which to build a moral theory. Moral debate 
is theoretical. No actions are being chosen as a direct consequence of the debate 
and the discussion itself is unlikely to have any detrimental effects on the agent 
expounding the theory.  
 
As Medlin claims, ultimate principles must be subjected to rigorous testing, must 
be universalisable and public. However, while we can insist that theories, if they 
are to be classified as theories, meet a minimal set of criteria such that they are 
coherent and consistent, we can do little more as it is logically impossible to 
determine an objective criterion by which to judge between those theories that 
meet these minimum requirements.  At the end of the day, the selection of one 
theory over another is a matter of preference. There is no fact of the matter as to 
the correctness of preferences and, in acknowledging this, no reason why I must 
promulgate my beliefs and attempt to sway the preferences of others.  
 
Returning again to the chess game, I take it that all of the following reasons for 
acting and motivations to act come into play: 
(i) [By universalizing the egoist principle] The egoist must accept that 
Deb has good reason to move the rook. 
(ii) [By egoism] The egoist has good reason for wanting to win the 
game. 
(iii) [By egoism and (ii)] The egoist has good reason for wanting Deb 
not to move the rook. 
(iv) The egoist believes that the egoist principle provides the preferable 
means of moral reasoning.  
(v) The egoist is motivated by (iv) an internal preference for egoism, 
and, (ii) the external reason of wanting to win the game and can 
either (a) not answer Deb, (b) offer a reply in terms of (i) that Deb 
ought to move the rook if she believes it to be the best move, or (c) 
lie.   
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The ultimate principle of egoism is that an egoist has reason to maximise interests. 
I imagine that (c) is unlikely to maximise interests as the lie (which is likely to be 
uncovered) will probably have further repercussions that outweigh any gains 
made by winning a single game of chess. Sitting mute (a) is, for obvious reasons, 
unlikely to have productive results. It would seem that maximising an egoist’s 
interests in this chess game requires that Deb’s question be answered by ‘if you 
think it is the best move’. The belief that the doctrine egoism provides a better 
type of reason together with the ultimate principle of egoism (reasons to maximise 
interests) motivates an egoist, on this occasion, not to promulgate the advice to 
move the rook. 
 
§4.6 Conclusion 
Medlin’s criticism of egoism was that attempting to universalise egoism led to 
general inconsistency to the point where the theory became incoherent and offered 
no moral guidance. I have shown Medlin’s criticism to be unsuccessful in that it 
conflates the egoist ultimate principle (reasons to act) and the egoist’s motivation 
(reasons for acting). The ultimate principle of egoism provides reasons for acting 
but it does not obligate the egoist to act.  There is no inconsistency in 
universalising the principle of egoism, which is simply that: 
If  is recognised as good in itself relative to Agentn’s worldview and 
acting to bring  about is the act that would maximise Agentn’s interests 
then  provides Agentn with strong moral reason and justification for 
acting. 
 
Whether an agent acts on these reasons depends on the individual beliefs and 
preferences of the agent and these beliefs and preferences cannot be universalised. 
If Agentn believes that ethical egoism provides preferable reasons for 
acting then Agentn will, in most cases, be motivated to act in accordance 
with the universalised form of egoism. 
 
The perceived inconsistency in egoism occurs only when the egoist’s reasons for 
action are interpreted as determining how the egoist must act.  However, while the 
criticisms examined in this chapter have been defeated this is not enough to save 
egoism from the charge of being inconsistent. If, in a specific context, an agent 
decides to apply the principles of egoism (believing egoism to be a theory of 
action guidance) then egoism, if it is a coherent theory, ought to provide the agent 
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with action guidance that has a reasonable probability of realizing the agent’s goal 
of maximizing self-interest. I will now turn my attention to the question of 
whether egoism can provide such action guidance.  
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Chapter 5 
Further Inconsistencies & Incoherence 
 
§5.0 Introduction 
Moral theory as a subject investigates the nature of good. According to egoism the 
nature of good is the maximisation of self-interest. Moral theories also provide 
action guidance, that is they attempt to answer the question ‘How ought I to act in 
this specific situation?’ According to egoism the answer to this question is that an 
agent ought to act so as to maximise self-interest. The criticisms discussed so far 
have, for the most part, assumed that good and self-interest are mutually 
exclusive, an assumption that I have shown to be false.  
 
In this Chapter I will consider two types of criticism that aim to show that a theory 
of action guidance built on a principle that equates good with self-interest is 
inconsistent, incoherent, or both. While each of these criticisms might have been 
extended to fill an entire chapter, space considerations required that I impose 
some limitations on the discussion.   
 
The first criticism that will be examined in this chapter is the claim that, following 
the prescriptions of egoism (acting so as to maximise self-interest) prevents an 
agent, in some contexts, from attaining the maximisation of self-interest. This 
criticism is similar in form to the hedonistic paradox, (where the continual pursuit 
of happiness prevents the attainment of happiness), but somewhat more complex 
in nature. It is claimed, in prisoners dilemma type contexts, that game theory 
shows it to be logically impossible for an agent to attain the goal of maximising 
self-interest by following the dictates of consequential egoism.  
 
I will begin this chapter by examining the prisoners’ dilemma in its simplest form, 
a scenario that presents the egoist with a single choice (a one-off ‘game’), and will 
then demonstrate that it is far from obvious that an egoist would adopt the strategy 
of always defect61. Gauthier (1974) uses game theory to analyse the actions 
promoted by egoism and claims that an agent ascribing to egoism is required (in 
some contexts) to act in a manner that prevents the agent from acquiring the goal 
                                                
61
 Always defect is one of many game theory stratagems, as will become clear as the chapter 
progresses.  
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prescribed by egoism. It is difficult to engage with such criticisms without moving 
deeply into the domain of game theory. However, I will engage sufficiently to 
demonstrate that Gauthier’s game theory analysis of the prisoners’ dilemma is 
incorrect; the dilemma cannot be realistically treated as a single event non-zero 
game. When the context of the dilemma is examined, and necessary iterations are 
considered, the paradox of the dilemma disappears and egoism appears 
completely rational. Secondly, I will contend that game theory does not easily 
apply to the real world and that the outcome of artificially constrained and 
restricted games tells us very little about how an agent will, or ought to, act in 
what might appear to be an analogous real life situation.    
 
The second type of incoherence criticism I will look at regards the nature of the 
self. The self is a central concept within egoism as the target (beneficiary) of 
egoist actions is the self. If the self cannot be demarcated then the egoist faces a 
serious problem; the target (beneficiary) of an egoist’s actions cannot be 
determined. Further, the criterion for determining the moral status of an egoist’s 
actions dissolves as it cannot be determined whether an action maximises self-
interest, unless there is a specific self to whom those interests can be said to 
belong. Zemach (1978) advances this line of reasoning, claiming the notion of the 
self is nothing more than convention and that the claim of acting out of self-
interest is incoherent. This line of criticism is not limited to the physical extension 
of the self. If the egoist’s claims involve a balance between current and future 
interests then it also needs to be shown that the notion of a self existing over time 
is coherent. Parfit (1984), amongst others, has claimed the self is actually nothing 
more than a series of psychologically related life stages, and the notion of a self is 
vague and refers only to a limited temporal self (that is, a life-stage that is part of 
but does not stretch across a full biological lifespan). Parfit claims that the 
relationship between these temporal-selves is not transitive (such that the 
connection between distant life stages may be lost). If such claims are true then an 
egoist who claims to be acting out of self-interest when the target of those actions 
exists in the relatively distant future is not acting so as to benefit him or her self. 
Rather, the egoist is acting as a limited and misguided altruist, and for the benefit 
of some other.  
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While Parfit brings to our attention alternative notions of the self that do not 
necessarily exist from birth until death, unless it can be shown that the concept of 
a self that stretches across a biological lifetime is incoherent then an egoist is not 
compelled to abandon such a claim. Given legitimate alternatives for explanations 
of the nature of the self the egoist has good reason for accepting as the best 
explanation a self that extends across a biological lifespan.  However, in doing so 
I will expose egoism to the final challenge of this section, namely, that the theory 
of egoism is an unjustifiable hybrid that merges agent relativism with temporal 
neutralism. This criticism is based on the assumption that all justifiable theories 
must be pure, that is, they must not mix methodologies, and that moral theories 
must be either entirely relative or entirely neutral and cannot be arbitrarily mixed.  
 
§5.1 The Prisoners’ Dilemma 
The prisoners’ dilemma is a situation where the reward or punishment you will 
receive is relative to and affected by the actions of another. The specific dilemma, 
as introduced in §1.2.1 was: 
 
Two known criminals have been arrested on suspicion of committing a 
crime. The evidence against both of them is quite weak and unless the 
guards can elicit a confession they will both receive only relatively small 
jail sentences. The guards approach each suspect separately and offer the 
following deal: 
 
If you confess (and in doing so provide evidence against the other), and 
the other prisoner remains silent, then you will be set free and the other 
will face eight years in jail (and vice versa). 
 
If you do not confess, and the other prisoner remains silent, then the 
evidence is sufficient that you will both face two years in jail.   
 
If you both confess then you will both be jailed for five years. 
 
The two agents (who for convenience I’ll refer to as Alfred and Brian) each has 
two and only two options, confess or stay silent. Depending on the actions of the 
agents one of four possible outcomes could occur. Alfred confesses and Brian 
does not, Brian confesses and Alfred does not, both Alfred and Brian confess, or 
neither Brian nor Alfred confesses. The first two of the four are different actual 
outcomes but are both of the same type, one confesses and one does not. If game 
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theory is applied to this dilemma then the utility of the possible outcomes is as 
follows: 
 
   Brian  
   Confess Don’t Confess  
  
Alfred 
Confess (iii) 
-5,-5 
(i) 
0,-8 
 
  Don’t Confess (iv) 
-8,0 
(ii) 
-2,-2 
 
 
 
(i & iv) Either Alfred or Brian confesses and the other does not. As a result 
the confessor goes free (a utility of 0) and the other faces 8 years in jail (a 
utility of -8).  I am assuming a year in jail equates to a utility of -1 and that 
these are the only factors relevant to the calculation of utility for this act. 
 
(ii) Both Alfred and Brian stay quiet and both serve two years in jail. The 
utility, to each individual agent is -2.  
 
(iii) Both Alfred and Brian confess to committing the crime and as a result 
they both serve five years in jail, a utility to each agent of -5. 
 
It is usually contended, taking the viewpoint of Alfred, that if Alfred is an egoist 
then his reasoning in this dilemma will be along the following lines: 
 
1. If Brian confesses and I stay quiet, I will face eight years in jail (-8). 
2. If Brian confesses and I confess, I will face five years in jail (-5). 
3. (by 1 and 2) If Brian confesses my best course of action is to confess. 
4. If we both stay quiet, I will face two years in jail (-2). 
5. If Brian stays quiet and I confess, I will not be sentenced (0) 
6. (by 4 and 5) If Brian stays quiet my best course of action is to confess. 
7. (by 3 and 6) Whatever Brian does I am better off if I confess. 
 
Brian will reason the same way and in attempting to maximise their individual 
self-interest, Alfred and Brian will both confess. However, in doing so they fail to 
maximise their self-interest and both serve five years in jail whereas by remaining 
quiet they would have served only two years in jail.  
 
This leads to the criticism that egoism is paradoxical (and thus ultimately 
incoherent) in that (in some contexts) following the dictates of egoism will 
prevent an agent from maximising self-interest and hence a theory of right action 
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will prevent an agent from having acted rightly. If Alfred and Brian determine 
how they ought to act by applying the principles of egoism (act so as to maximise 
self-interest), the outcome will be that they both fail to maximise self-interest. It 
would seem that, within this context, maximising self-interest requires that the 
agents do not act from self-interest.  
 
I should elaborate a little at this point. The criticism is not just that there exists a 
scenario where applying a theory of action guidance prevents the outcome that the 
theory is designed to obtain, but that game theory offers mathematical proof that, 
if an egoist theory of right action is adopted, then in any scenario that pits egoist 
against egoist, in such a manner that the egoist’s action is based upon minimising 
the effect of the other agent’s actions, then the maximisation of self-interest 
becomes impossible. If we do face prisoners’ dilemma type situations in the real 
world then the adoption of egoism will lead to non-optimal social instability; a 
state of social conflict where maximisation of self-interest is reduced to avoiding 
risk at the expense of everyone being worse off.  
 
Assuming that situations analogous to the prisoners’ dilemma do exist, it is still 
far from clear that the game theory analysis of how the egoist is required to act is 
correct. The prisoners’ dilemma has been treated as if it were a simple single 
payoff calculation, which requires that the game begins in the cells and ends once 
the decisions have been made, that is, that no other interactions are relevant to the 
decision about to be made.  While the prisoners’ dilemma, as described, limits the 
agents’ choices to one of two alternatives I contend that it is highly improbable 
that such dilemmas, in the real world, can be further restricted to a single 
occurrence event. For such dilemmas to be treated as single occurrences would 
require that the two agents had no previous interactions and, in all probability, 
would not be involved in any future interactions. Setting up the prisoners’ 
dilemma as a single event, as portrayed by those criticising egoism, would require 
that: 
 
(i) Alfred and Brian had only just met and, with extremely little 
knowledge of each other, had decided to commit a crime. This 
ensures the game begins in the cells. 
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(ii) It is highly unlikely than Alfred and Brian would ever meet again 
after the decision of whether or not to confess had been made. 
This ensures that the game ends when the decision has been made. 
 
It is of course possible to create such a scenario that meets these criteria; each of 
the criminals might have received his instructions from a third party and never 
met the other. However, the more clauses that are introduced to ensure that the 
prisoners’ dilemma is best described as a single one-off event the less likely the 
event could actually occur in the real world. The clause just suggested requires 
that an egoist would decide to embark on a risky criminal venture, blindly trusting 
an unknown accomplice in a manner that seems directly against the prescriptions 
of egoism; the risk involved is simply too great and those advancing the prisoners’ 
dilemma scenario implicitly accept that the egoist will always act so as to avoid 
such risks. If, on the other hand, the egoist had reason to trust the other agent 
(which would suggest previous interaction) then those who advance the criticism 
would have us believe that the criminals trusted each other enough to enter into a 
risky criminal venture but, once in the cells, do not trust each other enough to 
remain quiet. That is, they would trust each other at least to the degree that they 
would act professionally, would not betray the other, and would share the illicit 
gains, but that as soon as they were in the cells all such trust would vanish and 
each egoist would accept no risk, and instantly turn on his accomplice.   
 
The scenario could be further altered, but the result of continually modifying the 
scenario (such that it qualifies as a single event and is such that egoists could find 
themselves in such a position) results in the dilemma dissolving. For example, 
perhaps the egoist had come to the conclusion that the risk involved in trusting 
another was commensurate with the rewards to be gained from successful 
completion of the criminal endeavour. The two criminals may then find 
themselves in the scenario and facing the prisoners’ dilemma. Further, perhaps the 
reward for confession included a new fake identity (such that no new interactions 
between the two were likely). If all these conditions are met then the scenario is as 
the critics describe and the two criminals face a one-off decision. However, if this 
is the case the decision to confess is anything but irrational. Alfred in confessing, 
acts so as to have the best probability of maximising his interests. If both confess 
then the failure to actually maximise interest is not due to a fault with egoism, or 
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due to irrationality, but to having insufficient information. If there is a problem 
here it is not with egoism but a more general problem for all consequentialist 
theories, namely that rightness depends to a large part on factors beyond the 
agent’s control and that are often unforeseeable. 
 
However, I remain dubious situations that can be classified as one-off events and 
place egoists at loggerheads are likely to occur in the real world. It seems more 
likely that events preceding the situation and the (probable) events that will follow 
are of relevance in solving the dilemma. I will contend that, when making the 
decision whether to confess, the rationale for Alfred’s action, even if Alfred is 
fully aware that Brian will also act so as to maximise self-interest, will be 
different than is usually assumed and that Alfred will not necessarily confess.  
 
If it is accepted that the prisoners’ dilemma cannot be treated as a standalone 
event and that the two criminals have had some past interaction (at the very least 
in deciding to commit a crime) and further, that they are likely to have future 
interactions, then a single- event matrix cannot be used in determining how Alfred 
and Brian ought to act. While the game theory strategy of Always Defect (in this 
case confess) is, from a single agent’s perspective always the superior strategy 
within the context of single events, this strategy fails when iterations are 
considered. I contend that when iterations are considered the action promoted by 
the egoist doctrine is to stay quiet and that both criminals, even realising that the 
other is likely to stay quiet, will find it to be in their self-interest to do likewise.   
 
§5.1.1 Iterated Game Theory 
As Poundstone (1993, p. 237) correctly notes, “when only the present dilemma is 
subjectively important, it is effectively a one-shot dilemma in which defection is 
to be expected. But when players value future as well as present gains, a true 
iterated dilemma exists.” I have already argued that an ethical egoist is one who 
considers balanced short- and long-term gains and is not a hedonistic presentist. 
Further, whichever action Alfred and Brian take it is highly probable they will 
have future interactions, either in prison (should they both stay quiet or both 
confess) or some years later, if one confesses and one does not, when a (likely 
vengeful) cohort is finally paroled. 
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The best strategy of action in an iterated prisoners’ dilemma is a contentious issue, 
one that is still far from resolved and is subject to ongoing research within the 
field of game theory. In 1980 Robert Axelrod created a series of computer 
tournaments to examine strategies for solving the prisoners’ dilemma. This 
tournament took the following format; game theorists submitted ‘systems of 
action’ (the strategy of always defect being one such system62), each system was 
then pitted against every other system for a sequence of two hundred iterated 
dilemmas. In each iteration points were awarded as follows: mutual cooperation 
gained 3 points, defecting where the other did not gained 5 points, mutual 
defection gained 1 point, and cooperation where the other defected gained none.  
The values are a little different from those assigned to the Alfred/Brian prisoners’ 
dilemma but the resulting matrix is effectively the same. 
 
  Cooperate Defect  
 Cooperate 3,3 0,5  
 Defect 5,0 1,1  
 
The highest possible score from this tournament would be 1000 points where the 
winner defected on every occasion and the opposition cooperated on every 
occasion; a score that was gained in a single playoff when the always defect 
strategy faced the always cooperate strategy, but a score that was impossible 
across the entire tournament. always defect scored only 200 points when it played 
against an identical strategy. A more realistic score ceiling would be around 600 
points and this could be attained by averaging three points every round (the score 
assigned to continual mutual cooperation, but is unattainable by a strategy of 
always cooperate, which suffers when facing always defect).  
 
The strategy that prevailed at the tournament is known as tit for tat (which scored 
an average of 504.5 points). The tit for tat strategy cooperates unless the 
                                                
62
 The systems of action ranged from simple instructions such as always defect or always 
cooperate to complex patterns of action that involved lengthy lists of instructions  
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opposition defected on the previous round in which case tit for tat defects until the 
opposition once again begins cooperating. Tit for tat is, at first glance, an odd 
system because it “can’t beat anybody [i.e. any other system], but it still wins the 
tournament” (Axelrod cited in Poundstone. 1993). Tit for tat cooperates when 
others cooperate, gaining no advantage but scoring the same as if the strategy had 
been mutual cooperation. Similarly, tit for tat defects when up against Always 
Defect thus reducing the initial gain made by Always Defect and limiting its own 
losses to the 5 points lost in the first round.  
 
I am not suggesting that an egoist must embrace a tit for tat strategy to life only 
that, if egoism is to be criticised by way of applying game theory analysis to a 
prisoners’ dilemma, it first ought to be determined which game theory strategy 
most closely matches the egoist’s ideals. Given that self-interest is the underlying 
principle of egoism and tit for tat is the strategy that wins (gains the highest score 
over time, and thereby maximises utility for that player over the length of a 
tournament) then it seems reasonable to assert that the egoist would subscribe to a 
tit for tat strategy. 
 
§5.1.2 Prisoners’ Dilemma, the Egoist, and Tit For Tat  
If, as seems likely, Alfred and Brian have a past, then unless they are acting out of 
revenge, their self-interest lies in cooperation. They each know the other would do 
better in the short term by defecting (so long as the other didn’t). However, they 
are also fully aware of the situation they will be in if they both defect which is 
more time in jail. Further, they will likely face some form of revenge if one 
defects while the other stays quiet. Mutual trust, based on past history, appears to 
offer a better chance of maximising interests than a possible, one-off gain, from 
defecting. 
 
I suggest that Alfred’s egoist reasoning will be along the following lines: 
 
1. While it would be best for me if I served no time in jail, if I confess and 
Brian does not then in eight years (perhaps less with parole) I will likely 
face an ex-convict looking for revenge. 
2. Given that revenge is an attempt to balance the books or to gain an 
advantage, there is a reasonable probability that in the long term no 
advantage will have been gained by confessing. 
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3. Further, if I confess and Brian does likewise then we will both be sent to 
jail for an extended period. However, as a result I will also know that I 
cannot trust Brian and vice versa and this will likely be to our mutual 
detriment. Being aware that the other is playing a strategy of always defect 
will result in us both continually adopting this strategy to minimise losses. 
4. [By 1,2,3] I ought not to confess. 
5. Tit for tat appears to be the best strategy for maximising outcomes. 
6. Brian has not previously defected (such as setting me up during the crime) 
and so the strategy of tit for tat is not to defect.  
7. Brian ought to follow this same reasoning. 
8. [By 5,6,7] I ought not to confess. 
 
Alfred ought not to confess and while in not confessing he opens himself up to 
considerable risk he does so only because the alternative is worse and because the 
adopted strategy has the highest probability of maximising his self-interest. Tit for 
tat stratagems have their share of problems, the worst being that once one person 
transgresses against you an endless and unbreakable cycle of revenge commences. 
The second problem is that it requires two or more agents to view their past 
history in the same manner, a problematic state of affairs, given the numerous 
disputes from history where both sides adamantly claim that revenge was justified 
based on the action of the other. As Poundstone (1993, p. 253) notes, “The 
practical difficulty is not so much in knowing when to cooperate or to defect but 
to decide what is going on. In the real world it is not always obvious whether 
someone has acted cooperatively or defected. Actions can fall somewhere 
between the two extremes.”  While I am not claiming that tit for tat is the best 
strategy, I am claiming that a strategy of always defect definitely isn’t. Real life 
situations are, for the most part, too complex to be solved by the application of 
simple stratagems. However, if game theory is to be used to analyse a situation 
then the tit for tat strategy appears to most closely match the egoist decision 
making process.  
 
While it is true that Alfred or Brian would maximise self-interest if they could 
confess while the other stayed quiet, and that the gain made by confessing 
outweighed any future risk of revenge, then the egoist ought to confess. Within 
such a scenario, confession would maximise the self-interest of the confessor. 
However, it is hard to imagine such a scenario occurring and even if it did, given 
the guarantees that would need to be in place (to reduce risk to the degree that it 
ensures maximisation of the agent’s interest), it would not be a prisoners’ 
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dilemma. It appears that in most cases the greatest chance for an egoist to 
maximise self-interest within the confines of game theory is to adopt a strategy of 
tit for tat. I contend that, in everyday life, ascribing to the theory of egoism does 
not prevent an egoist from attaining the goals of interest maximisation. The 
paradox of egoism arises only within one-off game situations, which outside of 
thought experiments and computer simulations are most unrealistic.  
 
§5.1.3 A Final Word on Game Theory 
 One of the problems with game theory is that, “the nature of the game pre-empts 
other possibilities. The sentences are fixed, the choices are fixed; whilst this 
applies to the two prisoners, it is not obvious that every-day life generates such 
limited and limiting choices” (Mosely, 2001, para. 10). While a thought 
experiment is possible where two criminals are offered the outlined deal and, by a 
matter of stipulation no other alternatives exist, it is hard to imagine such a 
scenario actually occurring. Iterated prisoners’ dilemma situations do occur but 
they are not usually restricted in such an artificial manner and if those involved 
can enter into discourse then the strategies for dealing with the situations become 
increasingly more complex.  At the very least a meta-game may become apparent. 
As Howard (1966, cited in Poundstone) claims, it is not just a case of whether 
someone defects but the reason why they defected. We might further question 
whether the defection is ruthless and deserving of revenge, or nice (in as much as 
the person defected only through a lack of options or some other mitigating 
circumstance) in which case we might overlook a previous defection and not 
extract revenge, thereby allowing an agent to break the endless cycle of revenge 
acts that are usually associated with the tit for tat strategy. 
 
It may be that I’ve been too hasty and that it can be shown that agents do face 
single one-off type decisions as formulated in the prisoners’ dilemma, so I’ll 
return very briefly to considering the dilemma as a single action event. If this is 
the case then, rationally, the act that maximises an agent’s interest is to defect and 
to sacrifice what is often referred to as ‘the common good’. However, as Shubick 
(1982) noted, we should be no more surprised by this than we should be by 
learning that a feather and lead ball fall at the same velocity in a vacuum. Many 
philosophers’ moral intuitions may suggest that cooperation is the correct course 
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of action but in this case the explanation “is simply that common sense is wrong” 
(Poundstone, 1993, p. 277), just as the intuition that a lead ball will fall faster than 
a feather is wrong. The paradox of the prisoners’ dilemma does not exist; rational 
players in a one-shot, no compromise dilemma simply ought to defect because 
mutual cooperation in such a context is not a viable option. However, I remain 
unconvinced that actions can be isolated in such a manner and contend that the 
analysis of egoist actions as one-off events is seriously flawed. Iterated game 
theory is the best means by which to examine the prisoners’ dilemma and under 
such an analysis an egoist’s action does not prevent the maximisation of self-
interest and is neither irrational nor incoherent. 
 
§5.1.3.1 Gauthier – The Impossibility of Rational Egoism 
Gauthier (1974) tries to advance game theory further and demonstrate the 
impossibility of rational egoism. Gauthier’s argument fails on several accounts 
but is still worth exploring as it is one of the best attempts to disprove egoism via 
a well developed application of game theory. Firstly, it must be pointed out that 
Gauthier does not deny that an agent could be a successful egoist. That is, an 
agent could successfully subscribe to egoism and simply never encounter a 
situation where the theory was unable to cope. Rather, Gauthier’s (1974, p. 441) 
argument is an attempt to show that “the conditions of egoism cannot be satisfied 
by any function defined over all possible situations in which one might act and 
specifying an action for each of those situations.” In short, situations occur where 
egoism fails to meet the functional requirement of providing an answer to the 
question ‘How should I act in this situation?’63. 
 
Gauthier (1974, p. 442) defines an egoist as “a person who on every occasion and 
in every respect acts to bring about as much as possible of what he values”64. I 
have previously objected to such definitions; an egoist is one who gives 
preference to a particular moral theory, it does not obligate the agent to act in that 
manner on each and every occasion. Rather, egoism informs an agent as to which 
action is morally preferable  on that specific occasion. The egoist may simply say, 
‘Yes, morally the action I ought to take is  but I am simply not going to act 
morally on this occasion”. A better description of the egoist’s beliefs might be 
                                                
63
 See §2.6 
64
 My italics 
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that, ‘an egoist believes that the morally preferable action on every occasion is the 
one that would bring about as much as possible of what the egoist values’. 
However, Gauthier’s argument does not rely on the definition of egoism and in 
order to proceed all that is needed is agreement to something like ‘an egoist 
believes that egoism can provide a justifiable answer to the question, how should I 
act in this specific context.’ Gauthier’s thesis is that egoism is unable to meet this 
requirement in every context and thus is an incomplete theory of action.  
 
Gauthier (1974, pp 445-451) sets forth the following conditions that any principle 
of action must meet: 
 
Condition 1: (Full definition) A principle of action must prescribe one and 
only one strategy for each agent in each situation to which it applies (p. 
445). 
 
This condition seems reasonable and is similar to the point raised by Medlin 
(§4.1). If a theory offers more than one course of action or strategy then that 
theory fails in its task of action guidance, and is incoherent. A theory which 
determines that an agent ought to adopt strategy A and also determines that an 
agent ought to adopt strategy B, where the two strategies are mutually exclusive, 
fails to determine which strategy the agent ought to follow and ultimately says 
nothing. The rational egoist must accept that if egoism is a theory of action 
guidance then it will produce a definitive answer to the question ‘What strategy 
should I adopt in this specific scenario?’  
 
Condition 2: (Equilibrium) The product of the strategies prescribed by a 
principle of action in any situation must be an equilibrium outcome. (p. 
447) 
 
Equilibrium points are part of a games theory strategy developed by J.F. Nash. A 
point of equilibrium is deemed to have been achieved when no player can benefit 
from changing their strategy while the strategy of the opponent remains 
unchanged. Consider the criminals’ example; if both players had decided to stay 
quiet then either player could benefit by confessing, so long as their opponent’s 
strategy remained unchanged and thus mutual cooperation (not confessing) is not 
an equilibrium point within the prisoners’ dilemma. However, if both confessed 
then neither player can gain an advantage and, this strategy meets the condition of 
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equilibrium (at least when the game is viewed as a single event without the 
possibility of further repercussions).  Two egoists, each knowing the other is an 
egoist, will act so as to attain an equilibrium point, as this is the best outcome they 
can rationally expect to achieve. 
 
Condition 3: (Accessible Domination): The product of the strategies 
prescribed by a principle of action in any situation must not be an 
equilibrium outcome accessibly dominated by an outcome stable under 
reduction. (p. 452)  
 
This condition is simply that if there are two or more equilibrium outcomes then 
the strategy that ought to be selected is the dominant one (i.e. where one player 
cannot make another move to regain advantage). Gauthier offers no proof of this 
condition, simply claiming that the condition is intuitively correct. 
 
Condition 4: (Reduction) If a principle of action prescribes certain 
strategies to the persons in a given situation and if we reduce the situation 
by assuming that some of those persons follow the prescribed strategies, 
then the principle must prescribe the same strategies to the remaining 
persons in the situation so reduced. (p. 450)  
 
By reduction, where a strategy of action for three or more persons results in more 
than one non-dominated equilibrium point, if one agent’s action is taken as having 
been made (and is unchangeable) then equilibrium for the reduced set of agents 
must remain stable. The equilibrium point for three agents must remain the same 
for two agents, following the same strategy, once the decision of one of the agents 
has been fixed. 
 
Assume the equilibrium for three agents is met if they all act in manner A or all 
act in manner B. We can reduce the scenario by fixing one of the agents’ 
decisions at either A or B. If we then find that in the two-agent scenario either 
equilibrium A or B is accessibly dominated by the other then that option is 
unstable at the reduced level. Therefore, even though A and B are equilibrium 
points for the three agents, it is not the case that they can adopt either strategy; 
they must adopt the one that is stable at the reduced level.  
 
According to Gauthier (1974, p. 454), if a theory of action is a complete theory of 
action then it must meet all four of the specified conditions. Gauthier claims that 
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egoism is unable to meet these conditions in specific contexts and therefore is 
only a partial theory of action (i.e. it may be possible to apply the theory but only 
because an agent is never presented with a specific type of dilemma).  
 
The specific example Gauthier (1974, p.454) presents is one involving three 
people (A, B & C) where: 
 
(i) Each has exactly two pure strategies. 
(ii) A has a pure strategy a1 and B has a pure strategy b1 such that 
each agent is afforded at least as great a utility by this strategy as 
by his other pure strategy in all circumstances, and a greater utility 
unless the other agent uses his other strategy b2 or a2 and C uses 
his pure strategy c1. 
(iii) If A uses a1 and B uses b1, C maximises his utility by using c1. 
(iv) If A uses a2 and B uses b2, C maximises his utility by using c2. 
(v) If C uses c1 then the utility for each of A and B is greater if A uses 
a2 and B uses b2, than if A uses a1 and B uses b1. 
 
In such a situation the equilibrium point exists at a1b1c1, where no agent is put at 
any disadvantage. However, if C’s choice is fixed at c1 then by reduction the 
equilibrium a2b2 dominates a1b1 and therefore (by condition 3) agents A and B 
must select a2b2. However, prior to reduction agents A and B must select the 
equilibrium a1b1. This is in violation of condition 4 that a theory must prescribe 
the same action both before and after reduction.   
 
If Gauthier is correct, a serious theoretical problem has been outlined and egoism 
is reduced in status to a limited (partial) theory of action. However, a serious 
weakness in Gauthier’s argument is his total reliance on Nash’s theory of 
equilibrium. As Poundhouse (p. 99) notes, at times “Nash’s equilibriums appear to 
be strictly irrational”. Consider for example two rival manufacturing companies 
where each company initially sets its profit level at 32%. Each company can 
increase sales by decreasing profit levels and undercutting the other company. 
Each occurrence of undercutting is a move toward an accessibly dominated 
equilibrium. If conditions 2 and 3 hold then each company must reduce profit 
levels until they reach an equilibrium point that is not accessibly dominated. The 
only point at which this occurs is at a profit level of 0% where neither company 
can then improve its position by undercutting. However, while this position may 
be a stable equilibrium reducing profit levels to 0% appears anything but rational.  
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A more likely scenario is that the companies will agree on a higher level 
equilibrium, even though it ‘could’ be dominated, in order to avoid a series of tit 
for tat-like undercutting that could only result in the failure of both companies. 
Alternatively, one company could refrain from a final revenge if it believed other 
factors were involved (for example that the other company could not survive at 
the lower rates of return and it would eventually dominate the market)65. Either 
way, we have reason to doubt that condition 2 (equilibrium) and condition 3 
(accessible domination) hold fast in every context. If condition 3 is not absolute 
then the type of scenario Gauthier proposes poses no problem for egoism. The 
egoist need not change strategies based on the fixing of a third party decision. The 
egoist may overlook a dominating equilibrium, that is the result of a reduction, in 
order to avoid a revenge situation developing from abandoning the initial strategy. 
a2b2 may dominate once C has chosen c1. However, in order to avoid a revenge 
response from C, A and B’s best strategy may lie in a1b1 despite any immediate 
advantage that deviating from this strategy might bring. 
 
I am doubtful that always defect, non-accessibly dominant equilibriums, or tit for 
tat type strategies are sufficient for the analysis of actions outside of game theory. 
It is not possible to capture all of the contextual detail that is relevant to typical 
moral decision-making in the sort of scenario these theories can be applied to. 
However, assuming that these scenarios are a legitimate test of the capacities of a 
moral theory (regardless of whether they can actually occur), I have shown that it 
is not obvious that the egoist would adopt an always defect strategy or that an 
egoist must adopt a strategy that is a non-accessibly dominated equilibrium. 
Egoism is not shown to be incoherent by game theory analysis of prisoners’ 
dilemmas.   
  
I will now turn my attention to another attempt to prove egoism incoherent, 
namely, that any theory which makes reference to self-interest must be incoherent 
because the very concept of a self is incoherent. 
 
 
                                                
65
 Also taking into account that each cut as the profit margin approached 0% is likely to have a 
diminishing effect on the increase in market share. 
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§5.2 The Nature of a Self 
The self is a, perhaps the, central concept within egoism. If it can be shown that 
the concept of a self is incoherent then the concept of self-interest must also be 
incoherent and with it the doctrine of egoism. Critics of egoism who aim to show 
that it is based on an incoherent concept of the self, typically make one of two 
claims:  
 
(i) The self at any one time cannot be accurately demarcated.   
 
If the boundaries of the self cannot be demarcated the correct 
beneficiary of an egoist act cannot be identified consistently.   
 
(ii) The notion of a self existing over time is incoherent. 
 
This claim is similar to (i). However, where (i) mostly refers to the 
physical extension of the self, (ii) refers specifically to the extension of 
the self through time.  The criticism is that any theory which purports 
to act for an agent’s long-term interests is incoherent, for the simple 
reason that those long-term interests are the interests not of myself but 
of some future self; in effect, egoism is just a misguided form of 
altruism. 
 
 §5.2.1 Zemach’s Self 
For egoism to be a rational policy of action, the distinction between 
oneself and others (and thus between actions that benefit oneself and 
actions that benefit others), must be a factual one, not a mere conventional 
one. This, however, is not the case (Zemach, 1978, p. 154). 
 
The central thesis of Zemach’s criticism is that the way we divide up the world is 
a matter of convention, and while these conventions have been developed over 
time and, in the sciences at least, tend not to be completely arbitrary, neither are 
they factual. However, unlike the sciences and the so-called laws of nature, where 
the lines of demarcation are pragmatically sound, the lines that demarcate the self 
can become very vague and troublesome. I suggest the notion of ‘I’ that would be 
generally accepted (outside the philosophical community) would be something 
similar to: 
 
I, the speaker, exist from the moment of my birth (perhaps slightly earlier) 
until the moment of my death.  
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However, it is quite clear that this is not the only criterion that could be used. For 
example, any of the following, (amongst others) might be used to demarcate the 
self: 
 
Self-Awareness – The self might refer to a single person from the moment 
they gain self awareness until the moment they lose it; perhaps early 
childhood to senility. 
 
Multiple Personality – It might be claimed that the self involves a single 
stream of awareness. In the case of multiple personality it might be 
claimed that there are several streams of consciousness existing within the 
same physical space and hence  two or more ‘selves’ inhabiting the same 
physical space. 
 
DNA structure – The self could be tied to a specific physical body. Then, 
in the case of exact clones either one self would inhabit two locations or 
two, identical yet separate, selves would exist. Further, despite the logical 
possibility of basing the self on DNA structure this concept appears 
somewhat disconnected from what we generally refer to as the self which 
tends to incorporate a sense of awareness. 
 
Temporal Slices – The self may exist only for a specific period of time and 
bear only resemblance to past and future selves. (I will be discussing 
temporal slices in (§5.22) as they form the basis of the criticism that 
egoism, if it is based on the notion of a self existing over time, is 
incoherent). 
 
Body parts, souls, and a host of other concepts might be introduced to demarcate 
the self, and with each of them their own set of problems. The commonly 
accepted division of the self into birth (or just before) until death is simply “a 
matter of pragmatic convenience … it is not wrong to split up the world 
differently” (Zemach, 1978, p. 151). Any of the given definitional criteria could 
be used to denote the boundary of the self and “nothing in nature determines how 
far in time does the agent of action x extend before and after the time he 
performed x”. 
 
If the self cannot be demarcated then what does it mean to act for my self-interest? 
If, by criterion a the self is me* and by criterion b the self is me** then should I 
act so as to promote the interests of me* or me**, given that promoting the 
interests of one may harm the other? Zemach claims that an answer to such 
“pseudo-questions is logically impossible” (1978, p.454), the self cannot be 
objectively demarcated and therefore it is incoherent to speak of an action as 
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being in my self-interest. According to Zemach the best we can achieve is 
something along the lines of ‘the action x will benefit the person demarcated by 
criterion a’. I contend that Zemach is wrong in stating that the self cannot be 
demarcated and that the mistake rests largely in assuming that the demarcation of 
the self, if it is to be demarcated, must be done via the establishment of objective 
criteria. However, before going into details I will briefly evaluate Zemach’s claim 
that egoism can be revised into a rational theory that does not require demarcating 
the self. 
 
§5.2.1.1 Egoism Without the Self 
Zemach attempts to formulate a theory of egoism that does not rely on 
demarcating the self and hence is immune to the criticism discussed above. 
Zemach determines the rightness of an action by application of the following 
principle: 
 
For any action x, x is right iff it causes more benefit than harm. The 
amount of these [benefits and harms] is determined by adding the amounts 
of gratification and frustration caused by x to every y, weighted by the 
value of y to its agent Y and by the ‘distance’ between Y at the time of y 
and the agent of x, X, at the time of x. (Zemach, 1978, p.156) 
 
An egoist (X) when performing an act (x) can determine the rightness of an act by 
evaluating the amount of benefit/harm done to everyone affected by x and the 
degree to which each individual (Y) affected by x has “Continuity, Contiguity, 
[and] Similarity” (Zemach, 1978, p.156) with X. In mathematical terms the utility 
of an act is calculated by multiplying the utility of an act x to each affected target 
by the similarity of that target to the originator of x.  
 
For example: 
I (now) as the son of A and B and having a certain set of values and 
considering an act x that will benefit me* and harm me** will act so as to 
benefit me* if me* is also the son of A and B and has a precisely similar 
set of values and me** whom, while also the son of A and B, has a 
different set of values.  
 
It is the similarity of me* to the agent about to act which defines me* as the 
preferable target of the act.  Similarly, according to Zemach (1978, p.157) the 
egoist will be more committed to the well-being of dogs than microbes as “it is 
 116 
probably easier to conceive of himself as a dog than a microbe”.  A dog is more 
humanlike than a microbe and closer in kind to the agent than is the microbe. 
Therefore, when considering an act that will either benefit the dog and harm the 
microbe or benefit the microbe and harm the dog Zemach’s egoist ought to act so 
as to benefit the dog. 
 
Zemach’s theory also has consequences that many would object to, for example: 
 
I, as a male European, will be more committed to the well-being of males 
than females and to Europeans over those of other cultures.  
 
However, it also has implications that appear decidedly un-egoistic. For example: 
 
Inow as the son of A and B and having a certain set of values am 
considering an act x that will affect both me* and me** and will harm one 
while benefiting the other. 
 
Me* is a person with the exact genetic code as the agent about to act but 
many years in the future and (very probably) with a very different set of 
values (say the difference between a teenager and  a middle aged person). 
 
Me** is my twin brother who has a markedly similar set of values.  
 
Zemach’s egoist is morally obligated to act to benefit his twin brother and to harm 
the agent’s (genetic) future self, i.e., to act in un-egoistic fashion for the benefit of 
another over what most (non-philosophers) would have little difficulty in agreeing 
was the agent’s future self.  
 
§5.2.1.2 Egoism, the Self, and Worldviews 
I have some sympathy with Zemach’s position. Any attempt to objectively 
demarcate, that is, to declare the necessary and sufficient conditions of x, appears 
fraught with difficulties. As Wittgenstein noted, when considering the concept 
‘game’ we find that it has no, or at least has very blurred, boundaries. If those 
boundaries are set too tight many things that we consider to be games are defined 
as being something other than games. If the boundary is set wide enough to 
include every possible case of a game (assuming such a definition was possible), 
then many things that are not games become defined as games. 
 
While we can define the self within a specific context and for some specific 
purpose, all this does is provide us with a correct usage of a word within that very 
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specific context. For example, within the legal context the law must define a 
person if matters of ownership, personal rights, etc. are to be upheld. However, 
this does not provide an absolute definition of personhood, nor does it objectively 
demarcate a person outside of this context. All that is accomplished by a legal 
definition is that personhood refers to x when used within a legal context. 
 
Perhaps Zemach is correct in that an objective demarcation of the self is 
impossible and all we have is convention. If this is the case then, given the 
variance in conventions (across cultures, beliefs, etc.), an objective identification 
of the correct target of an egoist’s act is impossible and denoting x as being in X’s 
self-interest is simply incoherent. However, the egoist need not rely on an 
objective notion of the self, just as s/he need not rely on an objective notion of the 
Good. All the egoist needs do is consistently and, in a manner that fits within the 
egoist’s worldview, demarcate what is meant when the egoist proclaims ‘I’. 
 
One possibility is to say that the egoist’s claim is that ‘I’ (the egoist) ought to act 
in a manner to further the interests of the speaker of ‘I’, as defined by the speaker.  
The egoist is acting in the manner ascribed by egoism iff the egoist acts to 
preference whomever he recognises as forming a part of himself, over what he 
recognises as forming part of some other.  
 
This however, is problematic, in that the speaker of ‘I’ could be mistaken in the 
identification of the speaker of ‘I’. For example; 
 
An egoist and three others are involved in an horrific car crash. The egoist 
regains consciousness, looks down and sees that (i) he has lost a limb and 
(ii) identifies a bleeding limb lying just within reach. The egoist believes 
the limb to be his own and so acts to slow his own bleeding and to save the 
limb. The limb is saved by the egoist’s actions. However, it later 
eventuates that the limb actually belonged to one of the other passengers 
and that his own severed limb that was within reach of the egoist but 
obscured from view was irreparably damaged when rescue crews cut open 
the vehicle. 
 
On evaluation it appears the egoist acted with inadvertent altruism in saving the 
limb of another, failed to act so as to promote his self-interest, and was incorrect 
in his identification of the boundaries of his self. However, the fact that the egoist 
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can be mistaken in some contexts is insufficient to dismiss a quasi-relativistic 
approach to the notion of a self-determined self. The problem in this scenario lies 
with the agent’s lack of knowledge and not with the means of self-identification; 
self-identification is decisive under an idealised situation of perfect knowledge. 
The egoist acts in accordance with egoism so long as the egoist’s actions are 
directed toward benefiting the egoist’s self-determined self and in most cases the 
beneficiary of the act is the egoist’s self-determined self. 
 
The fact that the speaker can demarcate the extent of the speaker’s self, relative to 
the speaker, is sufficient to enable an individual to act as an egoist. However, the 
speaker’s ability to denote his own immediate physical extension might be 
insufficient as a complete basis for egoism. It needs to be considered whether the 
self-identification that has been applied to the physical extension of the self can 
legitimately be applied to temporal extension. Can an egoist, as the self-
determined speaker of ‘I’, also legitimately claim that the speaker of I at this 
moment in time (Inow) and the speaker of I at some future time (Ilater) are the same?  
If the answer to this question is no then egoism, or at least any egoist theory that 
incorporates claims about balancing long- versus short-term interests, is in effect 
nothing more than a misguided altruism. Inow in acting to benefit  Ilater acts so as to 
benefit some other (Ilater) at the expense of the temporal self (Inow) and in direct 
contradiction of egoism. Thus there remain two questions to be answered in this 
chapter: 
1. Can the self be demarcated as existing through time and, if so, to what 
extent? 
2. If the answer to the first question is yes then can the hybrid nature of 
egoism (i.e., being agent relative yet temporally neutral) be justified? 
 
§5.2.2 The self in time 
I will not consider the claim that the self is nothing more than an instant and has 
no extension in time. Such a concept would rule out any form of morality (with 
the possible exception of some limited form of presentism). If we accept, as I 
assume most will, some form of self-based causality, some functionalist account 
that we have beliefs and desires, or that agents formulate reasons for actions that, 
if not directly causing, precede and lead to an agent acting, then the self must have 
some extension in time. However, while any form of causality that includes the 
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self requires temporal extension, such a self need not extend from birth until 
death.  
 
According to Parfit selves are a series of mental states that are psychologically 
connected and while I1 will likely have strong connection to I2, I2 will have strong 
connection to I3, and In to In+1, I15 and I60 may have nothing in common. The 
teenager who takes out long-term life insurance may, according to Parfit, be so 
remote from the 60 year old who benefits so as to be completely detached and, in 
effect, different selves.  
 
The position that a self may exist for only a segment of a biological lifespan and 
that a biological lifespan may consist of several different selves has its share of 
critics (see Persson (1985), Matthews (1998), Wolf (1986), Maidan (1989)) 
however my intention is not to attempt to disprove Parfit’s thesis. For the moment 
I will accept that a self temporally expanded over a human lifetime and a self that 
consists of a life-stage are both possible, if problematic, explanations of the nature 
of a self. However, the notion that a teenager (I15) and a 60 year old (I60) while the 
same biological entity might be different selves goes against deeply held 
intuitions that the self does in fact exist across a (bodily) lifetime. As Robinson 
(2004) so aptly noted, “Earth carries about six billion uncontroversial cases of 
personhood”. While these persons may all be mistaken about the nature of 
themselves and their continued existence from birth till death it goes firmly 
against the counsel of conservatism to throw this notion of a self away without 
very compelling evidence and, while the arguments of Parfit are philosophically 
interesting, they fail to offer the required compulsion to overturn the commonly 
accepted notion of a self through time. 
 
Given that the egoist is more likely to subscribe to the common notion of the self 
than to Parfit’s analysis, and that the way the egoist ought to act is determined 
from within the egoist’s worldview (which incorporates the notion of a self across 
time) then, for the typical egoist, the notion of the demarcated self, both 
physically and temporally, is unproblematic. 
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§5.2.3 The Presentist Challenge 
The egoist, in accepting the notion of a self extended through time and a premise 
that requires balancing future interests against present interests, is exposed to a 
theoretical challenge from the standpoint of a presentist; A presentist being 
someone who adopts the more minimalistic moral theory where interests are not 
only relative to the specific agent but also to the point in time when the agent 
holds those interests.  
 
The presentist challenge to the egoist is that “if the utilitarian has to answer the 
question, ‘Why should I sacrifice my own happiness for the greater happiness of 
another?’ then it must be surely permissible to ask the egoist, ‘Why should I 
sacrifice a present pleasure for a greater one in the future?’” (Sidgwick, 1913, p. 
418).  Presentist theories, such as Parfit’s (1984) Present Aim Theory demonstrate 
“there is a coherent, more minimal alternative to rational egoism”. Of course, I am 
not contending that either the utilitarian or the egoist need answer this question as 
I have not claimed that egoism is the correct moral theory only that it is a rational 
moral theory.   However, the challenge as formulated does provide an interesting 
lead into the question of whether moral theories must be pure (i.e., the terms used 
within the theory must be uniformly applied). If, as I have claimed, the egoist is 
justified in making the claim that egoism refers to a self extended over time, then 
the egoist needs to further explain why interests ought to be extended over time 
but ought not to be extended to include other agents. 
 
A pure theory is one that has a consistent methodology. For example, theories of 
rational benevolence are both agent- and temporally-neutral, they involve doing 
good for others now or later. Likewise, presentism is consistent in that judgement 
of moral acts is relative both to the agent and to the moment in time. However, 
egoism is a hybrid theory agent relative (act for my good) but temporally neutral 
(act for my balanced future and current good). The hybrid nature of egoism has 
drawn criticism from Parfit (1984  p. 137-144), “If the egoist has no obligation to 
others then future interests cannot override present interests”, and Nagel (1986, 
pp. 88-100) if the egoist’s future self provides reason to act, then others also 
provide reason to act. 
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It would seem that if moral theories require parity (that is, moral theories must be 
either consistently relative or consistently neutral) then the egoist must either 
abandon the premise that egoistic action requires the balancing  of long/short term 
interests and adopt a presentist position, or show that moral theories do not, in this 
instance, require parity. I contend that an egoist can justify the hybrid nature of 
the theory, for two reasons. Firstly, the hybrid nature of egoism reflects the hybrid 
nature of an agent. Given that the egoist can perceive of himself as a separate and 
individual agent extended over time, it makes sense for a moral theory to reflect 
this, and also to make a distinction between agents in space and agents over time. 
Secondly, as Brink (1992, p. 212 ) notes, “As long as agents are metaphysically 
distinct, interpersonal compensation is problematic; and as long as agents are 
temporally extended, diachronic, intrapersonal compensation is automatic”. 
Together with the popular notion of a self this view allows the egoist to deny the 
need for parity between different agents, and the same agents over time. In many 
circumstances acting for another requires a sacrifice on the part of an agent and, if 
Sidgwick is correct, it is unreasonable to demand that agents ought to make these 
sacrifices uncompensated. Such compensation may be by way of reciprocity (the 
expectation that the other will return acts in kind) or the personal satisfaction and 
good feeling an agent gets from acting in that particular manner. The difference 
for the egoist is that in acting for others there is no guarantee of compensation 
(unless the act makes the egoist feel good). However, when an egoist sacrifices a 
present good for a later good, provided it is accepted that personal identity does 
extend over time, the egoist’s compensation is automatic; I sacrifice and I am 
compensated for that sacrifice. 
 
Physically demarcated and temporally extended selves are central to a 
conventional conceptual scheme. Given no compelling reason to renounce such a 
worldview there seems no good reason for denying that a theory of action, based 
on self-interest, should not be agent-relative and temporally neutral. 
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 §5.2.4 Conclusion 
 
My intention in this chapter was firstly to show that following the egoist doctrine 
does not prevent the egoist from attaining the egoist’s goal. Maximisation of self-
interest can be attained by adopting best strategies, that is, strategies designed to 
maximise self-interest in the long term even if initial risks must be accepted. The 
prisoners’ dilemma only highlights a flaw in limiting consideration of interests to 
the present moment and, perhaps, highlights a substantial flaw in presentist 
theories. 
 
Further, I argued that while it may be difficult, if not impossible, to objectively 
define the self the egoist can operate with his or her own concept of the self; 
which will likely match the conventional notion of a self. I have argued for what 
Brink (1992,  p. 209) refers to as “a common-sense [notion of] personal identity 
over time”.  The egoist is justified in adopting a hybrid version of egoism (agent 
relativity and temporal neutrality) as this is the most accurate reflection of the 
hybrid nature of a metaphysically distinct and temporally extended self.  
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Chapter 6 
Moral facts 
 
§6.0 Is Egoism a Pernicious Doctrine? 
The last of the criticisms outlined in chapter 1 (§1.2.7) was that egoism is an evil 
doctrine, and anything that is an evil doctrine is the antithesis of morality. Such 
lines of attack are uncommon in that it appears a moral judgment is being made 
(that egoism is an evil doctrine) prior to the conclusion of the argument that is 
supposed to determine the validity of egoism as a moral doctrine. If egoism is a 
standard of right and wrong then to pre-judge egoism as wrong (evil) is to beg the 
question. However, Rachels believes that this type of argument can be 
successfully formulated so it avoids begging the question and that showing 
egoism to be morally pernicious is “the most obvious objection to ethical egoism” 
(1974, p. 308). 
 
Even if Rachels argument is successful it does not demonstrate that egoism is a 
flawed theory of action guidance in as much as it will still meet the minimalist 
definition as laid out in §2.6  and quite clearly does answer the question ‘How 
ought I to act?’. However, it is generally accepted that (a) morality is inextricably 
linked with some notion of the good life, and that (b) wickedness is contrary to 
such ideals. If we accept both (a) and (b) then any argument that conclusively 
shows that egoism compels, or at least provides strong reasons for, an agent to 
commit wicked acts must be taken seriously66. What Rachels’ initial argument 
does demonstrate is a need to extend the minimalist definition and make a 
distinction between a theory of action guidance and a moral theory of action 
guidance. I contend that a theory of action guidance is one that consistently and 
coherently answers the question ‘How ought I to act?’ and that a moral theory of 
action guidance, in answering this question, does not compel an agent to act in a 
manner that is clearly morally wrong.  
 
If Rachels is successful he will have presented a damning argument against 
egoism and shown that while egoism may be a theory of action guidance it is not a 
                                                
66
 While both (a) and (b) can be denied there seems little point in doing so and to claim that 
morality is still the concept under discussion.  
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moral doctrine given that, in some contexts, it compels an agent to act in a 
morally pernicious manner. However, the question of whether specific acts can be 
recognised as clearly wrong must be addressed if Rachels’ argument is to be 
accepted and the minimalist definition extended to include the distinction between 
theories of action guidance and moral theories of action guidance.  
 
§6.1 Rachels’ Argument 
Rachels (1974, pp. 308-309) presents the following (true) case: 
 
A friend of mine who lives in a small town in south Georgia told me about 
the following incident which occurred within the past year. The town is so 
small that there is only one doctor and he is, as one might expect, one of 
the town’s more affluent citizens. One day the doctor was visited by a 
poor, uneducated black woman with a variety of minor complaints. A brief 
examination showed that she was suffering from malnutrition. The 
problem was that the woman did not have enough money to buy food for 
herself and several small children. She worked, whenever she could, as a 
cleaning-woman in the homes of the better-off people in the town, but she 
was able to earn only a few dollars a month in this way. All this was 
known to the doctor. After spending no more than five minutes with the 
woman, and having done nothing for her, the doctor told her the charge 
would be twenty-five dollars. The woman only had twelve dollars – this 
was, literally, all the money she had in the world – so the doctor took that. 
 
Using the above case as contextual evidence and making an appeal to moral 
intuition Rachels (1974, p. 309) attempts to discredit egoism via a simple modus 
tollens argument: 
(1) If ethical egoism is correct, then the doctor did the right thing. 
(2) The doctor did not do the right thing. 
(3) Therefore, ethical egoism is not correct. 
 
Correctly formulated modus tollens arguments tend to be uncontroversial and are 
generally considered to be valid. In this respect if someone is convinced that 
ethical egoism endorses the act as laid out in Rachels’ scenario, and is also 
convinced that the act is wrong, then rationally that person must accept the 
conclusion that ethical egoism is a pernicious doctrine. However, I suggest that 
Rachels’ intended purpose is not just to convince the casual reader that egoism is 
a pernicious doctrine but rather that the act outlined in the scenario is wrong and 
that ethical egoism is a pernicious doctrine. If this is the case then we need to do 
more than just examine if the argument is convincing, we must enquire into the 
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truth of the premises. If the premises of the presented argument are true then the 
conclusion must also be true and a decisive blow has been dealt to ethical egoism; 
it will have been demonstrated that egoism, in its consequentialist form, is not a 
moral doctrine.  
 
As I noted in the introduction, the conclusions of such an argument are usually 
dismissed without much consideration, as it appears the argument is either 
viciously circular or question-begging. The act of taking the woman’s last twelve 
dollars has been pre-judged as wrong and this claim (if true) in itself invalidates 
both the initial premise and egoism, and renders the conclusion of the argument 
redundant. If Rachels’ criticism is to be taken seriously, and not dismissed out of 
hand as nothing more than a rhetorical ploy designed to discredit egoism, then the 
countercharge that the argument begs the question and that the second premise 
presupposes the conclusion must be addressed. Rachels’ argument could be 
defended by appeal to either (noncircular) common morality, pure intuitions or by 
reference to moral facts. 
 
In Chapter 7 I will examine in more depth the criticism that Rachels’ argument 
begs the question and will argue that it cannot be defended by appeal to pure 
intuition or common morality. However, a more complex defense is available; 
namely that Rachels’ thesis can be supported by an appeal to moral facts. If it can 
be shown that some acts are as a matter of fact wrong and that egoism in some 
contexts promotes such acts then Rachels will have demonstrated that egoism is a 
pernicious doctrine and therefore not a moral theory.  It is to the possibility of 
moral facts that I will now turn my attention by engaging with Harman’s (1977) 
anti-realist position. 
 
§6.2 Harman’s Thesis 
Harman would reject the claim that Rachel’s argument can be supported by an 
appeal to moral facts, arguing that we can have no such knowledge. Harman 
claims in his anti-realist thesis that observational judgments, such as ‘X is wrong’, 
provide no confirmation of moral facts and that moral facts have no effect on what 
you observe. If we have no way of confirming the existence of moral facts then 
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we cannot claim to have knowledge of such facts and without such knowledge it 
cannot be claimed that specific acts are pernicious. 
 
The problem is not that moral observations cannot be used to confirm moral 
theories; if we accept that opinion can be formed via observations then it follows 
that moral observations may confirm moral theories (Harman, 1977, p. 5). Rather, 
the problem for those who would lay claim to the existence of moral facts is that it 
is unnecessary to make any assumptions about the existence of moral facts in 
order to explain observational judgments such as, ‘X is wrong’. There is no 
justification for the assumption that moral observations are true propositions, or 
that they entail moral facts.  
 
Harman notes a disanalogy between scientific and moral theories. While both 
scientific and moral observations are empirical in nature, scientific observations 
appear to play a role in the confirmation of scientific facts, whereas moral facts, if 
they exist, are unconfirmable by observation and appear irrelevant to the best 
explanation of moral judgments.  
Harman (1977, pp. 6-9) outlines what he perceives to be the “important apparent 
difference” between scientific and moral cases by comparing two observational 
judgments. The first involves a scientific experiment and the formation of the 
conclusion ‘There goes a proton’. The second involves the witnessing of a so-
called immoral act, the burning of a cat, and the formulation of the conclusion 
‘That’s wrong’. The difference between the observation of the two events and the 
formation of the observational judgments is as follows: 
 
The truth of the proposition ‘There goes a proton’, as formulated by a scientist 
observing a vapor trail in a cloud chamber, is confirmed by: 
(i) The observation of a vapor trail in a cloud chamber, and 
(ii) The hypothesis that a proton passing through a cloud chamber will cause 
a vapor trail. 
 
That a proton actually passed through the cloud chamber is the best explanation 
for the observation of the vapor trail which in turn explains the observational 
judgment ‘There goes a proton’. Further, the observation of the vapor trail 
provides evidence for the truth of the proposition ‘There goes a proton’ and 
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provides verification for the hypothesis that when a proton passes through a cloud 
chamber it will cause a vapor trail. The scientist is justified in making 
assumptions about physical facts in explaining both the observation (the vapor 
trail) and the observational judgment (‘There goes a proton’).  
 
However, according to Harman, this explanatory/evidential chain breaks down in 
moral cases. Explaining the observational judgment ‘That’s wrong’, formulated 
upon seeing children pour gasoline on a cat and setting it alight, requires no 
postulation of moral facts. Hypotheses about moral facts are irrelevant to either 
explaining the children’s act or the observational judgment. The best explanation 
of why an observer instantly formulates the proposition, or comes to a 
spontaneous belief (Lycan 1986, p. 97) ‘That’s wrong’ can be completely 
determined in terms of the psychological states and moral sensibilities of the 
observer; no assumptions about moral facts are required67. 
 
According to Harman, (i) observation plays an important and vital role in the 
formulation and verification of scientific facts whereas (ii) observation plays no 
similar role, nor lends any empirical force to the formulation or verification of 
moral facts. 
 
§6.3 Appeals to the Best Explanation and Evaluative Facts. 
It is important to note at this point that Harman has not claimed that moral facts 
do not exist, only that moral facts are an unnecessary component in the 
explanatory chain from the witnessing of a cat being burned to the judgment 
‘That’s wrong’. That is, the simpler explanation in terms of psychological states 
and moral sensibilities is better. In effect Harman applies Occam’s razor and 
determines that in making an explanation we should not make more assumptions 
than the absolute minimum that are required68. That Occam’s razor, or some 
similar principle, ought to be applied is to appeal to an evaluative fact.  It would 
be a mistake to assume that evaluative facts play no part in the formation of the 
observational judgment ‘There goes a proton’. The chain from the observation of 
                                                
67
 ‘Completely determined’ in the sense of what is required on top of the purely visual input. 
68Occam’s razor is attributed to William of Occam and is sometimes referred to as the principle of 
parsimony which underlies scientific modeling and theory building (F. Heylighen, 1997). 
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a vapor trail to the observational judgment ‘There goes a proton’ could be much 
more complex, perhaps involving a premise regarding God. Harman, in accepting 
the direct link between the observation of the vapor trail and the existence of the 
proton, makes an appeal to the best explanation and in doing so an appeal to 
evaluative facts. 
 
The causal chain between direct observation and observational judgments is 
reliant on an appeal to the best explanation. However, that an explanation that 
appeals to the minimum number of assumptions is superior is not a given and 
while the principle appears to be solid it is ultimately a matter of preference. Yet 
this presents something of a paradox, for while it is logically impossible to 
determine a superior criterion by which to rank hypotheses (see §2.3), if the 
explanatory criterion is to be of any use at all then we must accept that some 
explanations really are better than others. For any given observation O there will 
be numerous competing hypotheses H1, H2, H3, that explain the observation. 
Noncircular selection of Hx as the best (most probable) explanation requires a 
criterion by which to rank hypotheses. Even the importance placed on observation 
requires an evaluative judgment, namely that observation really is a better form of 
verification than some other form of evidence. 
 
Within the scientific paradigm it is usually accepted that qualities such as 
predictive success, repeatability, generality and simplicity form the backbone of 
the best explanation. Yet these are, quite obviously, not the only criteria that could 
be used and if all evaluative facts are denied then the selection of criteria for best 
explanations is itself nothing more than psychological preference. According to 
Sayre-McCord (1988, p. 278) we will not be saying that one explanation really is 
better than another only that we have societal or personal preferences regarding 
explanations. Unless we can legitimately claim that one explanation is better than 
another we cannot claim that the best explanation for observing the vapor trail is 
that a proton is passing through the cloud chamber. Harman’s explanatory chain is 
broken.69 
 
                                                
69
 Appeals to the best explanations and the concept of overriding criteria were discussed in §2.3 
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Harman’s thesis is contradictory if it is dismissive of all evaluative facts. “What 
the explanatory criterion presupposes is that there are evaluative facts” (Sayre-
McCord, 1988, p. 278), or at least there are some evaluative facts, those necessary 
for the selection of the ‘best’ explanation. These facts are not themselves directly, 
or indirectly, testable against the world but are a necessary presupposition if the 
explanatory chain from observation to observational judgment is to hold firm.  
  
However, that evaluative facts are a necessary presupposition to explanatory 
chains does not prove that evaluative facts exist. It is equally viable that appeals to 
explanatory chains face the same fate as appeals to moral facts under Harman’s 
analysis. Just as Harman denies moral facts on the grounds that moral judgments 
can be better explained in terms of psychological states, so we can deny 
evaluative facts on the grounds that explanatory judgments can be better 
explained by reference to psychological states and social sensibilities. The 
problem is that if we have no factual basis on which to judge between 
explanations then any explanation is an equally plausible candidate.  
 
It might be objected I have been too hasty. Perhaps we do have general problems 
with explanations, but that is not to deny that there is a fundamental difference 
between morality and science; namely, that observation plays a significant part in 
the verification of scientific facts and no part in the verification of moral facts. 
Like Lycan (1986, p. 89) I accept that there are epistemological differences 
between science and morality but, as Lycan goes on to note, these differences also 
hold between science and “logic, mathematics, [and] linguistics”. All knowledge 
requires evaluation and, if such evaluation is to be anything more than a societal 
preference, an appeal to evaluative facts. A strict reading of Harman’s thesis sees, 
at the very least, “epistemological facts consigned to the same flames” as moral 
facts. Acceptance of Harman’s thesis, logically extended, leads not merely to 
moral nihilism but to extreme nihilism, i.e. the denial of all values and ultimately 
all epistemological facts. Such extreme nihilism is a hole that is difficult, perhaps 
even logically impossible, to climb out of. However, while nihilism may be 
logically impenetrable it is questionable whether it is possible to actually hold 
such a stance and live in the world. I offer no argument against extreme nihilism, 
nor anything to try to sway those who hold this view. My resistance to extreme 
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nihilism is tooth and nail, not philosophical; it goes against too many previously 
held beliefs and offers no rewards or cognitive advantages. 
 
In order to further this thesis it is at this point necessary to briefly inquire what is 
meant by the term ‘fact’. In order to make such a determination it is necessary that 
I lay bare certain metaphysical assumptions. For the most part these assumptions 
are constructivist in nature and support a limited form of realism which, for want 
of a better name, I will refer to as demi-realism. 
 
My first assumption is that extreme nihilism is false, but this assumption needs 
some qualification. If nihilism is simply a denial of any absolute knowledge of 
facts with regard to things-in-themselves then I agree with both nihilism and Kant; 
Noumenal reality is unknowable in principle. Our knowledge is of phenomena 
(via the senses) and while there may be an indeterminate number of ways the 
phenomenal data can be interpreted, and thus an indeterminate number of realities, 
this is not to say reality is whatever we make of it. The position I hold is 
constructivist and neo-Kantian; like Hung (1997, p. 449) I take constructivism to 
be more than the claim that “Reality is an illusion, [and that] there is no mind 
independent reality”. I suggest that reality itself (even if unknowable), our social 
nature, and our initial assumptions about the world (even if this is nothing more 
than a general acceptance of sense data) constrict the reality we can construct. 
Acceptance that reality is socially constructed and theory-laden is also to accept 
that there are limits to what we can claim as fact. (For the remainder of this thesis 
I will use Realityr to denote noumenal reality and Realitys to denote our socially 
constructed reality). 
 
Facts, be they scientific, social, or moral are not statements about Realityr but 
rather about those phenomena that can be more coherently explained within 
Realitys and figure in our best explanations of the world. I take a position similar 
to Quine (1970). It seems that the further something is from the data of sensation, 
and the more that needs postulating in order to derive an explanation of the 
observation, the less solid the conclusion we claim as a fact. It is easier to let go of 
the notion of sub-atomic particles (such as protons actually traveling through the 
cloud chamber) than it is to let go of the belief, based on an observation, that there 
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really is a vapor trail in the cloud chamber. We accept and treat as fact that the 
vapor trail exists because the best explanation of our observation of the vapor trail 
is that we really do see a vapor trail in the cloud chamber. We accept and treat as 
fact that a proton really is passing through the cloud chamber only because 
scientists offer a plausible explanation (protons, when passing through a cloud 
chamber, will cause a vapor trail) that does not conflict with our macroscopic 
(closer to observation) beliefs. 
 
Harman also resists nihilism, at least in its extreme form, and looks for possible 
answers in reductionism and naturalism (1977, pp. 13-21) before pronouncing that 
moral facts are “not useful even in practice in our explanation of observations.” 
(Harman, 1977, p. 23). However, what Harman fails to fully consider is that, 
while moral facts may not figure in the explanatory chain from observation to 
observational judgment, moral facts might figure in explanations at a different 
level. As has already been argued, evaluative facts are unnecessary in giving 
explanations but they are necessary for appeals to the best explanation. Moral 
facts may fulfil a similar secondary, tertiary, or quadriary role, (as I will argue 
some mathematical postulates do) and be necessary to, or expand upon an 
explanation even if not directly part of the explanation itself. Lycan (1986, p. 82) 
similarly considers whether theories might be indirectly justified via explanatory 
virtues and reflective equilibrium. Prior to examining these claims I will briefly 
digress and consider what might constitute the criterion of a best explanation.  
 
Best explanations are necessary if we are to make any social sense (as opposed to 
a purely private, unconfirmable interpretation) of reality. I have argued that best 
explanations are reliant on the admittance of evaluative facts to our ontology. 
However, I note that this has an element of circularity; for, while explanations are 
not just a matter of personal preference and good reasons can be given for the 
selection of evaluative criteria, ultimately these reasons rely on an appeal to best 
explanations and unless these reasons were selected by appeal to a new (superior) 
criterion then these criteria are selected via reference to the criteria they are 
selecting. 
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This circularity is unavoidable given acceptance of nihilism with regard to 
knowledge of Realityr. We have no absolute facts to fall back on as a starting 
point and thus must accept an initial axiom (that determines the initial criterion of 
best explanation) if we are to make any progress. The axiom that I adopt, and now 
make explicit, is that making sense of Realitys primarily involves increasing 
predictive success without sacrificing existing beliefs (conservatism) unless doing 
so offers sufficient and compensating cognitive advantage. We make sense out of 
reality in that our explanations not only rationalise past events but also allow us to 
predict what will happen in relatively similar situations, evaluate these predictions 
in terms of our general beliefs, and in turn extend our beliefs and understanding of 
Realitys. The virtues (or values) of a best explanation that I will adopt, and appeal 
to throughout this thesis, are those of Quine & Ullian. According to Quine & 
Ullian (1978, p. 67), if we claim that hypothesis ‘X’ is the best explanation for ‘Y’ 
then hypothesis ‘X’ must meet the requirements of the virtues of hypotheses; 
Conservatism, Modesty, Simplicity, Generality, and Refutability. These virtues 
are for the most part self-explanatory, however, for the sake of clarity I have 
footnoted expansions on each of the five virtues. 
 
            Virtue #1: Conservatism 
Conservatism is both the strongest and weakest of the virtues. Strongest in 
that it allows the quick elimination of explanations that diverge radically 
from current worldviews (for example that everything I do is controlled by 
an evil demon); weakest in that sometimes the view that radically differs 
from generally accepted views turns out to be the better explanation (for 
example, claims that the world was round at a time when the general 
worldview held that the earth was flat). In short, the virtue of conservatism 
states that the fewer conflicts a new explanation has with our previously 
held beliefs the better, as this limits the changes we need to make to our 
overall worldview.70 
                                                
70Rationally, where hypotheses and previously held worldviews conflict we must, if we are to 
retain the hypotheses, reject the previously held beliefs. The overturning of (often deeply 
entrenched) beliefs is difficult and “the less rejection of prior beliefs required, the more plausible 
the hypothesis – other things being equal” (Quine & Ullian, 1978, p. 67). Where one or more 
hypotheses are available the hypothesis/explanation that conflicts with no prior beliefs usually 
prevails. We are not tempted by an explanation that upsets the applecart when a more 
conservative, non-conflicting explanation is available. 
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Virtue #2: Modesty 
This consists of two similar criteria: 
• The ‘modest’ explanation is the one that is logically simpler. 
• The ‘modest’ explanation is the one that is more humdrum71. 
 
Virtue #3: Simplicity (Occam’s razor) 
Simplicity consists of two conjoined criteria: 
•
 The fewer terms required in explanation, the better. 
•
 The more the simple explanation encompasses, the better.72 
 
                                                                                                                                 
 
The force of conservatism is, initially, very weak. We form and discard beliefs with extreme 
regularity. Conservatism grows in strength the longer a belief survives and the more it fits within 
our developing  worldview. To tear down these developed  worldviews to incorporate some new 
radical theory is to take great risk. The incorporation of small changes avoids such risk; we can 
easily disregard the change, or continue to build on it without major disruption to our higher order 
beliefs. 
 
Explaining how a magician performed a card trick (from a new and sealed deck), “The Counsel of 
Conservatism is ‘[He used] Sleight of Hand’” (Quine & Ullian, 1978, p. 67). Competing 
explanations such as “he did it by luck”, “he used a marked deck”, or “he has paranormal abilities” 
are generally dismissed on the grounds they conflict with the more strongly held beliefs 
respectively that “he would not have performed a trick with only a slim chance of success”, “he 
did not have access to the deck to mark it”, and that “the laws of physics and biology make 
paranormal abilities a doubtful concept”. This is not to say that the truth of the matter is that the 
magician used sleight of hand only that this is the best explanation of our observation. However, 
the truth of the matter may diverge from the accepted explanation but given our reliance on 
explanations one that is more consistent with current worldviews is (generally) preferable to one 
that calls for a revolutionary upheaval of our beliefs. Further there is danger in too easily accepting 
an explanation that radically differs and conflicts with current  worldviews. 
 
“The longer the leap, the more serious an angular error in direction. For a leap in the dark the 
likelihood of a happy landing is severely limited. Conservatism holds out the advantages of 
limited liability and a maximum of live options for each next move” (Quine & Ullian, 1978, p. 
68) 
To radically revise  worldviews in order to accept that the magician’s trick was accomplished via 
paranormal abilities may, if the explanation turns out to be flawed, leave a  worldview shattered 
and an agent with an incoherent view of reality. 
 
71That an explanation be modest, under the first criterion, is that it can be explained by a single 
logic predicate rather than a conjunct of two or more predicates. Quine & Ullian (1977) suggest 
that given the two hypotheses, (a) the car in my driveway is my car, and (b) my car was towed 
away last night and someone parked an identical car in my driveway, the first hypotheses is 
preferable due to its logically simpler form. Hypothesis (a) consists of a single predicate while (b) 
relies on a conjunct.  
 
Where two single predicate explanations are available the more humdrum explanation is 
preferable. In explaining why my car has a flat tyre; the ordinary single predicate explanation (c) I 
ran over a sharp object (causing a puncture) is preferable to the grander (d) someone shot out the 
tire (causing a puncture). 
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Virtue #4: Generality 
The testability/plausibility of a hypothesis presupposes Virtue #4. Two 
tests can never be identical therefore the hypothesis must be generalisable 
to at least a second case. The wider the degree of generalisability the 
higher the degree of belief we can invest in the hypothesis.73  
 
 
Virtue #5: Refutability & Predictive Success 
There must be some possible observation that would falsify the hypothesis 
or explanation.74 
                                                                                                                                 
72Firstly, the fewer terms a new hypothesis has to refer to the better (the terms referred to may 
well be hypotheses in themselves). The strength of the new hypothesis is inversely proportional to 
the number of terms it is reliant upon. Secondly, the more a hypothesis encompasses the better. A 
hypothesis that explains the occurrences in multiple contexts is preferable to one that explains only 
a single event.  
 
 The truth, in a complex world, may be far from simple. However, “our steps toward the 
complicated truth can usually be laid out most dependably if the simplest hypothesis that is still 
tenable is chosen at each step. It has even been argued that this policy will lead us at least 
asymptotically toward a theory that is true.” (Quine & Ullian, 1977, p. 72). 
73
“When a way is seen of gaining great generality with little loss of simplicity or great simplicity 
with no loss of generality, then conservatism and modesty give way to scientific revolution” 
(Quine & Ullian, 1977, p. 75). The virtues tend to become more powerful as they increase, but 
require far more careful application. Despite the disruption to our entire system of intertwined 
beliefs we had good reason to move away from our flat-worldviews and from Newtonian to 
Einsteinian physics as the eventual result, despite initial disruption, was a far more coherent view 
of Realitys. 
74If no such event is possible then the hypothesis serves no actual purpose. A hypothesis that 
allows for any and every event neither predicts nor explains. Hypotheses involving Gods may take 
this form; it is impossible to refute a theory that some God causes all of our sensations as there is 
no possible state of affairs that would refute the hypothesis. Anything that we could claim was a 
counter example could just as easily be explained in terms of some God causing the perception 
that led to that conclusion. Similarly psychological egoism (§1.0) was dismissed because it fails to 
meet the virtue of refutability. 
 
A hypothesis, together with background beliefs implies predictions (i.e. via induction, an 
explanation of a past event leads to a hypothesis that leads to predictions of future events). Should 
such future events be other than the hypothesis predicts then either the hypothesis or the 
background beliefs require adjusting. Albeit in most cases we would need more than a single 
exception to a hypothesis to justify its dismissal; two objects failing to react in the manner 
anticipated, given the gravitational forces in play, is not enough in itself to dismiss Newtonian 
theory. But, several such observations could be. 
 
However, “…[any hypothesis] can be held unrefuted no matter what, by making adjustments in 
other beliefs – though sometimes doing so requires madness… The degree to which a hypothesis 
partakes of Virtue 5 is measured by the cost of retaining the hypothesis in the face of imaginable 
events. The degree is measured by how dearly we cherish the previous beliefs that would have to 
be sacrificed to save the hypothesis. The greater the sacrifice, the more refutable the hypothesis” 
(Quine & Ullian, 1977, p. 79). 
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These criteria of explanation are accepted both generally and, more specifically, 
within the scientific community. Harman gives no details of the criteria he would 
refer to in determining the best explanation but given his analogy to scientific 
explanation it seems reasonable to adopt the five outlined virtues of best 
explanation. 
 
§6.4 The Vapor Trail and the Best Explanation 
If Harman’s thesis is tenable then we can justifiably claim that the best 
explanation (in terms of the explanatory virtues) for the observational judgment 
‘There goes a proton’ is that the vapor trail was caused by a proton. On the other 
hand, the best explanation for the observational judgment ‘[Burning the cat] is 
wrong’ will not involve moral facts. Prior to turning my attention to moral facts it 
is necessary to enquire as to whether Harman is justified in claiming that the 
proton explanation is the best explanation of the observation of a vapor trail, and 
thereby satisfies the explanatory virtues. 
 
It is not the case that a scientist, casually turning a corner, happens to see a vapor 
trail passing through a cloud chamber and instantly reaches the observational 
judgment ‘There goes a proton’. The path from observation to observational 
judgment is far more complex. Cloud chamber experiments involve the firing of a 
proton through a cloud chamber so the scientist is already convinced that a proton 
is passing through the cloud chamber. The hypothesis being tested is that a proton 
will leave a vapor trail, as it passes through a cloud chamber. The actual 
observation is of a reaction in the cloud chamber (i.e. the trail). This observed 
reaction is both (a) confirmation of the hypothesis being tested, not a test for the 
presence of protons, and (b) best (causally) explained by reference to a proton 
passing through the chamber. 
 
                                                                                                                                 
To use a bizarre example; The hypothesis that the earth was flat could have been held, unrefuted 
(even after the globe had been circumnavigated), by the addition of ad hoc hypotheses. Perhaps a 
God (or some mysterious force) immediately transported you to a new starting point as you 
reached the end of a flat earth. However, the cost of holding such a hypothesis and the need for 
more and more bizarre ad hoc hypotheses to support it would be far greater (at some point) than 
the cost of letting go of the previously held beliefs. 
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That we observe a vapor trail in a cloud chamber could be explained in many 
ways. It could, for example, be argued that protons do not exist, and that instead 
God causes the vapor trail each and every time the experiment is performed in 
order to test our faith. However, given that we are attempting to formulate a best 
explanation of our perception then, as Kornblith suggests, it seems reasonable to 
do so in a way that leads to “an improvement of our epistemic situation” (Walker, 
2000, p. 80). Predictive success, such as predicting that a dropped object will fall 
to the ground, plays a big part in our making sense of Realitys regardless of any 
actual causal connections. While it may be the truth that we are deceived and that 
our observation is the result of interference by an evil demon, the more humdrum, 
more modest theory that we actually did see a trail and that it actually was caused 
by a proton is preferable.  
 
The observation of a vapor trail gives indirect evidence for a proton passing 
through the cloud chamber. The best explanation for the vapor trail, that a proton 
is passing through the cloud chamber, seems justified given the constraints of 
Realitys and given what we value in appeals to the best explanation. Given these 
constraints, Harman is correct in the claim that scientific facts play an important 
role in the explanatory chain from observation to observational judgment.  
 
§6.5 Moral Facts and the Best Explanation 
Nelson (1999, p. 62) claims that Harman’s realist explanation, namely that the 
formation of the judgment ‘That’s wrong’ is better explained by reference to 
psychological states alone, fails to meet the criterion of conservatism.  
Consider the following beliefs: 
(i) some things (be they actions or character traits) are actually wrong,  
and  
(ii) in some cases there is close to universal agreement that some act is 
wrong or some character trait is bad. 
 
Given (i) and (ii) persist despite widely diverging worldviews any explanation 
that dismisses all moral facts and appeals instead to purely psychological states 
calls for the dismissal of some very deeply held beliefs and goes against the 
counsel of conservatism. However, while conservatism is “necessary to get any 
reasonable epistemology of any subject off the ground” (Lycan, 1986, p. 85) 
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explanations are not to be judged by this single criterion. If conservatism alone 
were the only defining criterion progress would never be made; the firm, near 
universal belief that the ‘earth is flat’ would never have been overturned. The 
question is not; does an explanation in terms of psychological states meet the 
criterion of conservatism? Obviously it does not. Rather, does this explanation 
offer a better understanding of Realitys such that it warrants overriding the 
principle of conservatism? 
 
An explanation of moral observations in terms of psychological states is certainly 
more modest and metaphysically simpler than one that requires the postulating of 
objective moral facts75. Further, the hypothesis meets the criterion of refutability, 
in theory at least; we would have refutation for the theory if two agents in the 
exact same psychological state formulated different observational judgments on 
viewing an exactly similar act in an exactly similar context76.  However, even if 
we accept that Harman’s thesis provides an explanation that is simpler, more 
modest, and meets (at least theoretically) the criteria of refutability, it remains 
doubtful that this provides sufficient justification to dismiss the counsel of 
conservatism. If psychological states are to prove a superior explanation they will 
need to do so on the grounds that the hypothesis not only meets all the other 
virtues bar conservatism but also has greater generalisability. 
 
If the two theses (explanation by appeal to moral facts and explanation by way of 
psychological states alone) are both applicable only to the domain of moral 
explanations then neither is more generalisable and the counsel of conservatism 
recommends rejecting Harman’s thesis. It is with regard to generalisability that 
Harman’s thesis is stronger; reference to psychological states can be used to 
explain away all evaluative facts. However, in evoking the generalisability of the 
hypothesis it becomes viciously circular and self-destructive. 
                                                
75
 However, as will be seen in the final section of this chapter, the hypothesis has some work to do 
if it is to explain animals carrying out what appear to be moral acts. 
76
 The agents must be in the exact same psychological state as any psychological difference 
between the agents could be used to explain away any differences in observational judgments. 
Given that Harman appeals to scientific standards this would be the only test of refutability that 
meets those standards, the variable being tested (in this case psychological states) must be identical 
in the test case. 
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Harman’s thesis is superior (a better explanation) in that it is simpler, more 
modest, and offers greater generalisability. 
 
Harman’s thesis can be generalised to any thesis that involves factual 
claims where those facts are not directly, or indirectly, supported by 
observation. 
 
Evaluative facts are not directly, or indirectly, supported by observation. 
 
If evaluative facts are dismissed (as nothing more than psychological 
preferences) then claims that one explanation is better than another are 
false.  
 
If we cannot rank explanations then it cannot be true that Harman’s thesis 
is superior. 
 
Harman (1977, p. 13) does note that the discussion on moral nihilism suggests a 
dependence upon a similar premise: 
We can have evidence for hypotheses of a certain sort only if such 
hypotheses sometimes help explain why we observe what we observe.  
 
However, Harman thinks this assumption too strong and allows that we can have 
evidence for facts that are reducible to other facts that we have observational 
evidence for. Giving the example of social facts being reducible to facts about 
individuals for which we can obtain observational evidence leads Harman to 
consider if moral facts might be reducible (ethical naturalism) before dismissing 
such notions as problematic. I will not discuss Harman’s less than convincing 
dismissal of ethical naturalism here as it is not necessary to the point at hand. 
Even if we allow as facts those hypotheses that are: 
(i) directly or indirectly confirmable by observation 
(ii) reducible to facts that meet criterion (i), or 
(iii) those that are necessarily appealed to in support of (i) 
this will still be insufficient for Harman’s case. Evaluative facts do not fit within 
any of these categories.  
 
Evaluative facts are not reducible any more than mathematical facts are reducible 
to physical facts. If anything the reverse may be true. As quantum mechanics 
becomes more accepted, so does (within the scientific arena) the notion that our 
everyday experiences of time and space may be nothing more than illusion and 
that all we can be certain of is mathematical truths. Nor are evaluative facts 
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necessary to giving an explanation; their importance is that they are implicitly 
necessary to claims that hypothesis X represents the best explanation. If 
evaluative facts as distinct from mere psychological preferences are denied then 
claims that X is a better explanation have no factual basis. It seems that, at the 
very least, if Harman hopes to hold the structure of his thesis intact he will be 
forced to allow a fourth type of fact: 
(iv) those necessary to the structure of explanatory theory. 
Harman must allow irreducible, non-observable facts, which, while not part of an 
explanation, are necessary to the formulation of a best explanation. My claim at 
this stage is only that the explanatory chain from observation to observational 
judgment is longer than Harman assumes and implicitly requires an appeal to 
evaluative facts that are, in themselves, not confirmable, directly or indirectly, by 
observation. 
 
§6.6 Counterfactuals 
Sturgeon (1988) criticises Harman’s thesis by way of counterfactuals: Is it the 
case that if a direct observer were to view a cat being needlessly burnt alive, but 
burning the cat is not as a matter of fact wrong, the immediate observer will still 
form the same observational judgment ‘That’s wrong’?  
 
Consider the following synopsis: 
(i) Unnecessarily burning a cat is objectively wrong 
(ii) You view the children carrying out what appears to be the unnecessary 
burning of a cat and form the observational judgment ‘That’s wrong’. 
 
Sturgeon points out that when we consider counterfactuals we are not limited to 
varying only the moral facts. If the actions of the children aren’t wrong, that is to 
say burning cats is still objectively wrong but what the children are doing isn’t, 
then the children must be doing something other than burning a cat. Sturgeon’s 
conclusion is that moral facts are relevant and play a role in what we observe 
(1988, pp. 249-250).  
 
Sturgeon’s defense appears to be directed at a minor strawman. It is not enough to 
show that moral facts are relevant to explanations of observations (Harman can 
concede that unconfirmable facts might exist), rather it must be shown that moral 
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facts figure in the best explanation of what we observe, otherwise they are 
explanatorily impotent. Further, it is not clear that Sturgeon has even 
accomplished enough to show that moral facts are relevant to explanations; that 
we believe moral facts exist undoubtedly has an effect on our observations but 
this leads only to the conclusion that our beliefs play a role in how we interpret 
what we observe. 
 
Both Sturgeon and Harman lay out the moral case as a single event (observation), 
and single events lack verifiability. It may well be the case that Harman is correct 
and the reason the observer, in this isolated case, drew the conclusion ‘That’s 
wrong’ was due to the observer’s psychological state. However, if we are to be 
serious in our search for moral facts we need an experiment that is, at least in 
theory, duplicable. Hypotheses explain sets of data and not isolated events. 
 
§6.7 Artificially Constructed Asymmetry 
Much of the asymmetry in Harman’s analysis of the scientific and moral 
observations is artificial, that is to say the asymmetry is constructed, and 
disappears when cases that are actually analogous are used. When observing a 
vapor trail in a cloud chamber the actual observation is (i) of a reaction, and (ii) of 
something external to the observer. That is, an independent observer witnesses a 
reaction in a cloud chamber, explains why the reaction is occurring by reference 
to a hypothesis, and then formulates the observational judgment ‘There goes a 
proton’. The observational judgment is confirmable and comparable; other 
independent witnesses of the same experiment, if they formulate the same 
observational judgment, provide confirmation. Further confirmation can be 
obtained via observers of relatively similar experiments, again assuming that they 
reach the same observational judgment. It is this repeatability and comparability 
that leads to faith in the observations, the theories that explain the observations, 
and the truth of the observational judgment.   
 
With the moral case, as Harman sets it up, it is difficult to locate the reaction (i.e. 
something analogous to the vapor trail) that the observer is attempting to explain. 
It might be that the fire is supposed to represent the reaction, which is explained 
by a hypothesis regarding flammable objects, but this only leads to the 
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observational judgment that the children set the cat on fire (or something similar) 
which is determinable by direct observation alone. It would seem that the only 
other reaction is internal to the observer; the observer notes a reaction in 
themselves. That is, the observer, in witnessing a cat being burnt, reacts and then 
forms the observational judgment ‘That’s wrong’. However, if this is the 
analogous reaction then we no longer have an independent witness as the observer 
is now part of the experiment. While the observer (O) can note that each time O 
views a similar act O denotes it with the token ‘That’s wrong’ but in the strictest 
sense this observation lacks both the repeatability and the comparability of the 
scientific observation. O can never compare O’s actual internal reactions, denoted 
by the token ‘That’s wrong’, nor confirm that O is actually experiencing the same 
reaction to an earlier, similar, observation. Nor can O compare the actual internal 
reactions with others who claim to have had similar reactions and who denoted 
them by reference to the same linguistic token. ‘That’s wrong’ could be being 
used to denote a range of differing internal reactions. 
 
The asymmetry between the scientific and the moral results from Harman’s use of 
disanalogous cases. In the scientific case an independent and objective observer 
formulates an observational judgment upon witnessing an external reaction, a 
reaction that  is explained by reference to both the observation and a hypothesis. 
When an objective observer is introduced and care is taken to make sure all the 
relevant features are analogous we find that the moral and the scientific show a 
great deal of symmetry. In the moral case, to make an analogous comparison, we 
need  an observer (to fill the role of the scientist), a medium (to replace the cloud 
chamber) in which to observe a reaction (the vapor trail), and an explanatory 
catalyst (the proton) that figures in a best explanation (hypothesis) of why the 
observation was made. 
 
I contend that a more analogous comparison would be something similar to the 
following experiment: 
In a controlled environment a person witnesses an act (such as the children 
setting the cat on fire), and an independent observer (of whom the person 
is unaware) then witnesses whether a reaction occurs (such as the direct 
observer exclaiming ‘That’s wrong’).  
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We now have a (theoretically) repeatable experiment and one where multiple 
independent witnesses (both of this event and of exactly similar experiments) can 
compare the data on the reaction of the person directly witnessing the burning of 
the cat77. If it turns out to be the case that the majority of direct observers react in 
a similar manner then we have an analogous case78. Further, given a consistent 
reaction in a direct observer witnessing a cat being burnt (just as the vapor trail is 
a consistent reaction to a proton being fired through a cloud chamber) it seems 
reasonable to attempt to explain that reaction by appeal to a best explanation. 
 
How most people would react to witnessing a cat being set alight is an unknown. 
However, I expect I am not making too great an assumption, for the purpose of 
this argument, in suggesting that most people viewing the cat being burnt by the 
children would have an adverse reaction. If you think my claim is too strong then 
the scenario can be replaced by a stronger one, perhaps an act of genocide, where 
you agree the reaction of the majority would be adverse. Just as the scientist 
attempts to explain why following act X a vapor trail is witnessed in a cloud 
chamber, the explanation we are now looking for is ‘Why do we (independent 
witnesses) observe an adverse reaction in most people when they observe a 
specific event (such as the cat being burnt)?’ 
 
Harman’s thesis, that the adverse reaction (the observational judgment ‘That’s 
wrong’) of a majority of persons to some specific scenario is a product of those 
observers’ psychological states, is still a contending explanation. However, I 
contend that at this stage the explanation begins to lose its inductive force. 
Assuming that the direct witnesses are from different cultural backgrounds and 
hold differing worldviews then it needs to be further explained why they reacted 
in a similar (adverse) manner despite the likelihood that the direct witnesses are in 
a variety of different psychological states. I imagine Harman’s reply would be that 
                                                
77Obviously, for moral reasons, we can’t, nor would we want to, carry out such experiments. It 
might be possible to create an experiment where volunteers were shown pictures or videos of 
events and the reaction to these were observed. However, the experiment would be different in 
principle; at some level the volunteers are likely to doubt that what they are seeing really occurred 
and this is enough to affect the way the volunteer reacts.  It is certainly enough that it would not 
meet the scientific standards we are trying to duplicate (i.e. the test introduces additional variables) 
and would render the experiment disanalogous. 
78In almost all cases where a proton is fired through a gas chamber a vapor trail appears.  
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similar psychological characteristics exist throughout the group and that this is 
attributed to a matter of training or ethos. Harman’s thesis at this level remains 
quite tenable; indeed the thesis would be difficult to falsify at any level. However, 
to prove Harman wrong is not my intention, rather the question is, does Harman’s 
thesis provide the best explanation? That is, does it provide an explanation that is 
better than one formulated in terms of moral facts. It could be contended that 
“Harman’s skeptical, antirealist explanation of moral observations is no better 
than competing realist, non-sceptical explanations” (Nelson, 1999, p. 62) and that 
Harman has provided insufficient reason to turn our backs on moral facts. 
However, I will argue an explanation formulated in terms of human flourishing is 
far more plausible (that is, that such an explanation meets more of the explanatory 
virtues) than one based on psychological states. Further, I will show that we have 
indirect observational support for moral facts in that they play a necessary 
supporting role in any theory of human flourishing (and that any discussion of 
flourishing will appeal to moral facts) in much the way that appeals to 
mathematical facts play a supporting role in scientific hypotheses.  
  
§6.8 Mathematics 
Harman (1977, pp. 9-10) claims that mathematics, while not confirmable by 
observation, is relevant to observation explanations. Although it is not necessary 
to invoke mathematics to expound the explanation that the vapor trail was the 
result of a proton, it is necessary to appeal to mathematical hypotheses in order to 
support the physical theory of protons.  Since mathematics figures indirectly in 
the formulation of the hypothesis invoked as the best explanation we have 
“indirect observational evidence for mathematics” (Harman, 1977, p. 10). 
 
While it is true that physicists rely on mathematics as they continually posit newer 
and smaller particles to accommodate “new observations without much loss of 
simplicity”, they conveniently ignore that mathematicians have been employing 
the same trick, “multiplying entities, positing ever weirder species in order to 
simplify theory” such as, the acceptance of an ‘unsolvable’ Pi, negative numbers, 
and the postulating of “imaginaries to make exponentiation generally applicable” 
(Quine, 1970, p. 17). While the posits of mathematics and physics can be 
confirmed by indirect observation and appeals to explanations, there is no way of 
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selecting between the competing explanations at a quantum level. The queerness 
of facts at a quantum level and the general disagreement about how the world is 
best carved up at a subatomic level seem to go well beyond any objection, such as 
the one by Mackie (1977), that moral facts are queer.  
 
However, that mathematical and scientific theories are problematic on the lowest 
level of explanation is not reason to dismiss these theories and “[t]o call a posit a 
posit is not to patronise it” (Quine, 1960, p. 22). Posits are necessary if we are to 
make any (scientific) sense of the world and as Quine goes on to say “[e]verything 
to which we concede existence is a posit from the standpoint of a description of 
the theory building process, and simultaneously real from the standpoint of the 
theory that is being built. Nor let us look down on the theory as make-believe; for 
we can do no better than occupy the standpoint of some theory or other, the best 
we can muster at the time”. Facts exist only as best explanations within a 
necessarily theory-laden Realitys. 
 
It is ironic that Harman dismisses the possibility of moral facts, yet implicitly 
accepts equally problematic mathematical and scientific posits as facts without a 
more than superficial questioning of their status. To dismiss moral facts on the 
grounds that they posit entities that (apparently) play no part in observation but to 
allow posited entities (protons) that are explained by posited mathematical entities 
is to apply a strange double standard. Mathematical posits are only provable 
internally within a theory-laden framework. Harman holds moral theory up for 
examination and claims it doesn’t meet scientific standards. However we might 
just as easily turn the tables. Scientific and mathematical theories are subject to 
rigorous standards within that discipline, but philosophy is equally, if not more 
rigorous, in its own way. Philosophers struggle to overcome counter-examples, 
find necessary and sufficient conditions, and create airtight theories that are true in 
all possible worlds. Such standards are not present in physics, where 
“inconvenient counter-examples no longer appear destructive of one’s position” 
(Rundle, 1993, p. 23) and are simply dismissed, to be explained later, without 
even consideration that the theory has been disproved.  
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Imaginary numbers (and many other theoretical posits) are not confirmable by 
either direct or indirect observation and play no direct part in explaining posits 
that are themselves indirectly observable. Imaginary numbers are necessary only 
for the internal coherence of mathematics. Yet it seems we must accept these 
posits if we are to have a consistent theory of mathematics, which is in turn 
necessary for making sense of scientific theory, and ultimately necessary in order 
to explain our observations. 
 
The scientific scenario that Harman presents requires that we accept multiple 
levels of fact (levels of best explanations), ever increasing in distance from the 
initial observation. When we observe a vapor trail (or any event ‘X’): 
 
On an initial level, the best explanation for the observation of X is that X 
is actually happening. We see a vapor trail in the cloud chamber because 
there is a vapor trail in the cloud chamber. 
 
On a secondary level, we formulate the observational judgment ‘There 
goes a proton’ and find verification for this from the initial observation 
together with a best explanation for the cause of the observation.  
 
However, it must be noted that on this secondary level we have already 
appealed to an evaluative fact, namely, that observation supplies reliable 
data. This evaluative fact itself cannot be verified via observation. 
  
On a tertiary level mathematics finds support in that “scientists typically 
appeal to mathematical principles” (Harman, 1977, p. 10) in providing an 
additional level of explanation; in this case explaining the theory of sub 
atomic particles. This is an appeal to the best explanation for the 
hypothesis that itself figures in the best explanation of the observation. 
 
On this level we also have a second appeal to evaluative facts when we 
select which criteria count as better in the formulation of best 
explanations. 
 
On a quadriary level, given Harman’s carte blanche acceptance of 
mathematical and scientific posits we must accept a fourth level of facts; 
those facts that are determined purely by their necessity within a theory 
itself. Even if Harman had offered a deeper analysis of mathematics he 
would still have been forced to accept these posits as facts, or deny 
mathematics any internal consistency. 
 
On the lowest level of mathematics and science, posits exist as facts that are very 
distant from any observation. However, all of these facts are ultimately related to 
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observation; they are all necessary to the formulation of the best explanation of an 
observation. If moral facts can be shown to be valid on any of these levels then we 
are as justified in referring to them as facts as we are to any other variety of fact at 
the equivalent level. It is at the tertiary and quadriary levels that I will argue moral 
facts are as important as any mathematical posits. It is as necessary to appeal to 
moral facts in explaining the principles of flourishing as it is to appeal to 
mathematics to explain some scientific principles. I will argue that mathematical 
and moral facts are highly analogous and that while both are “such remarkable 
human achievements that they naturally invite wonder as to how they are 
possible” (Lear, 1988, p. 93), they are both necessary within a theory laden 
Realitys and, that they each have as much claim to the status of ‘fact’ as do 
explanations that are closer to primary observations. 
 
§6.9 Best explanation – One Last Time 
The explanation we are looking for is one that best explains why: 
We (independent, objective observers) witness an adverse reaction in an 
immediate observer (in most, sufficiently similar, cases) of a specific act ‘X’.  
 
We are attempting to explain why in the majority of cases someone witnessing X 
has an adverse reaction. The act (X) that I suggest we consider is where young 
children pour gasoline on and set fire to a human baby. While X can easily be 
replaced by some other act I am suggesting that there are some acts that are close 
to universally condemned and it is these we should examine, not the more 
debatable act of the burning of an animal.  
 
Harman’s hypothesis is that the adverse reaction we observe in someone viewing 
X is best explained by reference to psychological states and moral sensibilities 
and we have seen that this is severely problematic in as much as via generalisation 
it leads to the dismissal of all evaluative facts and, in doing so, undermines the 
claim that the hypothesis really is a better explanation. As I have already noted 
my aim is not to dismiss Harman’s hypothesis but to introduce another contender 
and argue that this new hypothesis is viable, confirmable, generalisable and has 
none of the problems of Harman’s hypothesis, namely: 
[H1] Acts detrimental to flourishing tend to cause adverse reactions in an 
immediate observer. 
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H1 may sound like a psychological generalisation however it is ultimately my 
contention that explaining human flourishing relies upon an appeal to moral facts 
and it is the recognition of these facts that leads to an agent having an adverse 
reaction. It may be the case that recognition of moral facts on a subconscious level 
leads an agent to develop certain psychological states which in turn leads to 
observational judgments such as ‘That’s wrong’ and with such claims I have no 
real quarrel.  Moral facts still figure in the explanation. It is just that they are 
further removed from the observation. 
 
This hypothesis is testable against the world. If we (independent objective 
observers) witness an adverse reaction in an immediate observer who is 
witnessing an act detrimental to human flourishing we will have evidence for our 
hypothesis79. Now, of course, it cannot be the case that every time someone 
witnesses an adverse reaction in an immediate observer the conclusion can be 
drawn that an act detrimental to human flourishing has just been witnessed, any 
more than a scientist can justifiably conclude ‘There goes a proton’ every time she 
sees a vapor trail. Rather, we would hypothesise something like;  
[H2] If, in a given context (Y), an act (X) would be detrimental to 
flourishing then we would expect, all things considered, that in most cases 
anyone directly observing X in context Y would experience an adverse 
reaction. 
 
If, for example, we believed that an unnecessary act that caused intense suffering 
was detrimental to flourishing then, by hypothesis H2, we would expect to observe 
an adverse reaction in any immediate observer witnessing such an act. So, in our 
modified Harman scenario, a woman observes a group of children burning a 
human baby and exclaims ‘That’s wrong’ (or exhibits some form of adverse 
reaction). 
We (the objective observer) observe this adverse reaction in the woman. 
 
On an initial level, the best explanation for us observing the woman 
having an adverse reaction is that she is having an adverse reaction. 
 
On a secondary level, the observation of the adverse reaction together with 
the hypothesis is indirect evidence that she has witnessed something 
                                                
79
 Further, if the expected reactions are not present this would provide evidence against the 
hypothesis. 
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detrimental to flourishing. Further, the observed reaction provides 
verification for the theory. 
 
If the scientist is entitled to claim, as fact, that (a) there really is a vapor trail, and 
(b) that a proton has just passed through the cloud chamber, then we are as 
entitled to claim that (a1) the woman really is having an adverse reaction, and (b1) 
that an act detrimental to flourishing has occurred. 
 
At this point I am making no explicit moral claims. Rather, I am claiming that in 
Realitys there are certain acts that are detrimental to flourishing. No doubt the 
concept of flourishing needs considerable examination, and I will return to this 
later in the thesis. At this point I am merely suggesting that some things (in this 
case massive and unnecessary pain) are detrimental to flourishing and that this 
figures in the best explanation of why immediate observers have an adverse 
reaction to viewing certain acts. 
 
It is on the tertiary level that moral facts find their initial foothold. Just as 
scientists necessarily appeal to mathematical principles to explain their theorems 
so is it necessary to appeal to moral principles in order to fully expound theories 
of flourishing. Flourishing could be denoted in many ways, from simplistic 
survival and reproduction to having all one’s (perhaps rational, perhaps 
hedonistic) desires met. In order to fully understand what it is to flourish we need 
to appeal to evaluative (moral) criteria; namely, what it is to have a good life. My 
use of the term flourishing is somewhat crude at this time, I will return to a 
discussion of this concept in chapter 8. 
 
At this stage I will offer only a brief example of a necessary evaluative (moral) 
criterion, drawing on the work of McIntyre (2001). To flourish we need to be able 
to make sense of the world and making sense of the world requires appealing to 
best explanations. Best explanation with regard to my flourishing requires self-
knowledge as “self-knowledge is necessary, if I am to imagine realistically the 
alternative futures between which I must choose” (McIntyre, 2001, p. 95). True 
self knowledge requires an absence of self-deception. At the very least we must be 
honest and truthful with ourselves if we are to flourish. Honesty and truthfulness 
also has a social component, it is via confirmation that hypotheses are formed and 
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this requires that we can trust the information supplied to us by others. It is worth 
noting that the moral virtue of honesty is not just necessary to flourishing but is 
also an essential part of any best explanation; If a scientist cannot trust that the 
equipment was prepared as asked, that a proton really was fired into that chamber, 
and that others honestly report the results of similar experiments then the 
observational judgment ‘There goes a proton’ will never reach the status of being 
a best explanation. 
 
I have spoken in terms of flourishing, rather than human flourishing throughout 
this chapter. My reason for doing so is that we can find observational support for 
the hypothesis “If in a given context (Y) an act (X) would be detrimental to 
flourishing then we would expect, all things considered, that in most cases anyone 
directly observing X in context Y would experience an adverse reaction” as well 
as indirect support for moral facts from outside the human sphere. 
 
Stingl (2000, pp. 247-250) outlines an interesting scenario regarding chimps80 and 
the distribution of food. Given enough food chimps will share the food amongst 
the group. If any single chimp tries to take more than their share then the 
dominant male will discourage this act by dealing out punishment. Moreover, this 
punishment itself is judged by the females of the group and if the dominant male 
deals out too much punishment he will be chastised by the females of the group. It 
appears that when one chimp attempts to gain an unfair advantage, depriving 
another of sufficient food (an act that goes against the flourishing of the chimps), 
the dominant male has an adverse reaction and acts in such a way as to rectify the 
situation. It further appears that if the dominant male delivers too great a 
punishment to the offending chimp (an act that goes against the flourishing of the 
individual chimp and possibly causes distress in the group) the females act to 
remedy the situation. Further, these actions occur only when there is roughly 
sufficient food for the group. If there is an abundance of food chimps are not 
punished for taking more than they need. Likewise, during scarcity chimps are not 
punished for not sharing even though harm is done to those that go hungry (we 
might assume that when food is in extremely short supply, equally sharing the 
                                                
80
 I have used the colloquialism ‘chimp’ as this is the term Stingl uses.  
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available food puts everyone at risk). Stingl notes that not only must the dominant 
ape be able to recognise when harms are justified but also the level of punishment 
that is warranted. Further, the female group members “can tell when a certain 
level of harm is justifiably imposed on another chimp and when it is not” (Stingl, 
2000, p. 247).  
 
Harman’s explanation of this scenario would deny that the chimps were acting 
because of any actual rights and wrongs. Rather, the actions were purely 
psychologically driven. That some acts are harmful to the chimp group is (for 
Harman) an objective fact, but that certain punishments are justified “only appears 
to be objectively true, to the deluded chimps, insofar as they are psychologically 
programmed to mistake appearances for reality in precisely this sort of way” 
(Stingl, 2000, p. 248). This explanation is of course a possibility but it seems to 
involve a somewhat complicated story given we are unlikely to ascribe to chimps 
the rational capacity to develop “moral sensibilities” and debate moral beliefs. A 
better explanation, given the appearance that the chimps’ actions are both justified 
and applied within specific contexts, is that acts that affect flourishing give rise to 
attitudes of approval or disapproval and that the chimps have evolved to a point 
where they recognise these rudimentary moral facts (even if they don’t recognise 
them as moral facts) and are compelled to act by them. We gain greater predictive 
success and gain far more understanding of the chimp society via an explanation 
in terms of flourishing and through postulating moral (virtue) facts than we do 
through ascribing their actions purely to psychological states. 
 
§6.10 Conclusion 
If Harman’s thesis is only that moral facts are impotent in the formulation of best 
explanations of observations, then the thesis is untenable. Firstly; the asymmetry 
between scientific and moral observation is mostly of Harman’s own making. 
Secondly; Harman’s realist thesis is better only if it is more generalisable than the 
anti-realist explanation. However, in its more generalisable form it will also defeat 
evaluative facts and in doing so deny any possibility of an appeal to the best 
explanation. 
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A stronger reading of Harman, despite his denial of such a conclusion, leads not to 
nihilism (moderate or otherwise) with regard to moral facts, but to nihilism with 
regard to all epistemic facts. I have not argued against this position. From a neo-
Kantian perspective Realityr is, in principle, unknowable. Yet this does not mean 
we have no claims to factual knowledge, rather those entities which we refer to as 
facts are the best explanations of specific phenomena experienced within a 
socially constructed reality (Realitys).  
 
It is here I strike bedrock and claim, without argument, that the best explanations 
are those that increase predictive success without sacrificing existing beliefs 
(conservatism) unless doing so offers sufficient cognitive advantage. These best 
explanations are facts within Realitys and these facts allow us to make sense of 
both the world and our lives. Further, it seems upon acceptance of the initial 
axiom that there is no cognitive advantage in not postulating moral facts. Rather, 
the opposite is true. We gain great advantage in accepting that explaining the 
concept of flourishing requires appeal to moral facts in the same manner that 
explanation of science requires an appeal to mathematics. 
 
Ultimately mathematical, moral and epistemic facts are nothing more than 
constructs within Realitys. However, that something is a posit is not to deny it 
status as fact; within Realitys and divorced from theory everything is a posit. Facts 
in this context can only be appeals to the best explanation of Realitys and it is only 
by appeal to moral (virtue) facts that a best explanation of what it is to flourish 
can be formulated.  
 
This chapter began with a consideration of Rachels’ argument that egoism is a 
morally pernicious doctrine. Escaping the criticism that Rachel’s thesis begs the 
question requires an appeal to moral facts such that the claim some acts are 
pernicious can be substantiated. If facts are seen as best explanations, as I have 
argued they must be, then moral claims gain the status of facts and can be used in 
support of Harman’s thesis. In the following chapter I will begin afresh with the 
question “Is Egoism a morally pernicious doctrine?”. 
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Chapter 7 
Consequentialism, Egoism, and Pernicious Doctrines 
 
§7.0 Introduction 
As discussed in the introduction to Chapter 6, Rachels attempts to prove that 
egoism is a pernicious doctrine by showing that adherence to the theory compels 
an agent, in some contexts, to commit wicked acts. Rachels tells the true story of a 
doctor who took a poor, uneducated, and malnourished black woman’s last twelve 
dollars after giving her nothing more than a superficial examination, leaving the 
woman without means to feed herself or her small children. The doctor, a selfish 
man who will likely suffer no pangs of regret from taking the woman’s last twelve 
dollars, meets a minor interest by increasing his personal wealth. Rachels 
contends that the doctor acted rightly according to egoism but that the doctor’s act 
in taking the woman’s last twelve dollars was clearly wrong, thus egoism requires 
the doctor to commit an evil act and is a pernicious doctrine. 
 
The argument, in its simplest form, is: 
(1) If ethical egoism is correct, then the doctor did the right thing. 
(2) The doctor did not do the right thing. 
(3) Therefore, ethical egoism is not correct. 
 
In §6.1 I noted that such arguments are usually dismissed as they beg the question. 
The second premise predefines right and wrong and in effect predefines egoism as 
a pernicious doctrine. I will argue that the only successful defense that can be 
offered against this criticism is by way of an appeal to moral facts. However, prior 
to outlining this defense I will briefly outline other possible responses to the 
criticism and the reasons why these defenses are unsuccessful. 
 
§7.1 Question Begging 
An argument is assumed to have begged the question if the conclusion is 
smuggled into the argument as an implicit premise, or if one of the premises is a 
disguised form of the conclusion. The criticism that an argument is circular or 
begs the question can be formulated in many ways. However, I will focus my 
attention only on the stronger claim that Rachels’ second premise presupposes the 
falsity of egoism: 
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(a) Assuming the first premise is true; if ethical egoism is correct then the 
second premise must be false. 
 
(b) Rachels claims the second premise is true. 
 
(c) If the second premise is true then the conclusion that ‘the doctor did not do 
the right thing’ must be the conclusion of a moral argument from an 
ethical perspective other than egoism. That is, some non-egoistic moral 
principle must have been applied by which ‘taking the woman’s last 
twelve dollars’ was judged as wrong. 
 
(d) [by c] Rachels’ argument is exposed as: 
 
(1) If ethical egoism is correct, then the doctor did the right thing. 
(2) According to some other moral theory or principle, or by moral 
intuition alone the doctor did not do the right thing. 
(3) Because premise (2) is true it (question beggingly) is the case that 
ethical egoism is not correct. 
 
The main force of the criticism is that Rachels has assumed, without argument, 
that moral intuition or some non-egoistic moral theory or principle, that predefines 
the act recommended by egoism as wrong, is correct. It is trivially true that 
according to some other moral theory or principle egoism is incorrect but this is a 
far cry from proving the conclusion that egoism is incorrect.  
 
§7.1.1 Question Begging – Rachels’ Defense 
Rachels addresses this counter argument and claims that the second premise can 
stand alone. That is, premise two does not rely on some hidden principle or 
theory. As Rachels goes on to claim, the wrongness of taking unnecessary 
advantage of a helpless woman is intuitively recognizable independently of, and 
prior to consideration of, any moral theory or principle. Rachels would have us 
accept that the wrongness of the doctor’s act is clearly recognizable as a moral 
fact and that the wrongness of the act is “more certain than any mere theory could 
be: it is one of the fixed, constant points against which proposed theories may be 
tested” (1974, p. 313). 
 
Rachels’ claim, that the act of taking a helpless woman’s last twelve dollars is 
recognizable as wrong by way of moral intuition alone, does not imply that moral 
intuition is foolproof nor that we can always identify right and wrong by way of 
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moral intuition alone. The claim is the simpler one that certain extreme acts (for 
example torturing an innocent for fun or, in this case, taking unnecessary 
advantage of a helpless woman) can be objectively identified as wrong and will be 
identified as wrong by the majority of individual moral agents. The implicit 
generalised claim on which Rachels’ argument depends is: 
We (presumably morally sensitive people) will recognise intuitively that 
certain specific acts (such as taking unnecessary advantage of a helpless 
woman) are objectively wrong with more certainty than we know the 
reasons why such acts are wrong. 
 
That the doctor, in taking the twelve dollars, did not do the right thing is, 
according to Rachels, recognizable as wrong with intuitive moral certainty. The 
egoist, in claiming the doctor did the right thing, is mistaken (and, presumably 
morally insensitive) and has simply failed to recognise the wrongness of the act81.  
 
Rachels offers no argument to support the claim that the majority of persons 
would make the moral judgment that the doctor acted wrongly in the detailed 
scenario and that egoists (in holding on to the claim that the doctor did the right 
thing by taking the woman’s last twelve dollars) represent a small minority of the 
moral community. Nor, to be fair, does he really need to.  
 
All Rachels needs us to accept is:  
1. There is some act (X) where the moral intuition that (X) is wrong will 
be the intuition held by the majority of the moral community such that 
it is reasonable to conclude that (X) is wrong;82 
and 
2. There exists a situation where the act (X) will be the act promoted by 
egoism. 
 
It is the principle that some acts can be intuitively recognised as wrong and would 
be recognised as wrong by the majority of the moral community, not the specifics 
of the presented scenario that is central to Rachels’ claim. If such a position stands 
up under scrutiny then Rachels’ second premise ‘The doctor did not do the right 
                                                
81
 It could be that the egoist recognises the act as wrong but chooses to follow the egoist doctrine 
anyway. However, it would seem such an egoist has already given up on the claim that egoism is a 
moral doctrine.  
82
 This is not an appeal to majority belief, or a utilitarian calculation. Rachels is claiming only that 
the majority will recognise an act as being wrong without reference to any belief set or ethical 
theory. 
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thing’ is, as Rachels himself notes, recognizable independently of, and prior to 
consideration of, any moral theory. 
 
§7.1.2 Question Begging at a Deeper Level 
Rachels’ defense against the criticism that his argument begs the question relies 
on the claim that agents can experience pure intuitions. It is undoubtedly true that 
we can have moral intuition without knowledge of the structure of any specific 
moral theory – children formulate the notion that someone has acted wrongly 
toward them long before they gain knowledge of why the act might have been 
wrong. However, it is not so obvious that these intuitions are pure. While 
someone may be unaware of the specific moral structure of principles it may still 
be the case that learnt, or indoctrinated, moral principles are the ultimate basis of 
moral intuitions.  
 
As Hare (1986, p. 165) notes “[principles], if they are accepted sufficiently long 
and unquestioningly, come to have the force of intuition”. A child indoctrinated 
with a specific principle is likely to judge something that goes against that 
principle as wrong without any further consideration, and possibly without any 
conscious consideration of the indoctrinated principle. That Rachels and others 
intuitively find the doctor’s act reprehensible may simply be a result of having 
accepted the guiding principle that ‘taking unnecessary advantage of a helpless 
person is wrong’ to such a degree that it now appears unquestionable and even the 
consideration of doing otherwise is, to them, abhorrent. If this is the case then 
Rachels’ argument still begs the question. Rachels’ second premise: 
(2) [we can recognise by way of intuition alone that] the doctor did not do 
the right thing. 
 
is really nothing more than the claim: 
 
(2) [we can recognise by way of deeply held moral principles that have the 
force of intuition that] the doctor did not do the right thing. 
 
Ethical egoism is being dismissed, not by reference to some presupposed moral 
theory, but on the basis that it does not conform to some deeply indoctrinated 
(non-egoistic) moral principle. Many put little faith in the process of reciprocal 
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illumination and decry it as an error to rely on intuition over theory.83 However, 
intuitionism has its supporters. Though not specifically in a moral context, Kripke 
(1980, p. 42) claims “Of course, some philosophers think that something’s having 
intuitive content is very inconclusive evidence in favor of it. I think it is very 
heavy evidence in favor of anything, myself. I really don’t know, in a way, what 
more conclusive evidence one can have about anything, ultimately speaking”. 
Likewise Nelson (1999), while not offering anything new by way of argument for 
intuitionism, puts up a strong defense against Kantian and Aristotelian criticisms. 
I cannot possibly hope to do justice to, nor settle the debate regarding the purity of 
moral intuitions here. Rather, in order to make progress, I will for the time being 
work under the assumption that pure intuitions are at least logically possible and 
grapple with the question ‘why ought we take such intuitions as being indicative 
of a moral fact?’ 
 
§7.1.3 Question Begging – The Power of Intuition 
The practice of what Sober (2001, p. 432) refers to as reciprocal illumination is 
common in moral philosophy. It is a logical truth that if in a given context our 
moral intuitions differ from what moral theory advises then, if we are to be 
consistent, either the theory must be disregarded (or modified), or we must go 
against our intuitions. However, it is a considerable leap from accepting that we 
have pure (uninfluenced) moral intuitions to assigning them any form of factual 
status. Likewise, what might be referred to as common morality where the 
majority views an act as wrong, intuitively or otherwise, does not provide proof 
that such an act is, as a matter of fact, wrong.  
 
If moral facts are intuitively recognizable then we must question why Mary 
Wollstonecroft’s intuitions were those of a minority, and why her claims that 
women ought to have equal rights, were so “widely regarded as absurd… [and 
why] …they were satirised in an anonymous publication entitled A Vindication of 
the Rights of Brutes84” (Singer,1976, p. 33). It could of course be countered that 
the majority did intuitively recognise that women ought to have rights but that 
                                                
83
 Nelson (1999) cites Brandt, Hare, and Singer as regarding intuitionism as the “fashionable new 
error in ethics”. 
84
 The author is now known to be Thomas Taylor. 
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these intuitions were suppressed for political reasons. However, we need not rely 
on this single example. The briefest look back through moral history shows the 
naiveté in claiming the moral intuitions of the majority represent (realist) moral 
facts.  
 
The current majority view is that slavery (where slavery means the ownership of 
another human) is morally wrong. Yet, the ancient Greeks (and many others 
throughout history) appear to have had no doubt that slavery was morally 
acceptable. Few ancient Greeks would have recognised a premise suggesting that 
enslaving other humans was factually wrong or that such a claim was clearly an 
intuitively recognizable moral constant. It appears that at different points in 
history moral intuitions (or at least the moral intuitions of the majority) differed: 
(a) The ancient Greeks did not intuitively recognise slavery as wrong. 
(b) Most people in the modernised world do intuitively recognise slavery 
as wrong.  
 
That moral intuition varies across time can be explained by:  
(i) The intuitions (a) and (b) about slavery are correct in both cases. 
Morality is temporally relative. 
or 
(ii) Pure moral intuitions, where they seem certain and gain some credence 
in that the majority of others within the moral community share the 
intuition, can be mistaken.  
 
§7.1.3.1 Temporally Relative Moral Intuitions 
I will discuss the possibility that morality is temporally relative, that is that the 
morally correct action in a specific context is relative to the point in time at which 
the scenario occurs. More specifically I will consider the possibility that: 
The intuitions (a) and (b) about slavery are correct in both cases. Morality 
is temporally relative. 
 
While this would account for differing moral intuitions across time it presents a 
new set of problems and considerably weakens the conclusion of Rachels’ 
argument. If it is accepted that moral intuitions are temporally relative then all that 
can ever be claimed is  that ‘X is intuitively wrong at this particular instant’ and 
while the intuition may also hold for the next instant, and perhaps for a 
considerable time, there is no reason why this must be the case. Further, Rachels 
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is unlikely to want to adopt this position as it means premise (2) must be replaced 
with, 
  
(2) The doctor did not do the right thing relative to this specific point in 
time. 
 
and the conclusion of the argument is no longer that ethical egoism is 
incorrect, only that: 
 
(3) Ethical egoism is incorrect at this point in time.  
 
Temporally relative intuitions are unsuitable for reciprocal illumination. The 
correctness of moral theories would come and go with the passing of time; one 
moment correct, one moment flawed85. If temporal relativity is accepted Rachels 
is forced to concede that, should moral intuitions change, his argument against 
egoism will lose all its inductive force. Egoism might be an incorrect theory today 
but it could be the correct moral theory tomorrow.  
 
Temporally relative intuitions, while logically possible, are also an unsatisfactory 
answer. If universalisability is a criterion of morality within time then consistency 
demands it must also apply across time. This leads to conflicting intuitions, the 
Greeks’ intuition that slavery is morally acceptable is applicable both then and 
now and the current (common) intuition that slavery is wrong is applicable both 
now and then.  
 
Nothing I have said disproves the notion of temporally relative intuitions. 
However, if moral intuitions are morally relative then they are of no use in 
strengthening Rachels’ argument. 
 
§7.1.3.2 Moral Intuitions and Certainty 
If moral intuitions are not temporally relative then it must be the case that: 
(iii) Pure moral intuitions, where they seem certain and gain some credence 
in that the intuition is shared by the majority of others within the moral 
community, can be mistaken.  
 
                                                
85
 We might expect reasonably slow change but this need not be the case. Remarkable events that 
change our view of the world overnight might also lead to sudden changes in our intuition about 
right and wrong. 
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Either the intuitions of the ancient Greeks or those of the modern world are 
mistaken. It cannot be that moral agents know with certainty that slavery is 
morally acceptable and other moral agents know with the same degree of certainty 
that slavery is morally wrong. If it is conceded that moral intuitions are fallible 
(even where such intuitions coincide with the majority of others’ intuitions) then 
Rachels’ defense of premise two fails. We cannot be certain, by means of intuition 
alone that, as a matter of moral fact, the doctor did the wrong thing. Further, if 
moral intuitions that seem both obvious and certain can be false then it seems odd 
to ever assign them preference over moral theory. 
 
However, if moral intuitions are not infallible then they cannot be appealed to by 
Rachels in order to avoid the criticism of question begging. Rachels’ second 
premise (that the doctor, in taking unnecessary advantage of a helpless woman, by 
taking her last twelve dollars did not do the right thing) cannot be the conclusion 
of a moral theory or principle and, as I have shown, is unsuccessful in supporting 
Rachels’ conclusion if it is based on moral intuition alone. However, I contend 
that a stronger version of Rachels’ argument can be formulated by introducing the 
notion of moral facts. 
 
§7.1.4 Question Begging – Moral Facts 
In Chapter 6 I developed the thesis that all facts are constructs (best explanations 
of phenomena within a socially constructed reality) and that moral concepts have 
a factual status that is at least the equivalent of that of abstract mathematical 
posits. Where moral condemnation of a specific act approaches unison we have 
strong verification for moral hypotheses.86 The type of hypothesis I explicated in 
Chapter 6 involved the notion of flourishing and I further contended that a full 
account of what it is to flourish requires an appeal to moral facts in the same way 
that the explanation of a simple mathematical procedure (square roots) requires 
appeal to a mathematical posit (imaginary numbers). Accepting that moral 
concepts, even if ultimately constructs, are a necessary part of the explanation of 
                                                
86
 We do not need 100% unison of agreement any more than science expects a 100% success rate – 
though this is an ideal things sometimes go wrong in any experiment. 
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human flourishing87 allows for the considerable strengthening of Rachels’ initial 
argument, and for the argument to be formulated without begging the question.  
 
Before continuing I will make clear how this position (regarding moral facts) is 
incorporated with the doctrine of egoism as developed in the initial chapters. My 
claim is that Good is relative both to an agent and that agent’s specific worldview. 
The values and beliefs that an agent holds, within that agent’s socially constructed 
reality (Realitys), lead to certain actions being labeled as right or wrong. However, 
I am not claiming that any and every imaginable view of the world could be held 
by an agent. Realityr (even if in principle unknowable), social interaction, and the 
nature of being human all constrain how we view the world (Realitys). My claim, 
and the argument that will be further developed in Part 2 is that: 
While denoting good as relative to the egoist and his/her worldview, the 
egoist must also admit, given the limitations placed on Realitys, that some 
actions (as a matter of best explanation) really are for the benefit or 
detriment of human flourishing, and that the explanation of why these acts 
are perceived to be right or wrong requires an appeal to moral facts. 
 
Returning to Rachels’ case, my contention is that the reason most people 
experience an adverse reaction to hearing the story of the doctor taking the 
woman’s last twelve dollars is that the act is detrimental to flourishing88. Further, 
the general intuition that the doctor acted wrongly is an indication (Virtue #1: 
Conservatism) that the doctor did in fact act wrongly. These intuitions could be 
explained away by Harman’s antirealist explanation with regard to psychological 
states and, despite the problems I have highlighted with this method of 
explanation (§6.2), this is still a potential explanation. However, my claim is that: 
(i) the doctor did something detrimental to human flourishing; 
and 
(ii) in fully expounding why the act was detrimental to flourishing it will be 
necessary to make an appeal to moral facts;  
and further that 
(iii) an explanation in term of flourishing and moral facts is a better 
explanation and does not result in the nihilistic position that an appeal to 
psychological states leads to.  
 
                                                
87
 What flourishing is and who can flourish has not yet been discussed.  For now, I am working 
with a general assumption that some states of affairs lead to human flourishing and others do not.  
I will return to the concept of flourishing and a more in-depth analysis in Part 2 of this thesis. 
88
 Specifically to the woman and more generally to human flourishing in that we believe doctors 
ought to act in a specific manner. 
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Incorporating the above claims, Rachels’ argument can be expanded to:  
(1) If ethical egoism is correct, then the doctor (in taking the woman’s last 
twelve dollars) did the right thing. 
 
(2.i) Most people would have an adverse reaction upon witnessing a 
scenario whereby a doctor took unnecessary advantage of a helpless 
woman by taking her last twelve dollars. 
 
(2.ii) The best explanation for why the majority had an adverse reaction to 
the doctor’s act, given no other overriding explanation, is that the act is 
detrimental to the woman’s (and perhaps the doctor’s) flourishing and that 
most people recognise the wrongness (in this case) in acting to the 
detriment of the woman’s flourishing.  
 
(2.iii) [by 2.i/2.ii] It is a moral fact within Realitys that taking unnecessary 
advantage of a helpless woman is wrong. 
 
(2) The doctor did not do the right thing. 
 
(3) Therefore, ethical egoism is not correct. 
 
This argument avoids the question-begging criticism and remains a serious 
criticism of ethical egoism. However, it is still not possible to analytically engage 
with the argument without further defining what is meant by ethical egoism.  
Without such a definition the truth of premise 1 is unknown; it must first be 
determined exactly what egoism would require the doctor to do before it can be 
determined whether by ethical egoism the doctor did the right thing. 
 
§7.2 Defining Terms 
Rachels, perhaps assuming egoism to be inherently flawed, does not define the 
doctrine he is dismissing. The nearest he comes to a definition is in a later article 
where, in response to criticisms made by T. Machan (1978), he writes  “If ethical 
egoism is correct, then the right thing for anyone to do, on any occasion, is 
whatever would best promote his own interests.” (Rachels, 1978, p. 426). Such a 
simple (partial) definition is insufficient and unlikely to be accepted by anyone 
claiming to be an ethical egoist or seriously defending ethical egoism as a moral 
doctrine. If Rachels’ only claim is that selfish pursuit of one’s own interests is a 
flawed doctrine then there would be little point in quarreling. However, it appears 
Rachels wants to discredit consequentialist egoism in whichever way it might be 
defined and establish that any such theory built on self-interest is pernicious. This 
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being the case, Rachels is also directly attacking the egoist theory I have been 
developing throughout Part 1 of this thesis, that: 
(i) (Universal principle of ethical egoism) If  is recognised as good in 
itself relative to Agentn’s worldview and acting to bring about  is the 
act that would maximise Agentn’s interests then  provides Agentn with 
strong moral reason to, and justification for acting. 
 
(ii) (Individual motivation for acting) If Agentn believes that ethical egoism 
provides preferable reasons for acting then Agentn will, in most cases, be 
motivated to act in accordance with (i). 
 
In order to rise to Rachels’ challenge I will spend a little time further developing 
the egoist doctrine. I will begin with the principles above and develop them 
further by consideration of what Rachels might mean firstly, by interests, and 
secondly by what it means to best promote these interests. 
 
§7.2.1 The Egoist’s ‘Interests’  
Interests must be more than just what an agent desires or believes to be in the 
agent’s best interests.  To claim that an act would lead to the maximization of an 
agent’s interests is to claim that an act, all things considered, would most probably 
lead to the maximization of the agent’s interests. Undoubtably in many cases it 
would be difficult for a third party to establish what was in an agent’s best 
interests, even if that third party had some understanding of the agent’s 
worldview. However, all I am claiming is that some acts are quite clearly not in an 
agent’s best interests no matter what that agent might claim to the contrary. For 
example, it is quite clear that while an agent may claim it is in his interests to 
jump off a cliff (believing he can fly), or to drink poison (believing he is 
invulnerable to the effects of that poison), it is not in the agent’s actual best 
interests to do so. The agent’s belief in such cases is erroneous and acting in the 
manner the agent believes will lead to the maximization of the agent’s interests is 
not the act that will actually accomplish this goal. 
 
Further, it is not only impossible actions that are ruled out, for, although I may 
have an interest to be financially well off it does not follow that I have an interest 
in emptying my bank account and spending all the money on Lotto tickets. In fact, 
given the high probability that I would lose most of the money, it is in my rational 
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interests to do the exact opposite of what I believe it would be in my interests to 
do. Thus the egoist must not only balance long- and short-term interests, but these 
interests must also be pursued rationally. ‘Rational interests’ is a concept that is 
unlikely to be entirely sufficient for the task at hand but, for the sake of brevity, I 
will simply accept that we can identify a commonsense notion of rational interests 
where, for example, self-destruction, self-deception or acting in a manner that in 
all probability will not bring about the desired outcome is not rational. 
 
Probability of success is also problematic. An agent may have a rational interest in 
accepting some risk if the actual payout, if successful, is suitably compensatory, 
and the agent does not stand too great a loss if success is not forthcoming. An 
egoist making little headway in saving to buy a house may argue that his interests 
lie in using the rent money to play roulette and win enough to buy a house, and 
this may well be true, but given the improbability of this action being successful 
the egoist’s better interests appear to be paying the rent and not getting evicted. 
The loss (eviction) if the egoist is unsuccessful is too great a risk and the act 
(gambling) is clearly not in the egoist’s rational best interests.  
 
Interests then, are not the agent’s immediate desires nor are they merely what the 
agent believes will lead to the maximization of interests. To claim that an act is in 
my interest, such that it will result in the maximization of overall interests is also 
to claim that the act I believe to be in my interest has a reasonable probability of 
success, while factoring in the negative consequences such that should the act be 
unsuccessful the negative consequences will be minimised. 
 
 
§7.2.2 ‘To Best Promote’ 
Rachels’ term ‘To best promote’ interests is unlikely to mean ‘to advance a single 
interest’ nor is it exactly synonymous with ‘to maximise interests’. Most, if not 
all, individuals have a range of rational long- and short-term interests. An agent 
attempting to promote these interests will often have a choice of several actions 
all of which have a reasonable probability of success. However, promoting one or 
a specific range of interests will in many cases hinder others. Considering a 
specific, if extremely simplified, example: 
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Max has 12 different fields of interest and at this point in time two specific 
courses of action that he could follow.  
 
Action #1 would result in ten of these interests being slightly furthered and 
two of them being frustrated (to an equal degree). Let’s say the value of 
each action furthered is 10 and in that case Action #1 can be assigned a 
value of 80:  Ten interests furthered (100) less two interests frustrated (-
20). 
 
Action #2 would further a single interest a great deal (let’s say a value of 
80) and frustrate none. 
 
I take ‘to best promote’ to mean something like ‘given all of an agent’s interests, a 
specific act would promote rather than detract from the egoist’s balanced (long- vs 
short-term) rational interests.  That is, overall more of the egoist’s real interests 
will have been promoted than have been demoted; in short, the egoist has 
maximised his interests. In the above example both actions produce a utility of 80, 
however action #1, while increasing more of the egoist’s interests, actually 
detracts from two of them whereas action #2, while only promoting a single 
interest, detracts from none. Even though both actions produce the same overall 
utility I suggest an egoist ought to adopt action #2. Although the utility is 
theoretically equal I contend that the cost of sacrificing something the egoist has 
an interest in is greater that the minor gains made in other areas. I will argue this 
point more fully in Chapter 9. 
 
Adopting Rachels’ concepts the universal principle of egoism can be extended to: 
(Universal principle of ethical egoism) If  is recognised as good in itself 
relative to Agentn’s worldview and acting to bring about  is the act that 
would maximise and would promote rather than detract from Agentn’s 
‘balanced (long vs short term) rational interests and that acting to bring 
about  has a reasonable probability of success (i.e. of actually bringing 
about ) and the risk, should success not be forthcoming, is minimised’ 
then  provides Agentn with strong moral reason to, and justification for 
acting. 
 
§7.2.3 The Extended Argument: 
Incorporating both the definition of egoism and support for premise 2, by way of 
an appeal to the best explanation, the argument under consideration has become: 
(1.i) If ethical egoism is correct then the right thing for anyone to do, on 
any occasion, is whatever action would maximise and would promote 
rather than detract from an Agent’s balanced (long vs short term) rational 
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interests, assuming such action has a reasonable probability of success and 
the risk, should success not be forthcoming, is minimised. 
 
(1.ii) Within the context of Rachels’ scenario, the conditions of (1.i) would 
be met by taking the woman’s money. 
 
(1.iii) The doctor took the woman’s money. 
 
(1) If ethical egoism is correct then the doctor did the right thing. 
 
(2.i) Most people would have an adverse reaction upon witnessing a 
scenario whereby a doctor took unnecessary advantage of a helpless 
woman by taking her last twelve dollars. 
 
(2.ii) The best explanation for why the majority of people had an adverse 
reaction to the doctor’s act, given no other overriding explanations, is that 
the act is detrimental to the woman’s (and perhaps the doctor’s) 
flourishing and that most people recognise the wrongness (in this case) in 
acting to the detriment of the woman’s flourishing.  
 
(2.iii) [by 2.i/2.ii] that it is a moral fact within Realitys that taking 
unnecessary advantage of a helpless woman is wrong. 
 
(2) The doctor did not do the right thing. 
 
(3) Therefore, ethical egoism is not correct. 
 
Having fully extended the argument it can now be considered whether Rachels’ 
conclusion that egoism is a pernicious (incorrect) doctrine necessarily follows. 
 
§7.3 Machan’s Objection 
Allowing the second premise (the doctor did not do the right thing) to stand, 
Machan (1978) outlines a possible attack on the first premise (1) and more 
specifically the claim of sub-premise (1.ii) that the doctor’s act would be the act 
promoted by the application of the principle of egoism. 
 
Machan  (1978, p. 422) claims: 
What Rachels does not prove is that, under the circumstances, making 
himself twelve dollars richer, versus some other action the doctor might 
have taken, was to the doctor’s advantage.  
 
Machan argues that taking the twelve dollars is likely to have prevented the doctor 
earning more money, damaged his reputation, damaged the doctor’s own good 
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feelings, and that these negative factors far outweigh the small monetary gain. 
Machan (1978, p. 423) goes on to claim that these factors bring (1.ii) into serious 
doubt and that it most likely would not have maximised the doctor’s balanced 
(long vs short term) rational interests to take the twelve dollars. Rachels (1978) 
finds no problem in countering Machan’s criticism pointing out that, as a matter 
of fact, taking the twelve dollars had no actual negative effects on the doctor’s 
interests. His reputation did not suffer and the doctor would not have had good 
feelings from not taking the money (in fact he would never have given the woman 
another thought).  
 
We have only the limited context of the case study and the facts as presented by 
Rachels to go by, but I find it difficult to accept Rachels’ claim that taking the 
woman’s last twelve dollars did not negatively affect the doctor’s best interest. If 
the doctor’s act was  clearly recognizable as reprehensible, as Rachels claims it to 
be, and the story is widely known then we must assume that the majority of 
people in the town, affluent and poor alike, unless they are all of like-mind to the 
doctor, considered that the doctor had acted reprehensibly. However, if Rachels is 
correct then these same people, despite their feeling about the doctor’s actions, 
continued to treat him in a manner that had no negative effect and caused no 
damage to any of the doctor’s interests sufficient to offset an extremely small 
financial gain. 
  
However, even assuming Rachels is correct and the doctor suffered no negative 
effects from taking advantage of the woman’s predicament, Rachels has ignored 
Machan’s central criticism. Machan is claiming that the act of taking the twelve 
dollars is unlikely to have been the act, given all the possible options open to the 
doctor, that would have maximised the doctor’s overall (balanced long vs short 
term rational) interests. Rachels’ analysis rests on a false dilemma: limiting the 
consideration of options to only taking or not taking the twelve dollars. There 
were numerous options open to the doctor (some of these are discussed in §7.6) 
and if we are to assess whether an egoist would approve of the doctor’s actions 
and judge the actions morally right we need to determine whether taking the 
twelve dollars, rather than any other action open to the doctor, would have 
maximised the doctor’s interests.  
 167 
 
It is logically impossible to assess whether the doctor did the right thing 
(according to egoism, or any consequentialist theory) to the extent that we can 
clearly and uncontroversially show that action ‘x’ is the one that maximised 
interests. While we have reasonable information about how things have actually 
turned out for the doctor (that is, the doctor is twelve dollars better off and has 
suffered no noticeable negative effects) we can only make assumptions as to how 
things might have turned out had the doctor acted differently. To compare the set 
of actual consequences with the sets of possible consequences from different 
actions is pointless. The case can equally be made that if the doctor waived the 
twelve-dollar fee the result would be: 
(i) He was twelve dollars worse off and the action had no other effect on 
his interests. 
(ii) He was twelve dollars worse off and plagued by patients wanting free 
services. 
(iii)He was twelve dollars worse off initially but his reputation as a caring 
doctor eventually resulted in increased income. 
(iv) He was twelve dollars worse off initially but the woman felt so 
indebted that she carried out actions that greatly benefited the doctor. 
 
I will return to an attempt at calculating consequences in §7.6. All I am claiming 
here is that (i) through (iv) are all logically possible outcomes of just one of the 
many other options open to the doctor. Given that it is extremely unlikely that 
agreement could be reached as to the consequences of all of the other actions open 
to the doctor we cannot even begin to calculate the degree to which they would 
help or hinder the doctor’s overall interests. Further, if we cannot calculate the 
degree to which the other possible actions would have affected the doctor’s 
overall interests we cannot know whether the action the doctor did take is the one 
advised by the egoist doctrine. The premise that “On that occasion, it would 
maximise the agent’s overall balanced (long vs short term) rational interests to 
take the woman’s money” is far from uncontroversial. Whether an egoist would 
assess that the doctor acted correctly in taking the woman’s last twelve dollars 
depends on the values assigned and the outcomes projected. Machan’s criticism, 
namely that Rachels has not ‘proved’ that the doctor’s act is the one that would 
have maximised his overall interests, while not disproving Rachels’ argument, 
calls it into serious doubt. 
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§7.4 Hypothetical Cases 
Rachels does take on board something of Machan’s criticisms and counters with 
the argument that it really does not matter if he is wrong about the specific details 
of this case. Hypothetical cases are as valid as real cases in examining moral 
theories and a hypothetical case can be created similar to the one presented, but 
where as a matter of stipulation taking the twelve dollars does result in the 
maximization of the doctor’s overall interests. Thus, in this hypothetical case the 
doctor does the right thing according to ethical egoism, acts in a manner that we 
know to be wrong, and egoism is still shown to be incorrect. Premise (1.ii) is 
modified to: 
(1.ii) Within the context of  some hypothetical scenario, the conditions of 
(1.i) would be met by taking the woman’s money. 
 
However, if we accept Rachels’ claim with regard to the force of the hypothetical 
scenario then it must be assumed that we can create further hypotheticals to test 
Rachels’ thesis. Consider the following hypothetical scenarios: 
t1 : The doctor/woman scenario as at the time Rachels describes it. 
 
t2 : Exactly one year after Rachels’ scenario it turns out that, as a direct 
result of having her last twelve dollars taken by an unscrupulous doctor, 
the woman forms a civil rights movement which results in higher wages, 
better health care and a general improvement in the conditions of everyone 
in the black community without any adverse effects on the white 
community generally and without any effect on the doctor specifically. 
 
t3 : Exactly one year after t2 the woman is now held in extremely high 
regard and charges are brought against the doctor resulting in his 
disbarment from the medical practice. 
 
§7.4.1 Assessing Hypotheticals – Egoism 
At t1 the doctor’s overall rational interests are maximised, as a matter of 
stipulation, and so we can conclude that at t1, according to ethical egoism, the 
doctor did the right thing to take the money. At t2 little has changed that affects the 
doctor’s interests. Others are better off but unless the doctor has an interest in 
preventing others from doing well (and it is hard to imagine such an interest 
qualifying as rational) then taking the twelve dollars would still be assessed as a 
right action according to egoism. However, things have changed considerably at 
t3. The act of taking the twelve dollars, assessed as correct at both t1 and t2, has 
now quite clearly turned out to be detrimental to the doctor’s overall interests (the 
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loss of income alone from being disbarred would offset the initial gain) and by the 
doctrine of ethical egoism the doctor did not do the right thing in taking the 
twelve dollars. 
 
If egoism is to be judged by examining if the doctor’s act actually maximised his 
interests then the assessment of the doctor’s act may, and in our hypothetical cases 
does, vary depending on the point in time at which the act is assessed. How then 
are we to assess objectively whether the doctor’s act was right from an egoist 
perspective? 
 
 §7.4.1.1 Option 1 : Denying Temporal Importance 
One logical, if slightly bizarre option is to deny that  the temporal location of the 
assessor is of any importance. However, if this position is adopted and tx is 
irrelevant  the result is the somewhat absurd position that t1 and t3 are equally 
valid assessments. This being the case, according to ethical egoism: 
At t1 the doctor did the right thing. 
At t3 the doctor did not do the right thing. 
And, if we deny any relevance to tx 
The doctor both did and did not do the right thing in taking the twelve 
dollars 
 
This inconsistency makes it impossible for an egoist to assess the correctness or 
otherwise of the doctor’s act or the correctness of any action under any 
consequentialist theory. Given that this position results in both a logical 
contradiction and in the inability to make any definite consequentialist judgments 
I am assuming, without further argument, that the temporal location of the 
assessor is important. 
 
 
§7.4.1.2 Option 2 : Accepting All Temporal Assessments as Important 
Another option would be to claim that assessment of the doctor’s act from any and 
all temporal locations is relevant. If at any point a pernicious act is shown to be 
right according to the egoist doctrine then the theory is incorrect. This is a 
somewhat odd position for it allows that even if the egoist knows what all the 
consequences of his act will be (t1 through t3), and knowing this is compelled not 
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to take the money (his long term t3 balanced interests are maximised), egoism 
(and indeed any consequentialist theory) is still proved to be incorrect judged 
solely on what would have maximised interests at t1. 
1. As an ethical egoist, the act that maximises my rational balanced interests 
(t3) is not taking the money. 
2. As an egoist I don’t take the money. 
3. If assessed at t1 or t2, by calculating the actual consequences to date, I ought 
to have taken the money. 
4. Because [by 3] I ought to have taken the money at t1 or t2, then even though 
[by 1] I don’t actually take the money, egoism is incorrect. 
 
This position results in the absurd conclusion that a moral theory is proven 
incorrect by assessment of an act no-one correctly applying the theory would take. 
 
§7.4.1.3 Option 3 : Defining the Moment of Importance 
The third option is to provide argument that some specific time is the position 
from which an accurate assessment can be made. In the given hypotheticals it 
seems t3 is a far better position from which to judge the act than t1. If the 
promotion of balanced rational self-interests is the goal of the egoist then quite 
clearly by t3 the doctor did not do the right thing. If temporal location is important 
then it is absurd to suggest that the doctor’s act be assessed at t1 when his real 
balanced rational interests lie at t3. However, for any hypothetical tx another 
hypothetical tx+1 can be created that further modifies the outcome and is a truer 
indication of the doctor’s real rational interests.  
 
One method of locating an objective temporal location would be to judge the real 
scenario at the point of the doctor’s death, at which point all of the actual 
consequences of the doctor’s act (that have had any affect on the doctor) can be 
calculated89. But, apart from the absurdity of only ever being able to determine 
after the agent had died, if any of the acts undertaken by an agent throughout that 
agent’s entire life were right, this option leads back to the problems discussed at 
§7.3. It is unlikely any consensus could be reached as to what the consequences 
would have been had the doctor acted differently than he actually did. However, 
there is one other point at which the doctor’s actions could be assessed, namely; at 
the point of the moral decision. At this point all of the probable outcomes are 
                                                
89
 Possibly, though more controversially, the doctor’s interests might continue past his death. 
However, I will not pursue this extra level of complexity. 
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equally hypothetical, and the possible actions can be assessed in terms of the 
likely outcomes. I will discuss this option further in §7.6.  
 
Despite the importance of the problems raised by the temporal location of an 
assessor, Rachels can sidestep this issue by reformulating his hypothetical 
scenario, by adding the stipulation that, as a matter of fact, taking the twelve 
dollars does result in the maximization of the doctor’s overall interests at all 
possible assessment points. At any tx it is true that the act of taking the woman’s 
last twelve dollars maximised the doctor’s overall interests. 
  
§7.4.2 Assessing Hypotheticals – Generalization 
In adding further stipulations Rachels’ hypothetical scenario becomes more and 
more removed from reality. It is hard to imagine any moral theory that could stand 
up to increasingly bizarre and ever more stringent hypotheticals. However, it is 
not my intention to mount an attack against the validity of using hypothetical 
scenarios to judge moral theories. Rather, I will simply show that Rachels’ 
argument works too well. That is to say, it dismisses far more than just ethical 
egoism as wrong and leads to conclusions that even Rachels is unlikely to be 
satisfied with. The central premise of Rachels’ argument can be generalised to: 
Any moral theory (X) that compels us to commit an act (Y) where (Y) is a 
wrongful act determines that the moral theory (X) is itself objectively 
wrong. 
 
If Rachels’ argument ‘If egoism compels us to take the woman’s last twelve 
dollars where we know taking the woman’s last twelve dollars is a wrongful act 
then this determines that egoism is itself wrong’ is sound, then any argument of 
the same logical form is equally sound. Applying the generalization we can 
formulate the following argument (of the same logical form): 
If utilitarianism compels us to take the woman’s last twelve dollars where 
we know taking the woman’s last twelve dollars is a wrongful act then this 
determines that utilitarianism is itself wrong. 
 
Applying this argument to the hypothetical scenario t2 (see §7.4) whereby the 
consequence of the doctor taking the woman’s last twelve dollars resulted in a 
maximization of the interests of the majority proves, according to Rachels’ 
argument, that utilitarianism is not a correct moral theory.  
 172 
(1.i) If utilitarianism is correct then the right thing for anyone to 
do, on any occasion, is whatever action would maximise the 
‘balanced (long vs short term) rational interests, that have a 
reasonable probability of success, of the majority of the agents 
involved.  
 
(1.ii) Within the context of Rachels’ scenario, the conditions of 
(1.i) would be met by taking the woman’s money. 
 
(1.iii) The doctor took the woman’s money. 
 
(1) If utilitarianism is correct then the doctor did the right thing. 
 
(2) The doctor did not do the right thing. 
 
(3) Therefore, utilitarianism is not correct (is a pernicious doctrine). 
 
No doubt the scenario is somewhat implausible and it is unlikely that such an 
event would actually occur. However, the scenario is logically possible and given 
Rachels’ insistence that hypotheticals are a legitimate test of moral theory then the 
presented argument is, by Rachels’ criterion, an acceptable test of utilitarianism. 
 
The doctor’s act of taking the woman’s last twelve dollars is unchanged in the 
modified hypothetical and, according to both Rachels and our criterion of best 
explanation, is morally wrong. However, at t2 the utilitarian would judge the act to 
be morally right, in that the interests of the majority affected by the act have been 
maximised. If Rachels’ argument is sound then, as utilitarianism recommends an 
act clearly recognizable as wrong, utilitarianism must also be a morally pernicious 
doctrine. Rachels’ argument equally dismisses egoism and utilitarianism as 
wicked and incorrect moral theories.  
 
Such a dismissal of utilitarianism is likely to face far more rigorous objection than 
when the exact same criticism has egoism as its target, even though the argument 
is of the exact same logical form. Objections aside, perhaps it is the case that all 
consequentialist theories are morally pernicious? Rachels does not seem prepared 
to either advance this generalised form of his argument nor accept its logical 
conclusions and elsewhere (1993, p. 116) takes a much softer line against 
utilitarianism claiming not that utilitarianism is incorrect but rather that 
utilitarianism is not “a fully adequate theory”. Exposing the argument’s 
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generalised form does little except to show that in this context utilitarian and 
egoist theories stand or fall together. Either both are ‘incorrect’ or both are less 
than ‘fully adequate’. However, that utilitarianism and egoism stand or fall 
together is not a defense of egoism; it may be the case that both are equally 
flawed. I maintain that the problem is not in the theories themselves but in 
attempting to assess acts by reference to actual outcomes. 
 
§7.5 Temporality Again – Actual and Probable Consequences 
As discussed (§7.4.1) there is a general problem in determining the correct act by 
reference to the actual consequences at some specific point tx. The problem is that 
the result of the assessment may vary depending on the temporal locations chosen. 
If we assume that ‘taking unnecessary advantage of a helpless woman’ is 
objectively wrong, or at least a moral fact within Realitys then in assessing 
consequentialist theories against the hypothetical scenarios at t1,t2,t3 (§7.4) we 
find that: 
According to utilitarianism, taking the woman’s money is assessed right at 
t2 and t3, but wrong at t1, and that: 
 
According to egoism, taking the woman’s money is assessed right at t1 and 
t2, but not at t3. 
 
Both egoists and utilitarians will assess the act as right at t2 but will disagree over 
the moral status of the act at t1 and t3. Such temporal problems can be overcome if 
the actions required by consequentialist theories are judged at t0; the point at 
which a moral decision is to be made. By judging consequentialist theories by the 
probable consequences of potential acts we consistently compare the full set of 
probable consequences, (the most probable outcomes of the range of actions open 
to the doctor) rather than attempting to compare a single actual consequence, at 
some arbitrarily chosen future point, against what might have been the case had 
other options been chosen90. If right action is assessed on probable outcomes we 
can ask: 
Given the information available to the doctor at t0, which action should an 
egoist assess as the morally preferable choice?  
 
                                                
90At this point egoism has evolved considerably from the doctrine Rachels’ initially criticises. 
However, as previously claimed Rachels appears to be saying that the entire set of egoist theories 
ought be classified as pernicious. 
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Perhaps this is why Machan (1978) phrases the question not as ‘Would an egoist 
judge the doctor’s act as right?’, but rather ‘Was Rachels’ Doctor Practicing 
Egoism?’ or at least ‘Was Rachels’ Doctor Practicing a coherent and consistent 
form of rational Egoism?’ Further if we are examining the action Rachels’ doctor 
took we ought not be considering: 
(i) With reference to the actual consequences, at some future point tx, would 
the doctor’s past act be judged correct by an egoist?, 
and instead ought ask: 
(ii) With reference to the range of probable consequences that would ensue 
from the range of potential actions, would Rachels’ doctor’s decision to 
pursue the specific act of taking the twelve dollars be judged correct by 
an egoist? 
 
As has been argued throughout this chapter, judging egoism by (i) is plagued with 
difficulties – the correctness of egoism varies depending on the temporal location 
of the agent.  Further, the correctness of an egoist’s actions turns out to be little 
more than moral luck – assessment of an egoist’s act depends entirely on the fall 
of the cards and how events over which the agent has no control, actually unfold. 
However, (ii) provides a consistent means by which to evaluate consequentialist 
theories, while facing some difficulties in correctly evaluating probable 
consequences. 
 
§7.6 Calculating Probable Consequences 
Attempting to assign numerical values to the doctor’s interests and then to 
calculate the action that ought to be taken based on probable consequences is 
difficult and almost certain to be controversial. However, I think enough can be 
done to show that it is highly unlikely that any rational egoist would, after 
considering all of the possible consequences of the various options, choose to take 
the twelve dollars over some other action in the scenario Rachels describes.  
At t0 the doctor has just finished his very brief examination of the woman, 
has done nothing for her, has asked for his fee and discovered that the 
woman has only twelve dollars to her name. 
 
At this point the doctor has numerous options: charge anything from one to twelve 
dollars, take the twelve dollars and inform the woman she will have to pay the 
balance with interest (and given Rachels’ description of the doctor we might 
wonder why he didn’t pursue this harsher option), as well as more generous 
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options such as waiving the fee or feeding the woman. However, there seems to 
be no point in obfuscating the calculations so let us assume the choice is between 
(a) taking the twelve dollars, and (b) waiving the fee. These are the same options 
Rachels falsely limits the consideration to in the real case study. However, in our 
analysis of the probable consequences of these two choices we have no 
knowledge of what the actual outcomes will be or what will, as a matter of fact, 
maximise interests. The doctor, if he is an egoist, must weigh up the probable 
negative and positive effects of these two acts and rationally determine which 
‘would most probably maximise his overall balanced (long vs short term) rational 
interests’. 
 
§7.6.1 Option 1: Take the money and run. 
If the doctor decides to take the twelve dollars then the positive effect is 
instantaneous and easy to measure; the doctor is, as a matter of fact, twelve dollars 
richer. Assuming that the accumulation of wealth is a real and rational interest of 
the doctor then the gaining of twelve dollars will count toward maximizing his 
interests. There may be a few other positive effects; others trying to get a service 
for free will not approach the doctor, he may even gain some form of satisfaction 
from the woman’s suffering; but the primary gain appears to be the twelve dollars. 
 
To act as an egoist the doctor must also weigh up the probable negative 
consequences of the act. Assuming that Rachels is correct and the doctor is the 
type of character who will suffer no pangs of conscience if he takes the twelve 
dollars, nor even give the woman another thought, then any negative consequence 
must be external to the doctor himself. 
 
Machan (1978) suggests many probable negative consequences: It seems probable 
that the woman will tell others about the way she was treated by the doctor (and in 
the real case we know this happened as the story is widely known) and given that 
the doctor’s act is, according to Rachels, so clearly recognizable as reprehensible 
it seems equally probable that this will cause the doctor to lose some future 
business. Even if the doctor is the only doctor in town people are unlikely to visit 
his surgery unless it is vital to do so - it is doubtful someone with a flu would visit 
a doctor they believed might charge without adequately performing a service, or 
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indeed performing any service. While the impact might be small, if the doctor 
loses only one full paying customer (i.e. twenty-five dollars) then by taking the 
woman’s twelve dollars he may have acted against his own interests; he is 
ultimately thirteen dollars worse off. However, showing that the consequence of 
an act has a negative total value (-13) is not enough. It may well be that all of the 
other options open to the doctor result in consequences with a lower total value 
and diminish the doctor’s interests to a greater extent. It must be shown, if the 
egoist is to claim it is wrong to take the twelve dollars, that some other act will 
have a better outcome (that is a greater calculated value and a greater probability 
of maximizing the doctor’s overall interests). 
 
§7.6.2 Option 2: Egoistic Benevolence. 
The second option open to the doctor is to waive the fees (remembering we are 
artificially limiting the scenario to taking, or not taking the money). Choosing this 
action has an immediate negative effect for the doctor; he misses out on twelve 
dollars. He may also feel that he has wasted 10 minutes of his time (the doctor’s 
loss is actually –25, the full fee he would have received if he had seen a full 
paying customer). The doctor might also fear that if the story gets around he may 
face numerous others expecting free consultations to the detriment of his business. 
The doctor, being the sort of character he is, presumably gains no pleasure from 
helping the woman so any positive consequences must, once again, be external to 
the doctor. 
 
The story that the doctor waived the fee of someone in need will, in all 
probability, have some positive effects. We can assume that the story will enhance 
the doctor’s reputation (as a caring physician), regardless of whether the 
reputation is actually deserved or not. Even if the doctor cares nothing for his 
reputation he ought, rationally, to recognise that in most cases a good reputation is 
directly translatable into increased earnings. Further, he can limit the negative 
effects by making clear to the woman that this was an extreme case or by limiting 
his clients from poorer communities.  
 
This leaves the question of how we assess these two options, from an egoist 
perspective, such that one can be labeled correct. 
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§7.6.3 Assessing the Options 
The doctor’s decision is not as simple as a choice between taking or not taking 
twelve dollars. Rather, the decision is between (a) taking twelve dollars and the 
possible (and I suggest probable) loss of future income from a bad reputation 
versus (b) waiving the fee and potentially increasing future gains (via increased 
custom) due to an enhanced reputation. If it is accepted that taking the twelve 
dollars (a minimal financial gain) runs the risk of decreased income and taking a 
small loss by waiving the fee (with the potential for future gain) then the rational 
decision, when long and short term interests are considered is not to take the 
money. It begins to look very doubtful that Rachels is correct in claiming “if 
egoism is correct then the doctor did the right thing”. However, the calculations 
are controversial and more work needs to be done to justify the opposite claim 
that “if egoism is correct the doctor did the wrong thing” (Machan, 1978, p. 413).  
 
While it seems more likely that the doctor was acting out of greed than that his 
actions were guided by any ethical theory, and doubtful that an egoist would judge 
the doctor’s actions as correct it is to no avail to push this point home. Rachels’ 
argument is still far from defeated and can be reformulated one last time into its 
strongest form. 
 
§7.7 Rachels’ Argument – The Final Formulation 
Given that we have accepted the use of hypothetical scenarios, Rachels can 
reformulate premise (1.ii) so that a scenario is created that, when all of the 
probable consequences of all of the possible actions are considered, it will still 
turn out that the action that maximises the doctor’s balanced rational interests is to 
take the money. 
 
(1.i) If ethical egoism is correct then the right thing for anyone to do, on 
any occasion, is whatever action would maximise and would promote 
rather than detract from an agent’s ‘balanced (long vs short term) rational 
interests which have a reasonable probability of success and the risk, 
should success not be forthcoming, is minimised such that negative 
consequences would not unduly impact on the agent’. 
 
(1.ii) Within some hypothetical scenario and on consideration of the 
probable consequences of the possible actions it would most likely be that 
the conditions set by (1.i) would be met by  taking the woman’s money. 
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(1.iii) In such a hypothetical scenario the doctor will take the money. 
 
(1) If ethical egoism is correct then the doctor will do the right thing by taking the 
money. 
 
(2.i) The majority of people would have an adverse reaction upon 
witnessing a scenario where a doctor took unnecessary advantage of a 
helpless woman by taking her last twelve dollars. 
 
(2.ii) The best explanation for why the majority of people had an adverse 
reaction to the doctor’s act, given no other overriding explanation, is that 
the act is detrimental to the woman’s (and perhaps the doctor’s) 
flourishing and that most people recognise the wrongness (in this case) in 
acting to the detriment of the woman’s flourishing.  
 
(2.iii) [by 2.i/2.ii] it is a moral fact within Realitys that taking unnecessary 
advantage of a helpless woman is wrong. 
 
(2) The doctor will not have done the right thing in taking the woman’s last 
twelve dollars. 
 
(3) Therefore, ethical egoism is not correct. 
 
All I am doing now is accepting that there is some hypothetical scenario where 
upon consideration of the probable consequences of the available action the 
doctor’s interests will most likely be maximised by taking the twelve dollars. 
Further, this hypothetical need not be far removed from reality. Possible scenarios 
which might result in the doctor’s interests being maximised are: Where the 
doctor is leaving the country the next day and there is no way that what the 
woman says in her community can have any possible effect on the doctor, where 
the doctor is old and his short-term interests have far greater weight than his ever 
shortening long term interests, or where the woman has no friends to confide in 
and will soon die. 
 
The valid conclusion of Rachels’ (generalised) argument is that, in some contexts, 
consequentialist ethics will compel an agent to commit acts that are, by way of a 
best explanation, clearly wrong. Further, while egoism may meet the minimal 
requirements for being a theory of action guidance it fails to meet the additional 
requirement necessary for it to be considered a moral theory of action guidance. 
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That consequentialist egoism does in some contexts compel an agent to carry out 
reprehensible acts leaves the egoist with two options.  
 
1. Accept that egoism is not a moral theory and instead claim it is a 
preferable theory of action guidance. 
or 
2. Show where our view of Realitys is mistaken.  
If a more consistent, better explanation can be provided that has greater 
explanatory potency then it may well be that our intuition and beliefs 
(conservatism) are misplaced and that acts believed to be reprehensible are 
in fact the morally right acts in the given context. In short, claim that the 
theory is correct but our data mistaken. 
or 
3. Accept that ethical egoism is not a fully adequate moral theory. 
That is accept that Rachels’ criticisms do point to a flaw in consequential 
egoism (and possibly all consequentialist theories), a weakness that while 
insufficient to show the theory fatally flawed do highlight the fact that 
some modifications are required. 
 
Option (1) defines consequentialist egoism as something other than a moral theory 
and is unlikely to be adopted by anyone seriously defending egoism. I am 
doubtful that those pursuing option (2) will have any great success. It would 
require a dramatic change in our view of the world to accept that unnecessary acts 
that cause great harm, even if they do bring about a desired consequence, are 
morally correct. However, the third option holds some promise and in Part 2 I will 
argue that ethical egoism can be further developed into a value-based theory that 
overcomes all of the problems that consequentialist-based egoism faces. 
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Chapter 8 
Flourishing 
 
§8.0 Introduction 
My aim in Part 1 of this thesis was to examine the idea that an ethical theory 
could be founded in self-interest by way of an analysis of consequentialist egoism 
and the major objections to, and criticisms of, this theory. In doing so it was 
determined that to overcome the claims that egoism was inconsistent and 
therefore not an acceptable theory of any kind, the following axioms needed to be 
adopted: 
(i) The Good is relative both to an agent and to that agent’s specific 
worldview. 
and 
(ii) The Good, once recognised, provides an agent with strong moral 
reason and justification for acting in a manner so as to promote the 
Good. 
 
However, while this line of defence showed that egoism was a consistent doctrine 
it was insufficient to substantiate the claim that egoism was a defensible moral 
doctrine. Adoption of the above axioms, applied within a consequentialist 
framework, left egoism open to the claim it was a pernicious doctrine, and 
therefore the antithesis of a moral doctrine. Rachels’ criticism (discussed at length 
in Chapters 6 and 7) is that while  may be Good relative to a specific agent and 
to that specific agent’s worldview, that acting to bring about  is clearly wrong 
and any doctrine that labels acting in such a manner as good is a pernicious 
doctrine. While Rachels’ aim was only to discredit egoism his argument 
demonstrates a flaw in all consequentialist theories; for any consequence-based 
theory, hypothetical scenarios can be created whereby acting in the manner 
deemed correct by the consequentialist theory requires an agent to act in a manner 
clearly recognisable as pernicious, and therefore the theory is (a) seriously flawed, 
or (b) not a moral doctrine at all. 
 
We could continue to defend consequentialist egoism at this point by: 
Denying the claims I made in Chapters 6 and 7, namely that moral facts 
exist (in the form of best explanations), and responding that while some 
acts may appear pernicious this judgement is simply mistaken.  
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Such a claim would require showing, in scenarios such as the one presented by 
Rachels, that unnecessarily taking a helpless woman’s last twelve dollars (even 
though that twelve dollars would only promote the agent’s interest to a small 
degree and with the knowledge it would do a great deal of harm to the woman) 
was not, as a matter of fact, morally pernicious. Such an egoist must bite the bullet 
and claim that within a specific context such an act was the morally correct action, 
and while such a defence is logically possible, as I previously noted, I am doubtful 
that those pursuing this option will have any great success. It would require far 
too dramatic a change in our view of the world.  
 
An alternative strategy at this point would be to accept that consequentialist 
egoism is seriously flawed. However, to defeat consequentialism and more 
specifically consequentialist egoism is not to defeat egoism per se. I contend that 
it is the consequentialist aspect of familiar versions of egoism that results in the 
promoting of pernicious acts and that egoism can be successfully defended as a 
nonconsequentialist doctrine. 
 
I will begin to develop the concept of flourishing, more commonly associated 
with virtue ethics, and examine the thesis that what egoism requires is that an 
agent acts so as to promote that same agent’s flourishing. More specifically I will 
examine the thesis that: 
 
(i) (Universal principle of flourishing-based egoism) If  is 
recognised as good in itself relative to Agentn’s worldview, that is, 
if acting to promote (or bring about)  would lead to the agent 
flourishing, then  provides Agentn with strong moral reason to, 
and justification for promoting . 
 
(ii) (Individual motivation for acting) If Agentn believes that ethical 
egoism provides preferable reasons for acting then Agentn will, in 
most cases, be motivated to act in accordance with (i). 
 
In defending this thesis I will, firstly, analyse the concept of flourishing and 
question what it means to flourish both as an individual and as a being of a certain 
kind, who has the capacity to flourish, and when such flourishing is of moral 
importance. My primary approach to these questions will be an examination of 
Hursthouse’s ethical naturalist thesis and the claim that flourishing differs and 
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increases in complexity across four classes of beings; plants, animals, social 
animals, and rational beings. In doing so I will argue that Hursthouse’s bottom-up 
approach to defining flourishing is flawed and that a better model, one that avoids 
the problems inherent in the bottom-up approach, is a two-factor account that 
defines flourishing in terms of:  
(i) what it is for a creature of a certain type to flourish  
and 
(ii) what it is for an individual, that is for those creatures that have a 
welfare of importance to them, to flourish.  
 
In Chapter 9 I will examine the works of Ayn Rand, one of the leading proponents 
of egoism. The thesis developed by Rand is often treated as a variety of 
consequentialist egoism. However, it is far from obvious that this is the best 
description of Rand’s theory. Many of the examples presented by Rand do not 
appear to be designed to promote the best consequences for an agent (notably 
where Rand insists an agent must risk their life), and are not specifically egoist in 
nature.  
 
Rand was not an academic philosopher, in as much as she did not submit work to 
journals or engage in academic debate with regard to her work. Instead, for the 
most part, Rand preferred to present her theories in fictional literature. The nearest 
Rand came to presenting an outline of her theory in academic fashion is in a series 
of speeches later published in the anthology The Virtue of Selfishness. This work 
is somewhat confused, at times appears contradictory, and contains few specifics 
of the thesis Rand was extolling.  
 
I will attempt to unravel the basic premises of Rand’s central thesis by examining 
Nozick’s (1971) reconstruction of her argument and Den Uyl and Rasmussen’s 
(1978) criticisms of Nozick’s reconstruction. I have selected Nozick’s 
reconstruction as it might be reasonably concluded that, as a libertarian, he would 
be sympathetic to Rand’s position. Yet Nozick’s reconstruction is deeply flawed 
and demonstrates many of the mistaken ideas held with regard to Rand’s thesis. 
Rasmussen and Den Uyll’s criticism of Nozick is useful in highlighting these 
flaws and in formulating a more complete reconstruction of Rand’s theory. My 
goal will not be to accurately reconstruct Rand’s argument or to defend it. Rand’s 
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principles do not, in themselves, demonstrate a complete theory, nor do I believe 
they are supposed to, as Rand was articulating principles to live by, not attempting 
to develop a fully structured system of ethical principles.   
 
It is via Rand’s basic principles, together with the axioms of egoism (Part 1), and 
the two-factor account of flourishing (Chapter 8), that I will develop a defensible 
theory of nonconsequentialist egoism. Hunt (1999) has already taken the first 
steps in this direction in his thesis of Flourishing Egoism which is itself built upon 
the foundations laid by Rand.  It is to an examination of flourishing that I will 
now turn my attention. 
 
§8.1 The Concept of Flourishing 
A common dictionary definition of flourishing is:  “To be vigorous or in good 
health; to thrive; to be at the height of success….” (Grollier Webster, 1974).  
Common definitions are seldom useful for philosophical purposes, and this 
definition is insufficient in determining answers to questions such as: ‘What 
exactly does it mean for X to flourish?’, ‘Is X, at the height of success but in poor 
health, flourishing?’, and ‘Is an agent who suffers in one area but excels in others 
really flourishing?’. 
 
However, putting such questions aside for the time being, the definition does seem 
to capture what we mean by flourishing in its simplest sense. Flourishing, if by 
flourishing we mean to thrive, to be a successful X, can be applied to anything 
that is animate, for example any living thing (cancer cells, mould, viruses, plants, 
animals, and humans), connected groups of living things (communities, eco-
systems and species), and some non-living things (artificial intelligence or, 
perhaps, viri within a computer system). 
 
Few people would object to the claim that a multitude of individuals, groups and 
systems can flourish. That is, X as a specific kind of thing can flourish or 
otherwise, as an entity of that type. Further, it appears equally clear that what we 
mean by saying that X is flourishing differs, depending on the complexity of the 
individual or system to which X refers. To say that a human is flourishing seems 
to imply more than simply that the person in question is healthy or has been 
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successful at some specific task. However, for animals, lower animals at least, 
being healthy and thriving, being a successful creature of that kind, may perfectly 
denote what it is for that organism to flourish. Similarly, the flourishing of an 
adult human is more complex and more difficult to describe than the flourishing 
of an infant or baby. 
 
While possible, it seems unlikely that flourishing is of moral importance 
whenever and wherever it occurs. It appears equally unlikely that the axiom I 
introduced in Chapter 6, “If in a given context (Y) an act (X) would be 
detrimental to flourishing then we would expect, all things considered, that in 
most cases anyone directly observing X in context Y would experience an adverse 
reaction”, is sufficient. I still hold this axiom to be true within a limited scope. It 
is not the case that witnesses to numerous and everyday acts that are detrimental 
to flourishing suffer an adverse reaction. Pouring bleach (X) on bathroom mould 
in order to make a bathroom hygienic (Y), while quite clearly detrimental to the 
flourishing of the mould, is unlikely to produce an adverse reaction in all but a 
very small minority of persons witnessing such an act. Likewise, the act of 
eliminating a bacterial infection or pulling weeds from a garden, while detrimental 
to that organism is unlikely, in most cases, to be the cause of adverse reactions.  
 
Nor does it appear the axiom can be saved by the adoption of an anthropocentric 
approach and speaking only of human flourishing; sport provides numerous 
examples where the witnesses of acts clearly detrimental to the contestants’ 
flourishing do not cause adverse reactions in an observer. Rather, it would seem 
the opposite is true and the witnesses take pleasure from the suffering of others91. 
Further, any attempt to limit the scope of the axiom to humans appears destined to 
failure because it seems ad hoc. One of the strengths of the axiom is exactly that it 
may include the actions of non-human creatures. In the case of Stingl’s apes 
(§6.9) the explanation that the female apes reacted upon witnessing an act 
(excessive punishment) by the dominant ape appears to be the best explanation 
                                                
91
 I am not referring to suffering in terms of the team suffering by losing but more like the 
excitement generated when cars crash during racing events, or a particularly vicious tackle during 
a rugby game. It seems that these pictures are always reported on the front of papers, get the most 
replays on TV, generate the most conversations and that people, in general, take some form of 
pleasure from viewing and talking about these events.  
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available, given the predictive leverage that can be gained from adopting the 
premise: 
If, in a given context (apes’ tribal hierarchy), an act (excessive punishment 
by the dominant ape) would be detrimental to flourishing then we would 
expect, all things considered, that in most cases any ape92 directly 
observing X in context Y would experience a negative reaction. 
 
Perhaps clues to the question of the correct scope of the axiom can be uncovered 
in determining a more accurate definition of what it means to flourish and it is to 
this initial question that I will now turn my attention. 
 
§8.1.1 Flourishing and the complexity of life 
Hursthouse (1999) argues that although all living things can flourish, what 
constitutes an entity’s flourishing increases as we climb the evolutionary ladder 
and as life-forms increase in complexity. Hursthouse begins this climb up the 
evolutionary ladder with plants. A plant is evaluated as being a good example of 
its kind if it meets two criteria, and evaluated as a good member of its species if it 
meets two ends. A plant flourishes if it meets the criteria of: 
(i) having good parts (root system, stalk, leaves etc), and  
(ii) having good operations (extracting nutrients from the ground, 
photosynthesis, etc.) (Hursthouse, 1999, p. 198).  
 
Further, a plant can be said to flourish if it meets the two ends of: 
(a) individual survival, and  
(b) promoting the continuance of its species (Hursthouse, 1999, p. 198). 
   
An apple tree with (i) a strong trunk and good root system that (ii) extracts the 
nutrients it needs from the soil, (a) survives a lifespan typical of trees of its kind 
and, (b) produces fruit at the right time of year that ripens and contains fertile 
seeds can be said to flourish in the manner that plants (and more specifically apple 
trees) flourish. 
 
The flourishing of lower (non-social) animals (as individuals within the species) is 
evaluated by the same criteria as plants i.e., (i) and (ii), together with the 
additional criterion that they: 
                                                
92
 I have replaced ‘any one’ with ‘any ape’ here on the grounds it may not be possible for non-
apes to fully recognise what is occurring or to understand the specific worldview of apes. 
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(iii) Act well. That is they act well in a manner that is characteristic of the 
species.  
 
In addition to (a) and (b), animals flourish if they act towards the following end: 
(c) The “characteristic freedom from pain and (where appropriate) 
characteristic pleasure or enjoyment” (Hursthouse, 1999, p.200).  
 
A bear might be said to flourish if it (i) is fit, has strong teeth and claws such that 
(ii) it is capable of hunting and further (a) the bear is successful at hunting and 
feeding, (b) it breeds and produces young for the continuance of species, and  if 
(iii) the female bear provides food for and protects her young, as is characteristic 
of that species, while (c) being free from pain that is uncharacteristic of a bear 
(such as some form of physical deformity). The jump from plant to non-social 
animals is large and, except for being non-social, it would seem that bears have 
more in common with higher animals (perhaps all mammals) than other creatures. 
While the distinction between insects and mammals seems significant the line of 
demarcation between higher and lower animals appears somewhat arbitrary. 
 
The flourishing of higher social animals is judged against the three previous 
criteria and ends, plus their desires and emotions, toward the “good functioning of 
its social group - in the ways characteristic of the species.” (Hursthouse, 1999, p. 
202). The society of apes discussed by Stingl (§6.9) provides a perfect example; 
the apes in this social group monitored the actions of other apes within the group, 
and where necessary acted to modify that behavior towards the end of the good 
functioning of the ape social group such that the social group flourished. 
 
The idea of introducing new criteria as the forms of life increase in complexity 
has merit but I am dubious that a naturalistic augmentative ‘bottom-up’ notion of 
flourishing is workable. While in many cases it is possible to judge flourishing by 
Hursthouse’s criteria, at other times it appears that the criteria are inconsistent or 
contradictory. Take, for example, the plight of the inhabitants of Philip Island: 
rabbits were introduced to Philip Island and with no natural predators they 
flourished…. and continued to flourish until the point of extinction. In this case to 
do what was characteristic of individual rabbits, to flourish (eat and breed), was 
the exact thing that prevented the continuance of the species (in this locality at 
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least). Perhaps some tale can be told to accommodate such occurrences, however 
it appears that in many cases the natural inclination toward individual survival 
(criterion a) directly conflicts with survival of the group (criterion b). I fail to see 
how any creature can be judged against an end, the attainment of which would 
mean acting against that creature’s natural inclination.  
 
Climbing further up the evolutionary ladder leads us to humans, beings that are 
“not only social but also rational” (Hursthouse, 1999, p.206). According to 
Hursthouse the difference between higher animals and humans beings is that 
humans (as a rule) act from reasons whereas all animals act only from inclination. 
That is, humans can (and, if it is to be considered a norm, mostly do) act from a 
base of rationality and reason a course of action in respect of the current situation 
rather than, as animals supposedly do, acting directly in response to the current 
situation.  Humans have character traits and, according to Hursthouse, these are in 
some sense natural (in as much as they are determined via the naturalist process) 
and for a human to flourish requires not that they act in a specific manner (eat, 
breed, etc.) but that in whatever manner they act they act well, that is, they act in 
accordance with the virtues.  
 
While I accept that humans can act well or otherwise I find the line of 
demarcation drawn between animals and humans to be both arbitrary and 
problematic. Having already related the story of Stingl’s apes I find it difficult to 
see how such an explanation, purely in terms of inclination, can account for the 
consistency of the apes’ acts, a consistency not just in how they act as individuals 
or within a social group, but how those acts are modified according to both 
context and the reactions of others. A far better explanation (with greater 
predictive leverage) is that these apes acted from rationality and that in this 
particular story the female apes’ actions were reasoned. That is, the female apes 
acted rationally in assessing the justified level of harm (punishment) that can be 
handed out by the dominant ape in a specific context. If there is any difference 
between a dominant ape punishing others within the tribe (in what appears to be a 
justifiable context) and a human mother punishing her child to a justifiable extent 
(other than that we can understand the human mother when she later provides 
justification for her actions) or between the female apes assessing the punishment 
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dealt out by the dominant ape (and taking action if it is not) and one parent 
assessing if the punishment of a child by the other parent is justified (and taking 
action if it is not) then I am unable to determine what that difference is.  
 
It seems to me that the claim that all animals act purely from inclination is wrong. 
Further, I am unsure of the extent to which the ability to provide reason after an 
event is any evidence that the initial action wasn’t just from inclination. I am not 
claiming that animals act from reason, only that it is not clear all animals act only 
from inclination or that humans act from reason (as opposed to later rationalizing 
actions from inclination). The very concept of rational beings is vague and I am 
dubious it can work to separate humans from animals in the manner that 
Hursthouse believes, and results in the earlier criterion being conveniently set to 
one side when it comes to talking about humans. 
 
The case study about the apes might be dismissed, or called into doubt, if it was 
an isolated one, but this is not the case. De Waal, reporting on a study of baboons, 
relates the story of a troop where the dominant males all died after eating meat 
from a dump (the surviving baboons had been too subordinate to attend the dump 
brawling) (Cited in Angier, 2004). What was unusual is that none of the surviving 
males assumed the dominant role, rather there was “a cultural swing toward 
pacifism”. Many of the original survivors have since died yet the genial style has 
been maintained. As baboons from other troops try to immigrate and act in the 
usual dominant manner (to locate their hierarchical rating within the troop) it 
appears they are quickly instructed “we don’t do things like that around here” and 
are initiated into the “unusual customs of the tribe”. It would seem that the ethos 
of the troop is rationally cultivated and that the troop bands together to ensure that 
the peaceful lifestyle continues. Once again it seems part of a better explanation 
that rationality plays a role and that the troop has a rationally-based preference for 
a peaceful lifestyle and, due to the preference, teaches immigrants how to fit in 
with that lifestyle. Once again I fail to see any reasonable explanation to show 
these baboons are acting purely from inclination. 
 
Perhaps it might be argued that these apes are simply higher up the evolutionary 
scale and are approaching rationality, but examples of animal actions that appear 
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to involve some degree of rationality are not limited to apes. Many animals 
thought to be basically unintelligent (lemurs in this case) have the capacity for 
rational intelligence. A recent research project showed that lemurs have the ability 
to remember complex sequences of patterns and to continue such sequences 
where other lemurs leave off (a task that is often claimed to show the ability for 
rational thought and intelligence). However, lemurs (much like humans) only 
work when there is something available that they want - “they’ll work for a couple 
of hundred trials because they want these sugar pellets, even though we don’t 
deprive them in any way” (Brannon, 2004)93. It seems lemurs, previously 
considered to be unintelligent lower-animals, (i) make choices whether to work 
based on the degree to which they desire the offered reward, and (ii) carry out 
tasks that demonstrate both intelligence and rationality.  
 
Such examples are not limited to quadrumanous primates. Vicki Hearne (1986) 
tells the true story of Fritz, a Doberman police dog:  
Fritz was the partner of Philip Beem, who can’t be described as anything 
but a bad-assed cop. One night, Officer Beem stopped a young black 
woman for jaywalking and started clubbing her with his nightstick, for the 
sheer fun of it as near as anyone could make out. (There were witnesses.) 
Fritz attacked - not the woman, but his policeman partner, and took his 
club away from him emphatically. 
 
Fritz was a well-trained police dog and consistently followed the commands of his 
partner yet in this circumstance he went against this training and instead protected 
the woman. There are many possible explanations for the dog’s act but these 
competing explanations are hard pressed to better the explanation that the dog 
made a rational choice. Fritz recognised something as wrong in Officer Beem’s 
action and took steps to prevent something clearly detrimental to the woman’s 
flourishing. A competing explanation would need to better explain why the dog 
protected the victim in this scenario but in every other aided the officer.  
 
Likewise, journalism contains numerous stories, many with eyewitness 
confirmation, of animals that overrode their inclinations to run from fire and 
instead entered buildings to save people (sometimes complete strangers). 
                                                
93
 Cited in The New Zealand Herald World News (Reuters, 13th May 2004, Greed Spur in Animal 
Intelligence).  
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Similarly, dolphins have been known on many occasions to put themselves at risk 
to save humans from sharks. My point here is not to deny that rationality adds an 
extra layer of complexity when describing what it means to flourish, only that the 
line Hursthouse attempts to draw between the flourishing of social animals and 
human flourishing is far less distinct than she appears to claim.  
 
I am not claiming that animals act from reason as a norm. It is extremely doubtful 
that the Philip Island rabbits that drove themselves to extinction acted from, or 
were even capable of, rationality; but then, by the same token, it might be 
questioned whether humans who are increasingly laying waste to their 
environment, and act in a manner that restricts human flourishing, are acting 
rationally. I am claiming that rationality, or what appears to be rationality for all 
intents and purposes, exists on a continuum, a continuum that does not consist 
exclusively of humans. Drawing a division between human flourishing and non-
human flourishing seems unsupportable and, I will argue, is an unnecessary 
distinction. The ‘natural’ elements of flourishing can be accounted for by a single 
criterion. 
 
Returning briefly to Hursthouse’s ethical naturalism and her notion of human 
flourishing, it seems that the augmentativeness of ‘means and ends’ suddenly ends 
when we come to talk of humans, in that rationality overrides all the previous 
criteria. For lower animals the criteria for flourishing are the same as for plants, 
but with the addition of an extra criterion. For social animals the criteria are the 
same as for lower animals with the addition of an extra criterion. However, when 
we progress to humans the entire set of earlier criteria give way and, somehow, 
character traits are of sole importance. This would be reasonable if such character 
traits incorporated the other criteria, however it seems that rather than 
incorporating the earlier criterion it allows that, through reason, they be 
overridden. 
 
We are asked to accept that homosexuality (or celibacy) in animals points to a 
defect, no matter how the animal acts as a member of the pack (disregarding any 
character traits of the animal), as its goes against the end of the continuance of the 
species. However, we are then asked to accept that human homosexuals are not 
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defective human beings because what is at stake is not “sexual activity or 
orientation, but character traits” (Hursthouse, 1999, p. 214) regardless of the 
failure to continue the species. Unless a clear and relevant line of demarcation can 
be made between humans and (higher) animals such a position is inconsistent. 
Even if a clear division exists between humans and animals it remains unclear 
why the earlier criteria, attributed across plants, lower and higher animals, are 
completely overridden. According to Hursthouse rationality accounts for this 
difference in that “it is quite certain that it is primarily our acting from reason, 
well or ill, rather than those occasional actions we do ‘from inclination’, that 
makes us good or bad human beings in the ethical sense” (1999, p. 206). This may 
be, but if the ability to reason overrides those previously determined criteria of 
flourishing then it does so for any creature that has the ability to reason regardless 
of its rung on the evolutionary ladder or, if animals are subject to those criteria, 
regardless of any ability to reason, then so are humans.   
 
The claim that humans act primarily from reason, rather than merely having the 
capacity to formulate reasons for having acted, seems insufficient. If indeed it is 
our acting from reason, well or ill, that determines if we are good or bad human 
beings then we need some means by which to evaluate those reasons by which we 
act.  It cannot simply be that these reasons match with what a presupposed 
virtuous person would do, because the virtues are supposed to have been reached 
via the investigative process of ethical naturalism. That is, ethical naturalism is 
supposed to be something that provides the criteria for a particular character trait 
being a virtue.  
 
If ethical naturalism is correct then it would seem that the best criterion for 
evaluating reasons would itself be based in ethical naturalism. That is, good 
reasons would in most cases support the previously determined criteria and ends, 
bad reasons would do otherwise. Thus any reasoning that went against the 
previously determined end of continuance of the species was not a particularly 
good reason. Human homosexuals may exhibit the virtues of being caring and 
temperate etc (assuming that ethical naturalism can support these virtues) but, 
under ethical naturalism, they must still be judged as defective human beings 
unless we accept as good reasons those that go against the previously established 
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criteria and ends and in doing so invalidate the entire augmentative project. The 
alternative, holding that human homosexuals are good people (assuming they hold 
the relevant virtues), is to deny that the end of continuance of the species is a 
means by which to judge flourishing at any level and again invalidates the 
augmentative project.  
 
Rationality does seem to make a difference to what is denoted as flourishing for a 
particular individual but it is unclear who is included within the boundary of 
rational beings. A charitable interpretation of rationality will see a large number 
of animals included within its boundaries, whereas a restrictive interpretation will 
see many humans excluded (not just babies and the severely mentally impaired or 
comatose, but those with low IQ’s). Definitions of rationality are certainly 
possible but it is unclear why any specific definition should be accepted over 
another that broadens or restricts the boundaries to a greater extent. The capacity 
to act from rational thought seems certain to impact on what it is for that 
individual to flourish. However, it seems dubious that these individuals are 
necessarily human or, that acting from rationality alone determines what it is to be 
a good or bad human being.  
 
§8.2 Flourishing – A Two-Factor Account. 
While I have argued that the naturalist augmentative system that Hursthouse 
employs is flawed, I have considerable sympathy with her final position and agree 
that what it is to flourish increases with complexity parallel to the increase in 
complexity of forms of life. However, I would claim that flourishing is not limited 
to living things, that flourishing need not be the same (or of the same type) for 
every member of a species, nor that the increase in complexity reaches its apex 
with humans. Ecosystems can flourish, and the complexity of that flourishing 
goes beyond what it is for any individual to flourish and is far more than the 
aggregate of individual flourishing. It is not the case that if every individual 
flourishes then the ecosystem flourishes.  
 
Hursthouse’s project is flawed in its ‘bottom-up’ approach. Progressing from the 
flourishing of plants, through animals, and finally to humans introduces 
inconsistencies and contradictions that are difficult, if not impossible, to 
 194 
overcome. Further, when it comes to talking of good or bad in relation to humans, 
Hursthouse’s theory relies on an undefined notion of rationality and requires the 
abandonment of the previously extolled criteria, used to judge whether plants and 
animals were good examples of their kind, and thus the abandonment of the 
augmentative process.  
 
I agree with Hurtshouse, and in doing so concur with Anscombe, Geach and Foot, 
that ‘good’ does not change its meaning when used in relation to species of plant, 
animal or human. However, this ‘good’ is neither augmentative nor based on a 
‘bottom-up’ analysis of what it is for an evolutionary class of beings (namely; 
plants, lower animals, higher animals, humans) to flourish. While ‘good’ does not 
change its meaning, the answer to what is ‘good’ or more specifically what is it to 
flourish depends on the subject of the question.  (a) What constitutes human 
flourishing (generally), (b) what constitutes human flourishing in some vastly 
overpopulated region of the planet,  (c) what constitutes human flourishing in 
New Zealand, and (d) what constitutes my flourishing, will result in different 
answers.  
 
I will demonstrate that a consistent notion of flourishing can be developed by 
adopting a two-factor account. The first factor is based on a holistic approach 
taking the ecosystem as a whole as the determining criterion for what it is for a 
creature to flourish, both generally and within a specific context. Such an 
approach may seem at odds with the apparently individualistic nature of egoism 
but, as I will later go on to demonstrate, this is not the case. The second factor is 
based on rationality; any individual that has a welfare that is of importance to 
them can flourish, in promoting that welfare, and can be harmed when that welfare 
is put at risk.  
 
§8.2.1 The First Factor: Eco Flourishing 
Aldo Leopold in his essay ‘Ecocentrism: The Land Ethic’ formulated the thesis 
that right action is directly related to, or at least derived from, what is good for the 
ecosystem, the biotic community as a whole. His controversial central claim is “a 
thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the 
biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise” (Leopold, 2001, p. 125).  
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This thesis has been widely attacked on the ground that it is ecofascist, that is, it 
requires acting for the good of the whole at the expense of the individual. Regan 
demonstrates the ecofascist nature of the theory using the following scenario: 
 If, to take an extreme, fanciful but, it is hoped, not unfair example, the 
situation we faced was either to kill a rare wildflower or a (plentiful) 
human being, and if the wildflower, as a ‘team member’, would contribute 
more to ‘the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community’ than 
the human, then presumably we would not be doing wrong if we killed the 
human and saved the wildflower. (Regan, 1983, p. 362).  
 
I will argue that it is possible to interpret Leopold in terms of flourishing and to 
adopt a naturalist approach that is top-down, focusing on the flourishing of the 
biotic community. Such an interpretation lessens the ecofascist nature of the thesis 
and at the same time overcomes the problems highlighted in Hursthouse’s bottom-
up approach to defining flourishing. 
 
What is it for a certain form of life to flourish in a given context? A form of life 
can be said to flourish if, after examining the biotic community in which it exists, 
it is determined that, all things being equal, the form of life in question is acting in 
a manner that will lead to the integrity, stability and beauty of the biotic 
community.   
 
Such a position avoids some of the pitfalls in Hurthouse’s account. While the 
rabbits on Philip Island flourished in the simplest sense of acting in a manner 
characteristic of rabbits for the continuance of the species they were not good 
rabbits per se because they were out of balance with the ecosystem to an extent 
that would ultimately lead to their extinction. The rabbits, while breeding and 
multiplying, were not flourishing as rabbits (in the true sense of flourishing) 
because the actions of the rabbits were such that the only possible result was 
extinction and extinction is not a function of flourishing. 
 
A holistic position also avoids the result of labelling an individual of a species, 
who acts outside of the norm for that species, as defective. A (human) 
homosexual is not defective if the actions of the persons involved are not 
detrimental to the biotic community in which they exist. By the same token 
animal homosexuals are not defective unless that homosexuality is in some way 
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detrimental to the biotic community. If a species (necessary to the flourishing of 
the biotic community) was low in number, be it human or not, such that the sexual 
orientation of individuals within that species put the species at further risk then 
such action would illustrate a defect (no matter what other characteristics they 
possessed). Where sexual orientation does not put the species at risk such action 
does not necessarily point to a defect.  This holistic position has the benefit that (i) 
the exact same criterion is applied in all cases, and (ii) it avoids the inconsistency 
in Hursthouse’s theory whereby animal homosexuality points to a defect (in 
failing to act for continuance of the species) but human homosexuality, despite 
failing the same criterion, does not. 
  
Similarly, a ‘free-rider’ wolf is not necessarily defective. Hursthouse claims that 
“Wolves hunt in packs; a ‘free-rider’ wolf that doesn’t join in the hunt fails to act 
well and is thereby defective” (1999, p. 201). However, if the pack has sufficient 
numbers to hunt and there is sufficient food to go around there is no reason why 
every wolf must hunt (in order to be considered a good wolf). Rather, it may be 
the case that, in order to maintain a natural balance within the ecosystem, should a 
pack grow too large, free-riders are not only nondefective but a necessary part of 
the pack. I do not know enough about the society of wolves to comment further. 
However, it does seem possible that the condemnation as a free-rider of a wolf 
that does not join a hunt has certain anthropocentric overtones; we tend to object 
to so-called free-riders in human society.  
 
Humans (as a species) are good per se when they adapt and fit into the ecosystem; 
when rationality is used to carve a place in an ecosystem while minimising 
disruption to the environment. A good human, in this respect is no different from 
a good plant or a good animal with the exception of having a greater capacity to 
adapt and control through the use of rationality. 
 
From the holistic perspective the question, “Whose flourishing matters?” does not 
arise. If flourishing matters it matters wherever it occurs and such flourishing is 
good, or individuals can be said to be flourishing, when their actions lead to a well 
functioning biotic community.  In terms of the whole the flourishing of mould, 
plants, animals, and humans is all equally important. However, the question 
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“Whose flourishing matters?” does becomes relevant when an individual’s 
welfare is at stake, a welfare that is of importance to that specific individual.  
 
The flourishing of an individual is not entirely captured by reference to 
ecosystems and a second factor is required in order to expound “What constitutes 
an individual’s flourishing?” The answer to this question can, quite obviously, be 
at odds with what is it to be a good human in this specific context. 
 
§8.2.2 The Second Factor: ‘My’ Flourishing 
Every living thing can flourish, and that flourishing can be determined on the 
grounds of contribution to the working of the biotic community. However, there is 
a distinction to be made on an individual level; that is, between those that can 
flourish and are in some way aware of and affected by the degree to which they 
flourish and those that can flourish but have no awareness of that flourishing. At a 
holistic level flourishing matters because if it should fail the ecosystem and 
everything in it fails as well. However, for those individuals who are aware of 
their own welfare and are, in some way, harmed when they are prevented from 
flourishing, that flourishing becomes of important moral concern. 
 
The first question to be answered is ‘Who has a personal interest in their own 
flourishing?’ An initial answer might be humans, but such an answer will not 
stand up to close analysis. Not all humans have either an interest in, or awareness 
of, their own flourishing. The severely mentally incapacitated, comatose, young 
children and babies are obvious exceptions. Nor is the answer human as a norm 
for that species acceptable, either (i) some set of criteria separates humans from 
nonhumans, in which case the criteria, not human as a norm for that species, 
determines who has an interest in their own flourishing or, (ii) the answer is the 
speciesist naming of members of our own species as the only ones capable of 
having an interest in flourishing purely on the grounds of being of our own 
species. I will not attempt an analysis of who can flourish, as a related question 
has already been debated in great depth for numerous years under the guise of the 
extent of the moral community. Some philosophers, such as Kant (1949), have 
argued that the moral community consists only of rational beings, a position that 
results in the exclusion of some humans. Others, (notably Regan (2001) and 
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Singer (1976)), have attempted to extend the moral community beyond humans to 
include some animals. I follow Regan and claim that when we are talking about 
an individual’s flourishing we are talking about an individual’s welfare. Any 
individual that has a welfare that is of importance to the subject, in Regan’s terms 
any “experiencing subjects of a life”, can flourish and has an interest in that 
flourishing. Regan (2001) defines an experiencing subject of a life as a conscious 
creature having an individual welfare of importance to them whatever the 
usefulness to others. Any creature that wants and prefers things, believes and feels 
things, recalls and expects things has a welfare of importance and can flourish or 
otherwise. 
 
For the purposes of this thesis it is not necessary to determine exactly who the 
experiencing subject of a life is, only to note that anyone who qualifies as such has 
a specific interest in their own flourishing. From an egoist perspective, though the 
egoist recognises others have an interest in their own welfare, it is the egoist’s 
personal welfare that ultimately dictates action.     
 
The two-factor account of flourishing I am proposing is: 
1. (Environmental factor) For type X to flourish type X must be in balance 
with its place in the biotic community. 
 
This notion of flourishing can be applied to species, communities, living and non-
living things and is determined in the same manner on each and every occasion.  
A pack of wolves is good (is flourishing) if it has not grown too large (such that 
food is in short supply) and that there are sufficient wolves to hunt (not that every 
wolf hunts) so that pups are cared for. A biotic community flourishes when 
everything within that community is in harmony. The same applies to humans qua 
human beings, the harmony is disrupted where populations have increased beyond 
the carrying capacity of the land. To the extent that the mere existence of those 
humans is detrimental to the environment then those humans (as a species) are not 
flourishing, regardless of whether they act rationally or not. 
 
2. (Individualist factor) Any X that has a welfare that is of importance to X 
can flourish when that welfare is cared for. 
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Any individual who has an interest in their own welfare can be said to flourish or 
otherwise when that welfare is cared for. This, to a limited extent, relies on 
rationality, although to what degree is debatable. All that is required is that an 
individual has an interest in their welfare and can choose to act, in a manner that 
takes that welfare into account.  
 
Axioms (1) and (2) do not contradict each other, though they may produce 
inconsistent answers, as (1) judges whether the type X is flourishing, whereas (2) 
judges whether X is flourishing as an individual. We may judge, by (1), that 
humans in some famine-struck area of the world are not flourishing as humans 
qua human kind. However, that does not exclude the possibility (though it may 
place severe limitation upon it) that, by (2), the specific individual is flourishing 
in that despite the hardships, the individual manages to overcome adversities and 
promote their own welfare. At this stage (2) may sound like a return to a limited 
form of consequentialist or instrumentalist egoism, namely, that an agent ought to 
act so as to maximise that agent’s welfare. This is not the case and, as I will 
demonstrate in the following chapters, acting for one’s own welfare is not the 
result of a consequentialist calculation.  
 
A lot more needs to be said of how this two-factor account of flourishing can be 
applied without leading to some absurd conclusions. In Chapter 10 I will argue 
that the environmental factor (1) necessitates that humans, if they are to have the 
best chance of flourishing, adopt certain virtues. However, I will delay such an 
analysis as I wish to first examine the ethics of Ayn Rand, through the eyes of 
Nozick (1971), Den Uyl and Rasmusen, (1978), Hunt (1999) and Rand herself, as 
I believe doing so will provide insights into what it is for an individual to have a 
personal welfare, a welfare that is steeped in the individual’s personal values. In 
doing so it will become clear how acting for an individual’s own welfare differs 
from the consequentialist’s acting so as to maximise the agent’s own welfare. 
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Chapter 9 
Rand’s Ethics 
 
§9.0 Introduction 
Rand is pretty much a pariah of the philosophical community, perhaps due to her 
move toward presenting philosophical doctrines through fiction, perhaps because 
she was, at times, openly hostile towards analytic philosophy, or perhaps simply 
because the positions she held (or that were attributed to her) are extremely 
unpopular. Certainly, her work does not meet the rigorous standards of analytical 
philosophy and at times contains much that seems inconsistent or contradictory; 
but this alone is not reason to shun her entire work. The exact same charges of 
inconsistency or contradiction might be laid against the work of many respected 
philosophers.  
 
It may seem odd to introduce Rand’s theories so late in a thesis on self-interest. 
However, the discussion to date has focused on consequentialist egoism and I do 
not believe Rand’s work is best classified in this manner.  The first indication that 
Rand does not extol consequentialist egoism can be found in ‘The Fountainhead’; 
Roark, an architect down on his luck and in dire need of work, has submitted 
plans for the Manhattan Bank Building, and is currently waiting on the decision of 
the board with regard to his designs. The board eventually agrees to contract 
Roark but on the condition that they will alter his designs. Despite being on the 
brink of destitution Roark refuses to accept such conditions. When quizzed on his 
decision by a board member, who asks, “Do you have to be quite so fanatical and 
selfless about it?”, Roark responds: “That was the most selfish thing you’ve ever 
seen a man do”. By the use of the term ‘selfish’ Roark indicates that he was acting 
from within an egoist framework, yet at face value his actions appear decidedly 
non-egoistic; Roark acts in a manner that is detrimental to his self-interest, in 
terms of consequences, in that he turns down a job that will provide him with the 
means he needs to survive. Roark’s self-interest was based not in the 
consequences of actions but in the preservation of his personal values, values that 
included a love of architecture and values that he would have to compromise were 
he to allow his designs to be altered.  
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Further indications that Rand’s ethical theory94 is not consequentialist in nature 
are apparent in her essay on the ‘Ethics of Emergencies’, in which Rand discusses 
how one ought to act when faced with a scenario that is not “metaphysically 
normal” (for a specific individual). Rand uses the term “metaphysically normal” 
to refer to any “unchosen, unexpected event, limited in time, that creates 
conditions under which human survival is impossible” (Rand, 1964b, p. 54), for 
example natural disasters, or being involved in a plane, ship or car wreck. In such 
scenarios Rand claims that what an agent ought to do, regardless of what might be 
the best consequences for an individual, is “to combat the disaster and restore 
normal conditions …. [that is,] metaphysically normal, normal in the nature of 
things, and appropriate to human existence” (Rand, 1964b, p. 54). This position 
has similarities with the two-factor account of flourishing developed in Chapter 8; 
it might be claimed that during emergencies the environmental factor (first 
criterion) of flourishing takes precedence and the individualist factor (second 
criteria) is put on hold until a situation is restored in which flourishing (for 
humans in this case) is once again possible. 
 
It is common in applied ethics to examine moral dilemmas, that would (by Rand’s 
definition) constitute emergencies, and to determine how an agent ought to act in 
these specific emergencies. An example of such a dilemma is Unger’s (1996, p. 9) 
Shallow Pond scenario: 
The path … to the humanities lecture hall passes a shallow ornamental pond. 
On your way to give a lecture, you notice a small child has fallen in and is in 
danger of drowning. If you wade in and pull the child out, it will mean getting 
your clothes muddy” (Unger, 1996, p. 9) 
 
Singer, Rachels, Unger and others have used this and similar scenarios to 
demonstrate that there is no moral difference between killing and letting die and 
that just as we must jump in to save the drowning child we must also help others 
in need, specifically those suffering from famine. If we must act to save the child 
(because the required sacrifice of clean clothes is trivial) then, by generalisation, 
where we can we must act to save those suffering from starvation. Acting to save 
someone from starvation is of great value (life) and requires a trivial sacrifice  (a 
                                                
94
 Rand prefers the term ‘objectivist ethics’ and very seldom uses the term ‘egoism’. 
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few dollars) from those who live in absolute affluence (that is, those who can 
afford luxuries). 
 
Let us take a closer look at Unger’s scenario and for the moment assume that the 
girl in the pond is a complete stranger to you, no one else is near the lake and thus 
no one will witness you acting, whether that action be rescuing the girl or walking 
by and leaving the child to her fate. Further, let us assume that you have some 
specific interest in getting to this lecture on time (and in nice clean clothes). Many 
would argue that the consequentialist egoist, to maximise self-interest, ought to 
walk by. The egoist has an interest in being at the lecture on time and no interest 
in the complete stranger (and, being an egoist ought to have no pangs of 
conscience at having left the girl to her fate). Given that leaving a girl to drown 
solely to get to a lecture on time is (both intuitively and as a best explanation) a 
pernicious act such examples are usually given to show that consequentialist 
egoism is flawed. While I might quibble about what exactly the egoist ought to do 
in this specific scenario, as was demonstrated in Chapter 7, I agree that such 
scenarios appear to point to a serious flaw in consequentialist-based egoism95. 
  
Rand tries to navigate a middle ground between the altruistic argument that you 
must save the child and therefore have a similar duty to help those in need, and 
the extreme egoist position that you have no duty to help the child and in fact 
ought to walk by. Adopting the position that the passer-by must save the child 
(given that there is no danger to the passer-by) Rand once again demonstrates that 
it is not the specific consequences for an agent that dictate correct action. Her 
specific claim is that “If the person to be saved is a stranger, it is morally proper to 
save him only when the danger to one’s own life is minimal; when the danger is 
great it would be immoral to attempt it” (Rand, 1964b, p. 52). Again, the egoist 
aspect comes through; the danger to oneself dictating whether the agent should 
act, but the egoism in question is not primarily consequentialist. The personal 
interests of the agent, which might be furthered by not saving the drowning 
stranger, are not given any consideration. Rand goes on to claim that the closer the 
drowning person is to the passer-by, emotionally speaking, the greater the risk the 
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intuition is provided or my thesis regarding moral facts as best explanation is accepted. 
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passer-by ought to accept. The “greatness of the person’s value to oneself” (Rand, 
1964b, p. 52) the greater the risk one ought to accept in attempting to rescue them.  
That is, the greater the value an agent puts on the person in danger the greater the 
risk the agent will be prepared to take in attempting to rescue them. 
 
However, Rand denies that how we ought to act towards strangers in an 
emergency situation has implications for how we ought to act towards strangers in 
daily life. According to Rand (1964b, pp. 54-55), the fact that we ought to help 
strangers caught in a shipwreck does not mean that we are obliged to save these 
same people from “poverty, ignorance or neurosis” or “that we should sail the 
seven seas in search of shipwreck victims to save”. Rand (1964b, p. 55) goes on to 
point out that we “do not live in lifeboats”.  That is, life does not consist of a 
series of emergencies. The vast majority of persons will never walk past a shallow 
pond and see a drowning child but will, on a daily basis, have to interact with 
strangers and as such the first scenario (shallow pond) represents an exception to 
the generalised rules of ethics, not the rule itself.  
 
Rand advocates a partiality principle but exactly why one ought to save the child 
is unclear. While the following may not be a strictly Randian approach I suggest 
that the partiality involved is a limitation that is placed upon my first criterion of 
flourishing. A situation that inhibits flourishing in an agent’s immediate eco-
system compels action in a way that flourishing in a distant eco-system may not. 
Any emergency that puts those in an agent’s immediate eco-system in danger 
requires an agent to act so as to normalise the scenario and tends to override 
individualistic concerns. For the time being it is enough to note that Rand’s theory 
is not, or at least is not primarily, consequentialist. The specific axioms of Rand’s 
theory are far more difficult to ascertain; due to Rand’s literary style it is not 
always clear what the premises and conclusions of her arguments are. Certainly 
Nozick (1971) and Den Uyl and Rasmussen (1978) disagree, both on the 
construction and interpretation of Rand’s theory. However, both interpretations 
together with Rand’s own work and Hunt’s (1999) neo-Randan thesis provide a 
platform from which to begin examination of a nonconsequentialist form of 
egoism. 
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§9.1 On the Randian Argument 
Nozick and Rand share many of the same political (libertarian) views with regard 
to the rights of individuals, most notably, the belief in negative rights that prohibit 
the aggression of one upon another. However, whereas libertarians take these to 
be moral rights, for the most part when Rand talks of rights she doesn’t use the 
term in a moral sense; these are legal rights, albeit legal rights that are supposedly 
determined or, as Rand claims, derived from her objectivist moral theory. I will 
not discuss these specific rights. It is difficult to fathom exactly how they are 
supposed to follow from Rand’s moral theory and they are of little interest in 
regard to how Rand’s ethical theory is formulated.  
 
Before beginning an in-depth analysis of Rand’s theory I want to make it clear 
that my reason for doing so is not to defend Rand’s moral doctrine. I am doubtful 
a fully coherent theory exists within Rand’s works, and indeed she doesn’t claim 
to have a fully developed theory. Rather, her work consists of a series of ideas 
with regard to what she believes represents an ideal moral society. My goal over 
the next few chapters is to determine whether a nonconsequentialist theory of 
egoism can be developed using Rand’s work, and the philosophers mentioned in 
the previous section provide a starting point. 
 
§9.1.1 On the Randian Argument: Values 
I will show that Nozick’s reconstruction of Rand’s objectivist argument is flawed 
in almost every respect. However, I consider it worth tracking Nozick’s 
reconstruction as (i) it is by criticising Nozick that  Den Uyl and Rasmusen more 
accurately reconstruct Rand’s arguments, and (ii) Nozick’s misinterpretation of 
Rand highlights some of the  stranger positions attributed to her and, perhaps, the 
reason that her work is often overlooked. Nozick reconstructs Rand’s initial 
premises as follows: 
 
(1) Only a living being is capable of choosing among alternatives, or, 
(2) Only for a living being could there be any point to choosing among 
alternative actions, for 
(3) Only a living being can be injured, damaged, have its welfare 
diminished, etc., and 
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(4) Any rational preference pattern will be connected with the things 
mentioned in (3), and since 
(5) Values establish a (rational) preference ordering among alternative 
actions, therefore it follows that 
(6) Only a living being can have values with some point to them. 
Values have a purpose only for living beings (1971, p. 283) 
 
Nozick’s conclusion (6) seems strange in that, as Den Uyl and Rasmussen, (1978 
p. 185) note, “Only a living being can have values with some point to them” is not 
the conclusion that Rand draws nor is it implied by any of her premises. Nozick’s 
conclusion seems to suggest that values can exist apart from living persons (but 
without point), whereas Rand is not claiming “that only living being have values 
with a purpose”  (Den Uyl and Rasmusen, 1978, p. 185), but rather that only 
living beings can have values of any sort (Rand, 1964a, p 15-16). For Rand the 
idea of intrinsic value is incoherent, values are instrumental to living beings. It is 
only the existence of living beings, beings that have the capacity to choose, that 
makes the concept of value possible. Perhaps a charitable interpretation of 
Nozick’s conclusion brings it closer to Rand’s position, that is if Nozick means 
that ‘the concept of values would be pointless without living beings’ but this is not 
what his conclusion state.  
 
Nor does it appear that Nozick has correctly formulated the first premise of 
Rand’s argument. Rand’s claim is not that only a living being is capable of 
choosing but rather that only man has the capacity for choosing between the 
alternatives. For animals the code of values and choices between alternatives is 
automatic (Rand, 1964a, p. 20-21). As Den Uyl and Rasmusen (1978, p. 186) 
correctly note, Nozick has blurred Rand’s distinction between “facing alternatives 
and choosing between them”. According to Rand, animals face alternatives but 
the decision on which action to take is automatic whereas humans face 
alternatives and choose which path to follow.  
 
Perhaps, if the principle of charity is applied, reasons can be found for Nozick’s 
formulation, although the omission of any reasoning for his formulation makes 
this pure conjecture. It is possible that Nozick is simply attempting to formulate 
Rand’s argument in its strongest possible form and in doing so has manipulated 
Rand’s premise in order to overcome the objection that non-living things also face 
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(but do not choose between) alternatives. Any non-living thing faces the 
alternative of not being that thing any more. Whilst matter itself cannot be 
destroyed96 a house can be demolished and while all the house parts remain the 
house itself ceases to exist. As Den Uyl and Rasmusen (1978, p. 186) recognise, 
there is a distinction between living beings and non-living things in as much as a 
non-living being does not “achieve or fail to achieve [goals, in this case survival] 
as a result of its actions”. However, the distinction that Den Uyl and Rasmusen 
make is not available to Rand who has already claimed that the actions of animals 
are automatic. If the actions of animals are automatic then animals do not achieve 
or fail to achieve goals as a result of chosen actions (nor do they set goals). They 
simply, according to Rand, act in a pre-determined manner towards a pre-
determined goal. In this respect animals are no different from non-living things. 
Both animals and non-living things face alternatives and neither animals nor non-
living things choose between those alternatives. 
 
Perhaps realizing that Rand’s distinction between non-living things, animals, and 
humans was open to criticism, Nozick softened premise (1) to include animals 
(living things) and in doing so to make clearer the distinction between living 
beings and non-living things. Thus, premise (2) makes more sense in that the 
concept (point) of choice for a non-living thing is meaningless. Living beings (in 
some sense) choose between alternatives, non-living beings do not. The premise is 
of course still open to challenge as while it seems reasonable to ascribe choice to 
higher animals it seems equally unreasonable to ascribe choice to plants, despite 
being in the class of living beings. Nozick’s premise is simply wrong if it is 
supposed to be a direct interpretation of Rand, and flawed if it is supposed to 
present a stronger form of Rand’s argument. 
 
Premise (3) ‘Only a living being can have its welfare diminished’ is extracted 
directly from Rand, the difficulty lies in determining exactly what role it plays in 
the overall argument. Den Uyl and Rasmusen, (1978, p. 187) criticise Nozick 
claiming that “The capacity to be harmed, damaged, or have one’s welfare 
diminished does not constitute the primary reason for claiming that either only 
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human beings choose or only living things act for one alternative as opposed to 
another”. However, it is far from clear that this is what Nozick is claiming by the 
inclusion of this premise. If Premises (3) and (4) are read together then the 
conclusion is not that ‘human/living things act in order to avoid harm, damage or 
diminished welfare’, but, as Rand herself claims, that the very recognition that 
some things are of value flows from the recognition that some things are good for 
us qua humans and some things will do us harm. Rand  (1964a, p. 18) claims that 
“just as sensations are the first step in the development of a human consciousness 
in the realm of cognition, so they are its first step in the realm of evaluation” and 
in doing so infers the importance of the third premise. Premise (3) is vital in that it 
determines who can choose and not why we choose. Premise (3) sets the 
groundwork for determining who can have values, namely anything that can be 
harmed and has the capacity to be aware that it is being harmed. Which group of 
beings fall under this description is a difficult question; I would argue against 
Rand and claim that the group is wider than humans. However, I would agree with 
Rand that there is something in the distinction between those creatures that simply 
act and those with the capacity to make choices, but I am uncertain where and 
how to draw such a line. Certainly it excludes non-living things and equally 
certainly it is less than all living beings.97 For the sake of convenience I will 
employ Singer’s (1993, p. 58) term ‘sentience’ as shorthand for meaning all those 
beings that fit under such a description of having the capacity to be harmed, 
damaged, or have their welfare diminished. 
 
Nozick (1971, p. 284) does, mistakenly, assume that the values in question must, 
when acted upon, have some direct consequential benefit to the subject else they 
cannot actually be values at all. “I can’t value, or, in a valuing fashion, act to 
achieve some state of affairs, in a far off place, knowing that I shall never know 
whether my act has actually succeeded or not, and knowing that in either case its 
consequences will not affect me.” But this teleological aspect is simply not 
present in Rand’s determination of value. An act (one made based on values) must 
have an alternative and, in acting one way or the other, the act must make a 
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difference for the person acting, it does not matter if I achieve the goal of the act 
or even if I can ever know whether the goal has been achieved but that in acting I 
promote “those principles which determine the successful maintenance of one’s 
(i.e. qua human being) life or not.” (Den Uyl and Rasmusen, 1978, p. 188). If I 
have a value X and I act for that value X then I maintain that value by the very 
action itself, I need not ever know what the actual consequences of that action are. 
If I value honesty and in a given scenario am honest then I have acted for my 
value of honesty regardless of any consequences, of benefit or otherwise, that do 
or do not follow. It is the act itself and not the consequences of the act that 
determine if an agent has acted correctly, i.e. acted to promote the agent’s values. 
 
What then might be drawn from the discussion of Rand’s early arguments with 
regard to value? I contend that:   
1. Only sentient creatures have a welfare and are aware of that welfare. 
2. It is only through the possibility of having a welfare and being aware of 
that welfare that values are developed (i.e. what is good for me). 
3. Only sentient creatures have values. 
 
I have not determined exactly what is included in the class of sentient creatures, 
other than the likelihood that it is larger than the set of humans and smaller than 
the set of all living things, nor do I intend to. My claim is conditional; if a creature 
is such that it has a welfare and it has the capacity to be aware of that welfare then 
that creature has the potential to develop values and, in some sense, to act on 
those values. 
 
 §9.1.2 On the Randian Argument: Life as Value 
In Section II of Nozick’s article he attributes a second argument to Rand, 
concluding in the statement “life itself is a value to a living being which has it” 
(1971, p.283). Nozick’s (1973, p. 285) version of the argument runs: 
(1) Having values is itself a value 
(2) A necessary condition for a value is a value 
(3) Life is a necessary condition for having values. Therefore, 
(4) Life itself is a value 
Nozick attacks this formulation of Rand’s argument on the grounds that premises 
(1) and (2) are false. This argument seems quite bizarre and, if it were the position 
Rand held would be cause for some concern. However, Rand does not hold either 
premises (1) or (2) nor does she argue for the particular conclusion that Nozick 
 209 
claims. ‘Life’ for Rand is not just a value, it is the ultimate and fundamental value 
without which no other value exists.  
An ultimate value is that final goal or end to which all lesser goals are the 
means – and it sets the standard by which all lesser goals are evaluated. An 
organism’s life is its standard of value (Rand, 1964a, p. 17). 
 
Metaphysically, Life is the only phenomenon that is an end in itself: A value 
gained and kept by a constant process of action (Rand, 1964a, p. 18). 
 
The closest Nozick comes to capturing these concepts is in Premise (3) which, 
unfortunately, Nozick chooses not to discuss. However, as Den Uyl and 
Rasmusen (1978, p. 189) correctly determine, Premise (3) is “in fact her central 
ethical thesis”. When Galt, Rand’s hero/anti-hero from Atlas Shrugged is quizzed 
on the basis of his morality he replies “…in a single choice to live. Everything 
else proceeds from here.”.  Rand’s argument is that life is the ultimate or 
fundamental value without which there can be no other values. Rand provides a 
transcendental argument in favor of the claim that life is the ultimate value, an 
argument that Den Uyl and Rasmusen examine in some depth and to which I will 
now turn my attention. 
 
Rand (1964a, p. 16) criticises those who begin the development of ethical theories 
by asking which values are of importance and instead questions what values are 
and why we possess and/or need them. Rand’s use of the term “value” is morally 
neutral; it simply means the object of an action, “that which one acts to gain 
and/or keep”.  As Den Uyl and Rasmusen, (1978, p. 189) infer, a value is the 
“goal” of a specific action. Given that we (I take ‘we’ to mean all sentient 
creatures) do appear to act, at least on occasion, in a goal-directed manner it can 
then be asked ‘what are the conditions that make such goal-directed behaviors 
possible?’ In reply to this question Den Uyl and Rasmusen, (1978, p. 189) extract 
three basic criteria from Rand’s thesis: 
 
(1) Goal-directed behavior, by its very nature, implies that there is an 
alternative present. 
(2) Goal-directed behavior requires, by its very nature, the existence of an 
entity faced with an alternative. 
(3) Goal-directed behavior requires, by its very nature, that the alternative 
faced by an entity makes a difference. 
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Criterion (1) implies that if there are no alternatives, if we can act in manner A 
and only manner A then acting in manner A is not an example of goal directed 
behaviour, as no choice is being made. It is only because we could act in manner 
A or manner B and choose to act in either manner A or manner B that it can be 
claimed that choosing one of the two alternatives was (or at least could have been) 
goal-directed. When we must act in manner A and therefore do act in manner A it 
may well be that in so acting we promote a personal goal but that goal does not 
direct the behavior unless we have a choice, unless we could have acted 
otherwise. 
 
Criterion (2) is self-explanatory. Goal-directed behavior requires the existence of 
some entity that can act in manner A or manner B. The alternative to act in either 
manner does not exist unless an entity faced with the alternative also exists.  
 
Criterion (3) is the claim that, for an action to be goal-directed, acting in manner 
A or manner B must make a difference to the entity who acts. If it makes no 
difference to an entity whether that entity acts in one manner or the other then 
either no real alternative exits (both actions, though different, achieve the same 
end) or there is no difference for the entity between succeeding “or failing to 
achieve some goal, there would be nothing to differentiate [between] achieving 
and not achieving some goal [and] no alternative is faced by the entity” (Den Uyl 
and Rasmusen, 1978, p. 190).  
 
As claimed in section §9.1.2, only sentient creatures have values and thus only 
sentient creatures have the capacity for goal directed behavior, a goal necessarily 
based on some type of evaluation. Only sentient creatures can face alternatives, 
act for a goal, and achieve or fail to attain that goal such that they are affected by 
that success or failure. What ultimately differentiates between success and failure, 
such that criterion (3) is met? According to Rand it is the fundamental difference 
between existence and non-existence. It is that an entity’s very existence is 
conditional, that an entity can choose between existing and not existing is the 
fundamental source of all the alternatives a sentient creature faces. Life is the 
ultimate and fundamental value and is implicitly valued by the making of any 
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other choice. To demonstrate this, Den Uyl and Rasmusen, (1978, p. 191) present 
the following argument: 
(1) X is an object of choice 
(2) Y is a necessary condition for the existence of X as a value. Y makes 
X as a value possible 
(3) If P chooses (values ) X, P must choose (value) the necessary 
condition for P’s valuation of X. 
(4) P chooses (values) X 
(5) From 3,4 P chooses (values) Y 
(6) Y is life 
(7) From 5,6 P chooses (values) life in choosing (valuing) X 
 
Y can only be Life for the simple reason that for us to hold any X as a choice we 
must be alive. For any creature that can make the fundamental choice between life 
and non-existence the life of that creature (as the sort of thing it is) is that 
creature’s ultimate value, and the standard of evaluation, for that creature. It 
simply makes no sense to claim otherwise; to state that I value X but do not value 
Y (life) even though Y is a precondition (and also a choice) for holding X is 
absurd. 
 
Nozick’s premise (3) “Life is a necessary condition for having values” is a central 
component of Rand’s thesis, and Nozick’s second premise is correct, if it is 
amended to read “A necessary condition for a value is an ultimate value”, for 
which life is the only contender. As discussed at some length in §9.1.2, to claim 
that X is objectively superior to Y requires some evaluative criteria that has the 
property of superiority. In contrast to what I earlier contended, Rand’s claim is 
that life is this value and that all evaluative decisions are ultimately derived from 
this.   
 
The term ‘life’ without the conjoining “as the sort of thing it is” implies little 
specific meaning. By ‘life’ Rand is not referring to just the biological state of 
being alive but living in a certain manner (as is discussed more fully in §9.1.4). 
This being the case, the principles to be drawn from Rand’s transcendental 
argument are as Den Uyl and Rasmusen, (1978, p. 198) conclude: 
(1) Life is an ultimate end, an end in itself, for any living thing. 
(2) To be a living thing and not be a living thing of a particular kind is 
impossible. 
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(3) The particular kind of living thing that an entity is determines what one 
must mean when talking of “life” with respect to a given entity. 
(4) Thus, Life, as the kind of thing it is, is the ultimate value for each 
living thing. 
 
My only divergence from this formulation is that ‘living things’ be replaced with 
‘sentient creatures’, for the reasons discussed in the previous section. 
 
§9.1.3 On the Randian Argument: Rational Persons 
Nozick finds most of the arguments he has presented thus far, unsatisfactory. 
However, as I have shown, Nozick has failed to understand Rand’s basic 
principles.  In section III of Nozick’s paper he moves on to consider Rand’s 
conclusion that “For each man, the preservation and prolongation of his life qua 
man, as a person, is a value for him.” (Nozick, 1973, p. 288). Again Nozick 
misses the main thrust of Rand’s arguments and instead focuses on rationality as 
being either (i) something that man and no other creature has (or can have) or (ii) 
as being the necessary essence of being human. Given that Rand does not argue 
for either of these positions I will disregard what Nozick has to say on them. It is 
only in the last paragraph of section III, as Den Uyl and Rasmussen (1978, p. 192) 
similarly note, that Nozick touches on the actual Randian argument. 
Unfortunately, other than this brief paragraph, Nozick fails to consider what is the 
most likely interpretation of Rand’s position. Thus I will begin, where Nozick 
chooses to finish: 
It might be said that a rational person follows principles, general policies, 
and so we must consider those principles of action which make man’s 
survival possible. But it has not been shown why each person must follow 
the same principles, and why I may not as a rational being, have a clause 
in mine which recommends parasitism under certain conditions (Nozick, 
1973, p. 292). 
 
Value is that which we act for, the goal gained in choosing action A over action B. 
Given that it makes a difference for us (as sentient beings) whether we act in 
manner A or manner B then we are applying some form of evaluation and are 
acting, in Rand’s terms, to keep or gain some value. The ultimate value to any 
sentient creature, as a being of a certain kind (that is, being creatures of a certain 
nature), is the prolonging of life, as the type of thing it is for a creature of this 
nature. The principles and/or policies we apply in pursuit of these values are what 
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Rand refers to as virtues (though they differ somewhat from what is normally 
meant by this term, see  §9.1.3.1) 
 
Nozick rejects the claim that there are certain principles, policies or virtues that 
make human life possible as human life, on the grounds that it has not been shown 
that there are uniform principles that apply to all humans nor that a rational 
(human) being cannot work under a set of principles within a given context that 
allows or promotes parasitism. That is, according to Nozick, under a certain set of 
conditions a person could develop a set of values that allow that individual to act 
as a free-rider, to be a parasite upon society and live and benefit from the work of 
others. Rand would not deny that a rational individual could live as a parasite on 
humanity nor does her theory entail that everyone must adopt the exact same 
value set. What Rand is claiming is that there are a basic set of values that humans 
as a specific type of being must adopt, to live as humans. Humans, as a certain 
type of being, cannot live under a general principle of parasitism simply because 
humans (as a species) could not survive by such a principle. A general principle of 
parasitism would leave no society on which to be parasitic. The principles which 
Rand is referring to are not those that are simply logically possible, not those by 
which a single individual might survive, but those principles necessary for the 
survival of man qua man. Thus humans, as beings of the same kind, to survive as 
beings of that kind, must follow the same basic principles. This is not to say that 
an individual cannot act against these principles, but where we choose to do so, 
“we may, or may not live very long, but the fact remains that we would not be 
living the life of a human being; we would be a metaphysical misfit living by 
sheer luck and/or by the moral behavior of someone else.” (Den Uyl and 
Rasmusen, 1978, p. 193)  
 
Rand would deny that a person living by a different set of values (such as 
parasitism) could be a successful one. Rand would counter that such a person 
would fail in the achievement of his own ultimate happiness. The approach is 
similar to the one extolled by Hursthouse (1999, p. 228) when considering if 
virtue ethics, based in ethical naturalism, can determine that a gangster is a bad 
human being. Her answer is yes given that “a gangster is bad qua human being”. 
A gangster, in being a gangster, possesses certain character traits (acts from 
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certain principles), which are the antithesis of those characteristics that have the 
best chance of promoting human life. Thereby a “gangster is bad qua human 
being, and thereby unable to live a good human life.” I am not wholly convinced 
by this argument nor of the claim that ‘good human life’ requires the adoption of a 
specific set of virtues or values, but I will not engage with the claim at this time.  
 
For Rand, the goal of life is (for any specific being, as a being of that kind) to act 
in the manner that is suited to a being of that kind. For humans, that is to act in 
accordance with the nature of humans under the principles that will guide humans, 
as a being of a certain kind, towards successful lives as rational beings. 
Individuals can act against these principles but they cannot exclude themselves 
from these principles without also excluding themselves from the set of beings of 
that kind. 
 
§9.1.3.1 On the Randian Argument: A brief outline of virtues. 
Rand claims that, whereas values are what we act to gain or keep, virtues are the 
means by which we gain or keep them. Given such a claim it seems appropriate to 
pause at this stage, from extracting the specifics of Rand’s thesis on values, and 
consider exactly what Rand means by the term virtue. According to Rand the 
virtues are productiveness, rationality and pride. Rand (1964a, p. 29) describes the 
virtue of rationality as “the recognition and acceptance of reason as one’s only 
source of knowledge, one’s only judge of values and one’s only guide to action.”  
Rationality requires that one take responsibility for one’s own actions and that an 
agent is committed to gaining the greatest possible awareness of his/her 
surroundings and the fullest possible perception of reality. Every individual is 
responsible for acquiring the maximum possible knowledge (in any given context) 
and rationally acting upon that knowledge in accordance with the agent’s values. 
The virtue for rationality incorporates several other virtues, including; 
independence (accepting responsibility for one’s own life), integrity (not 
sacrificing one’s values to others), honesty (accepting reality and not skewering it 
in order to justify some goal realised out of desire rather than rationality), and, 
justice (that one accepts only what is deserved and likewise bestows only upon the 
deserving (remembering that this applies only within what might be considered 
normal life, not to emergencies). 
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The virtue of productiveness is “the recognition of the fact that productive work is 
the process by which man’s mind sustains his life” (Rand, 1964a, p. 29) 
Productive work is the rational pursuit of some worthwhile (valued) result. The 
virtue of productiveness requires that the mind is engaged and used in a rational 
manner and that an individual not act like a zombie, simply moving through life 
as a matter of routine. 
 
The final (primary) virtue is pride by which Rand means the acquisition of “ 
values of character that make life worth sustaining – that as man is a being of self-
made wealth, so he is a being of self-made soul.” (Atlas Shrugged, cited in Rand, 
1964, p. 29) Pride then is the development of a set of values, of which one’s own 
life is the highest value, and the recognition by an agent that the agent’s life, as a 
certain type of thing, is the agent’s highest value and that the agent has a right to 
pursue that value. 
 
I introduce this material only so it is clear what Rand means when talking of 
virtuous action to gain or keep one’s values. I will leave discussion of which 
virtues can be derived through a naturalistic process until the following chapter. 
 
§9.1.4 On the Randian Argument: Social Rights 
The depth of Nozick’s misconception regarding Rand’s position becomes clear in 
Section IV when he presents the three-step argument: 
(1) For each person, the living and prolongation of his own life is a value 
for him 
(1’) For each person, the living and prolongation of his own life (as a     
       rational being) is the greatest value for him. 
(2) No person should sacrifice his life for another 
(3) No person should sacrifice another person (’s life) for himself (his 
own.) 
 
This argument cannot be attributed to Rand. Firstly, Rand does not claim that a 
person’s life is the greatest value for him. To refer to a greatest value in this 
manner infers that life is a greater value than some other set of values when 
measured against some criterion. Rand’s claim is that life is the ultimate value; 
that which makes all other values possible. Perhaps Nozick meant exactly this but 
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it seems strange at this point to drop Rand’s terminology of life as an ultimate 
value and replace it with the term “greatest value”. Secondly, by ‘life’ Rand is not 
referring to the prolongation of biological survival. As Rand (1964a, p. 26) makes 
explicit:  
It [life for rational beings] does not mean a momentary or merely physical 
survival. It does not mean the momentary physical survival of a mindless 
brute, waiting for another brute to crush his skull. It does not mean the 
momentary physical survival of a crawling aggregate of muscles who is 
willing to accept any terms, obey any thug and surrender any values, for 
the sake of what is known as “survival at any price” which may or may not 
last a week or a year. 
 
It is life, as a certain kind of thing, which is the ultimate value. Rand does not call 
for the prolongation of biological life at the expense of sacrificing those rationally 
held values that were necessary to an agent’s life, as a rational being, being a life 
worth living. The prolongation of one’s biological life is not the ultimate value 
and Rand provides two examples where one might sacrifice biological life 
because not to do so would require an agent to sacrifice that which, as a rational 
agent, defines that agent’s life as a life of value. The first example comes from the 
ethics of emergencies where Rand (1964b, p. 52) claims that if the person one 
loves is in mortal jeopardy then one ought to be willing to risk one’s life to save 
them, as to not do so would make life unbearable. The principle (virtue) of 
integrity requires being loyal to one’s values, (and assuming the term love is being 
appropriately used then that love is of the highest value). Thus if a person does not 
act, where rescue is a possibility, despite any risk associated with the rescue, that 
person is failing to act in accordance with that agent’s own values and is, in effect, 
sacrificing those values. It is this exact type of sacrifice (sacrificing a greater 
value, love and a life worth living, for a lower value, biological survival) that 
Rand labels immoral. Another example, though unrealistic, comes from Atlas 
Shrugged, in which Galt considers suicide rather than be forced to live in a world 
devoid of what he considers to be of value.   
 
Nozick, in formulating his argument, seems to ignore the fact that what Rand is 
interested in are the guiding principles for the survival of rational beings as beings 
of that kind and it has already been demonstrated that Rand would deny that 
‘individual survival at any cost’ is a suitable principle. The ultimate principle, for 
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Rand, is not that no person should sacrifice his (biological) life for another but 
rather that one ought not sacrifice a greater value for a lesser value, “any action 
that a person undertakes for the benefit of those he loves is not a sacrifice if, in the 
hierarchy of his values, in the total context of the choices open to him, it achieves 
that which is of greatest personal (and rational) importance to him” (Rand, 1964b, 
p. 51). 
 
To be fair it is easy to find reasons why Nozick may have constructed the 
argument in the manner he has. Rand does state early in her thesis that the 
fundamental alternative living things face is the choice between existence and 
non-existence and it is from this that everything else follows, a claim that would 
seem to imply biological survival. However, as has been noted on several 
occasions, Rand was not writing as an academic philosopher so that much of what 
she says must be taken in the overall context and when this is done it is clear that 
Rand is referring to far more than biological survival (and certainly more than 
individual biological survival). However, simply taking Rand’s comments in 
context does not alleviate all of the problems in interpreting her work. It is often 
difficult to determine if by the term ‘man’ she is referring to human beings as a 
type of being or to an individual agent. However, putting these difficulties aside, 
Den Uyl and Rasmusen’s analysis of Rand’s overall project seems far more 
accurate or, at the very least, is presented in a style which more accurately reflects 
the ideals and concepts that Rand extolled. 
 
The remainder of Nozick’s argument attempts to analyse the move from values to 
individual rights. This analysis suffers greatly from the failure to correctly 
interpret the principles of Rand’s moral argument. Rights, for Rand, involve the 
implementation of values within a social context. While she does sometimes refer 
to these as moral rights (although for the most part simply political or legal rights) 
they are not part of the basis of Rand’s morality in themselves. I will therefore 
leave Nozick’s argument at this point as nothing additional can be gained from 
examining whether social rights can be derived from values. I will briefly turn my 
attention to Rand’s concept of happiness before returning to further consideration 
of what is implied by Rand’s constrained egoism. The egoist principle is that I 
ought to act so as not to sacrifice (or in positive terms, to promote) ‘my’ values 
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where those values are determined by myself, as a rational agent. The constraints 
are that values are restricted by what it is to be a rational human agent and that 
individualist values are overridden where the situation is such that the very 
possibility of flourishing requires acting in a certain manner. 
 
§9.1.5 On the Randian Argument: Happiness and the Good of others 
For Rand, humans, as a creature of that kind, ought to act from rationality. The 
ultimate goal for humans is happiness which can only be gained from having lived 
a life with the values appropriate to a being of a certain kind. Rand does not claim 
that happiness will be obtained by living such a life, merely that it is only through 
rational pursuits (for rational creatures) that true happiness can be obtained. 
“Happiness in Rand’s philosophy functions much the same way as in Plato’s and 
Aristotle’s. It is something that takes time and training to achieve.” Happiness is 
not some instant gratification or pleasure, rather “happiness is a lasting and 
continuous sense of rightness with the world” (Den Uyl and Rasmusen, 1978, p. 
201). This concept of happiness puts considerable constraints on Rand’s egoism. 
An individual’s happiness cannot be separated from ‘the way the world is’ and 
‘the way the world is’ to a considerable degree depends on the actions of others 
and interactions with others in order to attain that state of rightness with the 
world.  
 
This may at first appear to be some form of enlightened hedonistic egoism and 
that somehow the well-being of others brings about one’s own well-being. I 
contend this is not the case. Rather, Rand’s concept of rightness in the world has 
more to do with a world in which certain values can be promoted. Hunt (1999, p. 
83) appears to interpret Rand in a similar fashion and in describing an agent’s 
interests claims  “one’s own interest [and thereby, ultimately, happiness] is 
(consists in) the attainment of value, and one of the most valuable things is the 
good of others – that is, certain other – people.” As has been claimed throughout 
this chapter, Rand is not taking a consequentialist approach. It is not that bringing 
about good for others results in a better life for me. It is simply that the attainment 
of an agent’s values will include (as part of those values) the good of (some) 
others. Hunt (1999, p. 81) claims that, as such, a person acting on that individual 
agent’s values (i.e. acting to gain or keep those values) embraces “the common-
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sense view that the good of others is a ground floor reason for action in that it is 
worth pursuing in itself”. While I think Hunt is on the right track it might be 
objected that he has quietly dropped the some from his conclusion; the conclusion 
that follows from Hunt’s remarks is that the “good of some others is worth 
pursuing” and that the good of others is not worth pursuing in itself, it is worth 
pursuing because not to do so would be irrational, it would be to act in breach of 
the agent’s own set of values. The common-sense view that Rand would embrace 
is that the good of some others is worth pursuing because to do so is to promote 
one’s own values and that those values provide a ground floor reason for action. 
The values are worth pursuing in themselves. 
 
I have previously noted (see §9.1.4) Rand’s claim that to love someone obligates 
an agent, in acting for that value (love), to act for the good of the other. Rand has 
further comments regarding how we ought to act toward those we call friends, and 
to those who are strangers. Rand’s claim regarding friends progresses along the 
following lines; values are rationally derived from what it is for a human to exist 
as a creature of a certain nature. It must be allowed that humans are, by nature, 
social creatures and that for rational beings friendships form a vital part of being 
social. Thus humans, as social creatures, require friends and the friendship (not 
the friends themselves) will constitute a value. To say that someone is a friend, 
and to value friendship, is also to acknowledge that keeping that value will require 
acting for the welfare of that other (providing that doing so does not result in the 
sacrifice of a greater value). If a person claims some other is a friend and that 
friend faces difficulties then that person is compelled to help them (by the 
person’s own set of values) except where doing so would mean the sacrifice of a 
greater value. What would be of greater value so that a person ought not to help a 
friend in need? This question is difficult to answer; Rand never explains how the 
values are supposed to be placed within a hierarchy (other than noting the process 
would be a rational one based upon the ultimate value of life). Presumably love 
outweighs friendship but this would be little help in working out a detailed 
application of the theory. However, that a theory is difficult to apply is just that, a 
difficulty: it does not point to a flaw in the theory itself unless the difficulty is one 
that cannot be overcome. I believe the difficulty can be overcome and that 
developing a personal hierarchy of values is unproblematic and on most occasions 
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agents will have no problem in ranking values. However, it will on occasion be 
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to differentiate between two values. Such 
occasions are simply an accurate reflection of moral choice; moral dilemmas can 
arise, situations where no matter what action an agent takes they will be forced to 
sacrifice one of two equal values. I will return to the problem associated with 
determining and ranking values in the next chapter. 
 
When it comes to how an agent ought to treat strangers (individuals who are 
unlikely, even indirectly, to figure in an agent’s hierarchical set of values) Rand 
(1964b, p. 53) has this to say; we ought to grant strangers “the generalised good 
will which one should grant to a human being in the name of the potential value 
he represents – until and unless he forfeits it”.  According to Rand we ought to 
respect all other human beings as beings of the same form of life. Again it is 
difficult to determine exactly what the value is (perhaps respect) and where it lies 
within the hierarchy of values, certainly less than friends and loved ones and, it 
would seem, certainly more than trivial interests. It would seem that a value of 
respect for human beings would require that, except in emergencies where we are 
compelled to help, how we ought to act toward strangers entails simple non-
interference as per the principle of ‘not sacrificing another to oneself’. 
 
§9.2 Constrained Egoism 
It might reasonably be argued, at this point, that Rand’s doctrine is a form of 
constrained egoism (action is determined by self-interest except in certain 
contexts) and that such a theory is a farce; the real ethical theory is not the pseudo 
one being described but the one that determines the constraints. The constraint in 
this case is the notion that an agent cannot sacrifice others even if doing so is to 
the agent’s benefit, a constraint that appears decidedly non-egoistic. 
 
It is true that there are many cases where the good of another is a constituent part 
of our own good. If a loved one fails at some endeavour then an individual may 
suffer because he values that other, or more specifically values the relationship. 
However, assuming such an egoistic view of the value of friendships works, that 
still leaves a vast number of other cases where the good or otherwise of another 
will have no impact whatsoever on the agent considering how to act.  It is not only 
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that in many cases an agent will be able to predict (with a reasonable probability 
of success) that the other in question will never represent a value to the agent. 
Why then, if the agent stands to gain substantially, not sacrifice the stranger in 
order to make that gain? Why should Rand’s egoist have respect for all other 
human beings purely because they are human beings? The answer Rand gives 
seems to rely on the agent’s actions being restrained by a doctrine of flourishing; 
namely what it is for a human qua human to flourish. 
 
In attempting to interpret Rand’s theory as a form of flourishing-based egoism 
Hunt (1999, p. 89) agrees with Rand in that my friend can be a part of my good, 
claiming: “If I do take this position there is no prima facie reason to think that I 
will advance my interests by stealing his wallet, even if he never suspects me and, 
in purely consequentialist terms, I ‘get away with it’. If my relationship with my 
friend is, to use Rand’s terminology, ‘one of my highest values’, then by betraying 
his trust and victimizing him I would be damaging my own life just as I am 
damaging his”. Indeed, this seems a reasonable response from a 
nonconsequentialist egoist with regard to not stealing a friend’s wallet but how 
can such a defence work with regard to strangers? Someone I have never met and 
am unlikely to ever have a relationship with is unlikely to hold a particularly high 
rank in my hierarchy of values. Why then shouldn’t I steal the stranger’s wallet? 
The reason why is that it is difficult for humans to flourish where theft is 
commonplace and that flourishing of the community requires that I constrain what 
might appear to be a self-interested action (though I am dubious, outside of a 
controlled thought experiment, that stealing a wallet is ever likely to be in an 
agent’s true self-interest). Hunt (1999, pp. 92-93) argues that such a position is 
“equivalent to describing a way of life” a set of values under which humans will 
flourish. Hunt (1999, p. 93) goes on to argue that such a way of explaining self-
interest will lead to the determination of “why certain character traits have the 
status of virtues”.   
 
If it can be shown that by the adoption of certain character traits (and the valuing 
of these traits) humans give themselves the best chance of flourishing then we 
may find that acting with a certain manner towards strangers is indeed in an 
individual’s self-interest.  It is to this task that I will turn my attention in the next 
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chapter, namely, can the virtues (as specific values or character traits) be derived 
from an agent’s self-interest in flourishing and being happy (assuming, as I will, 
that humans qua humans desire to flourish and be happy). However, before 
attempting this task I will briefly introduce one criticism of flourishing-based 
egoism. 
 
§9.3 A brief Criticism of Randian/Flourishing Egoism 
My purpose in this chapter is to grapple with the basic premises of the Randian 
argument and the elementary ideas of an egoism based on flourishing. My 
intention has not been to defend Rand or claim her theory is particularly solid or 
coherent, in fact I agree that there are many flaws in the theory which invite 
criticism. One such criticism can be demonstrated by altering slightly Hunt’s 
(1999, p. 80) scenario of the man and his dying wife: 
Suppose a man’s wife is deeply ill and it would cost the man’s last 
$10,000 to save her. The man used to love this woman but has long since 
fallen out of love with her. Now suppose the man also has a company that 
employs 10 people, friends he cares about deeply. Injecting the $10,000 
into the company would save the company from bankruptcy and thereby 
also increase his friends’ welfare etc. 
 
It would seem by Rand’s theory that the man ought to invest the $10,000 into the 
business, increasing his friends’ welfare and thereby keeping his greater value. 
His wife should be left to die, certainly a sacrifice but a lesser sacrifice than (a) 
allowing his business (which he values) to fail, and (b) sacrificing the welfare of 
his friends by seeing them unemployed. Such a position feels counter-intuitive 
and it seems that saving his wife’s life (regardless of his feelings towards her) is 
more important than saving his business and his friends’ unemployment, 
(although, as I have earlier stated, I put no great faith in intuitions and perhaps 
mine are simply mistaken in this case). However, it does begin to highlight the 
extreme difficulty in actually applying Rand’s system. How exactly is the 
hierarchy of values supposed to be determined? Nor does it appear to provide any 
way to deal with states of conflict. Rand’s only answer to the latter is that states of 
conflict do not exist amongst rational men. 
 
Rand’s denial of conflicts between rational men is demonstrated using something 
of a false analogy; the conflict she dissolves never really exists. Rand’s example 
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involves two people applying for the same job and she argues that no conflict of 
interest exists between the job applicants primarily because rationality requires 
that both men realise only one can have the job. The very existence of the job 
requires a commercial environment, and excellence in business requires that more 
than one applicant be available for a specific job etc (1964c, p. 64). This may well 
be true enough, but this is insufficient to show that conflicts do not exist. In 
considering my earlier example (§2.5) of the four poisoned lab technicians this 
would seem to represent a very definite conflict of interests. In order to pursue 
any of the agent’s values, they necessarily must get the antidote. The recognition 
that only one can get the antidote only serves to heighten the conflict. I have 
earlier claimed (§2.5) that there are irresolvable conflicts and that no ethical 
theory can provide the means by which to resolve these conflicts. However, these 
occurrences are not the norm and it need not be a requirement of an ethical theory 
that it can solve each and every state of conflict. 
 
§9.4 Conclusion 
 
The neo-Randian notion of value examined in this chapter expands on the 
individualistic factor of flourishing; an agent flourishes when that agent is not 
forced to sacrifice that agent’s values, or is not forced to sacrifice a greater value 
for a lesser value. Rand also touches on certain objective values (virtues) that 
appear to be derived from an objective notion of eco-flourishing and what it is for 
a human to flourish qua human beings. 
 
In Chapter 10 I will expand on these ideas and demonstrate that a hierarchy can be 
developed that is partially holistic and partially individualistic. A combination of 
virtues that humans must adopt if humans are to have the best chance of 
flourishing together with individual (subjective) values that determine what it is 
for an individual human to flourish.  
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Chapter 10 
Flourishing Egoism 
 
§10.0 Introduction 
In Part 1 of this thesis it was determined that if consequentialist egoism is a 
consistent moral theory then the good must be relative both to an agent and that 
agent’s worldview (§3.4). Further it was noted that an egoist would, in most cases, 
be motivated to act in order to promote that good. However, the nature of good 
was left undefined. Having since discussed flourishing (Chapter 8) and Rand’s 
thesis of acting so as not to sacrifice one’s own values (Chapter 9) I will now 
defend a version of ethical egoism based on these principles. I will define the 
good as being that which an agent values, which necessarily (for any rational 
agent) involves that agent’s flourishing. 
 
The complete principles of flourishing- or value-based ethical egoism are: 
 
(i) (Definition of Value)  
x  is a value to an agent if; 
(a) Promoting or holding x is most likely to lead to or bring about 
an agent’s flourishing, as a certain kind of being, relative to any 
rational worldview, 
or 
(b) Promoting or holding x is constitutive of what it is for an 
individual agent to flourish relative to that agent’s worldview. 
 
(ii)  (Universal principle of Ethical Egoism)  
For any n, if 1 is of value to agentn relative to agentn’s worldview 
and 
If ing would promote agentn’s value 1 
and 
If ing would not require the sacrifice of something in which 
agentn instils greater value (2) 
then 
Acting so as to promote the value 1 provides agentn with strong 
moral reason to , and justification for ing. 
 
(iii) (Individual motivation for acting)  
If agentn believes that ethical egoism provides preferable reasons 
for acting then agentn will, in most cases, be motivated to act in 
accordance with (ii). 
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For the most part this chapter will involve a discussion of principle (i), the 
definition of value, and the difference between (a) the values that any rational 
agent must hold if that agent is to flourish as a kind of being, and (b) subjective 
values that are of importance only to a specific agent, and are a constitutive part of 
an individuals’ flourishing.  I will develop these principles using the discussed 
notions of flourishing (Chapter 8) together with the neo-Randian principle of an 
agent acting so as to promote the agent’s own values (or at least acting so as to not 
sacrifice greater values for lesser ones). 
 
§10.1 Beings of a Certain Kind and Universal Values 
Hursthouse claims that the adoption of certain character traits (her example is of a 
gangster who is dishonest, ruthless, greedy etc.), while not necessarily precluding 
that agent’s flourishing, is less likely to result in that agent’s flourishing than 
would the adoption of traits more commonly assumed to be virtuous in nature (i.e. 
honesty, benevolence, kindness). Such a position appears, intuitively, to be 
correct. However, on closer examination the claim quickly loses much of its 
intuitive force. It is true that modernised societies tend (as a rule) to shun 
criminals and wherever possible take punitive actions against those who break 
societal laws, resulting in a society where it is difficult for criminals to flourish. 
However, this same modernised society embraces capitalism and multinationals 
that are ruthless (e.g. hostile takeovers), greedy (the driving force behind 
corporations is increasing profits and rising share prices), and often dishonest (or 
at least not honest, e.g. the deliberate withholding of information preventing 
customers from making informed decisions) and these businesses do flourish. The 
flourishing of a business and human flourishing are clearly not the same, but these 
business enterprises are run by people and in many cases are run by a single 
person. Given that individuals are directly responsible for the methods adopted by 
the business enterprises they control, it would seem that to some extent the 
individuals themselves are adopting, or at least promoting, these negative 
character traits. While I do not want to claim these individuals are flourishing, it 
seems odd to suggest that a vast number of individuals in western society are 
involved in practices, and adopting traits, that prevent them from flourishing; 
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traits that they could fairly easily change98. Ultimately I agree with Hurthouse; 
honesty is more likely to result in flourishing than dishonesty. However, at first 
sight Hursthouse’s thesis is unconvincing given the vast numbers of people who 
appear to flourish by the adoption of negative character traits. 
 
In an argument that bears some resemblance to Hursthouse’s, Rand claims that 
being a rational human being excludes certain types of behaviour (the holding of 
certain values and the adoption of certain character traits) on the grounds that to 
act in such a manner would (i) be to act irrationally, and (ii) adopting such 
behaviour as a maxim would be to exclude oneself from the class of humans (as a 
certain type of being).  In short, to act in a manner destructive to flourishing (for a 
certain kind of being) is to exclude oneself from the class of beings of that kind. 
The statement is difficult to refute; if all Rand is saying is that it is irrational to 
adopt certain character traits that prevent the agent from flourishing, where 
rational action is defined as acting in a manner that leads to flourishing, then the 
claim is trivially true. All Rand has done is define rationality and state that those 
who don’t act rationally (so defined) are irrational. At best Rand would be making 
an existence claim, namely that there are character traits whose adoption prevents 
an agent from flourishing. 
 
Hursthouse does outline those virtues most likely to result in human flourishing 
but this is mostly done by negation (e.g. the gangster analogy) and, as noted 
above, such a claim is not compelling. Further, as discussed in Chapter 8, I think 
her naturalist project is flawed and with it the conclusion that specific character 
traits are likely to result in human flourishing; if the groundwork that leads to a 
specific claim is flawed then doubt must be cast over the conclusion drawn from 
that reasoning. I am not denying that the virtues Hursthouse extols may lead to an 
agent’s flourishing, only that (1) it has not been shown that the extolled virtues are 
more likely to result in an agent’s flourishing, and (2) the reasoning behind 
extolling these virtues is flawed.  
                                                
98
 I do not mean to suggest that capitalism is evil or in some way necessarily results in companies 
that are dishonest, greedy etc. My aim is simply to show that this does happen and companies that 
are as a rule dishonest, greedy, and ruthless do flourish. Numerous documented cases support this, 
a recent and highly documented case being the McLibel Trial (See: McLibel, Two Worlds Collide, 
2004, Madman) 
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Rand bases her theory in self-interest (the individual pursuit of a life worth living) 
and suggests the character traits (values) we ought to adopt are directly related to 
our individual self-interest. However, Rand is extremely vague in outlining which 
values we ought to accept, how those values are to be determined, or how a 
hierarchy of such values is to be formed. Other than Galt’s speech from Atlas 
Shrugged and the very general claim that life is our ultimate value and everything 
else flows from that, we are presented with no clear indication of what a Randian 
hierarchy of values might look like.  Applying the principle of charity, and a 
reasonable degree of interpretation, the ‘Randian value system’ can be extracted 
from Rand’s discussion of happiness. According to Rand an agent obtains real 
happiness only when things are right in the world (from that agent’s particular 
perspective). I interpret ‘things being right in the world’ to mean something like: 
(i) Realitys is such that an agent’s flourishing is logically possible 
(ii) It is actually within the agent’s control to flourish, and 
(iii) Such flourishing makes the agent’s life, as a certain kind of being, worth 
living.  
 
For Rand, ‘life’ is an agent’s ultimate value; a complex value that incorporates the 
entire set of an agent’s subjective values and determines the nature of a ‘life worth 
living’ for an agent as a ‘kind of being’. This ultimate value will consist of many 
subjective (agent-relative) values but it also places considerable restraints on what 
an agent can value.  Agents, as rational beings, cannot value that which is 
destructive to the flourishing of the species and still claim to be a rational member 
of that class of beings. For example, while an agent could hold a set of values 
based on death and destruction (perhaps claiming to value war) in doing so it 
would seem that the agent’s own flourishing is precluded, limited, or at least put 
at serious risk and that, counterintuitively, what the agent values is ultimately the 
agent’s own self-destruction. It might be countered that there are those who do 
thrive in conditions of war and do indeed flourish under these conditions – I am 
doubtful this is true. Certainly some persons can profit from war and many even 
seem to enjoy the state of conflict, my doubt is that these people are actually 
flourishing. A rational moral agent, in this case an ethical egoist, must accept the 
principle that individual flourishing is dependent on the world (Realitys) being a 
place where individual flourishing is a possibility and that the ethical egoist has 
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strong reason to ensure, where it is within the agent’s power to do so, that the 
world is such a place. 
 
Even allowing that some can flourish in such conditions as a state of conflict, such 
flourishing is limited. They can flourish only if wars are limited in scope; a world 
engulfed in endless war would soon see the end of any flourishing. A rational 
agent cannot hold death, destruction and war as values as, if it is accepted that a 
value is something an agent will promote wherever it is possible to do so, then 
promoting the agent’s values of death and destruction ultimately, and irrationally, 
leads to the detriment of the agent who holds those values.  If the agent claims to 
value a world beset by endless conflict the result of which will be an end to 
flourishing then the agent is being inconsistent; the agent desires an end to that 
which makes holding the value a possibility. If the agent claims to value war 
(elsewhere) and peace (where the agent spends the wealth gained from limited 
warfare) then again irrationality appears, the agent holds conflicting values (the 
agent cannot promote the values of both war and peace). The agent might claim to 
value a state of limited conflict but I am doubtful this is possible, more likely the 
agent would be acting as a consequentialist egoist promoting war where such 
conflict was of financial benefit and promoting peace where it was not. 
 
Such examples do little to provide any specific answers or bring us any closer to 
understanding what constraints might be placed on an egoist’s actions. However, 
they do demonstrate the means by which to do so. All that needs to be determined 
is what it means for the world (Realitys) to be such a place that the agent can 
flourish, in order to determine that actions detrimental to this state of the world 
are also detrimental to, or likely to negatively impact on, the agent.  
  
§10.1.1 An Agent’s Worldview and Holistic Values 
Principle (i.a) Definition of Value states that x is a value of an agent if 
promoting or holding x is most likely to lead to or bring about that 
agent’s flourishing as a certain kind of being and further that x will be a 
value regardless of the worldview the agent holds, so long as that 
worldview is rational. 
 
The flourishing reference in the above principle can be either holistic or objective. 
By holistic flourishing (see §8.2.2) I am referring to the biotic community, the 
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community that the rational egoist must admit he is dependent on and therefore 
values. By objective value I am referring to those values that an egoist must hold 
in order to have the greatest probability of flourishing regardless of the specifics 
of the agent’s worldview. I will discuss objective value in §10.1.2 but first will 
consider what limitations might restrict an egoist worldview. 
 
While some advanced or final science might prove otherwise, I am assuming that 
there is not some specific and objective state of the world X that can be pointed to 
or described and said to be the perfect flourishing ecosystem. The flourishing of 
an ecosystem is multiply realisable. Thus when I use the term ‘rational 
worldview’ what I mean is that an agent, as a certain kind of being, holds a 
rational worldview if the class of beings of which the agent is a member is likely 
to flourish (and the ecosystem flourishes in a manner that will support that class of 
beings).  This does little to inform us about how such a worldview might be 
constituted but it does tell us a great deal about what will not constitute such a 
worldview.  
 
As discussed (§10.1) an agent cannot rationally seek to create a world engulfed by 
war; the holistic system upon which the egoist is dependent would collapse and 
with it the egoist’s ability to flourish. Thus, while the egoist need not necessarily 
value peace and tranquillity the egoist cannot value a state of anarchy and 
destruction. At the very least the egoist must value an absence of unnecessary 
conflict and destruction99. Similar conclusions can be reached with regard to the 
egoist’s attitudes (and ultimately values) towards health; a rational being could 
not flourish in a world ravaged by disease and while the egoist may not value an 
end to all disease the egoist must value a reduction in disease, controls on virulent 
viruses etc. If disease is not controlled then humans will not flourish and in all 
probability the egoist will likewise fail to flourish. An egoist will value controls 
on diseases, as the egoist’s own flourishing requires minimising the possibility of 
contracting virulent disease. Similarly, while an egoist need not value an end to 
world hunger the egoist cannot value famine for, in a world ravaged by famine, 
beings that require food might manage to survive but they will not flourish. The 
egoist’s value is that there is sufficient food such that the possibility of flourishing 
                                                
99
 As demonstrated in §2.5 sometimes conflict is unavoidable. 
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is present. I contend that such values will rank highly in the egoist’s hierarchy of 
values (as they are necessary for the very possibility of flourishing), but these 
values are preferential. The egoist will more highly value an absence of famine for 
himself than an absence of famine for others. 
 
The egoist will value air clean enough to breathe (the degree of pollution an egoist 
might deem acceptable being dependent on the full set of values held by the 
egoist), biodiversity (to the degree necessary to support a food chain/biotic 
pyramid of some sort), forests (again for air), drinkable water etc. For an egoist to 
do otherwise, to value that which would render water undrinkable, the world 
plunged into war, the atmosphere rendered unbreathable would be to will the 
world was such a place (or to hold such to be a value) is to will that beings of the 
same kind as the agent will in most cases fail to flourish and counterintuitively, 
that the agent holding the value will most likely fail to flourish. In short, if the 
egoist holds certain negative values then (against the doctrine of egoism that I 
have begun to outline) the egoist is valuing that which is detrimental to eco-
flourishing, the egoist’s own flourishing, and ultimately to a life worth living. 
 
One criticism of the view so far, briefly touched on in §10.1, is that an agent 
might hold a worldview where that specific agent can and indeed would flourish 
but where all, or rather most, other agents suffer. Further, it would seem, given the 
egoist framework, that no call can be made to a veil of ignorance or, in this case, 
universality; worldviews are relative to an agent. Such a worldview might be 
possible for a few (dictators for example) who have direct control over the lives of 
others.  In a dictatorship the person in power knows they have this power (and 
may have been born into such power e.g. the Caesars of Rome) and has the ability 
to create a world where they flourish at the expense of others. However, I am 
doubtful that such a worldview is truly viable and that a rational agent could claim 
it is the most probable way by which that agent can flourish. It would seem that 
the only way for the downtrodden to flourish is to overthrow the dictator and in 
this respect the dictator places himself in a precarious position, necessitating 
constant guard against revolution, assassination, or internal coup. If the dictator 
must be on constant guard then the flourishing that can be experienced is already 
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limited. Further the dictator’s flourishing could disappear at any moment and be 
replaced by ‘a life of misery in jail’ or ‘violent death’.  
 
Very few of us have the power of a dictator or the ability to actually shape our 
world. Further, it is unlikely that the dictator holds any of the negative values 
outlined above. Rather I suggest the death and destruction that is wielded is more 
likely a consequence of other (perhaps misguided) values on the very fringes of 
what might be deemed rational.  For example, taking an extremely simplified 
view of history, Hitler would not be said to have valued a world plunged into war, 
rather his values of a restructured Germany overrode his values for peace and 
security and resulted in a scenario where, for Hitler, not to go to war would have 
been to sacrifice a greater value. I am not suggesting that Hitler was ethically 
correct in going to war only that if his worldview was rational and his value 
system well formed (both of which are unlikely) then Hitler would have acted 
correctly in promoting his greatest value. 
 
To recapitulate, an egoist must place value in an ecosystem that allows beings of 
like kind to the egoist the possibility of flourishing; a flourishing ecosystem is 
essential to the egoist’s health, security and general well-being. While the 
specifics of a valued ecosystem are subjective, the fact that the ecosystem is 
valued is universal. Exactly what these values are is difficult to determine given 
that a flourishing and sustainable ecosystem is multi-realisable. Further, a rational 
agent will value their own flourishing and given that an agent can only flourish in 
a context where others flourish it would be irrational to promote a situation in 
which agents tend not to flourish.  
 
So far I have given indications of the sorts of values an egoist clearly cannot hold. 
I will now turn my attention to objective values and specific character traits that 
an egoist must hold if the egoist is to act in a manner more probable to lead to an 
agent’s flourishing. I gave an indication of one such value in §2.4.3 and §6.9, 
namely ‘Honesty’. Both MacIntyre and Rogers noted the importance of honesty, 
not for the good of others, not as a duty to others, but because of the benefit to the 
individual. I will now examine the claim in more detail. 
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§10.1.2 An Agent’s Worldview and the Importance of Honesty 
We (i.e. any specific agent) could adopt a random set of virtues and see if we 
flourished while acting in accordance with that set of character traits. Then we 
could go on to modify the set of virtues and repeat the process over and over, each 
time determining the degree to which we flourished under the given set of traits, 
and eventually determining which traits led to the maximum degree of flourishing. 
However, while such a task is theoretically possible it is not practical. Firstly, 
virtues are things that make up part of our being and are not something we can 
change at whim. Secondly, testing the results and comparing degrees of 
flourishing would not be easy. Thirdly, the process would likely be self-defeating; 
one’s entire life could be spent testing sets of virtues at the expense of the very 
goal of the project, an agent’s flourishing. If an agent is to develop certain 
character traits in the belief that these traits are most likely to result in the agent’s 
flourishing, then the reasons for adopting those virtues must be clear and 
compelling to that specific agent. The most compelling reason I can conceive of 
for an agent to adopt certain virtues, values or character traits is that acting in a 
certain manner is in the agent’s self-interest and is the most probable means by 
which the agent can ensure that they will flourish. 
 
The flourishing of any agent regardless of the specifics of that agent’s worldview 
requires that the agent can have faith in the reality of the worldview they have 
adopted. To recapitulate my claims of Chapter 6: to flourish we need to be able to 
make sense of the world and making sense of the world requires appealing to best 
explanations. The best explanation of what would most probably lead to my 
flourishing requires self-knowledge, as “self-knowledge is necessary, if I am to 
imagine realistically the alternative futures between which I must choose” 
(McIntyre, 2001, p. 95). True self-knowledge requires an absence of self-
deception. At the very least we must be honest and truthful with ourselves if we 
are to flourish, but not only must we be honest with ourselves. If we are to trust 
our senses (and we must do so if we are to build up a picture of the world) then 
we must honestly express what we see to others and, knowing that others (or at 
least most others) will act likewise (if they are to have any faith in their 
worldviews), receive confirmation of our perceptions. Only by this ongoing 
interaction with others can the egoist build up a picture of the world in which the 
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egoist can feel secure. My claim is that for an agent to have a reasonable 
probability of flourishing that agent must establish faith in a worldview.  Further, 
given that faith in a worldview requires confirmation (firstly via the absence of 
self-deception, secondly via others) the egoist has good reason to develop the 
character trait of honesty. That is, an ethical egoist will place a high degree of 
value on honesty such that developing the character trait is in the egoist’s self-
interest. An agent who has not adopted honesty as a character trait, instead using 
honesty/dishonesty as a tool and acting in the manner the agent believed best 
suited the situation would be unable to place much trust in others (believing others 
ought to act in a similar manner), would be unable to find reassurance for the 
agent’s own worldviews, and would soon begin to lose faith in any facts. It is not 
that a dishonest person could not flourish; rather the claim is that an honest person 
is more probable to flourish and therefore it is in the individual’s self-interest to 
develop the character trait of honesty. 
 
I have not defined specifically what I mean by honesty. For the most part, in the 
discussion above, I have used being honest as the opposite of deliberately 
misinforming or lying. Dishonesty could also be defined in terms of withholding 
the truth, white lies, and non-verbal deception. My claim is that all of these would 
be contrary to the egoist’s values but that honesty/dishonesty exists on a 
continuum and certain forms of dishonesty are low on the continuum (e.g. white 
lies, or not supplying unsolicited truths) and are more likely to be tolerated simply 
because being honest on these occasions is more likely to result in the sacrifice of 
greater values. For example, not withholding honest opinion on someone’s attire, 
when the truth is likely to result in a widening chasm between yourself and 
someone important to you, is to place too high a value on this particular form of 
honesty.  
 
A critic might respond that this is a strange form of egoism given that it makes 
continual reference to others (and to the fact that the agent’s honesty benefits 
others). However, the egoist is not being honest for the good of others or to 
promote a functioning society, although these are obvious offshoots. Rather, the 
egoist values honesty, and is honest, primarily because it is necessary for 
establishing self-knowledge and rational worldviews.   
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(i) I have an interest in developing a character trait of honesty (to avoid 
self-deception). 
(ii) I have an interest in others being honest (to provide confirmation of 
worldviews). 
(iii) I assume that others are (generally) honest for the same reasons (i.e. it is 
in their self-interest to be honest). 
 
To say that the egoist values honesty, as with any other value, is to say that the 
egoist will promote, care for, and preserve that value. It makes little sense to say I 
care for X but I choose not to act in a manner that will preserve X (given no other 
contributing factors).  This does not mean that the egoist will always act honestly 
(as with the white lie example), or that ‘Be honest’ is an absolute rule (or in fact a 
rule at all), only that the egoist will develop a character trait of honesty and will 
tend to act honestly without conscious consideration. The egoist will not treat 
honesty lightly and unless some greater value would be sacrificed by an honest 
act, has no reason to act dishonestly; even then the dishonest act will be out of 
character and require mental effort. 
 
Rand claims that virtues are the means by which one keeps one’s values (see 
§9.1.3.1). To a degree I agree with Rand but I think she misses the essential point; 
namely that while certain virtues and/or character traits are the best means by 
which to ensure an agent flourishes (taking ‘an agent’s flourishing’ to be roughly 
equivalent to Rand’s use of the term ‘a life worth living as a certain type of thing’) 
the agent will necessarily value those things that enable the agent’s flourishing. 
An egoist values honesty because, given any reasonable view of the way the 
world is, it is highly probable that being an honest person is more likely to result 
in the agent’s flourishing than if the agent were to treat honesty as a commodity to 
be used or discarded as the agent saw fit. 
 
That honesty increases the probability of an agent’s flourishing is compelling 
reason for an agent to value honesty and adopt honesty as a character trait. Unless 
an agent is placed in a situation where acting honestly would require the sacrifice 
of something in which the agent instils even greater value, then the egoist will not 
even consider a dishonest act. Flourishing-egoism differs little from other moral 
theories in its promotion of honesty but (to put it somewhat crudely) whereas a 
utilitarian is honest only in as much as honesty generates the greatest good or 
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maximises preferences, and a deontologist is honest as a matter of rule, the egoist 
(in a manner similar to virtue theory) is honest because it leads to and is 
constitutive of the agent’s own flourishing. 
  
§10.1.3 An Agent’s Worldview and the Importance of Respect for Others 
In order for an agent to flourish he/she needs to feel secure. Someone in constant 
fear of attack or of losing one’s possessions cannot flourish (or at least any 
flourishing is extremely limited). An individual in such circumstances has two 
options. The first is to live behind a wall of security and bodyguards, and while 
not an option for the majority a few individuals are in such a position (dictators, 
the extremely rich etc). However, if history has taught us anything it has shown us 
that such positions are anything but secure. Bodyguards are corruptible, armies 
overthrow leaders, and even the highest level of security can be of very little 
defence against a fanatic. While such measures may lead to an agent feeling 
secure, I doubt that such a person can flourish given the restraints such security 
measures would place on the individual. It would seem that a far better method of 
obtaining a feeling of personal security is through removing, or greatly reducing, 
the reasons others might have to breach your personal boundaries. By allowing for 
and taking account of the boundaries of others, that is by respecting the personal 
space and property of others, an agent reduces the likelihood of, and a motive for, 
others to invade the agent’s space. It is in an individual’s interest to respect the 
space of others and in doing so not to provide others with a reason to invade the 
individual’s space. Likewise, it is in the interest of others not to invade a specific 
individual’s space if they are aware (and it is in an agent’s interest to make them 
aware) that doing so will likely result in retribution.  Such situations were 
discussed in §2.5 where I demonstrated that in most cases a consequentialist 
egoist has no problem with conflict resolution;  
Clearly it is not the case that egoism is unable to solve any conflicts of 
interest. For example, if some resource (R) exists and both Agent1 and 
Agent2 have an interest in R then while a conflict of interest appears to be 
present it is not the case that a Darwinian struggle need necessarily follow. 
For either agent to monopolise R is not in that agent’s self-interest given 
that both agents also have a self-interest in avoiding unnecessary conflict, 
conflict that would likely follow if one agent was to monopolise the 
resource. 
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Likewise, the flourishing egoist will, in most cases, avoid conflict. However, I am 
not suggesting that the egoist ought to respect others, and gain respect from 
others, as a matter of reciprocal interest. Such a position is problematic because 
not everyone is capable of harming an individual and such an approach would 
lead to an egoist only respecting some other based on the degree of harm they 
could do to the egoist.  Moreover, this is to slip back into a consequentialist frame 
of thought. Rather I am suggesting that because the flourishing egoist will highly 
value personal security the egoist will value character traits that best promote this 
value and that developing the character trait of respect, that is respect for the space 
and property of others, will directly result in a feeling of security for the egoist.  
 
What egoism compels in this case is little different from how most people do act. 
We take care not to invade the space of others lest we face repercussions, and we 
expect others not to invade our space lest we take retributive action (or request 
others take such action on our behalf). Further, we do not invade the space of 
those who have little if any chance of retributive action because our actions are a 
matter of character not conscious consideration of consequences. At the same time 
we take reasonable precautionary measures (such as locking the house) to protect 
our interests.  
 
The notion of respect for others outlined here differs greatly from the traditional 
moral notion that some inherent value of others makes them worthy of respect. 
This is to be expected from within an egoist framework; however, I maintain that 
what is described in this section is respect for others, if the reason for that respect 
is steeped in self-interest. Of greatest importance to an egoist is the pursuit of 
those things that the egoist values and in respecting the space of others an egoist is 
respecting the self-interest of others to pursue their values free from interference; 
in effect respecting others even if the reason for doing so is one of self-interest.   
 
§10.1.4 An Agent’s Worldview and the Importance of Limited Benevolence 
Many will find it counterintuitive, if not blatantly contradictory, to mention 
benevolence and egoism in the same sentence. However, I will demonstrate that a 
limited form of benevolence is essential to an agent’s self-interest; if an agent is 
selfish then certain systems, which the egoist values, are harmed. If those systems 
 237 
that the egoist values are to have the highest probability of thriving then the egoist 
must develop an attitude of limited benevolence. 
 
Consider, by way of analogy, an extremely simplified capitalist system, but one 
not unlike that which is common in western society. The basic goals of this 
system are the expansion of capital and the pursuit of profit, yet these goals lead 
to monopolisation (as by way of capital expansion the successful envelops the less 
successful), which in turn ultimately leads to the collapse of the capitalist 
system/worldview. The collapse of such a capitalist system can, in part, be 
prevented by government-imposed restrictions that restrict capital growth and 
limit the absorption of competitors. However, the thriving of such a system 
requires that those who are most successful within capitalist society and value the 
capitalist system act benevolently and inject money back into the capitalist system 
(even where there is no direct benefit) in order to ensure the stability of the 
capitalist system.  
 
Using a rather crude example, Bill Gates’ recent (November 2002) donation of 
$100 million to fight Aids in India is of no immediate financial benefit to Gates. 
However, the injection of $100 million back into society will filter through to the 
wage packets of many individuals who, in spending those wage packets, will 
perpetuate the capitalist system, a system Gates benefits from (and presumably 
values). Thus through donating $100 million, in an act of limited benevolence, 
Gates promotes and cares for something he values, namely the capitalist system. I 
am not attempting to pass judgement on capitalism nor am I suggesting that the 
given example encompasses all the relevant details. I am merely attempting to 
show that protecting and promoting a system that an agent values may require 
what superficially appear to be unrelated acts of limited benevolence. Gates’ 
donation of $100 million is an act of benevolence yet at the same time it is a self-
interested act, motivated by the desire to ensure the stability of a capitalist system 
and the worldview that embraces this system.  Under this analysis, assuming 
Gates is both an egoist and values the capitalist system, the underlying reason for 
the act of benevolence is not a desire to help cure Aids in India but a realisation 
that the continuation of the valued system requires injecting a percentage of 
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absorbed capital back into society, and thus the agent who values capitalism has 
an interest in developing a character trait of limited benevolence. 
 
By ‘system’ I mean the way that any group functions; it need not have a formal 
set of rules. For example, the family unit is a system and its members interact as 
part of that system. Likewise clubs, the work place, sporting events are all systems 
of interaction. An agent who values ‘the family’ will act with benevolence 
towards that system of interaction, that is the agent will act to ensure that the 
system of value (in this case the family) is sustained. This may be by way of 
caring for the individuals within the system (sharing the wage packet, providing 
adequate nutrition, ensuring access to education etc.) or by acting in a manner to 
promote the system itself (recognition of the family unit). If an agent values a 
church parish, a club, a sports team, or any community then that agent will take a 
benevolent approach towards that community; it is in an agent’s self-interest to 
care for and promote those systems that the agent values.  
 
This needs a little further clarification. I am not claiming that an egoist ought to 
weigh the pros and cons of a benevolent act and act only if it is of benefit to the 
egoist; this would once again be to slip into a consequentialist-based egoism. I am 
claiming that benevolence is a character trait that (regardless of worldviews) the 
ethical egoist needs to develop in order to flourish. However, a principle of 
partiality is in place; the egoist’s benevolence will be tempered and restricted by 
those systems that the egoist values. To not act benevolently, to fail to support a 
system the egoist values (unless such an action would require the sacrifice of a 
greater value),  even if the harm done to the system may be trivial, is to act against 
the dictates of flourishing egoism. 
 
§10.1.5 An Agent’s Worldview and the Requirement of Temperance 
In order to flourish an egoist must exercise self-control. The need for temperance 
will become clearer when the subjective values are discussed  (§10.3). However, 
as temperance is an objective value for the egoist I briefly introduce it at this 
stage. The unguarded pursuit of that which the egoist subjectively values can, in 
itself, be detrimental to that value which the egoist pursues (or other values that 
the egoist holds) and thus the egoist needs to develop a trait of temperance, and in 
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this regard values temperance. To offer a brief example, an egoist may value fine 
foods. However, the untempered pursuit of fine foods may lead to overindulgence 
which in turn is likely to affect the egoist’s health, where good health is essential 
if the egoist is to flourish. 
 
§10.2 Returning to Rand – Formalising the Principles 
Making use of the basic Randian objectivist argument and adapting it to take 
account of the notion of flourishing, the position I am developing is: 
1. Only sentient creatures can flourish and are aware of that flourishing. 
2. It is only through the possibility of flourishing and being aware of that 
flourishing that values are developed (i.e. what is good for me) 
3. Only sentient creatures have values. 
 
Simply put, it is because we can flourish and realise that some things work for that 
flourishing and others are to its detriment that we develop a system of values. (See 
§9.1.1) It was further argued (§9.1.2.1) that 
4. Life is an ultimate end, an end in itself, for any living thing. 
5. To be a living thing and not be a living thing of a particular kind is 
impossible. 
6. The particular kind of living thing that an entity is determines what one 
must mean when talking of “life” with respect to a given entity. 
7. Thus, Life, as the kind of thing it is, is the ultimate value for each living 
thing. 
 
To have a good life, to flourish in a manner appropriate for a rational sentient 
being is our ultimate value, it is the standard from which all other values are 
derived and placed within our personal hierarchy of values.  In §9.1.3.1 I 
discussed Rand’s claim that values are what we act to gain or keep, virtues are the 
means by which we gain or keep them. I have developed this into the claim: 
7.i   Certain objective values can be determined from accepting that personal     
       flourishing is the ultimate standard of value for rational sentient creatures. 
7.ii  Developing certain virtues or character traits provides the most realistic 
       possibility of gaining and keeping these values. 
 
The specific claims outlined in §10.1.1 through §10.1.3 were that if my flourishing 
is my ultimate value, as it must be if I am to count myself among the set of 
rational beings, then my personal flourishing requires that (1) I have certainty 
with regard to my surroundings so that I can, with certainty, define Realitys, (2) I 
feel secure within my surroundings, and (3) that those systems which I value, and 
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thus constitute part of my flourishing, also flourish. I then argued that the most 
probable way of gaining certainty and security within Realitys and ensuring those 
systems that I value flourish was through the development of the character traits 
of honesty, respect, temperance, and (limited) benevolence. In Rand’s terms, 
through the development of honesty and respect an agent will secure the values of 
certainty and security which are necessary to having a life worth living as a 
rational being. In my terms an egoist will come to highly value honesty and 
respect as a result of valuing certainty and security and an agent will have the best 
possibility of personal flourishing through the development of the virtues of 
honesty and respect. Further, the egoist will be benevolent (in a limited sense) as 
an agent’s flourishing is tied to the flourishing of those systems the agent values. 
Those systems that the agent values are partly constitutive of the agent’s own 
flourishing; an agent cannot flourish if those systems the agent values are left to 
fail.   
 
The egoist will value honesty and respect; trivially this honesty is towards others 
and the respect is for others. Honesty and respect gain their importance for the 
egoist not through being other-regarding but as necessary character traits that are 
constituents of the egoist’s flourishing. Further, the egoist will be motivated to 
perform benevolent acts (in the limited sense) not for the good of other 
individuals (although, this necessarily follows), but for the good of specific 
systems that the agent values. 
 
To continue formalising the principles of Ethical Egoism: 
 
8. Flourishing requires certainty with regard to Realitys. 
9. Certainty with regard to Realitys requires the character trait of Honesty. 
10.  Flourishing requires security within Realitys. 
11. Security within Realitys requires the character trait of Respect. 
12. Flourishing within Realitys requires that those systems that are constitutive 
of Realitys also flourish. 
13. Promoting those systems that the agent values requires taking a benevolent 
approach towards those systems which requires the character trait of 
(limited) Benevolence. 
14. Acting in a manner such that the pursuit of values does not, in itself, 
become detrimental to those values requires acting with temperance. 
 
My claim so far is that an ethical egoist must possess the character traits of 
Respect, Temperance and Honesty regardless of the worldview the egoist holds. 
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The egoist need not always be honest nor always respectful but will value these 
traits highly and will not lightly violate these principles. Again I stress that these 
virtues are not adopted out of reciprocal interests or mutual co-operation with 
other agents. Rather, the egoist adopts these virtues because they offer the best 
probability of the agent’s own flourishing and, in promoting these virtues, the 
agent acts out of self-interest regardless of the specific consequences of the act. 
However, as noted above, the egoist will not always be honest; the egoist will 
sacrifice this value when not to do so would be to sacrifice a greater value (the 
hierarchy of values is discussed in the following sections). I further claimed that 
the egoist must develop a character trait of benevolence, again regardless of the 
worldview, but that this benevolence would be limited. The limitations placed on 
benevolence are subjective to the agent and more specifically the agent’s specific 
worldview, and it is to these subjective values that I will now turn my attention. 
 
§10.3 Subjective Values 
I take X to have subjective value if an agent cherishes X and would feel a loss if X 
was in some way damaged.  These values, much like the virtues, are enfolded in 
and constitutive of the agent’s character. Values, again like the virtues, are 
developed over time and are not things adopted on a whim. However, values 
differ from the virtues in that whereas temperance, honesty, respectfulness and 
(limited) benevolence are objectively valuable (due to their essential nature in an 
agent’s flourishing) and cherished because they are valuable, all other values are 
dependent on an agent and the agent’s specific worldview. Despite value being 
subjective, this is not to say that an agent can value absolutely anything. 
Rationality and flourishing, while not determining what is of value, place limits 
on what those values might be.  I have already shown (§10.1) that an ethical 
egoist cannot value that which will result in the agent failing to flourish; while an 
individual may hold such values they are inconsistent with the notion of 
flourishing and the holder of such values would not be an ethical egoist. 
 
As to what the egoist can subjectively value, the list is endless. Anything that the 
egoist takes a stance towards, that the egoist cares for and would act so as to 
protect or promote is a value for the egoist. For example, an egoist might value 
sentient life, in any form, and consider such life to be precious (and I am 
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assuming, for convenience sake, that no other values come into conflict). Such an 
egoist would develop an attitude towards sentient life and, perhaps, become 
vegetarian or vegan, support certain charities, and attempt to persuade others (who 
hold differing values) that they were mistaken in their attitudes towards sentient 
life. The egoist will be aware that such values are subjective and that no absolute 
claims can be made. However, the egoist can, in this case, best promote this value 
by trying to convince others that the values they hold are misplaced, so long as in 
doing so the egoist does not sacrifice any higher values. Whether such a sacrifice 
occurs depends upon how highly this particular value is placed within the egoist’s 
hierarchy. It could be that the egoist more highly values respect for others, in 
which case it would be wrong for the egoist to press someone with regard to their 
attitude towards sentient creatures such that the value of respect was sacrificed. 
However, if the egoist places respect for all sentient creatures as amongst the 
highest of values then, even though the egoist is normally respectful of others, to 
remain silent while others acted in a manner that caused damage to something 
upon which the egoist placed great value would be unthinkable. All things being 
equal, an egoist who valued all sentient life could not remain inactive while others 
tortured an animal, and continue to claim that all sentient life was valued100. 
 
I have given no real indication of how the values might be ranked for the simple 
reason it is not possible to do so. An agent’s hierarchy of values is subjective. The 
objective values will, as they are necessary to an agent’s flourishing, rank very 
highly but they are not overriding as my example re the value of sentient life 
demonstrates.  
 
That a hierarchy of values is subjective leads to certain apparent problems, not 
least of which is how a hierarchy of value might be ordered. Obviously an agent 
need not have a formal list of values but there will be times when an agent must 
choose, sacrificing one value in order to promote another. In most cases this will 
present little problem as, from a personal standpoint, some things will have much 
greater value than others and the sacrifice of the lesser value will occur without 
                                                
100
 While I will not press such a line of argument here it might also be argued that accepting life as 
an ultimate value obligates an egoist to value all sentient life not just life for one’s own kind. 
While the value placed on the life of a cow may be a very distant value it may still outweigh such 
trivial values as taste.  
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much conscious deliberation. Dilemmas will occur when the egoist must sacrifice 
one of two values, both of which have great value to the egoist. Egoism provides 
no easy answer to such dilemmas. However, this is a strength rather than a 
weakness; it would be odd, when facing a ‘Sophie’s Choice’ and being forced to 
choose between one of your two children, to suggest a moral theory must give a 
clear answer. Whenever an egoist faces such a choice, that one of two near 
inseparable values must be sacrificed, whatever action the egoist takes their will 
be moral remainder; the egoist is left with ‘dirty hands’ and regret in having been 
placed in a situation where such a sacrifice was necessary.  
 
A further apparent problem for egoism is that agents cannot objectively judge the 
actions of others. I do not consider this to be a real problem. Flourishing- or 
value-based egoism is a moral theory in that it guides the actions of the individual 
who ascribes to it; it is not designed to be judgemental of the actions of others 
(except in as much as whether or not they meet the mandates of the doctrine of 
egoism). While flourishing-based egoism requires the development of certain 
character traits (such as honesty, respectfulness, temperance etc) in that these 
traits provide the egoist with the greatest possibility of flourishing, no mandate of 
egoism is broken by being dishonest if by acting honestly the agent would 
sacrifice some greater value.  
 
It should be noted that the reason an egoist cannot judge others is purely 
empirical. It would be logically possible for an egoist to make such an objective 
judgement if the egoist had knowledge of the values held by others and the weight 
others placed on those values within their personal hierarchies. However, that in 
practice an egoist cannot make moral judgements does not prevent the egoist from 
discussing the wrongness of specific actions or from challenging others’ actions. 
Firstly, the worldview and values of others can be discussed and critiqued and if 
the holder of such values cannot justify them then the perception of right action in 
the given context may come into doubt. Secondly, we can question how a specific 
action could possibly lead to an agent’s flourishing, and possibly convince them 
that an alternative action is preferable and has greater potential for the agent’s 
flourishing. Thirdly, as I noted in the discussion of moral facts (Chapter 6) there 
are limitations placed on what can constitute a rational worldview, and that right 
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and wrong is relative to the agent’s worldview. The limitations placed on what 
can constitute a rational worldview results in certain (extreme) actions that are 
close to being objectively wrong. For example, even though I have no direct 
access to X’s worldview, if X is torturing an innocent I can be reasonably sure 
that X is acting wrongly given the improbability of a scenario where the torturing 
of an innocent was the course of action that was most likely to result in that 
person’s flourishing. 
 
§10.4 Initial Objections 
I imagine one of the first objections would be that the theory I am extolling is not 
really egoism at all but rather some sort of confused virtue ethics that, while 
formally egoistic (the virtues benefiting the agent that holds them), the reason for 
holding the virtues is to be a good person, not to be a good person for the agent’s 
own benefit (which may or may not follow from acting virtuously). This is 
something of a reverse of the attack often made against virtue ethics; namely that 
virtue ethics is a form of egoism. However, the underlying premise is that an 
egoist ought to act so as to protect that which the egoist values. Given that the 
rational ethical egoist must value the agent’s own flourishing I have claimed that 
the agent must also value certainty (§10.1.2) and security (§10.1.3) and that the 
best means by which to protect these values is by adopting the character traits of 
honesty and respectfulness.  The only character traits I have claimed an ethical 
egoist must adopt are honesty, temperance, respectfulness and (a limited) 
benevolence because these are essential to an agent’s flourishing. The adoption of 
any other so-called virtue is dependent on the specific agent’s worldview and the 
values that may arise out of that worldview. Despite the arguments presented here, 
it is theoretically possible that acting so as to promote an agent’s own flourishing 
might require the adoption of character traits commonly assumed to be vices. I am 
extremely doubtful this would actually be the case (I can see no way that an egoist 
could flourish in a world populated by dishonest, disrespectful people), but if it 
can be shown to be otherwise I simply bite the bullet and say, yes, the egoist 
ought to adopt those traits regardless of the assumption that such traits are vices. 
 
It might be claimed that my conclusion that an egoist must adopt certain character 
traits is based on reasoning that is not egoistic; rather the theory is a disguised 
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form of utilitarianism. If everyone (or most people) were honest then I could gain 
certainty with regard to my worldview (as could others) and everyone would be 
better off if people were honest. This is not the case; the egoist is honest, first and 
foremost, to avoid self-deception. Secondly, the egoist is honest in portraying the 
egoist’s worldview to others in that it is logically impossible for the egoist to 
receive confirmation of a worldview unless the egoist portrays such a view 
accurately. The egoist assumes others will follow the same logic and likewise (in 
most cases) be honest101. It is certainly true that everyone is better off if the 
majority of people are honest and that this benefits the egoist, but the primary 
reason for adopting the character trait is the agent’s interest in the agent’s personal 
flourishing. That everyone is better off if most people are honest may be true but 
it is not the primary reason for the egoist’s honesty. Nor is it the case that the 
egoist is honest, and expects honesty form others, out of reciprocal interest; the 
egoist is honest out of self-interest and expects others will be honest out of their 
self-interest. The same is true of respect for others. While everyone (and therefore 
the egoist) will likely be better off if the majority of people are respectful of each 
other; the egoist’s reason for being respectful of others is that if the egoist lacks 
respect for others the egoist is likely to face repercussions of some form. 
However, this is not a case of co-operating with others simply to avoid 
repercussions (at best such an argument would ensure the egoist was respectful of 
some others), rather the egoist has the best probability of flourishing if the egoist 
develops the character trait of respect for others.  
 
A further objection (already briefly discussed) might be that the theory seems 
somewhat arbitrary and offers no clear action guidance in that no clear hierarchy 
of values exists. For example, the egoist will be honest unless by being honest 
some greater value would be sacrificed. But how is it determined which personal 
values are significant to the degree that dishonesty is justified? Faced with a 
situation where an honest answer will place a business in jeopardy (which the 
egoist has spent years developing and highly values), ought the egoist answer 
honestly or dishonestly? This criticism only appears difficult to respond to if there 
                                                
101
 At the very least Agentx can draw the assumption that in a given scenario Agenty is unlikely to 
suffer from telling the truth and is therefore unlikely to put other values at risk by attempting to 
deceive Agentx. While this offers no guarantees Agentx can reasonably infer that it is probable that 
Agenty is being honest. 
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is an assumption that such questions should have a clear answer. My response is 
that it is one of the strengths of ethical egoism that it gives no distinct answer. In 
such situations the egoist faces a moral dilemma; the egoist must either sacrifice 
the value placed in honesty or risk sacrificing the value placed in the successful 
business. The solution to the dilemma would rest on the degree of dishonesty 
required (and the ongoing untruths that might be necessary following an initial 
untruth), the degree of sacrifice the egoist would face by the loss of the business, 
and the degree of risk that the business might be lost. Flourishing-based egoism 
offers the means to examine such dilemmas; it does not provide an absolute rule 
on how to act.  
 
§10.4.1 An example of Ethical Egoism in Action: The Lifeboat Dilemma 
Returning to the lifeboat scenario (§1.1) where the lucky egoist is the only one 
aboard a lifeboat that can support up to a maximum of 15 persons at an increasing 
level of risk. How would the ethical egoist approach this dilemma? 
1. The ethical egoist recognises that the egoist’s own flourishing is the 
egoist’s ultimate value and (in this case) can be equated with survival. The 
egoist will act to ensure the egoist’s own position in the lifeboat is safe. 
 
2. The egoist values honesty (and in this case avoiding self-deception), and 
must recognise that she can save four passengers at no additional risk to 
herself.  
 
3. The egoist in valuing respect must recognise that by not saving any (not 
respecting the others’ lives) she sacrifices that value and must live with 
that sacrifice. Secondly, she recognises that the sacrifice of this value may 
lead to repercussions initially from those in the sea trying to board the boat 
and then from those on land (as discussed in §1.1) seeking recompense for 
their loss of value (i.e. the loss of family and friends whom they value). 
 
4. [from 2 & 3] The egoist will save four passengers at no risk, reducing the 
risk of repercussions and, with more hands to staff the boat, increasing the 
chances of her own survival. 
 
5. [from 1,2,3] The egoist will continue saving people until the sacrifice (the 
potential risk to her own life) exceeds sacrifice of respect for others (and 
accepting the risk of repercussions) 
 
The exact number of passengers the egoist will save is difficult to determine but it 
seems probable the balance will be similar to the one reached by the virtue 
ethicist, attempting to balance the foolhardy act of trying to save everyone (and 
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thereby sacrificing the egoist’s own flourishing) and the cowardly act of saving 
the minimum number of passengers (sacrificing respect for others and putting the 
egoist’s flourishing at risk from the repercussions of others). Again this may 
sound like consequentialist reasoning, but it is not. The egoist does not 
consciously weigh the outcome in terms of risk to the egoist either by drowning or 
by repercussions (although the egoist will be aware of these considerations). 
Rather, the egoist, having necessarily developed a character trait of respect for 
others, could not consider leaving others to drown except where a greater sacrifice 
was called for. Thus the egoist would not initially even consider the evaluation 
process given above until it neared the point where acting out of respect for others 
would require a foolhardy sacrifice of the egoist’s greatest value, the egoist’s own 
flourishing. 
 
§10.4.2 Ethical Egoism in Action: Rachels’ Doctor 
It seems fitting, given that I claimed consequential egoism fails as a moral theory 
in that it compels an agent toward pernicious acts, to subject flourishing egoism to 
the same test and investigate how Rachels’ doctor would act if he was a 
flourishing egoist. 
 
First we need to consider what set of values the doctor might have embodied. 
Perhaps the doctor was an extreme capitalist and placed enormous value in the 
acquisition of wealth. If this were the case then the doctor would have developed 
character traits that would have given him the highest probability of attaining such 
wealth in his chosen career; certainly honesty (as a dishonest doctor is unlikely to 
have an ongoing clientele), certainly a degree of respect for others (for much the 
same reason). Given these character traits the doctor would not even consider 
charging for a service (an examination) that was neither given nor necessary. 
Perhaps then the doctor valued wealth to such an extent he would sacrifice the 
values of honesty and respect in order to gain an extra twelve dollars? Such a 
claim seems improbable, twelve dollars is a trivial increase in wealth (to a doctor) 
and is extremely unlikely to justify the sacrifice of two virtues that are essential to 
the doctor flourishing. I can find no set of values that the doctor might embody 
that would lead to the doctor taking the woman’s last twelve dollars. The Doctor 
might, as a flourishing egoist, have refused to see a patient that could not afford to 
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pay (which would not require the sacrifice of any values) but, while harsh, it is 
unlikely such an act could be labelled pernicious. 
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Chapter 11 
A Day In Punxsutawney 
 
§11.0 Introduction 
In this final chapter I will demonstrate how the axioms of flourishing- or value-
based egoism might be applied by way of an extended case study. The case study 
I will use is the one presented in the movie Groundhog Day (1993). The original 
script for Groundhog Day was steeped in Zen Buddhism and is often supposed to 
demonstrate the progression from an egoistic or Nietzchean nihilistic position 
towards the discovery of a good life through virtuous living. Such a position is 
developed by Kupfer who claims that by the end of the film Phil (the central 
character) no longer sees “other people as opportunities for his personal 
advantage, he now views himself as a resource for the benefit of others” and, 
rather than “demean people, Phil goes out of his way to spare people’s feelings, 
including sparing them the embarrassment of being grateful to him” (2005, p. 
293).  I will argue that Kupfer is mistaken and that while Phil realises he cannot 
simply use others as opportunities for personal gain he does not see himself as a 
resource and does not sacrifice himself, or his values, for the benefit of others. I 
will further argue that Phil’s progression is not from egoism towards virtuous 
living but rather is a progression from consequentialist egoism towards a 
flourishing-based ethical egoism. Phil’s journey is the personal discovery of self 
worth and the development of values through an understanding of true self-
interest and not, as Kupfer would claim, the recognition of some inherent good in 
others (2005, p. 293). 
 
§11.1 A Day In Punxsutawney: The Scenario 
Phil Connors, a selfish, egocentric, and thoroughly dislikeable weatherman, is 
assigned the task of reporting the Groundhog Day festivities in Punxsutawney, 
Pennsylvania, for the fourth year running. Phil is bitter about having to travel to 
Punxsutawney and has nothing good to say about the trip, the town, or the people 
who reside there and intends to leave at the earliest possible moment. However, 
an unexpected blizzard prevents his departure and he is forced to spend the night 
in Punxsutawney. Phil wakens to the sound of his radio alarm at 6am, to discover 
that it is still Groundhog Day. We are given no reason for this bizarre 
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phenomenon, nor is one really required, the scenario is simply that no matter what 
Phil does, he will continue to wake at 6am each morning and it will always be 
Groundhog Day. Phil is trapped inside a repeating 24-hour loop. However, the 
scenario is further complicated in that only Phil has memories of the ongoing 
repetitions, everyone else believes they are experiencing this Groundhog Day for 
the first time. As Phil soon realises, if tomorrow never arrives then he has no 
reason to worry about long-term consequences: 
 [Phil] What if there was no tomorrow?  
[Bar Patron] No tomorrow? That means there’d be no consequences, no 
hangovers, we could do whatever we wanted. 
[Phil] That’s true we could do whatever we want. (Groundhog Day, 30:20) 
 
And the stage is set, similar to the story of Gyges (§2.3), for Phil to ponder the 
question ‘Why be moral?’ given that Phil does not have “to live by their rules 
anymore!” (GD, 32:25). Whatever action Phil takes there will be no lasting 
consequences, at 6am everything will be reset and no-one will be aware of any 
acts that Phil committed on the previous day. 
 
Despite the fantasy setting of Groundhog Day the movie is analogous to many 
everyday lives; at one point Phil queries the bar patrons “What would you do if 
you were stuck in one place and every day was exactly the same, and nothing you 
did mattered?” the reply being “that about sums it up for me” (GD, 29:11). Thus 
Phil is pondering not just how he ought to act within this scenario but how he 
ought to act period.  Rammis, the Director of Groundhog Day, notes that in 
searching for answers Phil progresses through five stages that closely follow 
Elisabeth Kübler-Ross’ five stages of death and dying; Denial, Anger, Bargaining, 
Depression, and Acceptance. (GD, Commentary, 32:25) I will discuss these five 
stages, focusing on bargaining and acceptance, as these are more relevant to the 
moral progression from consequentialist- to flourishing-egoism. While in the 
bargaining stage Phil is at his most egocentric, acting purely to satisfy immediate 
desires, whereas in the acceptance stage Phil acts benevolently. Kupfer argues this 
is out of a general concern for others, I will show that it is actually limited 
benevolence necessary to Phil’s flourishing and the promotion of self-interested 
values. 
 
 251 
§11.2 Denial and Anger 
Phil’s initial response is disbelief and denial, thinking that the day simply cannot 
be repeating. He continually questions people and sets little tests, such as breaking 
a pencil the night before. However, everything is reset the next morning, the 
pencil is once more restored and everyone else is convinced they are experiencing 
this year’s Groundhog Day for the first time. No longer able to deny the day is 
repeating, Phil’s disbelief turns to anger and he begins taking his frustrations out 
on whoever is at hand. It is only when Phil realises that he can do whatever he 
pleases without any risk of repercussions that we get to witness Phil’s egoistic 
hedonism in full flight. 
 
§11.3 Bargaining 
The section’s title is a little misleading; Phil’s actions are more a case of 
manipulation than bargaining. Without the threat of undesirable consequences to 
temper his actions Phil “goes to work grabbing for all the pleasurable experiences 
he can cram into the ever present Groundhog Day” (Kupfer, 2005, p. 286). He 
eats whatever he pleases, smokes as much as he wants, drinks to excess, steals 
money, and manipulates those around him for pleasure and personal gain.  Phil’s 
unique situation allows him to easily compile information about an individual that 
can be put to mischievous use in a future (repeat) occurrence of Groundhog Day. 
For example, Phil gathers information about a woman, her name, where she grew 
up, her English schoolteacher, so that he might pretend to be an old school friend 
in order to advance a desired sexual relationship. Yet, despite Phil’s unique 
advantage over the other residents of Punxsutawney the one thing that Phil really 
desires, a relationship with his producer Rita, seems beyond his grasp.  Rita 
recognises Phil’s actions as selfish and his friendship insincere, chastising him:  
The wretch concentred all in self 
living, he shall forfeit fair renown 
and doubly dying, shall go down 
to the vile dust from whence he sprang 
unwept, unhonoured and unsung. (GD, 35:30)102 
 
Still, Phil continues his attempts to seduce Rita, using each revolution of 
Groundhog Day in his plan to create the prefect date. At one stage it seems Phil is 
                                                
102
 The quotation is the closing lines from a poem by Sir Walter Scott 
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close to success; acting in the manner he believes Rita will approve of, Phil’s 
actions appear to be genuinely virtuous in nature. However, when Phil claims to 
love Rita she perceives the ruse and ends the date with a slap to Phil’s face. The 
more Phil tries to control the outcome the earlier Rita recognises the ruse and, in 
response to Phil’s professed love, responds:   
[Rita] I could never love you because you’ll never love anyone but 
yourself. 
[Phil] That’s not true I don’t even like myself. (GD, 53:00) 
 
Phil is unable to find happiness through a life of egoistic hedonism and, perhaps 
recognizing the truth in his own words, that there is nothing to like in his 
character, begins his slump into depression. Phil cannot have that which he really 
wants (a relationship with Rita) and, while he can satisfy almost any desire, Phil 
tires of this life of pleasure and soon becomes “bored beyond endurance” (Kupfer, 
2005, p. 287). 
 
§11.4 Depression 
Bored with immediate pleasures, Phil becomes depressed with his life and enters 
his nihilistic stage; he sees no value in anything nor the possibility of anything 
having value, and kills himself over and over again. However, suicide offers Phil 
no respite and he still awakes, fully restored at 6am. Suicide, like the pleasures 
Phil desired, offers only momentary relief from his predicament. We witness Phil 
at his most depressed when presenting a weather prediction, “This winter is never 
going to end. It’s going to be cold, it’s going to be grey, and it’s going to last you 
the rest of your life” (GD, 55:00) and indeed this is how the future must look to 
Phil, unable to escape his curse and unable to find happiness though the 
satisfaction of hedonistic desires. There appears little hope.  
 
But Phil’s many deaths do serve as a catalyst, they allow him to deconstruct 
himself. As Phil notes, he has been electrocuted, run over, exploded, stabbed, 
shot, poisoned, hanged, and burned; “I’ve been killed so many times I don’t even 
exist anymore” (GD, 1:08:08) and from this nonexistence Phil begins to create 
himself anew. 
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§11.5 Acceptance 
Phil’s initial acceptance of his situation results in the claim “I’m a God” (GD, 
1:03:02), not because he believes himself to be omnipotent (although he does 
appear to be immortal) but simply because he has been repeating the day for so 
long that he knows all of its possibilities and can manipulate and control all of the 
outcomes – or so he believes. Phil manages, in one 24-hour repetition, to convince 
Rita that something has happened to him by matter-of-factly providing intimate 
details about everyone in the diner and casually predicting the future. However, 
despite the matter-of-fact way Phil unveils his knowledge and ability there is still 
a degree of maliciousness in his actions; reaching the table of a young engaged 
couple Phil unnecessarily reveals to the groom-to-be that his fiancée is having 
second thoughts.   
 
On one occasion Rita decides to spend the day with Phil, trying to understand the 
bizarre predicament that has beset him. However, whereas Phil sees his situation 
as a curse Rita is far more positive noting, “perhaps it’s not a curse. It depends 
how you look at it.” (GD, 1:18:00) Rita goes on to claim that she would like to 
have the time to repeat some things and the good that could be done through the 
ability to correct mistakes and prevent harm. Kupfer sees this as the moment Phil 
begins to change (2005, p. 291). I disagree. Phil does not appear to be convinced 
by Rita, making light of her claims and noting that come 6am she will have 
forgotten this day and will treat him with the same disdain as on every other 
occurrence of Groundhog Day.  While Kupfer is correct, that from this moment 
Phil begins to act differently, what Kupfer seems to miss is that Phil appears 
somewhat detached from his actions. While outwardly Phil’s actions appear 
virtuous it seems more likely that he is acting in this new manner simply because 
he has tried everything else and this, at least, provides some respite from the 
tedium. 
 
I suggest the catalyst for Phil’s change of character is not Rita’s alternative view 
of his predicament. Rather, the first sign of change in Phil comes when he is 
forced to correct his mistaken belief that he has the power (or at least the 
knowledge) of a God and has the ability to control all the possible outcomes of 
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Groundhog Day. The discovery leads to Phil’s development of a hierarchy of 
values, a set of values developed out of self-interest. 
 
§11.5.1 Groundhog Day: The Ballard of the Tramp 
One of the events that we see repeated time after time in Groundhog Day is Phil 
passing an individual who is down on his luck and begging passers-by for money. 
We are given the impression that Phil has walked past this person countless times, 
each time seeing him as nothing more than a nuisance. We see him patting his 
pockets and pretending that if he had some change he would give it but, alas, he 
has none. Phil shows no concern whatsoever for the tramp and on the one 
occasion where he does speak to the tramp it is only the ironic quip “catch you 
tomorrow Pops” (GD, 34:03) 
  
However, after accepting his situation and following the discussion with Rita (that 
perhaps it is not a curse) Phil stops and hands the tramp a large sum of money. 
Phil does not speak to him, nor does he seem interested in the tramp, rather he 
appears totally uninterested. Handing over the money appears to be just something 
different to do and while the act appears to be one of benevolence, given Phil’s 
knowledge that the day will repeat, the charity does not actually cost him 
anything. Phil’s charity does not really seem to capture the essence of a 
benevolent act, there is no cost involved and Phil appears to lack even the 
remotest concern. What Phil doesn’t realise is that giving the tramp money will 
set in motion a series of consequences and that, for the first time, Phil and the 
tramp will cross paths a second time in the same day. Walking home Phil sees the 
tramp stagger and collapse to the ground. Phil rushes him to the hospital but the 
tramp passes away, the nurse reports the news to Phil who refuses to accept the 
outcome; 
[Nurse] Some people just die. 
 [Phil] Not today. 
 
Phil’s ‘Not today’ seems to express an intention to change the outcome to act so 
as to prevent the tramp from dying on his day. Rather than just giving money Phil 
takes the tramp in hand and feeds him, but to no avail, the tramp still dies. On 
another repetition Phil attempts mouth-to-mouth resuscitation, but again the tramp 
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dies. No matter what actions Phil puts in place he cannot change this outcome, the 
tramp always dies. Phil finally accepts the limitation that he cannot control others 
to the extent he believed.  
 
During the many cycles where Phil vainly attempts to save the tramp, he finds the 
tramp becoming more and more important to him. As Kupfer notes, Phil seems to 
adopt the tramp, referring to him as Father, Dad, and Pop (2005, p. 291). The 
value Phil places upon the tramp’s life grows with each repetition of Groundhog 
Day. In Randian terms Phil comes to recognise that his own life is his ultimate 
value and the lives of those close to him (in this case the adopted tramp) are also 
of great value. Phil’s attempts to save the tramp are guided by self-interest. He 
does not want a life to be lost on ‘his day’, especially the life of someone who has 
become important to him. 
 
In recognising that life has great value and that the cost to him (the sacrifice he 
must make) is in this case trivial, Phil is compelled to attempt to save the life of 
the tramp. There is no indication that under normal circumstances Phil will 
crusade to save the lives of those less fortunate than himself but things in 
Punxsutawney are anything but metaphysically normal103. During the endless 
repetition Phil comes to value the residents of Punxsutawney, those he will 
interact with every day, and with this value comes a purpose. It is in Phil’s self-
interest to promote that which he values and, where acting in such a manner 
would not require the sacrifice of a greater value, Phil has reason to act 
benevolently towards the people of Punxsutawney. 
 
Phil does not begin to view himself as a resource for all others as Kupfer suggests 
but rather recognises that life is a value and that within the confines of Groundhog 
Day he can act so as to promote that value, at little if any cost to himself. Nor, 
contrary to Kupfer’s claims  (2005, p.293), does Phil go out of his way to spare 
others the responsibility of being grateful to him. If anything Phil expects 
recognition for the sacrifices he makes as can be seen in the following case of the 
boy and the tree. 
                                                
103
 Though we might assume Phil would be far more likely to donate a few coins. 
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§11.5.2 Groundhog Day: The Boy and the Tree 
At some point Phil witnesses a boy fall from a tree (and presumably, as the boy 
falls headfirst, suffer serious injury). Recognising the value of life (within Phil’s 
hierarchy of values) and that by way of a trivial sacrifice (just being there at a 
certain time) he can save the boy from substantial injury, Phil takes it upon 
himself to be ready to catch the boy each time he falls from the tree. But Kupfer is 
wrong in assuming Phil is sacrificing himself for the good of the boy and wrong 
in assuming that Phil does not want recognition for his act. After Phil saves the 
boy the child runs off without pausing to thank him, to which Phil responds: 
You little brat, 
You have never thanked me. 
I’ll see you tomorrow… maybe. 
 
The indication is that Phil does expect gratitude and does expect recognition for 
his sacrifice, his taking the time (if a trivial cost) to be at the location where the 
boy has the accident rather than being elsewhere. Phil is not relegating himself to 
the position of a “resource for the benefit of others” (Kupfer, 2005, p. 293), rather 
he is prepared to sacrifice trivial values for greater values. That is, Phil values life 
just as he values other things and, on this occasion, promoting his greater value 
requires saving the boy.  
 
§11.5.3 Groundhog Day: The Value of Music 
Another clear illustration that Phil is acting to promote his own values and is not 
sacrificing himself on behalf of others is seen in his developing an appreciation of 
music. At some point (during the acceptance period) Phil hears music on the 
radio, perhaps really listening to the music for the first time, and decides to learn 
the piano. Beginning with no musical skill whatsoever, Phil develops into a first 
class pianist over the course of Groundhog Day.104  Phil appears to take pleasure 
from his musical ability and musical ability is awarded a significant place within 
Phil’s personal hierarchy of values.   
 
                                                
104
 We are not explicitly told why the cycle of Groundhog Days ends and there are numerous 
suggested reasons such as Rita falls in love with the new Phil, or he attains true happiness. 
However the original script was developed by a Zen Buddhist who suggested Phil was 
experiencing the 10,000 cycles (some 26 years) and that the cycle of Groundhog Days had a 
predetermined finishing point.   
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According to Kupfer (2005, p. 292): 
[Phil] comes to enjoy the activities for their own sake. The result is a life 
made meaningful by activity that is intrinsically valued. Piano playing, 
poetry reading, life saving – all are undertaken by Phil as ends in 
themselves. At the same time, Phil comes to value people for their own 
sake, not what they can provide him. 
 
Certainly Phil sees the piano playing as an end in itself; the promotion of 
something he values simply because he values it. Further, it might be claimed that 
certain music is intrinsically valuable within Phil’s specific worldview; the 
interesting aspect is the importance Phil places on this value. Each day Phil 
approaches the local piano teacher, who already has students booked on that day, 
and offers her $1000 dollars to teach him instead. The scheduled student (a young 
girl) is denied her lesson, escorted by the teacher to the door, and somewhat 
sulkily leaves the studio. The conclusion that Phil continues to bribe the teacher 
and to deny the student her scheduled lesson each and every occurrence of 
Groundhog Day can be drawn, firstly because of the time it would take to develop 
musical skill to such a degree and secondly because the piano teacher recognises 
Phil as her student on the final occurrence of Groundhog Day, which could only 
occur if Phil had bribed her for lessons on that specific occurrence (even though, 
by this point, Phil would have little need for lessons). 105  
 
In this context Phil clearly values people for what they can provide him. Phil 
places his value of music and musical ability sufficiently high within his own 
hierarchy of values that bribing the teacher and denying a young girl her piano 
lesson is not only justified but the recommended course of action for an ethical 
egoist. The young girl is denied thousands of piano lessons but only knowingly 
suffers the harm of being denied a single lesson.  Phil clearly does not see himself 
as a resource for the benefit of others, does not always go out of his way to spare 
the feelings of others, and where his personal values are of sufficient importance 
is prepared to use others in order to promote these values. In terms of the axioms 
of ethical egoism; 
 
                                                
105
 Rita, when outlining her perfect man, listed that he would play an instrument. However, Phil 
made no effort to learn an instrument when trying to trick Rita into a relationship and the decision 
to take lessons appears to be solely out of Phil’s self-interest. 
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(i) (Definition of Value)  
x  is a value to an agent if; 
(a) Promoting or holding x is most likely to lead to or bring about 
an agent’s flourishing, as a certain kind of being, relative to any 
rational worldview. 
or 
(b) Promoting or holding x is constitutive of what it is for an 
individual agent to flourish relative to that agent’s worldview. 
 
Musical ability becomes an important value for Phil to the extent that (i.b) musical 
ability is partly constitutive of what it is for Phil to flourish, relative to Phil’s 
worldview. 
 
(ii)  (Universal principle of Ethical Egoism)  
If 1 is of value to agentn relative to agentn’s worldview 
and 
If ing would promote agentn’s value 1 
and 
If ing would not require the sacrifice of something in which 
agentn instils greater value (2) 
then 
Acting so as to promote the value 1 provides agentn with strong 
moral reason to , and justification for ing. 
 
 
Piano playing becomes of great value to Phil and advancing his musical talent 
promotes this value. As I have previously noted, Phil comes to value the residents 
of Punxsutawney, however in this case the actual harm to the girl is relatively 
trivial (a missed lesson) and the likelihood of Phil facing any repercussion from 
causing this harm is extremely minor. Phil sacrifices respect for the girl and 
honesty. However, given the value Phil now places on musical ability together 
with the fact that he cannot take a lesson on a different day  (as no other days exist 
for Phil) not bribing the teacher would be a far greater sacrifice. Thus Phil has 
strong moral reason, and justification for bribing the piano teacher in order to 
promote the value he places in musical ability.  
 
It may seem odd to talk of bribery as being the correct moral action but we must 
remember the world Phil is inhabiting is anything but metaphysically normal and I 
maintain that in these circumstances, given the value placed on musical ability, 
Phil’s action is the moral one despite the harm done.  
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(iii) (Individual motivation for acting)  
If agentn believes that ethical egoism provides preferable reasons 
for acting then agentn will, in most cases, be motivated to act in 
accordance with (ii). 
 
Placing extremely high value upon his artistic outlet, Phil is motivated to bribe the 
teacher and deprive the girl of her piano lesson. Phil is not the sacrificial saint 
described by Kupfer. While on most occasions the promotion of Phil’s values will 
result in actions that are also for the good of others (e.g. the value Phil places on 
life, the rescue of the boy and his attempt to save the tramp) there will be 
occasions where those values require the use or sacrifice of others. 
 
§11.6 Phil and The Virtues of Flourishing-Egoism 
Phil progresses from an unhappy, selfish, consequentialist egoist to a happy, 
fulfilled, flourishing-egoist throughout the course of one extremely long day.  
Along the path he develops certain virtues, those that I have claimed are necessary 
if an agent is to have the greatest probability of flourishing.  
 
Phil has to adopt the virtue of honesty in order to flourish. Firstly, he must be 
honest with himself in accepting the bizarreness of his situation. Secondly, he is 
forced to be honest with himself and admit that the pursuit of immediate 
hedonistic pleasures doesn’t bring him happiness; an observation that might be 
missed under normal conditions as “in ordinary life, selfish pleasures can 
themselves conceal what is wrong with devoting oneself to their pursuit” (Kupfer, 
200, p. 293). Phil’s self-honesty culminates with the realization that he does not 
even like himself (GD, 53:00), an observation that opens the path to reinventing 
his character. Further, Phil’s real (or at least deeper) understanding of the world 
he inhabits only comes through being open and honest with Rita. His mistaken 
belief that he is an immortal God is modified and a clearer worldview developed 
only through honesty both with himself and with others. As Phil comes to value 
honesty it becomes a norm, a virtue adopted as part of his character, he is honest 
by default. This is not to say he is always honest, as can be seen in the example of 
the piano lessons; Phil has no problem in deceiving the piano teacher who 
believes she is giving Phil a single lesson for the $1000 where in fact she is 
providing him with thousands of lessons. Honesty is sacrificed in this instance 
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partly because the truth would not be accepted, partly because sacrificing the truth 
will do no great harm (the teacher will only ever know she has given a single 
lesson), and partly because to be honest would mean the total sacrifice of Phil’s 
musical ability (he will never have a single lesson, and he does not know that his 
Groundhog Day will at some point end). Thus, in this context, to be honest would 
require a greater sacrifice. 
 
I have already described acts of limited benevolence, such as Phil attempting to 
save the tramp, and claimed such acts were undertaken out of self-interest. Phil’s 
interest in the tramp comes about through the vast number of interactions he has 
had with him, because of his newfound values (and the recognition of life as an 
important value) and because Phil comes to see Groundhog Day as his day and he 
does not want someone to die on his day. We also see new acts of benevolence by 
Phil toward his television crew. He begins to bring them coffee and snacks prior 
to the early morning shoot (GD, 1:12:39). Partly this is done because he has 
adopted the virtue of limited benevolence, but again we clearly see partiality in 
play. Phil’s success depends on the quality of his weather broadcasts and these 
weather broadcasts depend not just on his talent but also on the talents of his 
producer and cameraman. By acting benevolently towards these specific others he 
increases the probability that they will work to the best of their ability which, in 
turn, makes Phil look good. But again I stress that these acts of benevolence are 
not calculated or undertaken purely to gain favourable outcomes; Phil acts 
benevolently because it increases the probability that he will flourish, but once 
adopted benevolence comes naturally. However, the emotional distance between 
the agent and the beneficiary tempers this benevolence. Other values are likely to 
be given preference where the beneficiary is metaphysically distant. 
 
During the course of Groundhog Day Phil also begins to value, and to take pride 
in, the work he does as a weatherman. We see Phil present the weather forecast 
many times and these reports progress from being sarcastic and uncaring to a final 
broadcast that is both moving and insightful. The change in the quality of Phil’s 
weather broadcast seems to reflect the adoption of the virtue of dedication (just as 
it is exhibited in Phil’s determination to master the piano). Phil shows dedication 
in taking time to research the material in his broadcast and in doing so greatly 
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improves the quality of the broadcast (and indirectly shows respect for both his 
audience and the people of Punxsutawney). Once again though, we see this 
respect is based in self-interest. For Phil to succeed as a weatherman requires that 
people enjoy his broadcasts. For people to like his broadcasts requires that Phil 
show respect both for the audience and the material and demonstrate that he 
understands the material he is presenting.106 Once again, this is not a 
consequentialist approach; it is only through the adoption of the virtue of 
dedication and respect for others that Phil is able to produce the quality of show 
that he does and in doing so gain the appreciation of his audience – virtues are not 
things that can be turned on and off at whim dependent on the likely outcome of 
expressing those virtues. 
 
§11.7 Conclusion 
At one point in Groundhog Day Phil attends a session of the movie Heidi II 
dressed in the costume of Clint Eastwood’s ‘Man With No Name’. Kupfer (2005, 
p. 288) interprets this as showing the distance between Phil (like the ‘Man With 
No Name’, a friendless stranger who would like nothing more than to escape 
Punxsutawney) and an ideal moral character steeped in love and friendship (as 
represented by Heidi107). How the scriptwriters or director intended this scene to 
be interpreted is unknown. All Rammis has to say on the reason Phil chooses to 
dress as the ‘Man with No Name’ is “because he can” (GD, Commentary, 40:35). 
However, like Kupfer, I place a great deal of significance in the scene if 
interpreting that significance differently. Eastwood’s character was a loner and his 
primary motivation was always self-interest but throughout the ‘Man with No 
Name’ trilogy we see time and time again that the character has a value system in 
place and that there are things that he will not do regardless of how they might 
benefit him. I believe the symbolism expressed in this scene indicates that an 
individual can act from a motivation of self-interest (the Eastwood character) and 
at the same time embrace the virtues expressed in Heidi (love and friendship). 
 
                                                
106
 By ‘succeed’ I mean to progress and perhaps gain employment with the networks, as he often 
indicates he desires. He is already succeeding, in as much as he works as a weatherman and his job 
is not under threat.  
107
 The movie Heidi II is fictional and presumably a play on the sequels to the Eastwood ‘Man 
With No Name’ movies A Fistful of Dollars, A Few Dollar More, and The Good, The Bad, and the 
Ugly. 
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In developing a set of values, derived out of self-interest, Phil finds the reasons to 
respect others, to be benevolent, to be honest, to be dedicated to his chosen career, 
and to appreciate fine arts. Rather than sacrificing himself to others as Kupfer 
suggests, Phil discovers a compelling reason to be moral, namely; that acting 
morally is in his self-interest.  
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Conclusion 
Out of Self-Interest  
The flourishing- or value-based egoism that I have been developing is a  
distant cousin to classical egoism. The simple consequentialist theory,  
that 'what an agent ought to do on any occasion is whatever would best promote  
his own interests', has been developed into the following nonconsequentialist 
universal principle of flourishing-egoism. If 1 is of value to agentn relative to 
agentn’s worldview and if ing would promote agentn’s value 1 and if ing 
would not require the sacrifice of something in which agentn instils greater value 
(2), then acting so as to promote the value 1 provides agentn with strong moral 
reason to , and justification for ing. 
 
This position is neo-Randian in as much as it requires an agent to act so as not  
to sacrifice a greater value for a lesser one. However, whereas the concept  
of 'value' is quite vague within Rand's work, I have analysed the notion of  
flourishing, commonly associated with virtue ethics, and used this as the basis  
for clarifying the concept of Value.  x  is a value to an agent if: (a) Promoting  
or holding x is most likely to lead to or bring about an agent’s flourishing, as a 
certain kind of being, relative to any rational worldview, or (b)  
x is constitutive of what it is for an individual agent to flourish relative to that 
agent’s worldview. 
 
I have claimed that for an agent to have the best chance of flourishing  
relative to any rational worldview the agent will necessarily value certain  
virtues and will adopt these virtues as part of the agent’s character. In this  
respect a value-based egoism is elevationist in nature. Living a good life and  
acting with (a very limited set of) virtues is ultimately in the agent's self- 
interest. However, value-based egoism also has a reductionist element. The Good  
is reduced to an individual agent's flourishing and an individual agent's  
flourishing involves the promotion of that which the specific agent values. 
 
For the most part value-based egoism promotes a course of action similar to that 
of the other moral theories; the egoist is compelled to save the drowning child, to  
share resources, and to not steal a friend's wallet. However,  
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egoism will at times diverge dramatically from other-regarding theories in the 
recommended course of action. 'Phil and the Music Teacher' (§11.5.3) provide 
such an example; while virtue and rights-based theories would advise that Phil 
ought not to bribe the teacher this is the very course of action recommended by 
egoism. I am uncertain how moral intuitions will run in such a case but imagine 
there would be considerable disagreement about what the correct course of action 
should be. It is where the correct course of action is uncertain that we turn to 
moral theories for guidance, and query 'How ought I to act?'.  Flourishing-based 
egoism provides a clear and concise answer to this question. 
 
I have not attempted to show that any of the other moral theories are flawed, but 
only to demonstrate that flourishing-based egoism is a coherent, consistent, moral 
theory. If the agent
 
believes that ethical egoism provides preferable reasons for 
acting then the agent
 
will, in most cases, be motivated to act in accordance with 
the dictates of egoism. However, where the proponents of other theories have 
difficulty answering the question 'Why be moral?' and often conflate the question 
with ‘Why be moral rather than act out of self-interest?’, the egoist can provide a 
very definite answer; you ought to be moral because being moral is in an agent's 
self-interest. 
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